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ABSTRACT 
Brittany Rose Lehman: Teaching Migrant Children: Debates, Policies, and Practices in West 
Germany and Europe, 1949–1992 
“Under the direction of Karen Hagemann and Konrad Jarausch” 
In theory, based on the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, all children have the right to education. Yet, what that right entails is still 
contested, particularly for ostensibly temporary residents. This dissertation uses an 
interdisciplinary and transnational approach combining history and education research as well as 
drawing on political science to examine the debates on and policies towards  the education of 
migrant children in the Federal Republic of Germany between its founding in 1949 and the 
signing of Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, with a focus on children with Italian, Greek, and 
Turkish citizenship in the states of Baden-Württemberg, West Berlin, and North Rhine-
Westphalia. Through these case studies, the dissertation examines not only the changing debates 
and policies of federal and state governments responsible for the implementation of education 
policies. It also analyzes how the migrants’ countries of citizenship attempted to influence their 
schooling abroad, the role the European Community played, and the influence of children’s 
parents. Examining 40 years of regional, national, and transnational debates and policies within 
their changing historic context, this study demonstrates how different integrative or exclusionary 
school initiatives were developed and their impact on different groups of migrant children. It 
argues that given incompatible state interests and the arrival of continually new waves of 
migrants, there cannot be a single, perfect answer, but that even imperfect solutions are better 
than none. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 1964, the Kölnische Rundschau, a local West German paper published in 
Cologne, ran an article titled “Bambini Want to Learn in German Schools.” The article described 
how migrant children with Italian citizenship in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) hoped to attend 
West German schools. These little bambini planned to live in West Germany. In consequence, 
they needed to attend local schools and learn to participate in North Rhine-Westphalian society 
and in the work force. But, the children and their families also wanted to maintain connections to 
their heritage. In order to have a touch of home, the newspaper reported, the children also hoped 
to take classes in Italian language and culture.1 
Although the West German press would not frequently use the word “multicultural” until 
the 1980s, that was what the news article was describing. German multiculturalism was, 
however, distinct from the American, British, or French versions. In those states, legacies of 
colonialism and specific histories of migration had led to citizenship laws permitting some 
migrants or their children to naturalize. In contrast, West German citizenship law, based on jus 
sanguinis (right of blood), stipulated that only individuals with German ancestry could be 
“German.”2 As such, regardless of migrant families plans to stay or emigrate, they and their 
children would remain legal foreigners. Nonetheless, active participants in society, many of these 
                                                
1 “Bambini möchten in den deutschen Schulen lernen: Italiens Generalkonsul Dr. Bocchetto über seine Pläne,” 
Kölnische Rundschau, February 25, 1964. 
2 Douglas B. Klusmeyer, “Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens: The Politics of Inclusion in the Federal Republic of 
Germany,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 81–114; Douglas B. Klusmeyer and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, 
Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2009). 
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children would grow up identifying themselves as part of both Germany and Italy. That 
difference frequently encouraged the development of diasporaic communities. German society 
adopted the so-called “mixed salad” multiculturalism as opposed to a “melting pot.”3 
In this dissertation I trace how the Federal Republic of Germany became a multicultural 
country through the development of West German public school programs for migrant children 
between 1949, when the state was founded, and 1992 with the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht and changes to Germany’s citizenship laws.4 During that period, West Germany 
became home to several waves of migrants. The FRG first absorbed thousands of migrants who 
had arrived in the country during the Second World War or shortly thereafter. Labor migrants 
from across the Mediterranean (from countries such as Italy, Greece, and Turkey) followed, the 
majority between 1962 and 1973. During that period the families of many so-called guest 
workers joined them in West Germany. After 1973, migration to West Germany was 
predominately family migration.5 During the 1980s, increasing numbers of asylum seekers, 
                                                
3 Maria Balinska, “Melting Pot or Tossed Salad? Increasing Racial and Ethnic Diversity Fuels Debate Over 
Integration in British Schools,” Christian Science Monitor, May 4, 1989. 
4 This dissertation focuses on the Federal Republic through unification, but does not talk about the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) at any length. As discussed in Chapter 8, the reason behind that decision was the 
GDR’s relatively small population of young “foreigners.” Although the GDR did support a guest worker population 
and actively recruit from Vietnam and other good, communist states, the East German government also included 
provisions against children and pregnancy in their contracts. Furthermore, for those children who did live in the 
country, there were very few special programs for schools. See Jan Behrends, Fremde und Fremd-Sein in der DDR: 
zu historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland (Berlin: Metropol, 2003). 
5 The so-called guest-worker groups included workers, and to some extent their families, from countries with which 
West German had signed bilateral labor agreements. Discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  
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predominately from Eastern Europe, joined other migrant groups.6 With each new group, the 
West German government had to decide how much these groups should integrate.7  
Analyzing the changing and contested debate on how best to educate children with 
foreign citizenship and the school policies implemented in West Germany, this project explores 
four main questions: First, upon arrival, what rights different migrant groups had to education 
and whether their citizenship status influence the realization of their supposed rights? Second, 
how did the state actors involved, from regional and national governments to supranational 
institutions, debate schooling for migrant children? Third, how these different actors tried to 
ensure those rights through policy and programs? Fourth, where any of those policies and school 
initiatives implemented over the forty years under examination successful? These questions 
emphasize which education policies were implemented in West Germany, how these policies 
shifted, and which factors influenced those changes.  
For the West German Federal and Länder (state) governments, schools played a central 
role in debates on integration and cultural maintenance.8 For many of the families and state 
actors involved, schools were the space in which children learned to be good citizens as well as 
to actively participate in the work force. It was in the public schools, after all, that teachers 
                                                
6 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland, 1880 bis 1980: Saisonarbeiter, 
Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz, 1986); Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, 
Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 
1999). 
7 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland; Klaus J. Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3rd ed. (Hannover: Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1994); 
Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven; Rita Chin, The 
Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
8 In West Germany, culture and education fell under state jurisdiction and not federal. The European Union was a 
reorganization and expansion of the European Community, which was established in the 1950s. The new EU 
included 28 Eastern- and Western European states (Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2005), 713–720; Konrad H. Jarausch, Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth 
Century (Princeton University Press, 2015), 520–525). 
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taught children what the family was supposed to look like and what voting was, alongside basic 
literacy in the host country’s state language. As such, schools were central to a migrants’ ability 
to fully integrate.  
The 1964 Kölnische Rundschau article from the opening paragraph described early 
efforts to develop school programs that permitted both integration and cultural maintenance. The 
article’s author informed readers about how the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education 
and the Italian Consulate in Cologne were collaborating to make simultaneous cultural 
maintenance and integration possible. The Consul and representatives from the NRW Ministry of 
Education had already begun offering consular instruction. The Italian Consul now envisioned 
the inclusion of children with Italian citizenship in the state school system. The state Ministry of 
Education, the article continued, was considering that request, weighing the children’s right to 
education and debating whether the Ministry should change their school laws to include all 
children, or only West German citizens.9  
Legally, in an age of human rights, every school age child from these groups of migrants 
had the right to education.10 What form that education should take was rarely clear. The West 
German Länder had to decide what, exactly, that right meant for the different groups. Yet each 
government in Europe, including the West German Federal and Länder governments, 
differentiated between their citizens and minority or foreign children.11 After all, despite each 
                                                
9 “Bambini möchten in den deutschen Schulen lernen: Italiens Generalkonsul Dr. Bocchetto über seine Pläne.” 
10 According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
December 1948, all children have the right to education. 
11 Because West German citizenship law during this period was primarily based on jus sanguinis, several groups of 
non-citizens, by the 1980s, would argue with increasing voracity that they were not in fact foreign despite 
possessing non-German citizenship. In consequence, this study tries to acknowledge their preferred self-
identification and differentiate between groups who themselves migrated and minority groups with non-German 
citizenship. Nonetheless, readers should be aware that West German officials frequently treated these groups apiece, 
simply calling them all “foreigners.” 
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child technically having a right to education, migrants without citizenship or foreign citizenship 
had different legal rights than local citizens in most European states. In addition, many minority 
groups and the governments of the countries of citizenship emphasized cultural diversity, 
demanding recognition of cultural and/or religious differences. These states argued that 
compulsory schooling should reflect citizenship status.12 Others claimed that the children needed 
to be treated exactly the same in order to be equal. Each actor defined and challenged the 
meaning of equality and how a child’s rights should be realized, disputing whatever local 
practice might be. 
Discussing the concept of equality, it is necessary to address issues of discrimination and 
racism. Within discussions on schooling, West German Ministries of Education and society at 
large were very careful to avoid the appearance of racism. Seeking to move beyond the legacy of 
the Third Reich, the West German government included prohibitions against discrimination in its 
new Basic Law (Grundgesetz).13 Many individuals across the political spectrum argued that they 
had moved beyond the Third Reich’s scientific racism. What politicians and scholars in the 
Federal Republic did acknowledge was xenophobia and culturalism. The problem here is that 
many individuals in Germany assumed (and continue to assume) cultural differences based on 
physical attributes. Within broad definitions of the word, that is exactly what racism is. In short, 
                                                
12 I use the phrase “country of citizenship” instead of “sending country” or “country of origin” because of the 
different migrant and minority groups’ changing relationship to the relevant state government. Migrants moving 
from a country with a bilateral labor agreement could consider themselves “sent,” but a refugee flees. In turn, an 
individual who migrates comes from a country of origin. An individual with foreign citizenship born in the “host” 
country, however, originates from within that “host.” See David Bartram, Maritsa Poros, and Pierre Monforte, Key 
Concepts in Migration (SAGE, 2014), 23–40. 
13 A. Dirk Moses, “The Fate of Blacks and Jews: A Response to Jeffrey Herf,” Journal of Genocide Research 10, 
no. 2 (June 2008): 269–87; Tina Campt, Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and 
Memory in the Third Reich (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2004). The West German Basic Law from 1949 is 
the West German constitution. The Basic Law was supposed to be temporary, provision until unification and the 
creation of a more permanent constitution thereafter. The course of history did not meet the original authors’ 
expectations and the Basic Law would be upheld after unification in 1990. 
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although the expression of racism is different in Germany than in England or the United States, it 
is still a problem that influences children’s acceptance in mainstream society and chances in the 
schools.14  
Depending on where a migrant children or children of migrants lived, they experienced 
different levels of acceptance or discrimination had different access to schooling. Because 
education policy fell under Länder jurisdiction in West Germany, each individual Länder 
government had to decide how to respond to international voices even as they debated what right 
migrant children had to what kind of education. In consequence, foreign governments had to 
negotiate individually with the eleven Länder Education Administrations.15 Coalitions of the four 
(five after 1980) major parties controlled the Länder governments, influencing how regional 
Education Administrations approached both migration and education. Those parties included the 
conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria 
(CSU), which frequently supported educational advancement based on merit and, in the late 
1970s, officially pushed return migration.16 The Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Liberal 
                                                
14 George M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Rita C-K Chin et 
al., eds., After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2009). 
15 Each of the Länder and West Berlin had their own Ministries or Senate Departments for Education. These 
Ministries or Senate Departments changed names frequently over the more than four decades this project covers. For 
example, in Baden-Württemberg, the Ministry of Education is currently the Ministerium für Kultus, Jugend und 
Sport Baden-Württemberg. The Ministry’s name is currently abbreviated Kultusministerium, which was the 
Ministry’s official name until 1978. In contrast, since 1995, North Rhine Westphalia’s Ministry of Education has 
been the Ministerium für Schule und Weiterbildung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, but was the Kultusministerium 
Nordrhein-Westfalen from 1946 to 1995. Berlin’s Senate Department for Education is the Senatsverwaltung für 
Bildung, Jugend und Wissenschaft, but was the Senat für Bildung, Jugend und Sport from 1981-2006, the Senat für 
Schulwesen from 1963 to 1981, and Senator für Volksbildung from 1949 to 1963. Because I am only discussing the 
portion of those Ministries and Senate Departments discussing education, I refer them as Education Administrations 
when referring to all or multiple of the West German Länder Ministries or Senate Departments of Education. 
Referring to individual departments, I use either Education Administration or Ministry of Education or Senate for 
Education when relevant.  
16 There were multiple members of both parties that actively disagreed with that stance, including several Ministers 
of Education. For a discussion of the major German political parties and their stances on migration, see Klaudia 
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Party (FDP), and the Green Party (since 1980), in contrast, often advocated measures supporting 
integration and equality of opportunity.17 In addition, and frequently more importantly, local 
economic and social conditions as well as legal and scholastic traditions also influenced each 
Länder government. In consequence, the different Länder frequently took divergent stances on 
how education policy for migrant and/or minority children should be shaped that changed 
drastically over the years.  
Acknowledging those differences, this project combines an analysis of international and 
national debates on the education of migrant children with the study of regional policies and 
local practices in West Germany with examples drawn from Baden-Württemberg, West Berlin, 
and North Rhine-Westphalia. These three Länder Ministries of Education often led the 
conversation about developing school programs and, with some of the largest populations of 
non-citizens, were usually early adopters. Furthermore, their internal differences highlight the 
influence regional differences could have on program development and the extreme variations of 
policy implementation. In Baden-Württemberg, under a Christian Democratic government, the 
Ministry of Education usually argued for migrant integration, claiming that the state was 
responsible for ensuring equality of opportunity for all children. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry 
of Education’s official policy stipulated that it was the countries of citizenship that were 
responsible for any extra cultural initiatives for foreign citizens. In contrast, North Rhine-
Westphalia, usually controlled by a Social Democratic-Liberal (SPD-FDP) government, initially 
argued for mother language and cultural programs at the expense of integration. West Berlin’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien: Akzeptanz und Abwehr von Migranten im Widerstreit in der 
Programmatik von SPD, FDP, den Grünen und CDU/CSU (Berlin: LIT, 2008). 
17 It should be noted that when discussing ‘liberal’ in scholarship based on German language materials, the term 
usually refers to individuals who identify with the Free Democratic Party (FDP) party and its ideology.  
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Senate for Education, governed by vacillating party coalitions, meanwhile, only became involved 
in the debate in the 1970s when its own migrant population of foreign citizens took off. At that 
point, the local Senate for Education built on programs for integration and cultural maintenance 
already in place.  
Despite differences, the Länder Ministries of Education frequently tried to coordinate 
their policies and collaborate on the federal level through the Standing Conference of Länder 
Ministers of Education (the Kultusministerkonferenz, or KMK). Even then, however, regional 
interpretations shaped regional implementation of the KMK’s recommendations. Within and 
among each other, the different Länder governments debated the following three points: first, 
whether migrant children with foreign citizenship should fall under compulsory schooling laws; 
Second, if they could receive state support for their integration; and third if the children were 
entitled to cultural or mother language classes within the parameters of the normal school day.18  
Alongside internal politics and economic developments, the international communities 
and country of citizenship governments also influenced Länder policy. Demonstrating their 
impact, I compare the Italian, Greek, and Turkish governments’ efforts to shape the education of 
their citizens in West Germany and look at how the Council of Europe and European 
Community tried to guide and standardize school development. Where the Italian Government 
declared in the late 1950s that its citizens were now mostly permanent West German residents, 
the Greek Government announced in the early 1960s that its citizens would all return to Greece. 
In contrast, Turkey focused first on general literacy, before, as of the early-1970s, avidly 
                                                
18 The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Ständigen Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), commonly 
called the Kultusministerkonferenz or KMK, was founded in 1948. Christoph Führ, “Zur Koordination der 
Bildungspolitik durch Bund und Länder,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, 
ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 71–74. 
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advocating cultural and language instruction. Added to their different assumptions regarding the 
permanence of their citizens’ migration, these three states also viewed schooling differently, their 
own laws demanding specific kinds of educational competencies in subjects like math and 
language. Furthermore, their internal finances and relative stability influenced their advocacy 
abroad. While the Italian and Greek governments were willing to pay for cultural classes, the 
Turkish government did not have the financial capacity to do so until the 1970s.  
Both host county and country of origin interest in the issue of education for migrant 
groups meant that the issue was an international and European wide concern. To guide and 
standardize programs and development, thereby promoting cultural compatibility and preserve 
children’s rights, supranational organizations like the Council of Europe (founded in 1949 to 
promote human rights and European cooperation) became involved in the question in the 1950s. 
The Council of Europe was enormously influential as individual state governments struggled to, 
at the least, not be viewed as lagging behind their fellow Member States.19 Likewise, once the 
European Community became involved in education in the 1970s, its members also tried to 
shape national policies and advocate specific best practices. Both supranational organizations 
tried to overcome by pushing measures such as degree equivalency and foreign language 
acquisition across the entire European continent.20 Each of these levels of international and 
                                                
19 The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 as an early effort to develop an international organization through 
which the different European states could cooperate and avoid another World War. Toward that end, the body “to 
protect human rights, democracy and the rule of law” (Council of Europe, “The Council of Europe in Brief - Who 
We Are,” Council of Europe, 2015, http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us.). The group currently includes 47 
members, 28 of which are European Union Member States. The Council of Europe is discussed in Chapter 1.  
20 Bartram, Poros, and Monforte, Key Concepts in Migration, 23–40. 
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supranational efforts had a role in shaping West German education policy toward children with 
foreign citizenship.21  
This project argues that the multiple layers involved in addressing the question of 
education for migrant school age children was part of the problem with finding a solution. Each 
of the local, national, and supranational actors involved had their rights, their ideals, and their 
proposed solutions. The changing meaning of citizenship, education and social equality, varying 
economic resources, and the transformation of the labor market all influenced education policy. 
Furthermore, while policies were frequently well-meaning, lack of financial and material 
resources or personnel often prevented full implementation. Further complicating the issue was 
the tension between individual rights and collective minority rights.22 Each individual migrant 
wanted a different balance of integration or cultural rights. Policies addressing large groups only 
benefit some individuals, usually the ethno-national majority within the migrant group or even 
the West German ethno-national majority.  
Migration in Post-1945 Germany  
Directly influencing the development of education policy for children with non-German 
citizenship in West Germany was who counted as “migrant” or “foreign.” In 1949, the newly 
implemented West German Basic Law tied citizenship explicitly to German ethnicity (jus 
sanguinis). Most of the other European states implemented citizenship laws based on place of 
birth (jus soli), often because of their colonial relationships, perception of diaspora, and official 
histories of multi- or monoethnicism. In contrast, the Federal Republic, the founding fathers and 
                                                
21 Gisella Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). See also 
European Commission and Luce Pépin, The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe 
in the Making - an Example (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006). 
22 Holly Cullen, “Education Rights or Minority Rights?,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 7, no. 
2 (August 1, 1993): 143–77. 
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mothers decided to maintain laws dictating that only individuals with ethnic German heritage 
could claim citizenship, following the letter of the Prussian and National Socialists' laws.23 Post-
war reconstruction combined with the Cold War tensions between East and West Germany 
meant that it was politically expedient to tie citizenship to paternity. In consequence, through 
West Germany’s first forty years of history, children part of non-German groups migrating to or 
born in West Germany had few options for becoming legally German, regardless of preference. 
As non-citizens, their rights, including the right to education, depended on whether they had 
citizenship to another country or were stateless. If they did have citizenship, then their rights 
were conditional on the various bilateral and international agreements involving the relevant 
state governments.   
Those citizenship laws reflected (and were part of) West German politicians and society’s 
fallacious depiction of Germany as monoethnic.24 As part of the post-1945 efforts at 
reconstruction and an emphasis on supposed normalization, the Federal Republic’s government 
downplayed the place of minorities and immigration in German society and culture. Instead, the 
first two Federal Governments, coalitions of Christian Democratic and Christian Social Unions 
with the Liberal Party (CDU/CSU-FDP) under Christian Democratic Chancellors Konrad 
Adenauer and then Ludwig Erhard, stressed economic reform and rehabilitation of the country’s 
international reputation alongside trying to stabilize local infrastructure like the school system. 
                                                
23 Klusmeyer, “Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens.” For information on the connection in Germany between its 
colonies and citizenship, see Lora Wildenthal, German Women for Empire, 1884-1945 (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2001), 79–130. School laws had not been unified under the Kaiserreich or under the Weimar 
Republic although the different territorial units within those polities would develop agreements regarding basic 
standardization in order to promote equivalency.  
24 Social scientist Karen Schönwälder’s 2001 book showed how the self-image of the British and West German 
states regarding welfare and inclusion influenced the reception of migrants and the extension of rights, arguing the 
FRG’s self-perception as a homogenous nation negatively influenced its willingness to extend social services or 
citizenship (Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in 
Grossbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren (Essen: Klartext, 2001)). 
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Furthermore, the largest migrant groups who stayed in West Germany after the war were 
returning ethnic Germans, whose entry fit into the political narrative of Germany as a welcoming 
home for Germans.25 Connected to a history of high rates of emigration, West German 
politicians viewed almost anyone not part of the loosely defined German ethnicity as foreign. 26  
Nonetheless, part of the West Germany government’s efforts to rehabilitate its 
international reputation in the postwar era involved trying to demonstrate its willingness to treat 
non-ethnic nationals well. In light of the recent past, West Germany’s Basic Law laid out the 
most liberal asylum laws of any European state. In addition, the West German government 
became party to the Council of Europe’s 1950 European Convention on Human Rights. With 
that Convention, Member States sought to safeguard human rights for all individuals, including 
displaced persons, stateless individuals, refugees, and asylum seekers. For the West German 
government, signing on was not entirely voluntary, but partially required by international 
oversight. For example, in 1950, the Allied High Command dictated that the West German state 
was responsible for ensuring the equal treatment – including schooling – for all displaced 
persons and refugees living in West Germany.27  
                                                
25 To read more on the “ethnic German” expellees, see Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl; Rainer Schulze, Reinhard 
Rohde, and Rainer Voss, eds., Zwischen Heimat und Zuhause: Deutsche Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in (West-) 
Deutschland 1945-2000 (Osnabrück: Secolo, 2001). 
26 Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 197–244. In addition, for a discussion of the development of German citizenship 
law through the Nuremberg laws, see Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: die Nationalisierung der 
Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2001).  
27 Yutaka Arai and Pieter van Dijk, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th ed. 
(Antwerpen: Gaunt Inc., 2006), 2–8. Until 1955, West Germany did not obtain full sovereignty when the Americans, 
British, and French ended the military occupation. For information on Konrad Adenauer’s efforts to achieve 
sovereignty and NATO membership, see Thomas W. Maulucci, Adenauer’s Foreign Office: West German 
Diplomacy in the Shadow of the Third Reich (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2012), 213. 
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With West German statesmen and women still depicting the county as monoethnic, the 
booming economy in the 1950s and 1960s led West Germany to become home to more than a 
million non-German citizens at the request of the state. West Germany signed guest worker 
agreements with Italy in 1955, Greece and Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, 
Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968. Under the guest worker programs, 
West German employers “invited” migrant workers (one in three of whom were women) and 
their families from these countries to live and work in West Germany.28 Wanting to break with 
the memory of forced labor used during the Second World War and demonstrate a changed 
attitude from the past, the West German government made sure to at least verbally acknowledge 
the migrants' right to dignity. The Länder governments did so in part through offering some 
social care, including access to public schools.29 Yet despite the clear establishment of small 
diasporic communities, the Federal Government officially claimed that these immigrant groups 
were supposed to leave after only two years.  
In the mid- and late 1960s claims regarding the impermanence of these minority 
communities was belied by the clearly established, decade-long residence of some non-German 
citizens. That obvious trend towards stability gave increased relevance to the ongoing question of 
integration versus cultural maintenance and the position of these non-nationals under political 
and eventually public scrutiny. Public schooling, as a site both of contact and social 
                                                
28 For a discussion of these contracts and the impetus for signing them, see Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, “Guest 
Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 until Its 
Halt in 1973,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 187–218; Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany; 
Johannes-Dieter Steinert, “Migration and Migration Policy: West Germany and the Recruitment of Foreign Labour, 
1945–61,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 9–27. For a discussion of female guest 
workers, see Monika Mattes, “Gastarbeiterinnen” in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und 
Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005). 
29 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland. 
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indoctrination served as a central point of question on techniques for integration. The push in the 
1960s to reform education across Europe in order to promote equality of opportunity lent 
additional weight to the debate on schooling for non-nationals. With politicians, educators, and 
parents across West Germany decrying the discriminatory nature of the tripartite public school 
system (including Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium), those exploring to the question of 
education of migrant children asked how they were supposed to fit in.30 If the children attended 
school, it was usually only at the primary and lower secondary school (Hauptschule) level, which 
prepared schoolchildren solely for unskilled or semi-skilled labor. Only students completing one 
of the two upper level secondary certificates were likely to be allowed to train for skilled labor, 
and even then the division was stark. A Realschule certificate meant eligibility for training for 
skilled professions while a Gymnasium certificate permitted application to university.31  
As it became more and more evident during the 1960s that many labor migrants would 
stay in West Germany, some of those affiliated with the Social Democratic and Federal 
Democratic Parties promoted the idea of the Federal Republic as a country of immigration. 
While some government bodies, including the majority of the Länder Ministries of Education, 
agreed with that position, the Federal Government did not change its official position even after 
Willy Brandt became West Germany’s first Social Democratic Chancellor (1969-1974). In line 
with that reticence, early efforts in the West German parliament to reform citizenship law to 
                                                
30 The sociologist and SPD politician Ralf Dahrendorf, one of the most influential voices in this debate, elucidated 
for example, that despite being supposedly merit based, the tripartite secondary school system preferred male, urban 
Protestants from well-to-do families. Children who were female, Catholic, rural, or from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds only sometimes completed secondary education at all (Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Crisis in German 
Education,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47). 
31 There were and continue to be some exceptions to this rule. For a description of the West German school system, 
see Arthur Hearnden, Education, Culture, and Politics in West Germany (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976); Klaus 
von Dohnanyi, Education and Youth Employment in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: Carnegie Council 
on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1978); David Phillips, ed., Education in Germany: Tradition and Reform in 
Historical Context (New York: Routledge, 2013). 
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enable long-term foreign residents to naturalize largely failed. Foreign citizens, despite being 
recognized as belonging to permanent minority communities, remained legally and socially 
“foreign.”32  
The discourse on migration and the related policies changed dramatically after the 1973 
Oil Crisis that led to the first severe economic crisis in post-1945 Europe. No more “guest 
workers” were needed leading to a recruitment stop implemented in November 1973. 
Unintentionally, however, this and associated changes to residency laws prompted many foreign 
citizens already in West Germany to bring in even more family members. The fresh wave of 
migration, including thousands of children as well as “foreign” live births in the country, 
challenged the claim that West Germany was not a country of immigration. With one in ten 
schoolchildren entering the first grade legally a foreign citizen, the West German Federal 
Government and the ethno-national majority increasingly viewed the groups as established 
minorities and not temporary visitors. By the time Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt became 
Chancellor in 1976, the West German parliament, the Bundestag, was starting to discuss West 
Germany’s substantial and disparate minority groups as “foreign fellow residents” instead of 
solely “guest workers” and “foreigners” generally.33  
The development of the European Community further influenced the understanding of 
who counted as “foreign” and transformed the connections between citizenship, ethnicity, and 
migration with education. In the early 1970s, European Community policy increasingly extended 
to cultural and education rights as well as promoting economic opportunity. Hence, while not 
                                                
32 Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. For a brief discussion of 
the continued immigration of “ethnic Germans” into the FRG during the 1980s, see Klusmeyer, “Aliens, 
Immigrants, and Citizens,” 99. 
33 Stephen Castles, Heather Booth, and Tina Wallace, Here for Good: Western Europe’s New Ethnic Minorities 
(London: Pluto Press, 1984). 
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citizens, European Community Member State nationals had almost identical legal rights to local 
citizens anywhere within the European Community. When another economic recession hit in the 
late 1970s, West Germany and other Member States used the legal divide between them and 
Third County (non-EC) states to differentiate between children with varying levels of rights.34 
 The worldwide economic recession in the late 1970s and a second oil crisis in the late 
1970s/early 1980s contributed to a rise in xenophobia and the election of a CDU/CSU-FDP 
government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who was elected on the platform of “Germany for 
the Germans.” Already under Schmidt, the Federal and Länder governments had begun to cut 
and consolidate state programs for things like extra education courses for migrant children in an 
effort to trim state budgets. The Kohl government continued that trend, slashing funding for 
social expenditures, particularly for groups like minorities or foreign nationals.35 The Federal and 
the Länder governments also tried to push non-citizens to leave and attempted to discourage new 
migration by limiting access to work or residency permits. Attempts to further limit migration 
through family reunification was, however, partly stymied by the Christian democrats’ emphasis 
on family and the Supreme Court’s decision that prevention of nuclear family reunification 
violated individual human rights.36  
By the end of the 1980s, however, the situation had against changed. The promotion of 
the upcoming expansion of the European Community and transformation into the European 
Union combined with the rise of local social activists promoting multiculturalism meant that the 
                                                
34 Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education; Ute Frevert, “How to Become a Good European Citizen,” in The 
Making of Citizens in Europe: New Perspectives on Citizenship Education, ed. Viola B. Georgi (Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008), 37–51. 
35 Jarausch and Geyer, Shattered Past, 213–220. 
36 Ute Knight and Wolfgang Kowalsky, Deutschland nur den Deutschen?: Die Ausländerfrage in Deutschland, 
Frankreich und den USA (Erlangen: Straube, 1991); Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in 
Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge (München: Beck, 2001). 
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Christian Democratic-Liberal Federal Government had to change its tune. Kohl began to vocally 
support multiculturalism, even as his government tried to further limit new migration. Even their 
efforts there, however, floundered as first border changes in the east and then multiple 
international crises led to an influx of both ethnic German foreign nationals and new asylum 
seekers.37  
In the context of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe (1989-1990) 
and the wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-2001) a flood of German national migrants and 
asylum seekers came to Germany even as it underwent unification. These new waves of migrants 
posed a challenge for German society and its institutions including the education system. 
Continued pressure from various West German political groups including the rising Green Party 
led the West German Parliament to finally approve changes to citizenship laws. New rules 
provided some avenues for established migrants to naturalize and also limited the connection 
between German ethnicity and citizenship. While local and international stipulations meant that 
the majority of West German minorities did not choose to apply for naturalization, the legal 
change was indicative of changing social perceptions. In the ethno-national majority’s eyes, the 
“foreigner” could now, at least partially, choose to be “German” and become part of an official 
“German minority” group.38  
From the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 to the signing of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992, education played a central role in the discussion of immigration and 
integration. Public schools were a primary site where schoolchildren learned to be good citizens 
                                                
37 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 263–285; Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe: From 
Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 1–37. 
38 Daniel Levy and Yfaat Weiss, eds., Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on 
Immigration (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002); Klusmeyer and Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
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and a part of local society. In consequence the education system is of central political importance 
as well as an ongoing concern. In the debate on the education of migrant children, language and 
literacy led directly into discussions of integration versus the maintenance of cultural ties to the 
home country and the question of eventual repatriation.39 Alleged support for return migration 
from both the countries of citizenship and host countries meant that all governments involved 
officially backed cultural and language instruction to prepare children for their return. If a child 
could not read in the home country's language, how were they supposed to find a job after 
repatriation? The provision of specific instructional classes then became a marker of a state’s 
political intentions and lingual fluency: a symbol of belonging.  
Historiography 
There is a rich scholarship exploring post-1945 European migration, education, and 
policy development that this project brings together and builds on. These bodies of scholarship 
are usually separate, but my project draws on each of them to examine the intersection between 
debates and practices. In so doing, the project connects the policies implemented with the various 
state actors’ goals influencing their development, looking at the process from conceptualization 
to evaluation.  
Historical scholarship on West German immigration encompasses both host country and 
migrant perspectives on the experience of immigration. Klaus Bade and Ulrich Herbert were 
among those who began an indepth examination of post-1945 immigration, focusing primarily 
on how the economic and cultural conditions of the FRG influenced migration patterns and 
                                                
39 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 8/1811: Antrag Der Abg. Hasinger, et Al. Und Der Fraktion Der CDU/CSU 
Betr.: Zukunftschancen Der Kinder Ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,” Verhandlungen Des Deutschen Bundestages 
(Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, May 17, 1978). 
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affected social acceptance.40 More recently, scholars have moved beyond emphasis on the host 
country, looking at international influence and migrant or minority group actions. Among them, 
studies by Karin Hunn and Roberto Sala have examined the role of the “sending countries” in 
affecting immigration policy and the experiences of immigrants and guest workers. These 
scholars have demonstrated how the countries of citizenship cultural and identity politics, 
emigration policies, and citizenship laws have influenced the rights and decisions of migrant – 
predominately labor – groups from specific places of origin (for Hunn and Sala, Turkey and Italy 
respectively). Researchers like Rita Chin, Alexander Clarkson, and Simon Goeke have built on 
that work, highlighting West German migrant and minority groups as actors through analysis of 
their political and cultural decisions.41 This scholarship emphasizes the emotional and pragmatic 
choices many migrant and minority individuals took based on their socio-political environment. 
Their work highlights the importance of the continued identification with the country of 
citizenship, but providing excellent analysis of specific cases do not demonstrate the 
complications engendered by the diversity of individual national identification.42  
The West German state was, however, only part of the mass migration in the post-1945 
era, as scholars in history as well as the social sciences have shown. Moving away from West 
Germany, scholars like Nermin Abadan-Unat compare immigration experiences across Europe, 
placing West Germany as a destination alongside other, predominately Central and Western 
                                                
40 Klaus J. Bade, “From Emigration to Immigration: The German Experience in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries,” Central European History 28, no. 4 (1995): 507–35; Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in 
Deutschland; Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. 
41 Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany; Alexander Clarkson, Fragmented Fatherland: 
Immigration and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1980 (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2013); Simon Goeke, “The Multinational Working Class? Political Activism and Labour Migration in West 
Germany During the 1960s and 1970s,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 160–82. 
42 Karin Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr kehren wir zurück--”: Die Geschichte der türkischen “Gastarbeiter” in der 
Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005); Roberto Sala, Fremde Worte: Medien für “Gastarbeiter” in der 
Bundesrepublik im Spannungsfeld von Außen- und Sozialpolitik (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2011). 
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European, states.43 Within the social sciences, there has been some consideration of international 
policy on the right to education for migrant labor, such as the Commission of the European 
Community’s own histories or Gisella Gori’s discussion of the European Union’s legislation, but 
these do not look at local implementation.44 Through an examination of West German school 
policies and practices, this project brings together two main lines of immigration historiography 
by examining the school system as a site of contestation for diverse state actors as well as the 
immigrant families and schoolchildren. 
Whereas historians of West German immigration concentrate on national trends and labor 
policy, educational researchers have explored the impact of diversity in the classroom. Cristina 
Allemann-Ghionda compares the attempts to accept diversity in a variety of European school 
systems.45 Looking directly at the composition of the West German schools, Leonie Herwartz-
Emden focused on the impact of heterogeneity and gender in the classroom on schoolchildren 
with migrant backgrounds.46 Examining the situation with an eye toward the present and a focus 
on the German schoolroom, this scholarship often overlooks special programs designed for 
foreign nationals. Scholars like Ingrid Gogolin, Ursula Neumann, and Lutz Reuter have looked at 
the issue as a right, but by focusing on law and high politics they have not explored the historical 
                                                
43 Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe. For a study on the Italian state’s efforts to shape its citizens identity from its 
founding through the Frist World War, see Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Harvard 
University Press, 2008). 
44 Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education; European Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European 
Cooperation. 
45 Cristina Allemann-Ghionda, Bildung für alle, Diversität und Inklusion: Internationale Perspektiven (Paderborn: 
Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh GmbH, 2013); and Cristina Allemann-Ghionda and Saskia Pfeiffer, eds., 
Bildungserfolg, Migration und Zweisprachigkeit: Perspektiven für Forschung und Entwicklung, 2nd ed. (Berlin: 
Frank & Timme GmbH, 2010). 
46 Leonie Herwartz-Emden, Aufwachsen in heterogenen Sozialisationskontexten: Zur Bedeutung einer 
geschlechtergerechten interkulturellen Pädagogik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010). 
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development of school programs.47 In order to understand the current debates in Europe and 
Germany regarding minority groups and their success in the education system, it is also 
necessary to consider the development of these school programs for “foreign” children both in 
regards to policy considerations and results. Multiple excellent studies on German migration in 
history and social science have generally focused on the narrative of the development of federal 
policies and have considered the actors influencing those policies. 
Theory, Methodology, Primary Sources, and Organization 
With its multi-perspective analysis this project is an interdisciplinary study that combines 
migration, legal and cultural history, and the history of education with discourse and policy 
analysis. Through its layered analysis, the project combines local, national, and international 
histories with a focus on transnational influences. First and foremost, however, this project is a 
history of migration. As Leslie Moch and Dirk Hoerder remind us, migration history is 
necessarily “transdisciplinary” in order to acknowledge the multiple actors and complex issues 
relating to population movements and transcultural interactions.48 It is migration history that 
brings together places of origin and destination, exploring different aspects of movement from 
causation to integration. This study focuses on the destination, emphasizing the multiple kinds of 
groups who migrate, looking at the actors involved in shaping their experiences, and exploring 
the willingness of the people in the place of residence to absorb the new arrivals.  
Migration histories frequently engage with the complex issue of citizenship as a central 
component of the question of belonging in the place of residence. Yet citizenship is not easy to 
                                                
47 Ingrid Gogolin, Ursula Neumann, and Lutz-Rainer Reuter, eds., Schulbildung für Kinder aus Minderheiten in 
Deutschland 1989-1999 (Munich: Waxmann, 2001).  
48 Christiane Harzig and Dirk Hoerder, eds., What Is Migration History? (Malden, MA: Polity, 2009), 84, 134; Dirk 
Hoerder and Leslie Page Moch, eds., European Migrants: Global and Local Perspectives (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1996).  
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define. As Dieter Gosewinkel lays out, on its surface, the concept of citizenship denotes 
membership to a political community and is frequently used as a legal category defining the 
relationship between an individual and a state.49 Citizenship often entails an obligation to the 
state, but also is supposed to guarantee an individual’s civil and political rights in exchange. The 
entire concept, however, is fraught with contention as different individuals are extended or 
denied different kinds of rights or even access to citizenship based on birth, gender, or heritage 
as scholars like Ruth Lister and Kathleen Canning have shown.50 Furthermore, as Yasemin 
Nuhoglu Soysal explains, in an age of supposedly global human rights, the meaning of 
citizenship has been further diluted as those rights once associated with the citizen are extended 
to humans generally (although not universally). Added to that, the development of supranational 
institutions like the European Union and the spread of dual- or multiple citizenship frequently 
means that an individual has membership to multiple polities, raising questions about loyalty and 
the meaning of each relationship.51 That transformation, however, takes place during the forty 
years of this study. Consequently, in this study, because of the peculiarities of West German 
citizenship law, citizenship is viewed as an amorphous concept frequently wielded by the ethno-
national majority as a tool for inclusion and exclusion, often used explicitly to discriminate 
between groups and deny or extend rights and privileges.52 
                                                
49 Dieter Gosewinkel, “Historical Reflections on Citizenship in Europe,” in The Making of Citizens in Europe: New 
Perspectives on Citizenship Education, ed. Viola B. Georgi (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008), 
31. 
50 Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 13–42; 
Kathleen Canning, “Class vs. Citizenship: Keywords in German Gender History,” Central European History 37, no. 
2 (2004): 225–44. 
51 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: 
University Of Chicago Press, 1995). 
52 Gosewinkel, “Historical Reflections on Citizenship in Europe,” 34. 
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In order to understand how citizenship and the concept of belonging are frequently 
utilized beyond the level of discourse, I turn to the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to 
shape my understanding of the social, cultural and political importance of education. Bourdieu 
argues that the school system is not only a place where basic skills are to be imparted, but also a 
kind of space in which one learns social behavior and accumulates “cultural capital.”53 He 
defines cultural capital as a non-economic resource in the form of knowledge, skills, and 
education that allows an individual to both navigate society and move beyond their socio-
economic background. This includes not just facts, but also styles of behavior. According to 
Bourdieu, the acquisition of cultural capital is a significant determining factor in children's 
success in schools and later in society and the work force. School is thus a vital space for the 
creation of social hierarchies in society, the inclusion and exclusion of social and ethnic groups 
in society and the creation of national identity. 
Closely related to the importance of the education system for the creation of social 
hierarchies and processes of inclusion and exclusion is its role in the definition of identity and 
citizenship. One main function of public schools, as John Dewey has argued, was and is to teach 
young nationals how to be good citizens. Children were and are indoctrinated with the state-
approved social and political capital. It is frequently in public schools that children learn 
everything from how to cross a street and the approved use of language alongside the role and 
form of the state as well as the responsibility of the citizen.54 But, as Abdelmalek Sayad shows in 
                                                
53 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, Die Illusion der Chancengleichheit: Untersuchungen zur Soziologie 
des Bildungswesens am Beispiel Frankreichs (Stuttgart: Klett, 1971); Umut Erel, “Migrating Cultural Capital: 
Bourdieu in Migration Studies,” Sociology 44, no. 4 (2010): 642–60. 
54 At the turn of the twentieth century, John Dewey showed how states require and fund public schools in order to 
teach children how to be good citizens. See John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Education (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005); Jürgen Oelkers and Heinz Rhyn, eds., Dewey and 
European Education: General Problems and Case Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). James 
van Horn Melton laid out the development of compulsory schooling in central Europe in his Absolutism and the 
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his work on migrant labor moving between Algeria and France, immigrant communities do not 
fit neatly into the national categories nation states and their school governments are aiming for. 
Instead, othering by the host community and continued ties to the “sending country” force these 
groups into a liminal space between both.55 Both Dewey and Sayad provide crucial insights for 
my own study, which help me to understand the different interests that informed the debates and 
the implemented education policies for migrant children in a more nuanced way.  
In order to understand the concepts of “identity” and “nationality” that were so central for 
all the relevant actors’ (who participated in these debates) goals and claims as well as the 
implementation of the policies in their complexity, I turn to Catherine Hall and other post-
colonial theorists. These scholars look not only at identity formation and “categories of 
difference” like class, gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality but also critical examine the national 
project itself.56 By considering the complex pressures existing in the conceptual space between 
the host and “sending countries,” these theorists examine the formation of subjective conceptions 
of identity for migrant groups located outside of the dominant political, economic, and social 
discourse of the home country. To engage with these negotiated spaces, my project analyzes 
multiple overlapping categories of difference (nationality, ethnicity, class, generation, and 
gender) rather than fixed or static conceptions of an “immigrant,” “foreign” or “German” 
identity.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). In it, he demonstrates how compulsory schooling developed in Europe with the intention of teaching 
school age children to become good subjects. Brian Puacca also demonstrates how public schooling was used to 
reform and shape citizenship and politics in post-1945 Germany in his Learning Democracy: Education Reform in 
West Germany, 1945-1965 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009). 
55 Abdelmalek Sayad, The Suffering of the Immigrant, trans. David Macey (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004). 
56 Catherine Hall and Sonya O Rose, eds., At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Nation and Imagination,” Studies in 
History 15, no. 2 (August 1999): 177–207.  
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Using these theories to create an interpretative framework, this project draws on primary 
sources from multiple archives and libraries across Germany and Europe. The main groups of 
primary material include five different source groups. The first set is the correspondence between 
West Germany’s Education Administrations (at both the federal and state levels) and the sending 
countries’ legations addressing the changing aims for integration as well as possible school 
programs for so-called foreign schoolchildren. These letters demonstrate the diverse state 
governments’ changing official stance and further show how they attempted to work together. 
The second group is made up of the protocols from the frequent conferences held between the 
Federal Republic and the migrants’ countries of origin, in which representatives debated policies 
regarding the education of foreign nationals in West Germany. These conferences provided a 
space in which officials from all of the countries involved – including countries of citizenship 
and host countries across Europe – to debate appropriate policies for the care (especially the 
education) of non-nationals. Adding to this international perspective, the project brings in the 
Council of Europe and European Community’s perspective through the third group. This 
includes reports and directives attempting to standardize and control the development of care for 
migrant communities, thereby acknowledging the influential role that the role the international 
community played.  
Looking specifically within West Germany, the fourth group focuses on the federal 
government’s reports as well as the protocols of the debates inside the West German as well as 
Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, and North-Rhine Westphalia’s parliaments. This group brings the 
international debates down to the regional level, showing how the West German federal and state 
governments understood the issue of migration and what responsibilities they viewed as accruing 
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to the state. It is here that party politics becomes evident as different Länder Members of 
Parliament (MPs) requested the relevant Ministry of Education explain itself or take action.  
In order to get a glimpse of the implementation and results of the programs designed, for 
my fifth source group, the project explores regional education administrations and school boards’ 
reports on school initiatives designed for children with migrant backgrounds. These documents 
provide an understanding of how teachers viewed these programs as well as provide insight into 
how teachers sent from the migrants’ countries of origin to teach language and culture in the 
Federal Republic fit into West German school systems. They further analyze the programs’ 
successes and failures, bringing in biased requests for more funding, program cuts, and demands 
for clarification. 
Placing these different sources in discussion, this study is organized chronologically in 
eight chapters. Chapter 1 “The Right to Education and the Schooling of Children of Displaced 
Persons, Exiles, and Refugees (1949–1959)” exmaines how the new Federal Republic and 
Länder governments addressed compulsory schooling laws for non-German citizens in the 
1950s. Chapters 2 “Compulsory Schooling and Extra Programs for the Children Guest Workers 
(1960-1966)” and Chapter 3 “Education Reform, Private Schools, and Plans for Return 
Migration (1962-1969)” carry those developments forward, looking in Chapter 2 first at the 
Italian Government’s request for mother language and cultural programs for foreign citizens and 
then in Chapter 3 at the Greek and Turkish governments’ demands regarding private schools. 57 
Chapter 4 “Rising Numbers of Migrant Schoolchildren, Equalizing Access to Education, and the 
Question of Success (1967-1974)” analyzes the efforts on the part of the Federal and Länder 
Education Administrations to extend equality of opportunity to all children and the substantial 
                                                
57 Heike Knortz, Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte: “Gastarbeiter” in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und 
Beschäftigungspolitik 1953-1973 (Köln: Böhlau, 2008). 
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hurdles they faced. Chapters 5 “Citizenship, Minority Rights, and the Question of Return (1973–
1981)” and chapter 6 “Equality in Education and Continuing Discrimination against Minority 
Children in the Schools (1976–1984)” explore the changing discourse and policies in the decade 
after 1971 Oil Crisis and the 1973 Recruitment Stop. Finally, Chapter 7 “From a Push for Return 
Migration to Multiculturalism (1982–1987)” and Chapter 8 “The Right to Education for Ethnic 
Germans, Asylum Seekers, and Foreign Nationals (1987-1992)” carry the analysis of the 
development further to early 1990s looking at how programs have been extended to 
schoolchildren in the post-guest worker era. 
The analysis of forty years of transnational debates in the education of migrant children 
and the implemented school policies demonstrate the importance of schools not only as a site 
where children learned basic skills, but also citizenship and identity. The study shows how 
schools were a contested space for implementing social goals and shaping children’s identities as 
locals and/or foreigners. Consequently, the supranational, state, and non-government actors 
involved continually shaped and revised school initiatives in their attempts to create an “ideal” 
citizen or guest. As each of the actors, from the Council of Europe to Baden-Württemberg’s 
Ministry of Education to Italian Parent Groups, each had different and sometimes contradictory 
goals, leading to the development of programs that often conflicted with one another. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND THE SCHOOLING OF CHILDREN 
OF DISPLACED PERSONS, EXILES AND REFUGEES (1949-1959) 
Between 1949 and 1950, hundreds of parents classified as Displaced Persons (DPs) tried 
to enroll their children in North Rhine-Westphalian schools.1 These parents hit an immediate 
hurdle, however, as their children did not fall under the purview of school laws. Using those 
laws, the local school administrations in NRW as elsewhere in the newly founded Federal 
Republic of Germany often turned these children away, on the grounds that they did not speak 
enough German or were not themselves ethnically German. School principals, unsure if non-
Germans were even allowed to attend public schools, wrote local school administrations, which 
in turn asked the Länder Education Administrations if non-German children should be allowed 
to attend public school. Already short-staffed and under-funded, the school principals wanted to 
know if they had to allow these non-nationals in their schools and what their education was 
supposed to entail.2  
Approaching the issue, the Länder Education Administrations looked to international 
trends and their own legal traditions. They wanted to avoid any suggestion that they were still 
                                                
1 Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf, 
August 25, 1950), NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW. 
2 For discussing the legal status of the children without German citizenship, I use the phrasing from the various 
Länder Education Administrations. These government ministries did not necessarily adhere to international norms 
and standards regarding wording, but used the terms they viewed as legally relevant. Hence, Displaced Persons were 
usually referred to as “homeless or stateless” individuals. According to the Federal Ministry for Displaced Persons, 
Refugees and War Victims, “homeless foreigners” were “foreign citizens or stateless individuals who, as of 30 June 
1950, came under the care of the High Commissioner for Refugees of the United Nations and had their residence in 
the Federal Republic or West Berlin” (Bundesminister für Vertriebene, “Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Kriegsgefangene, 
heimatlose Ausländer!: 1949-1952,” 1953, 9–11, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.Vertriebene; and 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” in \iStatistisches Jahrbuch für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1953), 31). 
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trapped in a Nazi mindset and thus tried to adhere to the new international norms and standards 
of the postwar era. In the early 1950s, that meant turning to the recently implemented United 
Nations and the Council of Europe’s Human Rights guidelines, which established education as a 
fundamental right. The West German Education Administrations would then carefully follow 
these norms and eventually contribute to the development of new norms and standards, 
particularly after the establishment of the European Community.  
At both the local, national, and international level, a central concern regarding schooling 
for non-citizens was how to reconcile education as a human right with public schooling as a tool 
for teaching citizenship. All children had to receive an education in order to have full access to 
their other rights. Furthermore, education was a positive right, meaning it had to be compulsory 
in order to ensure that children received it. Yet, public schools taught citizenship and belonging. 
Should, the various European Ministers of Education asked, non-citizens participate in the public 
system if it taught them to be other, particularly if their parents planned on returning to their 
places of origin?3 Would it be better to encourage ethno-national classes? It would not do, after 
all, to be accused of forcing non-national minority schoolchildren to assimilate. 
How the international community and West German Education Administrations 
answered those questions depended on exactly which groups they were discussing at any given 
moment. For both Europe and West Germany like other West European countries, the main 
groups under consideration in the early 1950s included “stateless and homeless children” 
(heimatlose und staatslose Kinder), mostly Displaced Persons, moving out of refugee camps five 
                                                
3 “Europe” as used in this study refers to the continent in its broader sense and includes those countries/states that 
either view themselves as “European” or have membership to an international European body (i.e. the Council of 
Europe). It is important to note that based on this definition, “Europe” includes the Republic of Turkey. This 
definition reflects the definition of “Europe” the West German Federal Government used in its official reports, 
statistics, etc.  
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years after the end of the war. It was these children, after all, who had an immediate need for as 
well as a clear entitlement to post-war Germany’s limited resources, on account of the atrocities 
of the immediate past. As the decade progressed, however, European and West German 
Ministries of Education would extend the same questions to political refugees, German expellees 
or returnees, and increasing numbers of spontaneous migrants and migrant workers from the 
Netherlands and other European states. These children had citizenship, but if all children had the 
right to education and West Germany wanted to maintain its friendships with its neighbors, then 
schooling was essential.4  
Establishing the Right to Education for Migrants across Europe 
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration Human 
Rights (UDHR) stipulating in Article 26: “Everyone has the right to education.” It continued 
“Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary 
education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally 
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.”5 Without 
literacy, after all, children – future citizens – would be unable to fully participate socially or 
politically.6 
                                                
4 During their discussions of “foreign children” generally in the 1950s, the Länder Education Administrations 
almost always meant “Displaced Persons,” homeless or stateless individuals, and refugees. That approach to the 
question of schooling for “foreign children” directly impacted the kinds of school programs the Länder Education 
Administrations developed and what their rights to education and cultural maintenance meant in practice. 
5 Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (General Assembly of the United Nations, “The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” December 10, 1948, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/; and Klaus 
Dieter Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law: Including a Systematic Analysis of 
Article 13 of the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006), 93). 
6 Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law, 11–16; Michael Haas, International Human 
Rights: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (New Yotk: Routledge, 2014), 80; and UNESCO, Education for All 
Global Monitoring Report 2006 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 135–145, http://www.unesco.org/. 
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The emphasis on “everyone,” however, did not preclude an implicit emphasis on 
nationality and citizenship with regards to these rights. Despite the inclusive language of the 
Universal Declaration, the governments involved in the United Nations – in the early powerwar 
years 51 nations – assumed that the country of citizenship was responsible for ensuring its 
citizens’ (not residents’) rights both locally and abroad. Citizenship status was thus central to an 
individual’s access to universal rights. That interpretation meant the system began to break down 
for migrants and was a hollow promise for stateless individuals. These individuals had no state 
power to advocate on their behalf. Recognizing the problem, various international communities, 
particularly the United Nations and the Council of Europe, claimed responsibility, first for 
stateless or homeless individuals and refugees and then for exiles, over the course of the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Addressing one group at a time, they defined and redefined a state 
government’s responsibility for its residents without local citizenship. As new groups crossed 
international borders either voluntarily or unwillingly, the various international communities and 
their members had to address the question of who was responsible for ensuring these groups’ 
fundamental rights and what those rights meant. 
One of the aims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the attempt to 
reorganize postwar societies after World War II and prevent the atrocities of this war from ever 
repeating themselves. Already in the last war period, international heads of state had tried to 
assess the causes of the war and methods for preventing a repetition.7 They had determined that 
the answer lay in creating the supranational institution that became the United Nations in order to 
                                                
7 In his Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999), Mark Mazower discusses the 
extremity of this devastation. See also Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2005), 63–100.  
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promote communication.8 In addition to that, however, those leaders felt that the pre-war 
emphasis on minority rights had, in part, been what led to the mass genocide. To prevent another 
genocide, new plans focused on the dignity of the individual instead of the minority. Every 
citizen was supposed to be equal, regardless of gender, socio-economic background, or ethnicity. 
Toward that end, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in late 1948, a list of fundamental rights for every individual that every state 
was supposed to guarantee its citizens.9  
In the immediate aftermath of the war, even before the Universal Declaration was 
published, the assumption of state responsibility for its citizens and nationals led the Allied 
Powers to implement a policy of ethnic homogenization across Europe. The conflict had 
devastated the continent and most resources – from food to teaching materials – were available 
only in limited quantities. In consequence, the relevant national government was supposed to 
ensure its citizens’ welfare by providing housing, food, and education. While some individuals, 
forcibly relocated during the war, voluntarily returned to their places of origin, others were 
shoved across state borders.10 Groups with uncertain or contested citizenship status often ended 
up in camps so that the international community could monitor and provide for them.  
                                                
8 After the First World War, some world leaders had, of course, already tried creating an international institution. 
Yet that body, the League of Nations, while accomplishing an impressive amount with limited resources, had been 
unable prevent the outbreak of the Second World War (Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” The 
American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (October 1, 2007): 1091–1117). 
9 For a discussion of the United Nations and developing a human rights regime, see Jean H. Quataert, Advocating 
Dignity: Human Rights Mobilizations in Global Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); and 
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
10 For example, in Czechoslovakia and other eastern European states, the populations and governments forced the 
ethnic German population to leave the country regardless of longevity or guilt (Benjamin Frommer, National 
Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); and Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, trans. Allison Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003), 204–216).  
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The International Refugee Organization (IRO), which was eventually folded into the 
United Nations, organized the care and education of those individuals – Displaced Persons (DPs) 
– who ended up in camps with no clear citizenship claims.11 The camps’ staffs processed the 
individuals who came through its doors, often sending them onward. Millions moved on, but 
hundreds of thousands remained in camps across Europe without clear destinations. As different 
groups of Displaced Persons’ stays extended from months to years, many groups in the camps 
either set up schools or had the camp administration arrange education programs. Many of these 
groups were taught by teachers drawn from within their own groups, who taught the language 
and curricula of the group and not of the country of residence.12 One example is the DP camp in 
Backnang near Stuttgart in in West Germany with a larger group of displaced persons form 
Poland. Here, a Polish-speaking teacher was selected to educate the children in the camp with 
funding from the International Refugee Organization. After being denigrated and treated as sub-
human by the Nazis, many of these groups felt that the maintenance of their cultural heritage was 
extremely important.13 
As the camps’ residencies turned from months into years, many of the camps’ 
administrations tried to incorporate the local curriculum into the camp schools. In theory, for 
example, the camps in North Rhine-Westphalia had schools that included intensive German 
language instruction in addition to an introduction to North Rhine-Westphalia’s curriculum. In 
practice, however, teachers were often in short supply and teaching materials were only 
                                                
11 For a discussion of the camps, including the treatment of youth, see Derek Holmgren, “‘Gateway to Freedom’: 
The Friedland Refugee Camp as Regulated Humanitarianism, 1945-1960” (University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, forthcoming). 
12 KMK, “Beschulung der Kinder heimatloser Ausländer in Württemberg-Baden,” Aktenvermerk (KMK, October 4, 
1950), B 304/2057/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
13 “Stoffverteilungsplan für die 3 ersten Jahrgänge der polnischen Lagerschulen 1952,” Abschrift (Munich, 1952), 
MK 62244, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv. 
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occasionally available. Consequently, despite International Refugee Organization funding, the 
schools were frequently only staffed by teachers from within the refugee or exile community. 
Children, in turn, often did not receive any instruction in the local language.14  
The camps were, however, only supposed to be a temporary measure, and the 
international community had to develop a more permanent solution. The issue was particularly 
pressing, as instead of depopulating many of the camps continued to receive new migrant groups, 
particularly as the Cold War began to heat up. Furthermore, five years after the end of the war, 
thousands of Displaced Persons (100,000 in West Germany alone) were still living in camps. The 
international community simply did not have the funding to continue caring for these DPs, 
refugees, and exiles indefinitely. With state governments across the world having to address the 
issue, the heads of state agreed to supplement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with 
the 1951 multilateral treaty on Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.15 The Convention 
stipulated that refugees who had fled before 1 January 1951 were entitled to state support in their 
country of residence. In short, the state governments who signed the convention agreed to 
expand their responsibilities beyond their own citizens to include refugees associated with the 
Second World War.  
                                                
14 KMK, “Beschulung der Kinder heimatloser Ausländer in Württemberg-Baden”; and KMK, “3. Forderungen des 
Verbandes polnischer Flüchtlingein Deutschland betreffend Errichtung polnischer Schulen in der Bundesrepublik,” 
Niederschrift (Wiesbaden: KMK, September 12, 1953), B 304/2057/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
15 The Federal Republic ratified the Convention in 1953, and it came into force in 1954 (Germany, Grundgesetz: Mit 
Menschenrechtskonvention, Verfahrensordnung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, Parteiengesetz, Untersuchungsausschussgesetz, Gesetz über den 
Petitionsausschuss, Vertrag über die Europäische Union, Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, 
Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union!; and Textausgabe mit ausführlichem Sachverzeichnis und einer 
Einführung, 42nd ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2011), 71–73). The time limit and geographic 
limitations were removed in the 1967 Protocol Relating the Status of Refugees (United Nations Refugee Agency, 
“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/). For a discussion of the 
Convention, see Andreas Zimmermann, ed., The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 
Protocol: A Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 37–115.  
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The broad guidelines defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees were, however, unclear about implementation and 
provided only limited oversight. To fill that gap, ten European states established the Council of 
Europe (CE) in May 1949 to address questions of human rights and refugees within a 
specifically European context. In the name of peace, the Council was supposed to promote 
cooperation between the European states in the areas of social and economic development – 
including the implementation of human rights.16 The idea was that if each of the European states 
and peoples could understand each other better, then they would be able to cooperate peacefully, 
thereby avoiding another World War and genocide. Yet, without the authority to create law, the 
Council focused predominately on the exchange of information and discussions of best practices, 
as well as on the creation of (small) programs to test and promote those practices.17 
Looking at war refugees and Cold War exiles, the Members of the Council of Europe, 
which had expanded to fourteen states by 1951 (Greece, Iceland, Turkey, and West Germany), 
decided that part of ensuring peace meant promoting cultural understanding. That goal 
necessitated a celebration of diversity in and among the various European societies. The Council 
Members assumed that countries of citizenship would keep a look out for their own ethno-
nationals, expecting them to step in or raise concerns if their citizens were mistreated. The 
Council acknowledged, however, that some individuals did not have state protection, such as 
exiles or refugees. To watch over these groups and those European nationals not represented in 
                                                
16 Established on 5 May 1949 by the Treaty of London. The original ten signatories included Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Turkey and Greece 
are both listed as founding members, but officially joined in 8 August 1949, while West Germany became a member 
almost a year later, on 30 July 1950.  
17 Part of the Council of Europe’s early work (1951) included supervision of a European fund for exiles 
administered by a specialized agency placed under the CE’s aegis (Council of Europe Bundestagary Assembly, 
“Creation of a European Cultural Fund for Exiles,” Recommendation 17, (December 8, 1951), 
http://assembly.coe.int/). 
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the Council, the Council members assembled a Special Committee in 1951.18 Without funding to 
actually assume full responsibility, however, the Council of Europe’s Committee took on the role 
of an advocacy group to pressure its member state governments into action.  
Combining its commitment to diversity in the name of peace and its role as an advocate 
for under-represented migrant groups, the Council of Europe pressed for the expansion of state 
responsibility beyond the United Nation’s Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. In 
particular, it focused on promoting diversity, as the Council pushed its member state 
governments to encourage cultural maintenance among its refugee and exile populations. For 
example, in 1952 the Council’s members decided that exiles – those from Eastern Europe – 
needed additional support. In a move motivated by Cold War politics, the Council declared that 
it “consider[ed] it most important that its proposals preserve among the exiles now in Western 
Europe their cultural inheritance and national civilizations.” The Council of Europe’s members 
agreed that measures encouraging the preservation of cultural inheritance for stateless persons, 
refugees, and exiles should be implemented “without delay.”19 Those measures for cultural 
maintenance included everything from supplemental cultural instruction to private schools – 
which either local groups or the state was supposed to fund.  
According to the Council of Europe’s members, education was a central component of 
preserving cultural inheritance, but it was also a fundamental human right. Expanding on the 
                                                
18 Special Committee to watch over the interests of European nationals not represented in the Council of Europe, see 
Council of Europe Bundestagary Assembly and Standing Committee, “Report on the Activity of the Standing 
Committee,” Progress Report, (May 5, 1951), http://assembly.coe.int/; and Council of Europe Bundestagary 
Assembly and Etienne de la vallee Poussin, “Work Carried Out by the Special Committee to Watch Over the 
Interests of European Nations Not Represented in the Council of Europe,” Communication, (August 7, 1953), 
http://assembly.coe.int/. 
19 Council of Europe Bundestagary Assembly, “Creation of a European Cultural Fund for Exiles,” Recommendation 
40, (September 27, 1952), http://assembly.coe.int/. Adopted by the Assembly during their the 24th Sitting, 27 
September 1952 (Council of Europe Bundestagary Assembly, “Creation of a European Cultureal Fund for Exiles,” 
Report, (May 22, 1954), http://assembly.coe.int/). 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Council of Europe’s European Convention of 
Human Rights, signed in November 1950 and effective in September 1953, established each 
individual child’s entitlement to an education – particularly at a primary school level.20 
According to the Council of Europe’s member states, all children needed to have access to state 
schools regardless of background. Yet, in saying exiles and refugees were also supposed 
maintain their cultural connections, both the United Nations and the Council of Europe implied 
that these groups needed to be treated differently. With its declaration, the Council of Europe’s 
members agreed that the local state was not only responsible for providing schooling for the 
Displaced Persons, refugees, and exiles living within local borders, but that that education should 
include cultural instruction. Instead of pushing homogeneity, the states were supposed to accept 
difference at the states’ expense. 
That emphasis on the connection between culture and citizenship featured heavily within 
the zeitgeist of the period. According to most of the European governments, school was, after all, 
the place where children learned to be citizens and thus a part of the local society. In France, for 
example, schoolchildren who went through the entire French school system were theoretically 
French.21 In West Germany, that direct connection between school and citizenship was weaker, 
because German law denied almost all non-nationals the option to naturalize, but a public 
education still taught German-ness and how to participate in German society and its labor 
                                                
20 Jean-Jacques Friboulet et al., eds., Measuring the Right to Education, trans. Joanna Bourke-Martignoni 
(Hamburg: Schulthess, 2006), 10. In the European Convention on Human Rights, see Article 2 of the first Protocol 
of 20 March 1952 (Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth Wicks, and Clare Ovey, Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)). 
21 Christina Allemann-Ghionda, “Contrasting Policies of All-Day Education: Preschools and Primary Schools in 
France and Italy since 1945,” in Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool, and Primary 
Education in Europe, ed. Karen Hagemann, Konrad Hugo Jarausch, and Christina Allemann-Ghionda (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2011), 196–219; and Raymond Grew, School, State, and Society: The Growth of Elementary 
Schooling in Nineteenth-Century France: A Quantitative Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). 
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market.22 In almost every West and Central European country migrants who voluntarily 
relocated needed to go through the system in order for the government to count them as locals, if 
they ever were at all. Refugees and exiles, as “forced migrants,” were supposedly not moving to 
become part of the local community, but to escape danger in their place of origin.23 As such, the 
Council Members felt that host countries should not add to these migrants’ trauma by forcing 
them to assimilate into the local community. Hence, children from these groups did not 
necessarily need to attend local schools. Taking it a step further, to promote understanding and 
accept exiles’ and refugees’ rights as minorities, the state government was supposed to at least 
support, if not outright offer, access to cultural and language instruction.  
Those declarations of state responsibility specifically for Displaced Persons, refugees, 
and exiles did not, however, include either foreign nationals who migrated voluntarily or asylum 
seekers. The international community continued to differentiate between those groups which had 
clear state governments to advocate on their behalf on the one hand and those who – arguably – 
chose to leave their countries of citizenship and live abroad. Asylum seekers, in contrast, 
frequently fell through the cracks as a different other whose categorization was left ambiguous 
by the international community. Clearly, these asylum seekers could not rely on their country of 
citizenship to advocate properly on their behalf, but they also had one – and they were often not 
expected to permanently relocate.  
Based on these assumptions of state responsibility, in the early 1950s, using the presumed 
connection between citizenship and rights, several countries choose to limit their school laws or 
                                                
22 Ulrike Popp, “Die sozialen Funktionen schulischer Bildung,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 
1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 2 vols., 6 (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1998), 265–76. 
23 Pertti Ahonen et al., eds., People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War 
and Its Aftermath, English ed (Oxford: Berg, 2008); and Atina Grossmann, Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close 
Encounters in Occupied Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
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refuse some schoolchildren with foreign citizenship entrance to public schools. All children had 
the right to education, technically, but the “everyone” in that phrasing was interpreted as citizens 
and nationals. Instead, the United Nations and Council of Europe would have to advocate on 
those non-nationals’ behalf, pushing inclusion under compulsory schooling laws and advocating 
for cultural instruction. Their advocacy, however, highlighted the perception of difference as 
they emphasized the right to a continued connection to cultural heritage beyond state residence.  
West Germany and Compulsory Schooling for Displaced Persons and Foreigners 
It was within this international framework that the North Rhine-Westphalian and other 
West German Ministries of Education responded to their school boards’ questions regarding the 
education of the “homeless children” (DPs) moving out of refugee camps. Where the 
international committee in the beginning of the 1950s was, however, almost entirely focused on 
stateless, refugee, and exile children, the local Ministries of Education in West Germany – like in 
North Rhine-Westphalia – had to also decide what public schooling for other migrant and 
established minority groups should entail. In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the question 
of schooling for Displaced Persons became intertwined with concerns about schooling for 
migrant ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and those of Dutch citizenship from the West. For 
each of these groups, citizenship status and a perceived need for assimilation was central in 
determining if a specific group should be allowed to attend public schools and what that 
schooling would encompass. 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulated that all children should be 
able to attend (at least) primary school and declared that schooling should be free and 
compulsory, but West Germany, like many members of the United Nations, interpreted that 
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wording as explicitly applying to citizens.24 Under the Third Reich (and previously under 
Prussian) law, compulsory schooling laws only included “German” children.25 The Nazi laws 
had also, however, established a standardized school system across the Reich where none had 
previously existed. In order to maintain some equivalency between the Länder instead of 
returning to the varied school systems existing during the Weimar Republic, in the 1940s the 
Ministries determined that it was “useful and practical” to continue implementing the Nazi 
laws.26 In establishing new laws in the late 1940s, the Ministries did remove direct references to 
the Nazis, including the stated aim of public schooling being “to ensure the education and 
indoctrination of the German youth in the spirit of National Socialism.” Yet, they maintained 
stipulations that the school system was for Germans.27  
Trying to de-Nazify and rebuild with limited resources, the West German education 
system was stretched almost to the breaking point. The school system suffered from more than a 
decade of Nazi government and total war. There were few teaching materials available and even 
fewer that did not espouse Nazi propaganda. For the first years after the war, the Allied High 
Command and new local governments had to explicitly teach the children who had grown up 
                                                
24 Lora Wildenthal, “Human Rights Advocacy and National Identity in West Germany,” Human Rights Quarterly 
22, no. 4 (2000): 1051–59; and Lora Wildenthal, “Human Rights Activism in Occupied and Early West Germany: 
The Case of the German League for Human Rights,” The Journal of Modern History 80, no. 3 (2008): 515–56.  
25 From Article 1 Paragraph 1 Line 2. See “Gesetz über die Schulpflicht im Deutschen Reich 
(Reichschulpflichtgesetz) vom 6. Juli 1938,” Reichgesetzblatt I, no. 105 (July 7, 1938): 799. The 
Reichschulpflichtgesetz was altered in “Erste Verordnung zur Durchführung des Reichsschulpflichtgesetzes,” 
Reichgesetzblatt I (March 7, 1939): 438; “Gesetz zur Änderung des Reichschulpflichtgesetzes vom 16. Mai 1971,” 
Reichgesetzblatt I (1941): 282; and “Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung des Reichsschulpflichtgesetzes vom 16. 
Mai 1941,” Reichgesetzblatt I (1941): 238–39. For a discussion of Nazi education, see Lisa Pine, Education in Nazi 
Germany (New York: Berg, 2010).  
26 KMK, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer,” Beschluß (Bonn, January 18, 1952), B 304/2057/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
27 See, for example, North Rhine-Westphalia’s “Ersten Gesetzes zur Ordnung des Schulwesens” from 8 April 1952. 
Compulsory schooling laws under the Weimar Republic had not guaranteed the right to a public education for 
“foreign children” either. However, the Weimar Republic’s school laws had dictated that the various minority and 
foreign groups that the children belonged to were entitled to educate their own children. Article 4 of the Weimar 
Constitution covers schooling.  
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under Nazi leadership a new form of citizenship and educate them in what democracy was. Many 
principals and teachers did not want to try and fit a group with new needs in or seat more 
children in overflowing classrooms.28  
While the Länder agreed to maintain the Nazi school law, education still fell under local 
Länder jurisdiction. Consequently, in 1949 and 1950 as parents from the Displaced Persons 
communities asked if their children could attend school, each of the eleven Länder Education 
Administrations had to write their own laws. The Kingdom of Bavaria’s Ministry of Education 
(under a Christian Socialist Union (CSU), a religious-conservative, government) was one of the 
first to address the issue directly. With one of the largest populations of non-Germans, at the end 
of the decade, in January 1949, a ministry representative acknowledged that, under the Third 
Reich’s school law, only German children fell under compulsory school law. “But we in 
Bavaria,” the representative explained, “base our policy on the old Bavarian law, which, in 
contrast to the Prussian, covered all children living in [the state].”29 The representative further 
explained that, if the children of Displaced Persons registered at the local schools (Volksschule) 
and knew sufficient German to follow instruction, the child would be admitted. The Ministry did 
not intend, however, to have the local school authorities force Displaced Persons to attend 
primary school.30 The Bavarian government would not officially change its laws until 1952, but 
with the Ministry’s 1949 statement, the government had effectively settled the legal side of the 
question.  
                                                
28 Brian Puaca’s 2009 Learning Democracy discusses the condition of schools and education in post-1945 (West) 
Germany.  
29 The Bavarian school laws the representative referred to dated back to 1902. It was only with the 
Reichsschulpflichtgesetz of 1938 that foreign citizens and ethnic minorities were excluded (Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, “Schulpflicht von Ausländern” (Munich, January 5, 1949), MK 62243, 
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv). 
30 Ibid. 
  42 
In contrast, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education (under Christian 
Democratic Union control, the sister party to the CSU) felt that non-Germans should not be 
covered by their compulsory schooling law. North Rhine-Westphalia had exactly those Prussian 
laws in its background that the Bavarian Ministry of Education representative had referred to. 
Prussian law had, like the Nazi and West German school laws after them, stipulated that 
education was the provenance of the citizen. Building on that tradition at the end of the 1940s, 
the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education representatives decided that foreigners 
should be allowed to attend school voluntarily, but compulsory schooling was for “Germans.”31  
Although parental requests and international attention forced the Länder Education 
Administrations to address the right to schooling for non-Germans, the numbers of “homeless or 
stateless children” in the Federal Republic was actually relatively small. And – at the beginning 
of the decade – the largest concentrations were still in the refugee camps, as they did not have an 
automatic right to free movement. For example, as of 28 July 1950 in Baden-Württemberg 
(Württemberg-Baden at the time) there were 1,573 homeless foreign children from 0-6 years of 
age, 538 children from 6-14, and 272 youths from 14-20. The majority of these individuals spoke 
little to no German and had, up to that point, been instructed by teachers of their own nationality 
and language who were paid by the International Refugee Organization.32  
Limited German language skills and divergent cultural identities complicated the 
question of education for the Bavarian and North Rhine-Westphalian – as well as the other nine 
Länder’s – Education Administrations. The Nazi repression of cultural difference and insidious 
                                                
31 Kultusministerium NRW and Koch to Regierungspräsidenten in Münster, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer 
Staatsangehörigkeit sowie ihre Aufnahme in deutsche öffentliche Schulen,” April 12, 1951, NW 20-483, 
Landesarchiv NRW.  
32 KMK, “Beschulung der Kinder heimatloser Ausländer in Württemberg-Baden.” 
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racial policies meant that the new West German state governments needed to avoid clearly 
repressive policies. The Education Administrations agreed that the Nazi past meant the Länder 
governments were now responsible for providing restitution.33 As the Bavarian Ministry of 
Education’s statement highlights, its government decided that school age DPs should be allowed 
to attend school if they had sufficient German language skills. The Bavarian Ministry of 
Education and other Länder Education Administrations asked, however, if the children should 
attend if they could not speak German. Furthermore, should the children be required, like 
German nationals, to learn to be German in the education system? Or, should new classes be 
established for minority groups? 
The question of German language mastery was one of the most immediate, in part 
because of concerns over participation, but also because it connected the school age Displaced 
Persons to the migrant ethnic Germans arriving in the thousands from across Eastern Europe. 
Those migrant ethnic Germans were actually the largest migrant group arriving at the end of the 
War and through the 1950s in the British, American, or French zones and then the new Federal 
Republic. Because citizenship law in the post-Nazi state was based on paternity (jus sanguinis), 
these supposedly “ethnic German” individuals were immediately entitled to citizenship, 
regardless of their level of German language mastery.34 As of 1950, this included approximately 
8 million individuals in a population of almost 48 million (16.6 percent). In contrast to the 
proportionally small number of Displaced Persons, once recognized as citizens each of these so-
                                                
33 For information on general post-war education reform, see Carl-Ludwig Furck, “Entwicklungstenzenen und 
Rahemnbedingungen,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, 
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34 For a discussion of different kinds of citizenship regimes based on either paternity or birth right, see Rogers 
Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).  
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called “Heimatvertriebene” received the entire range of rights associated with that status.35 
Alongside the rights to housing, to free movement, and to labor was the right to an education.  
Applied to ethnic German children, the Länder Education Administration interpreted the 
right to education to include a state obligated to try and level the playing field. The West German 
Basic Law acknowledged “inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every 
community, of peace and of justice in the world.” The Basic Law further specified that citizens 
had the right to the free development of their personality and rejected any discrimination on 
grounds of sex, ancestry, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious and political 
views.36 Consequently, the Länder felt responsible for ensuring the migrant ethnic German’s 
ability to participate. The Länder governments interpreted this as indicating a responsibility for 
providing German language instruction for any “German” child without sufficient mastery.37 
                                                
35 Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” 1953, 30. For a brief discussion of returning 
ethnic Germans as migrants and West German policy, see Daniel Levy, “Integrating Ethnic Germans in West 
Germany: The Early Postwar Period,” in Coming Home to Germany?: The Integration of Ethnic Germans from 
Central and Eastern Europe in the Federal Republic, ed. David Rock and Stefan Wolff (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2002), 19–37; Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 242; and Douglas B. Klusmeyer and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, 
Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 53–75. For discussion of the requirements during the Kaiserreich and Third Reich, 
see Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen 
Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001). See also Dieter 
Gosewinkel, “Historical Reflections on Citizenship in Europe,” in The Making of Citizens in Europe: New 
Perspectives on Citizenship Education, ed. Viola B. Georgi (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008), 
31–36. Helen Williams discusses changes to German citizenship law in the 2000s (“Changing the National 
Narrative: Evolution in Citizenship and Integration in Germany, 2000–10,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, 
no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 54–74). 
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They had the right, after all, to “equality of opportunities” on par with “German children” born in 
the country.  
Despite efforts to promote equality of opportunity for all “German children,” the Länder 
Education Administrations assumed that migrant ethnic German children would attend 
Volksschule and not the higher levels of the tripartite secondary system (i.e. Realschule and 
Gymnasium; see Chart 1.1). Each year, only a limited number of children were selected to attend 
the higher levels of secondary school (as dictated in the Basic Law). This selection was supposed 
to be based on merit and skill without regard to background at the end of the fourth grade (or 
fifth, depending on location), yet migrant children (of any sort) entering the country after the age 
of ten were usually placed directly into the Volksschule, regardless of their past academic 
achievements. Even those migrant children who were enrolled from a younger age often did not 
have the language fluency or home support system necessary for selection for the higher tracks. 
This meant that most forms of skilled employment and university training were rarely a viable 
option.38 
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 As many Länder began to reform their school systems during this period, some states also developed a 
Mittelschule as a buffer between primary and secondary schools (see Chart 3.1). Eventually, comprehensive schools 
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Chart 1.1: West German Compulsory School System in the 1950s39 
 
 
As the Chart above illustrates, the Volksschule track of the tripartite structure that the 
children were pushed through ran eight years (usually ages six to fourteen, but increasingly nine 
years) of “full time” school and then led into vocational education. Full time instruction included 
primary school (which all children attended together) for the first four or five years and then 
what became the lowest level of secondary school (Hauptschule).40 After completing the 
Volksschule, a school-age youth was (technically) obligated to participate in vocational training 
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(Berufsschule) if they were under the age of eighteen.41 Yet, youths needed a “school-leaving 
certificate” to place in any sort of vocational training program and to obtain qualification for any 
form of semi-skilled labor. Older migrant children and youths – regardless of their citizenship 
status – often did not have time to complete the requirements or obtain sufficient German 
language mastery before they turned eighteen. As a result, many newly arriving youths finished 
school without receiving any certifications. This in turn meant that it was not uncommon for 
migrant children to be denied vocational training.  
Although the vast majority of migrant children in West Germany were deprived of fully 
equal educational opportunities, immigrant status was not the only social factor highly correlated 
with educational opportunity and achievement. Many ethnic German children were also denied 
these opportunities. In the late 1940s and 1950s, there was a clear divide between which groups 
were able to attend higher secondary schooling tracks. Those enrolled were largely white, urban, 
protestant males from upper socio-economic backgrounds. Furthermore, despite compulsory 
schooling laws, many ethnic German children dropped out before completing any form of school 
certificate.42  
Despite the fact that migrant children with German citizenship and, to a lesser extent, 
ethnic Germans of lower socio-economic status faced a discriminatory and rigid system, they 
still had the right to receive support, however limited, in contrast to children without German 
citizenship. The Länder governments were, after all, not obligated to provide any scholastic 
support to newly arrived migrants without German citizenship. Nonetheless, perceived moral 
obligation on account of the Nazi past as well as changing international perceptions about who 
                                                
41 KMK, “Verhütung der Diskrimierung.”  
42 Ralf Dahrendorf, Bildung ist Bürgerrecht: Plädoyer für eine aktive Bildungspolitik (Bramsche: Nannen-Verlag, 
1965). 
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was responsible for stateless, refugee, and exile school age children meant that school 
administrations often felt that they were supposed to do something.43  
That belief in responsibility was tempered, however, by practical and material concerns. 
Although most of the school age Displaced Persons entered public schools in ones and twos, 
local school boards worried about the children’s level of German language mastery.44 The very 
existence of these German language courses and semi-bilingual instruction in the camps gave 
space for schools to deny “foreign children” admittance, particularly when “foreign children” 
spoke limited or no German. In many Länder, North Rhine-Westphalia among them, it was not 
uncommon for school administrators to tell the parents of non-German schoolchildren that 
enrollment was “pointless” and suggest they return instead to the camp schools. These 
institutions supposedly already had the necessary German language instruction to prepare for 
“German schools.”45 These school principals claimed that “foreign children’s” limited German 
language skills meant that they should not be permitted to enter public schools for fear of 
disrupting the classroom.  
To overcome language barriers, the Länder Education Administrations did consider 
putting school age Displaced Persons in classes with migrant German children, thus preparing 
them for enrollment in regular instruction, but hesitated. Part of that reluctance was on account 
                                                
43 Several international communities, from the United Nations to the Council of Europe, included the right to 
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of the majority of the Education Administrations’ opinion that non-German children were not 
entitled to the same support structures as ethnic German children. Another side of that 
indecision, however, was the children’s parents’ preference. After all, Displaced Persons might 
not have clear citizenship status, but families still had their own ethnic heritage. Treating these 
children the same as ethnic German children would be paramount to forced assimilation.  
In addition, as the UDHR and the Council of Europe’s Convention stipulated, “parents 
have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.”46 For 
many of the parents living in the camps for years, the provision of cultural instruction for their 
children was important. For various groups of ethnic Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, and later 
Hungarians fleeing various pressures in the East, the camps provided a central gathering point 
and the schools provided a continued connection to “their” language and culture. These groups 
were loath to lose that connection, so, as they were slowly removed from the camps, they often 
petitioned to continue the classes on the weekend, in the afternoons, or even via private 
schooling.47 
Although the Länder Education Administrations did not want to deny these groups access 
to language and cultural classes, they also assumed that the DPs and stateless children still in the 
country were permanent residents and would likely be granted citizenship. In order to avoid 
having thousands of youths without school certifications (and consequently only employable as 
unskilled labor) and because of the moral imperative associated with the Nazi past, these West 
German officials felt that the DPs remaining in West Germany unquestionably needed to 
                                                
46 See Article 26(3) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”; 
and Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law, 93. 
47 The DP camps, for example, became a center of Jewish culture and education in West Germany. For a discussion 
of camp schools for Polish DPs, see Anna D. Jaroszyńska-Kirchmann, “Patriotism, Responsibility, and the Cold 
War: Polish Schools in DP Camps in Germany, 1945-1951,” The Polish Review 47, no. 1 (2002): 35–66. 
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integrate into West German society. According to the Education Administrations, this 
necessitated attending West German schools. Yet, the compulsory schooling law went both 
ways. Children with non-German citizenship were not guaranteed the right to participate, but the 
state also had no legal recourse to force them to attend. 
Even as the Länder Ministries of Education debated the rights of school age Displaced 
Persons among themselves, on 9 February 1950, the Allied High Command (AHC) sent a letter 
to the Federal Government to announce that as of 1 June the approximately 100,000 DPs 
(“verschleppten Personen” in the official German translation) in the country would be the 
responsibility of the West German state.48 The Allied High Command further stipulated that 
these individuals would come under West German laws just like any West German citizen.49 For 
the individual Länder’s Ministries of Education, this meant that those “stateless and homeless 
children” already in the camps or West German villages and cities now fell under Länder 
compulsory schooling laws.50 
The Allied High Command’s letter forced the Länder Education Administrations to 
seriously address what education for school age Displaced Persons should entail, particularly 
regarding access to German public schools or national private schools. Over the following 
months, the Kultusministerkonferenz held a series of meetings examining the issue of “foreign 
ethnic groups” and schooling, with particular focus on DPs and other refugee groups that were in 
                                                
48 It should be noted that the term “verschleppten Personen“ would later refer to the “German” Heimatvertriebene 
and not to Displaced Persons. Nonetheless, the Ministries of Education and KMK would consistently understand the 
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über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer im Bundesgebiet” (Bonn: Bundeskanzler, September 21, 1950); and 
“Declaration of Rights of Displaced Persons,” Information Bulletin, September 1950, 10. 
50 “Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (Bundesvertriebenengesetz - BVFG),” 
Bundesarbeitsblatt, Teil I, no. 22 (1953): 201–31. 
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the country “as a consequence of West Germany's past.”51 The resulting 1950 recommendations 
on the “Construction of Schools for Foreign Ethnic Groups” (“Schulangelegenheiten; hier: 
Errichtung von Schulen für fremde Volksgruppen”) followed international recommendations in 
three parts: First, the Länder Education Administrations felt that the schoolchildren decidedly 
needed more German instruction in order to enable the children to take “subject classes in 
German as soon as possible.” The second recommendation stipulated that “the children of 
Displaced Persons” should, “where the possibility exists,” receive instruction in their mother 
tongue as well as in the history and geography of their homeland by teachers of their nationality. 
The third part reminded the Länder Education Administrations that, under the Basic Law, the 
construction of private schools was permissible for the children of Displaced Persons.52 
The decision straddled the divide between assimilation and cultural acknowledgement. 
On the one hand, school age Displaced Persons were now clearly subject to compulsory 
schooling laws. On the other hand, when convenient, the children were supposed to be allowed 
to receive cultural instruction. In so doing, West German schools were going to acknowledge the 
children’s right to a free education while trying to respect difference. That respect was, however, 
also somewhat mercenary, and local schools could pass off some of their costs to private 
associations or other state ministries.  
Although the Kultusministerkonferez’s recommendation’s title indicated a general 
discussion of “foreign ethnic groups” the actual wording of the text meant that it was only 
applicable to the Displaced Persons already subject to the compulsory schooling law. The core 
                                                
51 The first official discussion took place during the KMK’s 27/28 October 1950 meeting in Freiberg. See 
“Schulangelegenheiten; hier: Errichtung von Schulen für fremde Volksgruppen,” Beschluß der KMK (Freiburg: 
KMK, October 27, 1950), B 304/2057/3 Az. L1472, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
52 Article 7 of the Basic Law, see Germany, Grundgesetz, 2–3. 
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issue of the recommendations was how to decide on the states’ obligation to provide extra 
instruction, or how far to support access. The issue at stake was, in short, how to acknowledge 
difference while bringing “homeless children” fully under West German law. For the individual 
West German Ministers of Culture in 1950, as with migrant ethnic Germans, this primarily 
meant that the children needed to learn German. Basic literacy was the goal, not the completion 
of school certificates or secondary schooling.  
The KMK’s 1950 decision established parameters for the education of “homeless 
foreigners,” but the question of compulsory schooling for other “foreign” groups continued to be 
a concern for many schools. Refugees continued to arrive in West Germany, predominately from 
various states in the communist bloc, but other national minorities began to enter the country as 
the decade wore on, particularly in search of work.53 Even at the beginning of the 1950s, 
migration from neighboring states was already picking up. While there were over 100,000 DPs 
and refugees in the country in 1950, that was less than a quarter of the overall number of 
“foreigners,” who by 1951 numbered over 485,700.54 Consequently, while the children of DPs 
could unquestionably attend public schools, there remained a significant number of children with 
foreign citizenship who did not necessarily have that right.  
The largest migrant group in 1951 was actually the 75,000 Dutch citizens living in West 
Germany (58,000 in North Rhine-Westphalia alone). Concerned about their citizens’ access to 
schooling, the Dutch government advocated on their behalf, exactly as the Council of Europe had 
assumed that they would. What the Dutch government wanted in the early 1950s was simply 
                                                
53 Bade, Migration in European History, 227–239. 
54 Bundesminister für Vertriebene, “Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Kriegsgefangene, heimatlose Ausländer,” 9–11; and 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” 1953, 31. “Homeless foreigners” are “foreign 
citizens or stateless individuals, who had their residence in the Federal Republic or West Berlin and were under the 
custody of the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees on 30. June 1950.” 
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inclusion under compulsory schooling laws.55 There was a brief inquiry on the part of the School 
Board in Münster as to whether a reciprocity agreement already existed between the two states 
(as it did with Austria), but no evidence of such an agreement was discovered. Instead, North 
Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education unequivocally declared that schoolchildren with 
Dutch citizenship did not fall under compulsory schooling laws in the state. Furthermore, as 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education felt that the group was integrating without 
trouble, the Ministry had no intention of taking further action. Dutch schoolchildren did, 
however, have the right to attend school voluntarily.56 
The Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee under Eugen Löffler (teacher and 
politician57) from Württemberg pointed to the “pressing necessity” of the situation for non-
Germans and recommended that the individual Länder alter their school laws to include “foreign 
children” under compulsory schooling.58 Löffler argued that it was crucial for the different 
Länder to create a common right to compulsory schooling for all children. For Löffler, this 
meant not only that refugees and DPs should be brought under the law, but that an the 
                                                
55 Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, “Gebiet und Bevölkerung,” 1953, 31. 
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58 Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf, January 21, 1952), NW 20-483, 
Landesarchiv NRW. 
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establishment of compulsory schooling for all the citizens of foreign States who had their 
residence in the Federal Republic or were planning a long stay was “as pressing [a] necessity.”59  
The Kultusministerkonferenz did not follow the Committee for Education’s suggestions. 
Instead, the recommendation released in conjunction with the KMK’s January 1952 meeting in 
Königswinter stated that, in order to avoid difficulties and unequal legal relationships, 
compulsory education ought be extended through provisions at the Länder level for “homeless 
foreigners” as well as the citizens of foreign states and stateless foreigners. Discussion of the 
recommendations in the assembly, however, made it clear that while all DPs and homeless 
children in West Germany had to be included under each of the Länders’ compulsory schooling 
laws, the individual states could make their own decisions regarding the inclusion of “foreign 
nationals.”60  
No one who studies West German education would be surprised that the West German 
Länder responded to the KMK’s recommendations regarding the education of foreigners in 
different ways. All eleven Länder did in fact pass new school laws including DPs and homeless 
foreigners under compulsory schooling as required by the KMK’s recommendations.61 Only 
eight of the eleven states, however, complied with the full intent of the recommendations and 
included all foreigners in their new compulsory schooling laws. Among them, Bavaria’s new 
1952 law, as planned, extended compulsory schooling to all children, specifying that any child 
                                                
59 Even in this, however, it was acknowledged that an all-inclusive compulsory schooling law would not, in fact, be 
all-inclusive, as the children of foreigners with the right of exterritoriality and the children of the occupying powers 
would be exempted. Sekretariat and Burkart, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer,” Beschluß (Bonn: KMK, September 8, 
1951), NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW. 
60 KMK, “Schulpflicht der Ausländer.”  
61 Note that the compulsory schooling laws covered any child who was legally stateless or homeless (without a 
country of citizenship) at the time, not only Displaced Persons.  
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staying in the state for longer than two days outside of holidays had to attend.62 The Education 
Administration claimed that including not only citizens “but foreigners and the homeless” under 
general compulsory schooling “reflected the Bavarian spirit and constitution.”63 
Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and the Saarland, in contrast, only 
extended the right to education. For North Rhine-Westphalia, the question had partly been one of 
the high numbers of resident foreign citizens, like the Dutch nationals, for whom the state 
government was hesitant to acknowledge responsibility. In 1953 the North Rhine-Westphalian 
Education Administration did, however, declare “foreign children’s” voluntary school attendance 
should be “assisted in every way.”64 On the other end of the same spectrum, Saarland’s Ministry 
of Education did not think it had enough residents without German citizenship to make any sort 
effort worthwhile. Whatever the Education Administration’s reasons, within those three Länder, 
children with foreign citizenship could attend school on a voluntary basis, but were in no way 
required to. Consequently, these West German Länder had no legal obligation to provide support 
for entrance into the schools or for mother language and cultural instruction. But this also meant 
that the West German Länder could not compel the children to attend. 
Regardless of inclusion under compulsory schooling laws, each of the Länder Education 
Administrations agreed that children without German citizenship were inherently other (i.e. not 
German). Even that broad statement, however, meant different things according to citizenship 
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lines and based on legal status. That difference meant that, regardless of what the right to 
education entailed, different groups of children needed to be treated differently. Part of that 
disparity in treatment was supposed to be a celebration of diversity in order to acknowledge 
cultural heritage. Another side to that decision, however, was a separation of resources. 
Reflecting international trends, the Länder Education Administrations took responsibility for 
their own citizens as well as for school age displaced persons, stateless individuals, and exiles.  
Degrees of Responsibility for Education in West Germany and Europe 
On 13 December 1955, the Council of Europe’s members released the “European 
Convention on Establishment.” In it, the member states stipulated that children of any associated 
parties should be permitted to enter those primary, secondary, and vocational and technical 
schools under state control on “equal footing with the nationals” of the host country. 
Furthermore, school attendance was to be compulsory for those school age nationals residing 
within the territory of any of the other contracting parties. Although the Convention would not 
come into force until 23 February 1965, its emphasis on equal education reflected new 
international trends regarding the perception of the state’s responsibility for providing public 
schooling for non-citizens.65  
Two major developments in the mid-1950s led to a fundamental shift in how both West 
German and the international community discussed schooling for non-nationals. First, as many 
European states recovered from the devastation of the Second World War, they turned toward 
the question of economic alliances and collaboration. Six of the members of the Council of 
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Europe, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany, decided to 
form a series of economic partnerships focused on resource exchange.66 The second change, 
intertwined with the first, was the growth of labor migration. As economies grew, jobs opened up 
across Europe, leading to expanded labor migration. The West German Federal Government 
placed itself in the middle of the debates on expanding European collaboration and cooperation. 
Under the leadership of CDU Chancellor Konrad Adenauer,67 the Federal Government saw the 
Council of Europe and European Community as way to improve its international reputation and 
expand the West German economy.68  
The emphasis on collaboration and focus on peace meant that, verbally at the least, the 
different states pushed forward the idea of equality. The idea of a unified Europe opened the idea 
that public schooling was for more than the citizen. Equal access to education was also about 
treating fellow European citizens as equals. That equality implied inclusion under compulsory 
schooling laws as well as assistance with integration into the West German school system. 
Nonetheless, refugees and exile groups were still viewed as deserving or in need of cultural 
support.  
Although the West German Länder failed to implement a common policy regarding 
compulsory schooling, the question of if the children should be allowed into West German 
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schools had been settled. Nonetheless, for most of the Länder, uncertainty remained as to what 
compulsory inclusion necessitated and what it meant in practice. Questions about German and 
mother language instruction as well as about private schools continued to vex the different 
Ministries of Education, particularly as the rate of migration increased. For the next decade, the 
Ministries would discuss the major issues in periodic meetings of the Kultusministerkonferenz. 
But the Länder also developed different approaches to schooling “foreign children” as their own 
situations developed. These approaches were, in turn, heavily dependent on which “foreigners” 
were involved and the size of the minority groups. Despite their legal foreignness, for example, 
the Austrian, Dutch, and Polish communities were treated differently based on their exact legal 
status as well as their comparative degrees of difference from the West German ethno-national 
majority.  
In West Germany, most minority groups were spread out, with “foreign” children 
attending German schools in ones and twos, meaning language competence was not actually a 
common problem. It was unusual for a West German classroom to have larger groups of “non- 
German” children attending. With most children speaking German, those who did not had space 
to learn the language without overburdening teachers. Nonetheless, to avoid stressing teachers 
when there were larger groups as well as to accommodate new groups, some Länder Education 
Administrations, like Baden-Württemberg’s, developed programs for language and cultural 
support for “homeless” and refugee groups. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education 
considered itself responsible for ensuring that all children enrolled in public schools, even if they 
did not fall under compulsory education laws. Consequently, the Ministry deemed it necessary to 
provide newly arriving groups, like those from Hungary in 1956 after the failed Revolution, with 
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intensive German language instruction in order to prepare them for participation in West German 
schools.69  
Via additional efforts to encourage enrollment in West German schools, Baden-
Württemberg’s Education Administration attempted to ease entrance into the classroom. Baden-
Württemberg’s Ministry of Education dictated that, if there were problems with language, then 
the (usually singular) child could temporarily be placed either in a lower grade level, or spend 1-
2 hours a day in the first grade. As soon as the child had a sufficient mastery of the language, 
then s/he was to be moved to a grade corresponding to his/her age group.70 Baden-
Württemberg’s four regional school boards claimed that there were supposedly no difficulties 
with this course of action and that the children generally mastered the German language quickly. 
School principals in turn reported that the “foreign school children … in no way interrupted the 
normal course of instruction.” The school officials’ reports did acknowledge that classroom 
teachers sometimes faced difficulties if the child spoke little or no German to begin with, but the 
Ministry of Education judged that “contact between the children [was] very important.”71 The 
readiness of the local school children to welcome “foreign children” and to also be helpful after 
instruction created a very good atmosphere. Therefore the attendance of “foreign children” in the 
schools was generally welcomed.72 
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Table 1.1: “Foreigners”(Ausländer) in West Germany by Country of Citizenship, 195573 
 FRG NRW BW Bavaria Hesse W. Berlin 
Austria 63,233 6,964 11,589 30,456 5,121 3,453 
Czechoslovakia 10,090 1,336 1,677 4,571 682 724 
Denmark 3,979 278 159 203 134 200 
Estonia 3,822 668 724 1,379 176 43 
Greece 3,394 258 719 1,465 361 402 
Italy 24,688 8,811 4,975 4,492 2,355 1,114 
Latvia 13,391 2,360 2,060 3,400 584 36 
Lithuania 6,147 725 817 2,499 538 28 
Netherlands 78,207 61,190 1,682 1,838 1,579 821 
Poland 79,906 15,642 11,909 22,956 6,575 1,386 
Portugal 157 24 26 20 14 3 
Spain 1,957 271 469 432 251 114 
Turkey 1,580 138 217 736 183 103 
USSR 13,311 1,197 1,953 7,320 800 87 
Yugoslavia 20,553 7,476 1,592 5,988 889 444 
Other 91,166 19,863 19,540 21,141 8,112 6,067 
Stateless 51,094 20,065 5,123 10,349 2,953 3,119 
Total 466,675 147,266 65,231 119,245 31,307 18,144 
 
There were, however, some larger groups and areas with higher concentrations of 
schoolchildren. As Table 1.1 shows, by 1955 the largest groups of “foreigners” were those from 
Poland, the Netherlands, and Austria. In 1955, the three national groups at the center of this 
study (Italian, Greek, and Turkish citizens) were comparatively small, although the number of 
individuals with Italian citizenship was already growing. Nonetheless, through the 1950s, 
“foreigners” continued to imply mainly refugee groups or exiles from Eastern Europe. Länder 
Education Administrations discussing “foreign children” frequently overlooked migrants from 
the West, such as those with Dutch and Austrian citizenship. For children with Austrian 
citizenship this was in part because of the language similarities, but also because of the 
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longstanding reciprocity agreement regarding compulsory schooling.74 For children with Dutch 
citizenship the situation was, as discussed above, more complicated. The NRW Ministry of 
Education, responsible for the majority of them, explicitly refused to include them under the 
compulsory schooling law, but “welcomed” them if they voluntarily registered. In addition the 
Ministry denied requests for any assistance for Dutch cultural or language classes, claiming that 
the Netherlands were culturally similar enough to (West) Germany to render such extra 
instruction superfluous.75  
Further complicating the matter was the development of the European Community. Six of 
the Council of Europe’s member states expanded their areas of collaboration by creating the 
European Economic Community (EEC), one of the pillars of the European Community, under 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957.76 Initially, the European Community focused on the trade of 
materials and labor. Culture, already addressed under the auspices of the Council of Europe, was 
supposed to remain firmly under the sovereignty of the individual member States. As such, 
schooling was (almost) a taboo subject.77 What the EEC focused on instead was resource 
exchange – which included manpower. Yet, with the establishment of the European Community, 
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an equal footing in education became even more important between countries like the 
Netherlands and West Germany. The six Member States (Belgium, the Federal Republic, France, 
Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands) could not discuss labor exchange without considering 
qualifications. Vocational training was, after all, a central component of developing a work 
force. Hence, building on the “European Convention on Establishment,” the Treaty of Rome 
guaranteed “freedom of movement, non-discrimination and ‘the mutual recognition of diplomas, 
certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications.’”78 It also promoted cooperation relating 
to “basic and advanced vocational training.”79 In so doing, cooperation began to influence the 
primary goals of public education, shifting its value from primarily being about citizenship to 
being increasingly focused on vocational opportunity, although the effects would only fully 
become clear in the 1970s. For the West German and Dutch Education Administrations in the 
late 1950s, the European Community connection made the question of school integration and 
equivalency more important. The two governments explored the possibility of additional student 
and labor exchanges.  
In contrast, the West German Education Administrations approached the Polish ethnic 
minority as a foreign other with significant cultural distance. The West German Education 
Administrations viewed ethnic Polish children, both citizens and stateless, as culturally different 
enough to warrant cultural classes. In addition, during the 1950s, the majority of the ethnic 
Polish children in Germany were either Displaced Persons or had fled Cold War Poland, 
meaning they fell under the compulsory school law. Their legal status also meant they were 
                                                
78 Article 57 of the Treaty of Rome. 
79 Article 118 (European Commission and Luce Pépin, The History of European Cooperation in Education and 
Training, 22). 
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included in KMK’s rubric of groups deserving cultural instruction.80 Hence, while the local 
Education Administrations did not have a legal obligation to provide cultural instruction, there 
was no legal bar preventing the establishment of Polish language classes. Providing such 
instruction was, in fact, advisable.81 For this group, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of 
Education (as well as other Länder Education Administrations) consistently provided support 
instruction. Alongside extra German language classes, the North NRW of Education frequently 
gave ethnic Polish groups as well as other stateless children and Eastern European nationals 
permission to establish weekend or afterschool cultural and language classes.  
Although the Polish nationals living in West Germany did not have a state government to 
advocate on their behalf, there was an incredibly active Polish Association. The Association 
campaigned for cultural instruction across the country and was largely successful.82 By 1953, in 
the American and French zones there were already 1,179 children taking part in Polish language 
instruction in 24 locations, of which 790 were in extra classes and 389 in preschool. In the 
British Zone, there were a total of 2,221 children in Polish language instruction, in Polish schools 
(407 in Lower Saxony and North-Rhine Westphalia), in extra classes, and in preschool (913), 
                                                
80 Furthermore, there already a history of providing Polish language and cultural instruction in some German – 
including North Rhine-Westphalian – schools. During the Wilhelmine period there had been a large ethnic Polish 
minority group with German citizenship in the Rhineland. After years of demands from the Polish minority, the 
predecessors of the North Rhine-Westphalian governments permitted Polish instruction in German public schools. 
See Richard Charles Murphy, Guestworkers in the German Reich: A Polish Community in Wilhelmian Germany 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); and Peter O’Brien, “German-Polish Migration: The Elusive Search 
for a German Nation-State,” International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 373–87. 
81 Article 7 Paragraph 5 of the West German Basic Law. See also KMK, “3. Errichtung polnischer Schulen in der 
Bundesrepublik,” Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die 32. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 6./7.10.54 in Munich 
(Munich: KMK, October 7, 1954), Anlage, B 304/2057, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
82 KMK, “3. Forderungen des Verbandes polnischer Flüchtlingein Deutschland betreffend Errichtung polnischer 
Schulen in der Bundesrepublik.” 
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while 1,140 attended German schools (901 taking part in extra classes in the Polish language).83 
Although happy with these developments, the Polish Association continued pushing for 
additional instruction and private schools.  
The Polish private schools in North Rhine-Westphalia were not legally private schools, 
but camp or supplementary schools. Partly in order to alleviate any burden on local German 
schools caused by having to teach children without German language skills, NRW hosted a 
handful of other non-public classes in association with the camps, including one near Münster 
and one in Augustdorf (Administrative District Detmold). The first was for children in first 
through third grade, taught by one Polish national. The second was for first through fifth grades 
(156 schoolchildren). Four Polish teachers taught in both Polish and German. The teachers for 
these classes, selected from within the groups, were then paid by the Ministry of Labor, Health, 
and Social Affair’s office for DPs, Refugees, and Aussiedler (resettler or returning “ethnic 
Germans”).84 
Technically, Article 7 of the Basic Law guaranteed the right to establish private schools. 
The article stated:  
Private schools that serve as alternatives to state schools shall require the approval of the 
state and shall be subject to the laws of the Länder. Such approval shall be given when 
private schools are not inferior to the state schools in terms of their educational aims … A 
private elementary school shall be approved only if the educational authority finds that it 
serves a special pedagogical interest or if, on the application of parents or guardians, it is 
to be established as a denominational or interdenominational school or as a school based 
on a particular philosophy and no state elementary school of that type exists in the 
municipality. 
                                                
83 Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, “Notiz: Der Stand der polnischen Schulwesens in der 
Bundesrepublik” (Bonn, March 4, 1954), B 304/2057, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
84 Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales’ Landesbeauftragter für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge, Aussiedler. 
Kultusministerium NRW and Koch to Regierungspräsidenten in Münster, “Schulpflicht für Kinder ausländischer 
Staatsangehörigkeit sowie ihre Aufnahme in deutsche öffentliche Schulen.” The DPs/ minority groups wanted to 
continue mother tongue and cultural classes alongside West German schooling. 
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According to the article “foreign” minority groups and/or foreign governments were eligible, 
theoretically, to establish private schools for school-age children belonging to national 
minorities, if the parents’ desired instruction was unavailable in public schools.85 Permission 
was, however, only granted on a case-by-case basis, and even then these schools’ leaving 
certificates were not guaranteed West German recognition.86 The Länder Education 
Administrations only reluctantly granted permission. 
With the majority of the children spread out across the country, there were only a few 
locations with a large enough concentration to even warrant consideration for the establishment 
of private schools (see Table 1.1). Nonetheless, there were some regions where private schools 
were established for “foreign children,” usually run by private institutions. By the mid-1950s, the 
Länder Education Administrations had only given permission for five such private national 
schools. The largest of these schools was for the approximately 8,000 Lithuanians living around 
Diepholz in Lower Saxony and on the border between Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, and was 
intended to provide “special school possibilities” (besondere Schulmöglichkeiten). There, the 
Lithuanian children attended a Lithuanian primary school, after which the majority of the 
graduating schoolchildren attended a Lithuanian Gymnasium in Schloss Tennhof near 
                                                
85 Article 7, Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Basic Law. 
86 Paragraph 15 then stated that the foreign certificates (Prüfungszeugnisse) of any homeless foreigners (heimatlose 
Ausländer) require, as do all foreign certifications, the special recognition of the Ministry of Education in the area in 
which they have their residency. See Kultusministerium NRW to Schulkollegium beim Regierungspräsidenten in 
Düsseldorf und and Regierungspräsidenten Aachen, Arnsbeg, Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster, “Gesetz 
über die Rechtsstellung heimatloser Ausländer vom 25. 04. 1951 (BGBl. I vom 27. 04. 1951 S. 269),” September 8, 
1951, NW 20-483, Landesarchiv NRW. 
The Länder education officials were responsible for ensuring that these schools did not fall behind public schools in 
their teaching goals (Lehrzielen) and that such establishments (Einrichtungen) not separate out school children based 
on their parents’ circumstances (Besitzverhältnis). 
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Lampertheim in Hesse.87 The others included the Orthodox Russian diocese’s administration of 
West Berlin and Germany’s Russian Gymnasium for children of Russian exiles in Munich.88 
West Berlin also hosted a French Gymnasium for both German children and other nationals.89  
By the mid-1950s, problems with the few private schools and camp schools available 
heightened reluctance to permit more.90!Children attending the Polish schools in North Rhine-
Westphalia experienced difficulties transferring into local public schools, having both limited 
German abilities and frequent problems in other subjects.91 Furthermore, there was significant 
anti-German sentiment in the school materials the classes used. In addition, the Polish 
Association frequently pushed for more Polish instruction time than many of the ethnic-Polish 
parents actually wanted. Many of the parents, after all, had no intention of moving to a Poland 
under communist leadership. As such, many parents wanted their children to learn some Polish, 
but also attend German schools and become part of German life. These parents did not want their 
children to have a full Polish education.92 
                                                
87 KMK, “Verhütung der Diskrimierung,” 7–8. The school costs are covered by land grants, parental contributions, 
and donations (Landeszuschüsse, Beiträge der Eltern und Spenden). 
88 During its existence, however, the school received funding from the Bavarian state and had its exit exams 
(Abschlussprüfung) recognized by the state. The Russian gymnasium closed as of 14 November 1955 because of a 
lack of teachers on the one hand and a limited number of schoolchildren on the other. See Höhne and Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to Sekretariat, “Russisches Gymnasium in Munich,” February 13, 1956, 
B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
89 There was also the Nicolaus Cusanus Gymnasium in Bonn for American children (KMK, “Verhütung der 
Diskrimierung,” 7-8).  
90 Vorsitzender des Schulausschusses and Reimer to Zentralstelle für ausländisches Bildungswesen, “Anerkennung 
des ‘Reifezeugnisses’ des Lettischen Gymnasiums in Augustdorf,” July 23, 1956, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz. 
91 Kultusminister NRW to Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, “Ihr Schreiben vom 18. 10. 
1954 - IV 58 542 - betr. öffentliche Volksschule für Kinder der polnischen Minderheit,” II E 1/030/5-d Tgb.Nr. 
4809/54, (November 30, 1954), MK 62244, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv. 
92 KMK, “3. Forderungen des Verbandes polnischer Flüchtlingein Deutschland betreffend Errichtung polnischer 
Schulen in der Bundesrepublik.” 
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With the majority of parents focused on integration and spread across West Germany, at 
the end of the decade only around 800 schoolchildren participated in extra language and cultural 
instruction, while the camp schools were mainly closed. Those few were spread through Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Schleswig-Holstein. Even 
among those few hundred, there were ethnic Polish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Estonian, 
and Hungarian schools. The primary focus of the instruction was to impart the children’s mother 
language and the history of the country of origin, although Baden-Württemberg and North 
Rhine-Westphalia also offered religious instruction. In each of the Länder, a “foreign teacher” 
led the instruction.93  
Table 1.2: National Instruction for “Homeless Foreigners” in 196194 
 No. of Children Ethnicity Subject  Financing 
Baden-
Württemberg 50 Polish and Latvian 
Religion und native 
tongue 
Ministry for Displaced Persons as 
well as Regional School 
Administrations  
Bavaria 110 Ukrainian, Polish, and Lithuanian 
Native language and 
history No state support, private funding 
North Rhine-
Westphalia 392 
Polish, Latvian, 
Ukrainian, Estonian, 
and Hungarian 
Native language, 
social studies, and 
Religion 
State Minister for Social Affairs’ 
subsidy 
Lower 
Saxony 143 Polish and Ukrainian 
Native language and 
social studies 
City of Braunsweig Social Services 
Office 
Schleswig 
Holstein 137 
Polish, Latvian, 
Lithuanian, and 
Ukrainian (as of 1958) 
Native language and 
social studies No state support, private funding 
 
                                                
93 KMK and Schulausschuß, “18. Nationaler Ergänzungsunterricht für Kinder heimatloser Ausländer,” Auszug aus 
der Niederschrift die 73. Sitzung des Schulausschusses der KMK am 19./20. 10. 1961 in Berlin (Berlin, October 20, 
1961), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Rhineland-Pfalz, and Saarland were not 
offering any Ergänzungsunterricht at that time. For information on the financing, see KMK and Schulausschuß, “17. 
Nationaler Ergänzungsunterricht für Kinder heimatloser Ausländer: Beteiligung der Länder an der Finanzierung,” 
Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die 75. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 8./9. 2. 1962 in Bremen (Bremen: 
KMK, February 9, 1962), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
94 Kultusminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein and Grothusen to Sekretariat, “Nationaler Ergänzungsunterricht 
für Kinder heimatloser Ausländer,” V 11 a - 04/3938, (May 18, 1961), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
  68 
From the mid-1950s through the end of the decade, the members of the 
Kultusministerkonferenz would claim that, in general, problems with minorities and education 
“only existed in Schleswig-Holstein,” and then only in regards to an ethnic Danish minority 
group with West German citizenship. The group had special rights regarding schooling and 
language acquisition because of their long history in Schleswig-Holstein, but they still explicitly 
needed to be “German,” as they were most decidedly staying in the FRG.95 Part of the issue with 
this group, then, was the continued difference between their schooling and the standard West 
German system. It was unclear where they were supposed to fit. 
Through the end of the decade, the Education Administrations reported that all other 
groups integrated well and easily. The different Länder Administrations claimed that, even 
without the requisite German language knowledge, children usually participated in West German 
classrooms without problems. The “foreign children” were reported to typically master sufficient 
German language skills for participation in public schools within a year. Some local school 
boards claimed that the presence of “foreign children” actually added to the school atmosphere 
and encouraged a healthy learning environment.  
Part of the Education Administrations’ lack of concern and perceived success related to 
the continued smaller sizes of most newly arriving migrant groups. Länder initiatives for 
“foreign children’s” care were designed with the idea that there were not (and would not be) that 
many of them in most schools. Furthermore, educational success in general was seen in the 
enrollment in school, the acquisition of passable German language skills, and the demonstration 
                                                
95 KMK, “Verhütung der Diskrimierung,” 7–8. Because of the historical relationship between the local government 
and the Danish speaking minorities of the region, the minority group had some special rights in regards to schooling. 
The Ministry of Education in Schleswig-Holstein sent out a decree on 7 March 1950 establishing the conditions of 
the establishment of private schools for the Danish minority. For this group, after the first year of establishment, 
these schools received a yearly allowance of up to 80 percent of the personnel and extraneous costs. This grant went 
far beyond what Schleswig-Holstein could grant other West German private schools.95  
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of frictionless participation in the classroom. As with migrant German children, the Länder 
Education Administrations were not concerned about whether or not children with foreign 
citizenship could complete secondary schooling or enroll in vocational programs. Any worries 
over vocational schools that did exist tended to focus on the right of the children to attend at all. 
The Länder Education Administrations’ lingering concerns focused on the degree of 
difference between local and foreign groups and how that influenced state responsibility. In 
North Rhine-Westphalia, the Ministry of Education treated Austrians as locals, the Dutch as 
foreigners too culturally similar to warrant acknowledgement of cultural difference, and the 
Polish as foreign others despite long-term ties. Furthermore, the Austrian and Dutch 
communities usually arrived during this period as spontaneous or labor migrants, while the 
Polish communities were frequently refugees and exiles. Non-European minority groups were 
generally too small to take active note of and were therefore considered less problematic than 
those groups from Eastern Europe.  
The international understanding among European states’ Educational Administrations 
during the 1950s shifted from stressing general human rights that would somehow mysteriously 
be extended to every individual to the idea that it was in the state’s best interest to extend 
compulsory schooling to all children, regardless of their country of citizenship. The Council of 
Europe and the European Community wrote about the issue in terms of world peace, mutual 
exchange, and economic development, while the European Community considered the problem 
in view of labor exchange and equality. These international bodies discussed the issue usually in 
regards to smaller forms of exchange, looking at refugee populations or spontaneous migrants.96 
                                                
96 Spontaneous migrants are those individuals who only apply for residence permits and/or visas after migration. See 
Ahmet Akgündüz, Labour Migration from Turkey to Western Europe, 1960-1974: A Multidisciplinary Analysis 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 51; and Joanne van der Leun, “Excluding Illegal Migrants in The 
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They were not exploring education for long-established minorities, but rather recent and new 
minority or migrant groups.  
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the 1950s, public schooling in West Germany was predominately 
about teaching citizenship and basic literacy. As the decade progressed, however, changes within 
the international community meant that schooling became a fundamental human right necessary 
for the realization of personhood, integration, and increasingly vocational opportunity. As the 
emphasis within the concept of schooling changed, so too did the perception of the state’s 
responsible for ensuring non-citizens access to education as well as what that education was 
supposed to entail.  
As long as schooling was about citizenship first and foremost, a state could argue that its 
responsibility – and its resource expenditure – was solely towards and for its citizens. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its emphasis on education for all was focused on 
equality between citizens, regardless of minority status, gender, or otherwise. In West Germany, 
that commitment was particular important given the Nazi past atrocities, and because of the 
material deficits in what the state could provide. Fighting an uphill battle to teach its citizens 
democracy, West Germany did not want to accommodate non-citizens and their particular 
concerns as well. 
The Länder Education Administrations could not, however, entirely ignore their minority 
populations without German citizenship. These groups, predominately Displaced Persons, were 
there as a result of the Nazi past and German atrocities. Consequently, despite their status as 
                                                                                                                                                       
Netherlands: Between National Policies and Local Implementation,” in Immigration Policy in Europe: The Politics 
of Control, ed. Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav (New York: Routledge, 2013), 113. 
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stateless and homeless, West Germany had a responsibility for their welfare – including their 
education. Yet, again, the situation was different for minority groups with citizenship (like the 
Danish minority in Northern Germany). Those minorities needed to learn to be German, even as 
they retained their ethnic identity. For the Displaced Persons, the nature of Nazi oppression 
meant that the West German state needed to provide these groups with access to cultural and 
language instruction. But their presumed residence was to be merely temporary. 
As the various Displaced Persons from the Second World War integrated into society, 
new immigration did not stop, although the reason for such migration shifted. During the mid-
1950s, the majority of new migration included ethnic Germans leaving various eastern states as 
well as spontaneous migrants from across the European continent. These spontaneous migrants 
moved with increasing frequency across state boundaries in search of jobs. International pressure 
– including the Council of Europe’s emphasis on collaboration and equality combined with the 
development of the European Community – meant that there was increased importance placed on 
treating these migrants the same as local host country nationals.  
Equal treatment and education did not necessary mean inclusion in compulsory schooling 
and certainly did not guarantee cultural instruction. These migrants remained foreign others, 
even as the international community pushed equality and equivalency. Nonetheless, state 
governments in countries like West Germany judged and weighed their needs differently based 
on their citizenship status. Based on their judgement, each of the West German Länder would 
develop their own programs.  
 
CHAPTER 2: COMPULSORY SCHOOLING AND EXTRA PROGRAMS FOR THE 
CHILDREN OF "GUEST WORKERS" (1960-1966) 
In 1960, during initial bilateral discussions about the schooling of children with Italian 
citizenship living in West Germany, the Italian Consul in Cologne, Giovanni Mayr, laid out the 
Italian government’s aims. First and foremost, the Italian government wanted all Italian citizens 
in the Federal Republic to receive a German education, partly with an eye toward integration into 
West German society through the schools.1 As part of a second set of goals, the Consul hoped 
that the North Rhine-Westphalian government would work with him to set up supplementary 
language and cultural classes. Mayr wanted teachers (both male and female) chosen by the 
“Italian side” to provide instruction while the West German authorities footed the bill. Finally, he 
suggested that these “consular classes” could be required for the children of Italian workers in 
West German public schools, but also made available to ethnic German schoolchildren as an 
elective.2  
Mayr’s suggestions were a response to the development in the last five years. In 1955, 
West Germany and Italy had signed a bilateral labor agreement for the recruitment of migrant 
workers with Italian citizenship. The West German economy was flourishing while Italy, 
particularly in the south, was plagued by unemployment. In order to alleviate that pressure, the 
                                                
1 In contrast, the parents of Spanish children in North Rhine-Westphalia would express hesitation to enroll their 
children in West German schools as they expected to return to Spain. See Kultusministerium NRW and Rürup to 
Herrn Gemeindedirektor der Gemeinde Hückelhoven-Rathe, “Einschulung von Kinder ausländischer Arbeitskräfte,” 
August 15, 1963, Landesarchiv NRW. 
2 Consolato d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium NRW, “No. 24583,” November 14, 1960, NW 141-111, 
Landesarchiv NRW. 
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Italian state requested the agreement. For the Italian government, the agreement went toward 
furthering their goal of European integration. For that integration to fully benefit the state, the 
growing number of families with Italian citizenship in West Germany needed to integrate and be 
capable of getting jobs.  
Working with the Italian legations in the Federal Republic, the Länder Education 
Administrations debated internally and among themselves what kind of school initiatives they 
should develop for the children of Italian workers. These new migrant groups were not refugees, 
stateless persons, or expellees, nor were they spontaneous migrants. Consequently, none of the 
programs in place for those groups (discussed in Chapter 1) applied. New guidelines were 
needed, outlining what “integration and cultural maintenance” should entail for this group. 
Determining best practices and legal obligations toward these diverse new, European Italian so-
called guest worker groups, three issues framed the Länder Education Administrations’ 
considerations. First, the children of Italian workers living in West Germany were there at the 
invitation of West German businesses. Consequently, the West German governments – including 
the Education Administrations – felt that the Länder governments had some responsibility for 
their welfare. As a part of that status as so-called “guest worker children,” however, the 
permanency of their residence in West Germany was unclear.3 Second, children with Italian 
citizenship were, according to the Länder Education Administrations, culturally different from 
the German ethno-national majority. As such, they were theoretically eligible for cultural classes 
as the ethnic-Polish minority had been in the 1950s. Third, the Italian state was a member of the 
European Community. Consequently, the Länder Education Administrations had to weigh their 
                                                
3 Christoph Rass, “Temporary Labour Migration and State-Run Recruitment of Foreign Workers in Europe, 1919-
1975: A New Migration Regime?,” International Review of Social History 57, no. S20 (December 2012): 191–224; 
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actions and regulations regarding this group within the context of their work within the European 
Community. That membership also meant it was likely that Italian citizens would remain in West 
Germany. Such possible long-term residency thus necessitated integration. 
With other guest worker states’ requests following the Italian’s, the Italian governments’ 
demands shaped early West German policy regarding the care of children with non-German 
citizenship who entered the country as “the children of foreign workers.”4 Each of the policies 
regarding integration and cultural maintenance which the Länder Education Administrations 
developed for “Italian children” would – in the name of equality – be extended to all children 
with citizenship from a state with a bilateral labor agreement with West Germany. In 1960, 
however, when the Italian delegation made its first official request for inclusive compulsory 
schooling and cultural instruction, the West German delegation viewed the issue as a matter of 
friendly state relations, hardly a pressing matter.  
International Advocacy and Italian Language Instruction in West Germany 
The Italian government first raised the question of Italian instruction for its citizens in 
West Germany in 1960 during a meeting of the West German-Italian Joint Cultural Commission. 
During that meeting, the Italian delegations expressed interest in setting up cultural and language 
classes for Italian citizens, as it had already done in Belgium. These classes were, however, to be 
provided in conjunction with regular West German schools. The Italian government assumed 
that children “would remain in West Germany permanently” as residents and therefore needed to 
                                                
4 Wanderarbeiter (migrant workers), ausländische Arbeitnehmer (foreign workers), or Gastarbeiter (guest workers). 
Fremdarbeiter (foreign worker) was off the table as it was the term the Nazi’s used for their foreign and forced labor 
during the Third Reich. See Ulrich Herbert, “Immigration, Integration, Foreignness: Foreign Workers in Germany 
since the Turn of the Century,” International Labor and Working-Class History, no. 48 (Fall 1995): 91–93; and 
Robert Sala, “Vom ‘Fremdarbeiter’ zum ‘Gastarbeiter’: Die anwerbung italienischer Arbeitskräfte für die deutsche 
Wirtschaft (1938-1973),” Vierteljahrshefte Fur Zeitgeschichte 55, no. 1 (January 2007): 93–120.  
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integrate into the West German school system. Italian maintenance was only supposed to be a 
bonus.5  
Neither the West German nor Italian governments saw the schooling of Italian citizens in 
West Germany as solely an issue of the children’s education. For the Italian government, their 
citizens’ education was important, particularly in light of continued illiteracy in Italy. In addition, 
however, for both the West German and Italian governments the children’s education was a tool 
to promote their own international political goals at a bilateral level, as well as at the level of the 
expanding European Community. For both the Italian and the West German governments, their 
views of European Community integration and local agendas shaped what school initiatives they 
were willing to permit and develop and, eventually, what programs the children had access to.  
For the Italian government during the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, one of its major 
goals was to promote European integration, partly in order to improve its international reputation 
and alleviate unemployment. In the immediate post-1945 period, the Italian state had to recover 
international reputation, because of its Fascist past, its alliance with Nazi Germany and the 
devastation that World War II had caused. The Italian peace treaty stipulated the loss of 
significant territory and required the Italian state to pay reparations to the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia. Hoping for an alteration to that treaty and in order to be again recognized as an 
important international player, the pro-Western government threw itself into international 
developments. Under Christian Democratic Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi (1945 to 1953) 
the Italian state supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Marshall 
                                                
5 “1. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des am 8. Februar 1956 in Bonn 
unterzeichneten Kulturabkommens zwischen Italien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Rom, 9. bis 11. 
Dezember 1958,” Protokoll, (December 11, 1958), B 90, Bd. 815, PA AA; and “2. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen 
Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des am 8. Februar 1956 in Bonn unterzeichneten Kulturabkommens 
zwischen Italien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Unkel/am Rhein von 4. bis 6. Oktober 1960,” Protokoll 
(Unkel/am Rhein, October 6, 1960), B 90, Bd. 732, PA AA. 
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Plan, the European Recovery Program initiated by the United States.6 Nonetheless, while 
interested in a strong Atlantic connection, the Italian state’s position remained weak, leading it to 
push for further European cooperation in the hopes of increasing its international standing, 
particularly in the Mediterranean. That hope led the state’s involvement in the founding of the 
Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).7 
After De Gasperi, under successive Christian Democratic Prime Ministers, the Italian 
state played a central, if often ignored, role in the “re-launching of Europe.” The Italian state also 
had a long Europeanist tradition it hoped to profit from. The new generation of Italian politicians 
promoted the European Economic Community as an opportunity for igniting the Italian economy 
and for social modernization. It was partly Italy, then, in various discussions with the members 
of the ECSC and later the European Economic Community (both of which were later folded into 
the European Community) that pushed for the development of a European social policy as well 
as freedom of movement for Community Member State nationals.8 
The Italian delegation’s successes in the European sphere led to access to the West 
German labor market.9 The Italian state suffered from high unemployment, which it hoped to 
alleviate through labor migration. For Italy, there was a long tradition of labor emigration 
beginning with the founding of the state in the 1860s.10 The young state initially tried to stem 
emigration, but finding that goal impossible, developed programs for encouraging their cultural 
                                                
6 Antonio Varsori, “Italy’s European Policy1,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 25 (January 2011): 41–64. Alcide De 
Gasperi (1881–1954) served as Prime Minister from December 1945 through August 1953.  
7 Ibid., 42–45. 
8 Ibid., 50–51. 
9 Ibid., 51. 
10 Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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maintenance instead. In the post-1945 era, the Italian state resumed those efforts, partly to 
alleviate high unemployment, particularly in southern Italy.11 Only with expanded European 
cooperation, however, was it able to send significant numbers of workers abroad.  
For migrant workers, West Germany was a particularly attractive destination on account 
of its booming economy. In the 1950s, all across Western and Central Europe, the various 
European economies were recovering from the war. The Federal Republic’s economy exploded, 
growing fast enough that it needed additional workers.12 Until the construction of the Berlin Wall 
by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1961, the majority of the country’s labor needs 
were filled by refugees from communist East Germany in 1961, the majority of the country’s 
labor needs were filled by ethnic German migrants. Nonetheless, the West German state also fell 
back on older traditions of recruiting seasonal labor from across Southern Europe, partly with an 
eye toward its international reputation.13 In the company of countries like Switzerland, West 
Germany would become the destination country for the largest total number of migrant workers 
during the period.14  
Like for the Italian government, until the mid-1960s the West German government under 
Christian Democratic Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard saw the European Community and 
                                                
11 Varsori, “Italy’s European Policy1.” 
12 For a discussion of the re-militarization of West Germany, see Friederike Brühöfener, “Defining the West German 
Soldier: Military, Masculinity and Society in West Germany, 1945--1989” (Ph.D., The University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, 2014), 1945–1989. 
13 Herbert, “Immigration, Integration, Foreignness: Foreign Workers in Germany since the Turn of the Century”; 
and Oliver Grant, Migration and Inequality in Germany, 1870-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 17, 
90–91. 
14 Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, trans. Allison Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 
227–240; and Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe: From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2011), 5–11.  
  78 
European integration as a way to improve its international standing.15 Unlike the Italian state, 
however, it was the German Democratic Republic, not the Federal Republic, that had to pay war 
reparations to the Soviet Union. Without that drain on state finances, and with Marshall Plan 
funding, West Germany was able to rebuild relatively quickly.  
In order to improve its international relations and support that growth, the West German 
government signed (as host country) a series of bilateral labor contracts with a series of eight 
different states (sending countries) in Southern and South Eastern Europe as well as North 
Africa.16 Responding to the Italian government’s’ advocacy, the Federal Republic’s first “guest 
worker agreement” was with the Republic of Italy in 1955.17 The other agreements would, as 
mentioned, be signed with Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, 
Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and Yugoslavia in 1968.18  
For the Italian Government, by 1960, five years after signing its bilateral labor 
agreement, there were enough children with Italian citizenship abroad generally and in West 
Germany specifically to make the schooling of its emigrants an active concern. Because the 
largest communities of Italian citizens in West Germany lived in North Rhine-Westphalia and 
                                                
15 Ronald J. Granieri, The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West, 1949-1966 (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2002). 
16 Frederick Cooper discusses the move for independence and citizenship in French West and North Africa in 
Citizenship Between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2014).  
17 See Heike Knortz, Diplomatische Tauschgeschäfte: “Gastarbeiter” in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und 
Beschäftigungspolitik 1953-1973 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008); Sala, “Vom ‘Fremdarbeiter’ Zum ‘Gastarbeiter’: Die 
Anwerbung Italienischer Arbeitskräfte Für Die Deutsche Wirtschaft (1938-1973)”; and Steinert, “Migration and 
Migration Policy,” 14–17. Bavaria, however, did want to renew the seasonal labor contracts (“Bekanntmachung zu 
dem Kulturabkommen zwischen der Bundespublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik,” 
\iBundesgesetzblatt, Teil II, no. 5 (February 6, 1958): 77–84). The agreement was signed 8 February 1956 and came 
into power on 9 December 1957. 
18 For a discussion of “othering” and the contracts, see Jeffrey Peck, Mitchell Ash, and Christiane Lemke, “Native, 
Strangers, and Foreigners: Constituting Germans by Constructing Others,” in After Unity: Reconfiguring German 
Identities, ed. Konrad Hugo Jarausch (Providence, R.I: Berghahn Books, 1997), 75; and Steinert, “Migration and 
Migration Policy,” 1945–61.  
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Baden-Württemberg, the question of compulsory schooling and integration was a pressing issue. 
The Italian government did not want its citizens to move abroad only to become illiterate in both 
Italian and German, thereby effectively becoming unemployable.  
Concern over literacy and employability combined with the Italian state’s focus on 
European cooperation led the Italian state to push integration. With a long tradition of labor 
emigration, the Italian state was fully aware that a large portion of its citizens would not return to 
Italy. These migrants, however, could provide a bridge between the Italian and West German 
states, encouraging collaboration as they developed connections in both countries. Hence, for the 
Italian government, both its own and its citizens’ best interests were served by full integration 
into the West German school system and society. That integration, however, did not preclude 
continued identification as Italians, particularly as they were not eligible for German citizenship 
(which was still based on paternity). To fully take advantage of possible connections, the 
children needed to identify as Europeans, encompassing both the Italian and German sides of 
their identity. It was toward that end that the Italian delegation in 1960 promoted full integration 
into the school system combined with a few hours of Italian instruction to encourage a cultural 
connection.19  
The Italian state did not, however, think that only its citizens should be representative of 
European integration. Even before trying to establish Italian instruction for its own citizens, the 
Italian state tried to promote Italian language instruction in West Germany for the ethno-nation 
German majority. In the name of European integration and in line with the Council of Europe’s 
recommendations promoting modern language instruction, the Italian state argued that both 
countries needed to establish more language classes. When the two countries signed their 1956 
                                                
19 “2. deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission (1960).” 
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bilateral Cultural Agreement, in the section on education, the Italian government largely 
concentrated on the establishment of language classes for Germans in Italy and Italians in the 
Federal Republic, although they also discussed the few German schools already in Italy.20 Those 
few German schools in Italy were mainly for the children of high-level officials and diplomats, 
which neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the Republic of Italy’s governments were 
particularly concerned about in the 1950s. Modern language classes, however, could 
theoretically be made available to a large number of school children in both countries. The 
Italian government argued – both with West Germany directly and in bilateral and international 
meetings on the European level – that it was these kinds of classes that would best promote 
cultural exchange and European integration by encouraging communication and hence 
understanding.21  
The West German Länder Education Administrations theoretically agreed with the Italian 
government’s arguments regarding modern foreign language instruction.22 Nonetheless, the 
Länder decided to focus on English as a first foreign language and established Latin and French 
                                                
20 The Cultural Agreement between the FRG and the Republic of Turkey was signed on 8 February 1956 and came 
into power on 9 December 1957 (“Kulturabkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Italienischen Republik,” Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II no. 5 (1958): 77–84). Cultural Agreements framed the involved 
countries’ cultural relationships. Among other things, the Agreements outlined acceptable cultural exchange by 
committing to, among other things, literary and film translations, music and theater troops exchange, as well as 
archeology. Most of the Agreements also incorporated final paragraphs dictating the creation of (bi-yearly) Joint 
Commissions, during which the relevant parties involved could discuss implementation and possibly changes. For a 
discussion of what “cultural politics” are, see Zsolt Nagy, “Grand Delusions: Interwar Hungarian Cultural 
Diplomacy, 1918-1941” (Ph.D., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012), 1918–1941. For a 
discussion of Italy’s cultural politics at the beginning of the 1970s, see UNESCO, “Cultural Policy in Italy; and a 
Survey Prepared Under the Auspices of the Italian Commission for Unesco” (Paris: UNESCO, 1971). 
21 “Kulturabkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik”; and “1. deutsch-
italienischen Gemischten Kommission (1958).” 
22 Many secondary schools across Europe continued to emphasize the classical languages, including Ancient Greek 
and Latin instead of modern languages, which included modern French, English, and Italian. 
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as the normal options for a second required language.23 In consequence, while the Italian 
government pushed for more Italian language instruction in West Germany, only a few Länder 
Education Administrations would provide Italian language courses as a voluntary third or fourth 
modern foreign language in upper levels of secondary schools (Realschule or Gymnasium).24 
Consequently, the majority of children in West Germany had little to no exposure to, much less 
opportunity to learn, the Italian language.25  
In contrast, demonstrating its commitment to modern language acquisition, the Italian 
state made significant efforts to ensure the spread of German language acquisition. In Italy, the 
study of foreign languages began in the first year of lower secondary school.26 The Italian state 
introduced the compulsory three-year middle school (for around eleven to fourteen year old 
students), a form of lower secondary school, in 1962 in order to meet the new demands that post-
1945 industrialization placed on the work force. In so doing Christian Democrat Luigi Giu,27 
                                                
23 Some of those guidelines were part of the 1955 Düsseldorf Agreement (Saul B. Robinsohn and J. Caspar 
Kuhlmann, “Two Decades of Non-Reform in West German Education,” Comparative Education Review 11, no. 3 
(October 1967): 311–30). 
24 See “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission: hier: IV. Unterricht der deutschen Sprache in 
italienischen Schulen und der italienischen Sprache an deutschen Schulen,” Protokoll, (January 23, 1963), B 90, Bd. 
815, PA AA. 
25 Ibid. All children in West German secondary and intermediate schools had to take at least one modern foreign 
language, and schoolchildren in secondary modern schools, which about half of the secondary school pupils 
attended, had to learn two with the possibility of learning a third foreign language. For example, in Berlin, modern 
languages were taught in the top forms of primary schools and the teaching of modern foreign languages in primary 
school was spreading steadily into the other Länder. In Italy in the new intermediate school, the study of foreign 
languages began in the first year. Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, “I. Resolutions Adopted 
by the 2nd and 3rd Conferences of European Ministers of Education on Modern Language Teaching; and II. 
Summary of Action Taken on National and International Level as a Follow-up of the Resolutions (extract from the 
Document Min.ed./London (64) 1),” Fourth Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of 
Europe, February 28, 1964), Box 2431, Council of Europe. 
26 Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, “Resolutions Adopted.” For more on Italian education 
reform in the 1950s and 1960s, see Pippa Pridham, “The Problems of Educational Reform in Italy: The Case of the 
Decreti Delegati,” Comparative Education 14, no. 3 (October 1, 1978): 223–41. 
27 Luigi Giu (1914-2010) was the Italian Minister of Education, at the time the “Italian Minister of Public 
Instruction,” under Christian Democratic Prime Ministers Amintore Fanfani (January 1954 to February 1954, July 
1960 to June 1963, December 1982 to august 1983, and April 1987 to July 1987), Giovanni Leone (Prime Minister 
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Italian Minister of Education between 1962 and 1968 for the various center-left coalition 
governments, sought to extend that lower secondary school to all citizens instead of an elite 
cohort, thereby encouraging equal opportunity. The addition of the lower secondary school to the 
five-year primary school system meant that a larger number of schoolchildren had a chance to 
attend university instead of vocational training, thereby producing a needed skilled labor base.28 
Part of those changes included curricular development and the addition of foreign language 
instruction.29 Largely successful, by 1963, according to the numbers provided by the Italian 
government during a joint meeting of the Cultural Commission, there were 62,306 Italian 
schoolchildren who were learning German in Italy as a required subject.30  
Nonetheless, even in 1964 as the Länder Education Administrations reformed the local 
school system, they continued to dismiss the possibility of Italian language instruction for ethnic 
Germans.31 Part of this decision was evidenced in the October 1964 Hamburg Agreement 
(Hamburger Abkommen), prepared by the Kulturministerkonferenz, which aimed to standardize 
the West Geman school system. The Hamburg Agreement stipulated that all schoolchildren were 
                                                                                                                                                       
from June 1963 to December 1963 and then June 1968 to December 1968 as well as President December 1971 to 
June 1978), and Aldo Moro (in office December 1963 to June 1968 and then again November 1974 to July 1976). 
During his political carreer, Giu would also serve as Minister of Health and Minister of the Interior. 
28 Günter Brinkmann and Wolfgang Hörner, “Italy,” in The Education Systems of Europe, ed. Wolfgang Hörner et 
al. (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007), 397. 
29 For more on reform of the curriculum into the 1970s, see Lamberto Borghi, “Lower Secondary Education in Italy 
with Particular Reference to the Curriculum,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education 10, 
no. 2 (January 1, 1980): 133–40. 
30 See “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission.” The Italian Delegation expressed frustration when 
the West German delegation claims that they could not really do anything because of Länder-jurisdiction and the 
Düsseldorf Agreement. 
31 Carl-Ludwig Furck, “Das Schulsystem: Primarbereich - Hauptschule - Realschule - Gymnasium - Gesamtschule,” 
in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and 
Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 2 vols., 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 282–356; and Christoph Führ, “On the Educaiton 
System of the Five New Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany [1992],” in Education in Germany: Tradition 
and Reform in Historical Context, ed. David Phillips (New York: Routledge, 2013), 266, 271–273.  
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to start learning their first required foreign language – usually English – in all schools from the 
fifth grade onwards (occasionally the sixth). The Agreement also laid out the levels/years for a 
second foreign language, which were still supposed to be Latin, French, or English.32 The 
Agreement, however, also opened up the possibility of learning a different first or second foreign 
language, offering local schools the option of offering alternative languages. Yet, relatively few 
Länder Education Administrations offered Italian language programs at any level of secondary 
schools.33  
For children with Dutch citizenship, in contrast, the Kultusministerkonferenz and the 
Foreign Office considered the possibility of permitting Dutch in place of French as an acceptable 
second foreign language, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia where the largest group of 
Dutch children lived. A small number of North Rhine-Westphalian schools already offered 
Dutch language instruction (a few Realschulen had put together two-hour working groups, and 
there were two four-hour working groups in two Gymnasien in the boarder town Emmerich). 
Furthermore, the Dutch and West German delegations at the first meeting of the Joint West 
German-Dutch Cultural Commission set up a working group to look into the question of 
“support of language in the partner country” and explore ways language teachers could be made 
available.34  
                                                
32 Christoph Führ, “Review of Ten Years of Educational Reform in the Federal Republic of Germany or Was There 
an Educational Catastrophe?,” Western European Education 6, no. 4 (December 1, 1974): 38–51; and Stephanie 
Marshall, “The German Perspective,” Comparative Education 25, no. 3 (January 1, 1989): 309–17. 
33 “5. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des zwischen Italien und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Kulturabkommens, Rom, 25.-27.Mai 1966,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 
27, 1966), 8, B 97, Bd. 270, PA AA. 
34 Förderung der Sprache im Partnerland. The conversation about Dutch language instruction in West Germany 
focused predominately on the post-secondary level with some emphasis on the training and exchange of language 
teachers. They did, however, discuss the question of schoolbooks and the first meetings (since the 1950s) of the 
presentation of history for the schoolbooks. See Kräling, “Deutsch-niederländisches Kulturabkommen,” November 
9, 1965, Anlage 1, B 90, Bd. 854, PA AA; and “Sitzung der Deutsch-Niederländischen Kulturkommission: 
Förderung des niederländischen Sprachunterrichts in Deutschland,” Bulletin - Presse und Informationsamt der 
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The Länder Education Administrations’ willingness to develop Dutch language programs 
for secondary schools but not Italian ones stemmed from multiple concerns. First, there were 
actually more school-age Dutch citizens living in North Rhine-Westphalia in the early and mid-
1960s than Italian citizens. In addition, because of earlier migration, the Dutch government 
started advocating for its citizens’ scholastic inclusion beginning in the mid-1950s. Perhaps more 
importantly, however, although both the Netherlands and Italy were European Community 
Member States the West German government viewed them as culturally different. According to 
the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration, Dutch citizens were culturally similar 
enough that they did not need support for integration or for cultural classes. In contrast, Italian 
citizens were not only culturally different enough to warrant consideration of cultural classes, but 
for many ethnic Germans they were culturally inferior, a subaltern group of Southerners, 
Mafioso, and garlic (or spaghetti) eaters. Furthermore, the West German authorities assumed that 
children with Italian citizenship would only be in lower secondary schools, meaning any Italian 
language programs in the higher levels of secondary school would be for ethnic German 
children.35  
Although the West German Federal and Länder governments were not receptive to 
providing Italian language instruction to the local ethno-national majority, they were willing to 
consider developing Italian language and cultural programs for Italian citizens in West Germany. 
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Consequently, when the Italian delegation surprised the West German delegation during their 
1960 Joint Cultural Commission meeting with the Italian government’s request for Italian 
cultural instruction for its citizens, the West German delegation felt the appeal was “eminently 
reasonable,” particularly in comparison to the idea of promoting Italian language classes for 
ethnic Germans.36 Unable to take any action, however, the German delegation suggested the 
Italian legation approach the Länder Education Administrations or the school boards in cities 
with larger groups of Italian citizens, like Essen in North Rhine-Westphalia.  
The Italian government directed its Foreign Missions to approach the Education 
Administrations in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg, two of the Länder with the 
largest communities of Italian citizens. The two Länder had several similarities. At the time, a 
Christian Democratic Coalition (CDU) led their governments. Both were industrial states with 
factories in need of unskilled labor, making them two of the largest areas of recruitment. It was 
not a coincidence that these two Länder were among the three that had not changed their 
compulsory school laws in the early 1950s to cover foreign citizens, although they encouraged 
voluntary school attendance.37 Consequently, not only were these two Länder prime locations for 
Italian consular courses, but the Italian consulates were already pressing for changes to local 
school laws in order to promote integration. Nonetheless, despite their similarities, when the 
                                                
36 Sekretariat and Schermuly to Kultusministerium BW and Kultusministerium NRW, “Deutsch-italienisches 
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local Italian Consulates inquired about setting up cultural instruction the North Rhine-
Westphalian and Baden-Württemberg Education Administrations approached the question of 
cultural instruction from opposite directions.  
Of the two, the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration in Düsseldorf was 
the first to take action, responding to the local Italian Consulates’ requests as well as logistical 
considerations. In November 1960, when the Italian Consul in Cologne approached the North 
Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education with the recommendation from the Joint Cultural 
Commission in hand, the Ministry of Education was supportive.38 Although not pressing, the 
Ministry felt that the creation of Italian language classes for schoolchildren with Italian 
citizenship would be a positive development. According to the Ministry, however, there were 
barely enough children with Italian citizenship in West Germany to make the issue relevant.39 
Instead, the Ministry saw cultural courses as a sign of goodwill between the host and sending 
country as well as needed support for the connection between “foreign children” and their 
culture. As a result, the Ministry’s representatives neither agreed to open these courses to 
“German” children nor to make them compulsory.40 
The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s willingness to immediately 
address the issue upon request stemmed from the state’s emphasis on developing selfhood 
                                                
38 Consolato d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium NRW, “No. 24583.” 
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(Persönlichkeit) of the child, a central component of which was ethno-cultural identification. For 
the Ministry, the development of ethno-cultural identification was a fundamental human right, 
one that it was supposed to protect.41 Toward that end, for North Rhine-Westphalia, cultural 
instruction took precedence over integration during the 1960s. Integration was important, but 
integration required a public education that would teach Germanness. As the children of migrant 
workers – including Italians – were not going to become German citizens, they needed to be 
taught what it meant to be whoever they were.  
Arguing that, in the name of human rights, children had a right to maintain their own 
cultures, the North Rhine-Westphalian Education Administration began working with the Italian 
Consulate in Cologne to develop language and cultural courses – eventually called “consular 
classes” – in 1961. While it was the first Education Administration to work on the issue in West 
Germany, the Italian and North Rhine-Westphalian representatives involved did not start with a 
blank slate. The Italian government had already set up classes for language and cultural 
instruction in Belgium with the assistance of the Belgian government. Once it was clear that 
something was actually going to be done, the Italian Consulate in Cologne called one Magliulo, 
who had led the team setting up the consular courses in Belgium, to work with the North Rhine-
Westphalian Ministry of Education.42 Although with parameters modified to meet local needs, 
the consular instruction developed in North Rhine-Westphalia would be based on the earlier 
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Belgian courses, which ran five hours a week for children attending local public schools 
corresponding to their age. Instruction, using Italian school materials, focused on the Italian 
language, history, geography, and religion. They would almost immediately begin to include 
some German language training, as both the Consulate in Cologne and the six District Presidents 
(Regierungspräsidenten) in North Rhine-Westphalia expressed concerns that some of the 
children had limited German language knowledge and hence some difficulties following the 
West German classes.43 
From the beginning of the joint Italian-German team’s discussions about consular classes, 
the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education had agreed to finance the instruction. The 
Ministry felt that, as an important aspect of education, it had a responsibility for providing 
cultural instruction even if the schooling of Italian citizens was not yet legally the state’s 
responsibility. That willingness, however, also shaped the consular class’s structures and limited 
the number of schoolchildren who would be reached. Initially, the Italian and North Rhine-
Westphalian team wanted to set up classes for any group of five schoolchildren with Italian 
citizenship. The team abandoned this preference, however, because the number of teachers from 
Italy needed for such a set-up was prohibitive. Even more problematic was the fact that, based on 
North Rhine-Westphalian wage stipulations, the teachers would have needed to teach a minimum 
of five classes to earn a living wage, which would have been impractical (if not impossible) in 
regions where only a single class was needed. In the end, the international team settled on groups 
                                                
43 See Regierungspäsident Düsseldorf to Schulämter der Stadt- und Landkreise des Bezirks, “Italienische Kinder in 
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of a minimum of 15 schoolchildren (maximum of 25) for a single class with five weekly hours of 
instruction taught by teachers selected by the Italian Ministry of Education. 
After some delays, involving the availability of schoolrooms and the arrival of the 
teachers from Italy, the Italian consular classes began in the 1961/62 school-year in January 
1962, in the region around Düsseldorf. Additional classes were already scheduled to begin with 
the upcoming school year 1962/63 starting after Easter 1962.44 Although the courses spread 
quickly, the process of arranging additional classes required a series of back-and-forth 
communications that took some time. Once an Italian Consulate had determined that there was a 
group of 15-25 school children with Italian citizenship, the Consulate, in communication with 
the individual District Presidents, alerted the Ministry of Education.45 The relevant local school 
board then had to confirm the group’s existence, after which the North Rhine-Westphalian 
Ministry of Education would arrange for classrooms with the relevant District Presidents and 
local education authorities and discuss funding for the teachers’ wages with the Ministry for 
Finance.46 Meanwhile, the local Italian Consulate had to coordinate with the Italian Ministry of 
Education in Rome to arrange for personnel and school materials. The local Italian Consulates 
technically employed the teachers, but the North Rhine-Westphalian state paid them. Those 
wages, based on a special work contracts, included weekly remuneration of 8, – Deutsch Marks 
per instructional hour. In addition, these teachers, who taught up to six classes a week, received 
                                                
44 By March 1962, the Ministry of Education sent out general instructions to the four District Presidents in NRW. 
Magliulo was to contact them individually (Consolato Generale d’Italia, Colonia to Kultusministerium des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen and Werner Schültz, “No. 04618, Pos. F-12/19,” March 26, 1962, 19, NW 141-111, 
Landesarchiv NRW). Prof. Magliulo also mentions this concern in “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen 
Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” Gemeinsame Niederschrift, (January 27, 1962), B 304/3245/1, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz.  
45 Kultusministerium NRW to Sekretariat, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulturabkommen,” October 31, 1961, NW 141-
111, Landesarchiv NRW. 
46 Kultusminister NRW II C 3 (Bermann) to II A (im Haus), “Unterricht für Kinder von Ausländern.”  
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remuneration from North Rhine-Westphalia for costs incurred for travel between the different 
classes.47 
By the end of 1962, the consular courses received general acclaim. Reports from the 
District Presidents and notes from the Italian Consulate in Cologne declared that the children’s 
guardians were happy about the Italian-language classes.48 Magliulo, in turn, praised the consular 
courses under development in North Rhine-Westphalia, claiming that they had met with 
success.49 Nonetheless, not all of the evaluations were positive. For example, the Chair of the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee argued that while there were benefits, the classes 
also brought with them “considerable difficulties,” referring to the long lag times between 
requesting courses and actual implementation, among other issues.50 
Happy with the consular courses in North Rhine-Westphalia, the Italian Government 
wanted to reach more of its citizens across West Germany. During a 1962 meeting between the 
West German and Italian delegations, Magliulo forcefully requested that the other four Länder 
interested (Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and Saarland) send him information about the 
“Italian children” living in their borders.51 Yet, although the Italian government felt the 
instruction was important, the majority of the Länder governments did not. In 1962, there were 
simply not enough children with Italian citizenship in any of the Länder to make the issue a 
serious concern. Instead, the various West German bodies involved – from the Foreign Office to 
                                                
47 See Stolze to Piazollo, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder italienischer Gastarbeiter,” November 30, 1962, NW 
1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW.  
48 Ibid.  
49 “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik.” 
50 Hans Reimers to Vizepräsidenten des Kirchlichen Außenamtes der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, “Sch. 
152,” March 19, 1963, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
51 “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik.”  
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the Educational Administrations – viewed these courses as a positive acknowledgement of small 
national minorities and a demonstration of “friendliness” to foreign states.52  
In some Länder, like Baden-Württemberg, the small size of the group was one of but not 
the only reason for delay. Only in January 1962, as North Rhine-Westphalia got its first Italian 
consular courses off the ground, did Baden-Württemberg discuss opening similar courses with 
the Italian Consulate in Stuttgart.53 The initial delays in starting the dialogue had been first on 
account of the Italian Consul in Stuttgart’s illness, but then due to an unfavorable analysis from 
Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education. In 1960, only 367 schoolchildren with Italian 
citizenship, of different (and changing) ages and therefore class levels, lived across Baden-
Württemberg. Gerhard Storz, Christian Democratic Minister of Education from 1958-1964,54 
argued that that geographic and individual diversity meant the establishment of any centralized 
measures for cultural education would lead to unnecessary complications, due to “new 
difficulties and unexpected barriers.”55 According to Storz, the Italian population living in 
Baden-Württemberg was too small to warrant any especial efforts.  
                                                
52 Ibid. It was actually not infrequent that the Federal Government had only limited knowledge of what was actually 
happening with the schooling of “foreign children.” See, for example, Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminsiters der 
Länder an den Vorsitzenden des Schulausschusses, “Unterrichtskurse für Kinder italienischer Arbeitnehmer,” 
February 7, 1963, B 304/3245/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
53 See Sekretariat, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulturabkommen,” Vermerk (KMK, December 1, 1961), B 304/3245/1, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and “IV. Die Betreuung der italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik.” By January 
1962, BW and Hesse had also begun talks with the relevant consulates (Bavaria and Saarland had not).  
54 Dr. Gerhard Storz (1898-1983), a soldier in the First World War, was a German pedagogue, writer, and Christian 
Democratic politician. He held the office of Minister of Culture in Baden-Württemberg between 1958 and 1964, 
during which time he worked to reform the Gymnasium system and supported the founding of the Universities in 
Konstanz and Ulm. 
55 Largest group of 39 lived in Stuttgart (Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/682: Schriftliche Antwort des 
Kultusministeriums Baden-Württemberg auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abd. Stefie Restle betr. Ausländerkinder in 
deutschen Schulklassen” (Stuttgart, February 6, 1961), 1140, EA 3/609 Bü 66, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart).  
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For Storz, however, the bigger issue was the social role of schools and education. The 
Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education under Storz argued that it was responsible for 
enrolling all children into West German schools, not for providing cultural or foreign language 
support. Storz believed that these children lived in West Germany and at least some of them 
would remain in the country. Therefore, in his view, the school’s role for foreign residents was 
exactly the same as it was supposed to be for local children: to prepare them to act as Germans as 
long as they lived in Germany. Only with a full German education would they be able to 
participate in local society. 
Table 2.1: Schoolchildren in Public Schools in Baden-Württemberg by Citizenship, 1960-
1963 
 Total Children Total foreign (% of Total) Italian Spanish Greek Turkish Polish Other 
196056 886,572 1,208 (.14) 367 52 97 6 161 525 
196257 938,189 4,061 (.43) 1,109 344 306 83 287 1,932 
196358 963,181 5,000 (.52) 1,906 826 506 1,755 
 
Yet, within two years, as Table 2.1 demonstrates, the total number of “foreign 
schoolchildren” had more than tripled in Baden-Württemberg, changing the situation. The Berlin 
Wall had been erected and West German companies had started aggressively recruiting Southern 
European workers. With a (slowly) growing number of schoolchildren with Italian citizenship, 
multiple schools now enrolled more than a single “foreign schoolchild” in individual classes. At 
                                                
56 Ibid., 1140; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1962), 92. 
57 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2524: Schritliche Antwort des Kultusministeriums Baden-Württemberg auf die 
Kleine Anfrage der Abg. Krause und Gen. betr. schulische Betreuung ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlicher” 
(Stuttgart, October 29, 1962), 4831–4832; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1965), 92. 
58 Kultusministerium BW to Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” January 30, 
1964, B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1966), 95.  
  93 
the end of 1962, that transformation, together with continued pressure from the Italian Consulate 
in Stuttgart and the West German Foreign Office, led Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of 
Education to agree to the construction of a “central course” in greater Stuttgart, where 51 
“children with Italian citizenship” attended local schools. In that central course for children with 
Italian citizenship, Italian teachers would instruct the children in their mother tongue as well as 
in history, geography, and German.59  
By June 1963, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education had formulated a set of 
general guidelines for its four Regional School Boards to follow when working with the Italian 
Consulates – or those of other foreign states – to set up new classes. Similar to the guidelines in 
North Rhine-Westphalia, the Ministry’s decree stipulated that foreign consulates could set up a 
class for any group of at least 15 children with foreign citizenship, to run five hours a week.60 In 
contrast to North Rhine-Westphalia, these classes were the responsibility of the Italian 
government. The Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education permitted them in addition to 
regular instruction, but declared it would not fund them. Initially Baden-Württemberg’s 
Education Administration provided no financial concessions, except to instruct the relevant 
schools to make schoolrooms available. Within the year, however, the Ministry of Education 
began providing small subsidies per class to the Consulate. In the 1960s, this difference between 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg was almost purely financial. Otherwise, the 
Italian government had almost complete control over the teachers, organization, and content of 
the courses.61 In the 1970s, however, that difference in funding would lead to different curricula 
                                                
59 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2524.” – this question was put forward by the SPD during the 3rd Wahlperiode. 
60 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to alle Bezirksschulämter, “AV H 41 Nr. 473,” June 5, 1963, EA 3/505 Bü 
405/1, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
61 By January 1964, Baden-Württemberg had not only began 20 classes for children with Italian citizenship, but also 
classes for children with Spanish and Greek citizenship (see Table 2.1 for numbers of schoolchildren) as well. 
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and operations as the Länder – like North Rhine-Westphalia – funding the courses sought to take 
increasing control over them.  
In 1963 and 1964, with regulations in place for cultural classes for Italian citizens, both 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg started permitting similar classes for the 
children of Greek and then Spanish citizens as well.62 Despite not being European Community 
Member State nationals (they joined the EC in 1981 and 1986 respectively), these two ethno-
national groups’ countries of citizenship also had bilateral labor agreements with the West 
German government, making associated migrants’ care partly Länder responsibility. 
Consequently, when the Spanish and Greek governments expressed interest in having something 
similar to these Italian consular classes for their growing migration populations (see Table 2.1), 
the Länder governments agreed. With guidelines for cultural and language instruction already in 
place, North Rhine-Westphalia’s and Baden-Württemberg’s (and other Länder’s) Education 
Administrations extended permission for “sending country” governments (countries with 
bilateral labor agreements) to establish consular classes.63  
Yet, it should be noted that neither of the Länder Education Administrations extended 
permission to create courses for all ethno-national minority groups. This privilege was only 
extended to those with a supposedly significant degree of cultural difference.64 In North Rhine-
                                                
62 The West German government signed bilateral labor agreements with Spain and Greece in 1960. Steinert, 
“Migration and Migration Policy,” 21–24. 
63 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2371: Kleine Anfrage der Abg. Krause und Gen. betr. Schulische Betreuung 
ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlicher” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, September 19, 1962); and Kultusministerium 
BW and Piayolo to Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht Für Kinder Ausländischer Gastarbeiter.”  
64 Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference, 
ed. Fredrik Barth (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998), 9–38; Carol Weisbrod, “The Debate over Education: 
Truth, Peace, Citizenship,” in Emblems of Pluralism: Cultural Differences and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 138–56; Cornelia Wilhelm, “Diversity in Germany: A Historical Perspective,” German 
Politics and Society 31, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 13–29; and David Bartram, Maritsa Poros, and Pierre Monforte, Key 
Concepts in Migration (SAGE, 2014), 84. 
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Westphalia, for example, the Education Administration continued to deny any need to construct 
supplemental cultural and language classes for schoolchildren with Dutch citizenship as the 
“maintenance of the Dutch language was not a priority.”65 According to the Ministry of 
Education, there were already a “considerable” number of Dutch children in North Rhine-
Westphalian schools who mastered the German language quickly and consequently did not need 
special training.66  
The development of Italian language instruction in West Germany reflects the involved 
state actors’ divergent assumptions regarding the place of Italian citizens and Italian culture in 
West Germany. For the West German Education Administrations, the assumption that ethnic 
Italian children needed consular instruction when the Dutch did not reflected the West German 
perception of Italian children as a foreign other. Despite the Italian state’s inclusion in the 
European Community, the West German (and other Member States) often treated the Italian state 
and its citizens as inferior. Nonetheless, both in the European Community as well as in West 
Germany, the Italian state played an influential role in shaping policy and regulations.  
Integration and Cultural Maintenance through Preparatory Classes (Vorklassen)  
In the early 1960s, the Italian state wanted its citizens to maintain cultural connections, 
but its first goal was still for its citizens to attend West German schools and succeed. After the 
                                                
65 Kultusminister NRW II A to Referat II B 2 (im Haus), “II A 36.0/0 Nr. 1090/62,” June 27, 1962, NW 1223-269, 
Landesarchiv NRW. The Dutch Consulate began this discussion in house by requesting information on Compulsory 
Schooling for Dutch citizens in NRW. See Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen and Referat II B 2 to 
Referat II A 4 im Hause and Referat II C 6 im Hause, “II B 2 - 36 - 0/0 Nr. 67/62,” June 12, 1962, NW 1223-269, 
Landesarchiv NRW. Yet, In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the government used its 1963 regulations to 
argue that the government only needed to act when there was a necessity (Kultusministerium Nordrhein-Westfalen 
and Tiebel to Regierungspräsidenten in Detmold, “Schulbesuch von Schülern, die nicht die deutsche 
Staatsangehörigkeit besitzen”).  
66 Kultusminister NRW II A to Referat II B 2 (im Haus), “II A 36.0/0 Nr. 1090/62”; and Kultusministerium NRW, 
Referat II B 2 to Referat II A 4 and II C 6 im Hause, “36 - 0/0 Nr. 67/62,” June 12, 1962, NW 1223-296, 
Landesarchiv NRW. They did, however, restate that should the schoolchildren with Dutch nationality wish to attend 
West German public schools, then NRW’s Ministry of Education would foot that bill. 
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Berlin Wall went up in 1961, cutting off most of the East-West migration, West German 
companies began recruiting more aggressively from the South. As more workers with Italian 
citizenship set down roots in Germany, they began bringing their children into the country. The 
foreign populations in individual schools soared (see Table 2.1). Where previously, most migrant 
school children with Italian citizenship had arrived in ones and twos, making integration 
relatively easy, the larger groups of children now arriving had difficulties integrating into the 
school system. In order to alleviate these problems for its citizens, the Italian government 
advocated new school initiatives to prepare children with Italian citizenship for integration into 
the local school system.67  
At the start of the 1960s, in line with international guidelines including Council of 
Europe recommendations, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education 
Administration assumed the state was responsible for both enabling and easing the enrollment of 
schoolchildren with foreign nationalities into West German schools. Yet, as the number of 
schoolchildren with foreign citizenship increased, multiple children in a classroom who could 
not speak German frequently caused disruption. It became clear that the Länder needed to take 
new steps to assist integration if the Education Administrations were to fulfill their obligations.68 
Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administrations (as well as those 
of Hesse, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony, whose populations of “foreign schoolchildren” were also 
growing) had to decide what steps to take. The stance on cultural maintenance and integration 
                                                
67 Kultusministerium NRW, “Intalienischunterricht für Kinder italienischer Arbeitskräfte in der Bundesrepublik,” II 
E 1. 02-26 Nr. 3493/60, (January 5, 1961), NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW; and “IV. Die Betreuung der 
italienischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” Gemeinsame Niederschrift, (January 27, 1962), B 304/3245/1, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
68 Kultusministerium BW, “Schulische und kulturelle Betreuung der Kinder der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer” 
(Stuttgart, March 12, 1963), EA 3/609 Bü 67, Baden-Württemberg Landesarchiv, Haupstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; and 
Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2371: Kleine Anfrage der Abg. Krause und Gen. betr. Schulische Betreuung 
ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlicher.”  
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that the two Länder Education Administrations’ in Baden Württemberg and North Rhine-
Westphalia took would again influence the development of school initiatives in the other federal 
states. 
Regarding the question of integration, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education 
addressed the issue early. Although in 1961 the Ministry still did not view special measures as 
necessary, the Ministry was already making plans for an “expected increase” in schoolchildren 
with non-German citizenship “due to new migration.” 69 As Christian Democratic Minister of 
Education Gerhard Storz would outline in response to an inquiry from Social Democratic 
Member of Bundestag Stefie Restle,70 the Ministry had three special measures under 
consideration. For smaller schools with a limited number of “foreign children,” the Ministry 
anticipated providing – in addition to regular instruction – private instruction in the German 
language, which was to be paid for by the parents, their employers, or the Youth Office. For 
larger cities with particularly sizeable groups of “foreign children” of a single nationality, the 
Ministry proposed creating “centralized special classes” (later renamed preparatory classes). The 
final measure under consideration was the creation of special support classes for the 
schoolchildren of the largest ethnic groups. Storz envisioned these being run along the lines of 
the boarding institutions with support classes for migrant ethnic German youths.71 
By 1962 the anticipated increase in labor migration was underway. As the number of 
children with non-German citizenship nearly quadrupled (rising to 4,061, see Table 2.1), some 
                                                
69 “Förderlehrgänge für spätausgesiedelte deutsche Jugendliche.” Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/682,” 1141.  
70 Stefie Restle (born 1901- died 1978) was a member of the SPD from 1926 and worked alternately as a 
stenographer and accountant before serving as a Member of Bundestag (Abgeordnete) from 1950 until 1968 (from 
1950-1952 as MP in the Württemberg-Baden Bundestag, from 1952-1953 in the Constituent Assembly, and from 
1953-1968 in the Baden-Württemberg Bundestag). Her main focus was on social policy.  
71 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/682,” 1141.  
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cities (i.e. Waiblingen near Stuttgart) began reporting that the dozens of newly arrived children 
could not be easily integrated. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education wanted to prevent its 
local schools and teachers from being overwhelmed. In response, the Ministry began 
implementing its planned measures.72 The third of the outlined initiatives (special support 
classes) would never become widespread, but the first (German language instruction) and second 
(preparatory classes) became standard practice through the subsequent decades, although not in 
the forms in which they were initially envisioned.  
The first measure, “Extra Instruction in German,” was intended for “foreign children” 
who needed to master the German language in order to follow classroom instruction and 
eventually “earn a diploma in secondary schools.” Funded by the state Baden-Württemberg, this 
supplemental German language instruction was supposed to be for smaller groups (less than 20) 
of newly arrived children or for children who needed language support after enrollment in 
“German schools.” Furthermore, it was only to be made available for older schoolchildren. 
Based on past experience, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education took the stance that non-
German citizens born in the country or starting in the first or second grade did not need extra 
support and should enroll directly in West German schools. These children were supposed to 
learn their German with “German schoolchildren” of their own age group.73 
                                                
72 Kultusministerium BW, “Schulische und kulturelle Betreuung der Kinder der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer.” See 
also Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2371: Kleine Anfrage der Abg. Krause und Gen. betr. Schulische Betreuung 
ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlicher.” In response to this growing number of “foreign children” and their limited 
German language knowledge upon school attendance, the SPD Members of Bundestag (MPs) asked the State 
Government several questions about how measures had changed since the previous inquiry in 1960/61. They 
inquired about costs, school attendance (particularly in regards to vocational schools).  
73 Zusätzlicher Unterricht in Deutsch. Kultusministerium BW and Nothardt, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von 
Ausländerkindern, insbesondere von Kindern ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Kultus- und Unterricht, April 14, 1965, 
176.  
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Nonetheless, based on the reports of the four Regional School Boards, older children did 
need extra support. It was for larger groups of older “foreign children” that the second measure – 
preparatory classes – was designed. These classes were supposed to prepare newly arrived 
children for entrance into the West German school system. So as to avoid overwhelming Baden-
Württemberg’s schools, groups of a minimum of 20 schoolchildren from a single language group 
living in a single (or a few) school district(s) were supposed to be gathered into their own 
classes. In these classes, teachers from the children’s country of origin taught two-thirds of the 
classroom instruction in their native tongue while a German teacher provided one-third of the 
children’s lessons in German. The goal was to provide the children with enough German 
language skills to enable them to participate in the West German classroom while preventing 
them from falling behind their age group.74 The Ministry of Education planned for children to 
attend the classes for up to one year and then transfer into a local public school (primary and 
lower secondary) class corresponding to their age and level.75 Neither Baden-Württemberg’s 
Ministry of Education nor the Italian consulates considered higher levels of secondary schools 
(Realschulen and Gymnasien) at this juncture. 
In contrast, although North-Rhine Westphalia’s Ministry of Education had jumped at the 
chance to develop consular courses, the Ministry waffled over special measures for integration. 
Yet, the Italian Consulate in Cologne and the six North Rhine-Westphalian District Presidents 
claimed that some “children with foreign citizenship” (Italian) were “not attending West German 
                                                
74 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/682,” 1141; Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 4/2044: Schriftliche Antwort des 
Kultusministeriums auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abg. Stefanie Roeger und Gen. betr. Schulunterricht für 
Gastarbeiterkinder” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, October 26, 1965), EA 3/609 Bü 67, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; 
and Kultusministerium BW and Nothardt, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch 1965.”  
75 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 4/2044”; Kultusministerium BW and Nothardt, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch 
1965”; and Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 4/3651: Schriftliche Antwort des Kultusministeriums aud fie Kleine 
Anfrage des Abg. Haase (SPD) betr. Schulpflicht der Gastarbeiterkinder” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, November 
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schools” at all. 76 Supposedly, some parents only enrolled their children in the Italian consular 
courses for the five-to-six hours of weekly Italian instruction. Furthermore the District Presidents 
(particularly the one in Düsseldorf) complained that those children who did attend public school 
had limited German language skills, hampering regular classroom instruction.77 Taken together, 
it appeared that something needed to be done.  
In a September 1963 letter to North Rhine-Westphlian Christian Democrat and Minister 
of Education Paul Mikat,78 Roberto Cerchione, the consul general from the Italian Consulate in 
Cologne, suggested that the situation could be resolved through the “establishment of special 
preparatory classes.” Stressing that these measures were only for those cities where the entrance 
of several schoolchildren simultaneously made inclusion in the West German classroom difficult, 
Cerchione proposed two possible types of courses. The first would provide equal amounts of 
Italian and German language instruction. The second proposal was for the creation of a stepped 
Italian class, which would be taught increasingly in German until the children were able to 
participate in German classes. The Consulate recommended the Volksschule in Homberg (in 
North Rhineland), where 58 children with Italian citizenship lived, as a possible location for a 
trial run.79  
                                                
76 Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf to Kultusminister NRW, “Beschulung der Kinder italienischer Gastarbeiter,” 
April 15, 1965, NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Paul Mikat (born 1924, died 2011) was a CDU politician, professor of Civil Law, Canon Law, and Legal History 
at an der Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, and Minister of Culture in NRW from 1962-1966 (when the 
Social-Liberal coalition came to power). During his tenure, he tried to answer the pressing teacher shortage by 
bringing in teachers with shorter periods of training. 
79 Consolato d’Italia, Colonia and Roberto Cerchione to Paul Mikat and Kultusminister Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
“14768,” September 27, 1963, NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW to 
Regierungspräsidenten, “Bildung von Eigenen Schulklassen Für Italienische Kinder,” October 10, 1963, NW 141-
111, Landesarchiv NRW. This issue also began to show up in local papers. See, for example, “Bambini möchten in 
den deutschen Schulen lernen: Italiens Generalkonsul Dr. Bocchetto über seine Pläne,” Kölnische Rundschau, 
February 25, 1964.  
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The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education did set up a trial stepped class in 
Homberg, but subsequent evaluations from the school and the responsible District President in 
Düsseldorf advised against further implementation. Not only were most of the “guest 
schoolchildren” with Italian citizenship still spread out (on 19 November 1963, the largest 
groups were in Oberhausen, with 143, Moers, with 129, and Düsseldorf, with 53), but, while the 
Italian group was by far the largest, children with Italian citizenship only made up 26 percent of 
the total number of foreigners. Furthermore, the District President in Düsseldorf stressed that of 
those, the percentage of guest pupils whose German language skills was insufficient for 
“successful participation in German elementary school was actually only 6.8 %.”80 This, based 
on the opinion of the District President in Düsseldorf, was too small to warrant the creation of 
special courses.81 
The other District Presidents in North Rhine-Westphalia were similarly against the 
implementation of the Italian Consulate’s recommended stepped-classes. The District President 
in Münster admitted that there were technically enough schoolchildren in Gelsenkirchen (38 
“Italian children”) for two such classes. Nonetheless, the District Presidents felt that the 
measures already in place for the children to receive instruction from an Italian teacher sufficed. 
The other four District Presidents (in Aachen, Arnsberg, Cologne, and Detmold) each 
acknowledged that there were some areas in which to establish preparatory classes. They 
reported, however, that the local educational authorities claimed that either families lived too far 
apart or parents wanted their children in normal German schools.82 In later discussions of the 
                                                
80 Underlining in original document. 
81 Erbstösser, “Zusammenstellung der Berichte der Regierungspräsidenten über die Möglichkeit, eigenen 
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North Rhine-Westphalian ministerial meetings, the Ministry of Education would add that there 
was insufficient space (schoolrooms) available and not enough Italian teachers with either 
sufficient comprehension of the German language or experience in single classroom schools.83 
Despite these unenthusiastic responses, the Italian legation continued to press for more 
special classes. On 6 February 1964 Dr. Domenico Boccetto, the Italian Consul for Cologne, and 
the Italian expert Magliulo met with representatives from North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of 
Education to discuss the issue. The Italian representatives argued that the five-hour language and 
cultural classes (49 of them in North Rhine-Westphalia as of February 1964) were only suitable 
for those children already in the country. Newly arrived children, the Italian delegation claimed, 
needed extra support before they could fully participate in West German schools. These children 
reportedly “experienced psychological problems” due to their sudden transplantation into the 
West German classroom from Italy. According to the Italian representatives, this supposedly led 
all too often to a loss of desire to attend school and could promote unrest in the classroom. It was 
in order to alleviate these adjustment difficulties as well as to serve the “spirit of the European 
Community” that more intensive efforts, such as the stepped classes, were needed.84 
The Italian Legation’s new vision for stepped preparatory classes entailed classes for 
children between the ages of six to fourteen in North Rhine-Westphalian schools, to be given in 
Italian but based on the West German curriculum. From the third grade onward, the classes 
would also include some Italian history and geography as well as extra German language 
                                                
83 Single classroom schools included all grade levels in one classroom, usually under the instruction of one or two 
teachers simultaneously. Erbstösser, “Probleme des Unterrichts für Kinder von ausländischen Gastarbeitern,” 
Vermerk (Düsseldorf: Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, April 7, 1964), NW 141-111, Landesarchiv 
NRW. 
84 Kultusministerium NRW, “Bildung von eigenen Schulklassen für italienische Kinder,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf, 
February 6, 1964), NW 141-111, Landesarchiv NRW; and Consolato Generale d’Italia, Colonia and Domenico 
Bocchetto to Kultusministerium NRW, “06237 Pos. F-19,” Verbalnote, (February 14, 1964), NW 141-111, 
Landesarchiv NRW.  
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instruction, to be taught by West German teachers. As ever, once the children had acquired 
sufficient German language skills, they were then supposed to be transferred into the 
corresponding West German class.85 
Despite the Italian Consul’s arguments, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education 
continued to oppose any additional Italian-heavy classes. The Ministry instead argued, based on 
its District Presidents’ reports, for direct enrollment in West German schools in the same class 
level that they had attended in Italy with supplementary consular classes. Unable to agree on the 
proper course of action, the Ministry of Culture in North Rhine-Westphalia and the Italian 
Legation decided to wait to implement any new initiatives until the Kultusministerkonferenz 
could produce standardized recommendations regarding the schooling of “guest worker 
children,” which it was scheduled to do shortly.86  
The Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee began actively re-examining the 
question of the schooling of foreign children in early 1963, gathering information on what the 
individual West German Länder were already doing and examining the legal implications. The 
Italian Government had consistently appraised the KMK’s Secretariat of its concerns regarding 
the development of language and cultural courses since 1960. Only in early 1962, however, 
when the Federal Ministry of Labor passed the issue on to the KMK, did the group address the 
issue.87 At that point, Social Democrat Hans Reimers, Director of Education in Hamburg and 
                                                
85 Kultusministerium NRW, “Bildung von eigenen Schulklassen für italienische Kinder”; and Consolato Generale 
d’Italia, Colonia and Bocchetto to Kultusministerium NRW, “06237 Pos. F-19.”  
86 Kultusministerium NRW, “Bildung von eigenen Schulklassen für italienische Kinder”; and KMK, 
“Arbeitsvorlage für die 88. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 6./7. 02. 1964 in Rendsburg, Punkt 12: Unterricht für 
Kinder von Ausländern” (KMK, February 6, 1964), 12, B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. For a discussion of 
15/16 May 1964 Recommendations, see Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism (New 
York: Praeger, 1978), 187–190.  
87 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2524,” 4830. 
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Chair of the KMK School Committee, was of the opinion that, as of 1963, the issue was going to 
become serious. Whereas before early 1963 most of the children (predominately from Italy, 
Spain, and Greece) were being absorbed easily into West German schools, he expected that there 
would be problems as the number of new arrivals increased in the following years.88 The issue 
needed to be examined before it developed into a problem.  
The base on which the Kultusministerkonferenz’s School Committee built their debate 
differed in three regards from the discussions of the early 1950s. First, the perception of the 
responsibility of the state in guaranteeing the right to education had changed. Where previously, 
a state had been responsible for its own citizens and for not preventing the education of the 
children of foreign citizens, it was now assumed that a (host) state was accountable for ensuring 
their access and attendance.89 Furthermore, within the Länder governments there was in this 
period of general education reform a series of increasingly within the school system for its own 
citizens, a question which increasingly bled over into debates about “foreigners.”90 
Consequently, the KMK now approached the question of “instruction for the children of 
foreigners” with the idea that all children (regardless of citizenship or relation to the EEC) 
should unquestionably come under the purview of compulsory schooling laws.91  
The second major difference was that the Kultusministerkonferenz’s discussions (at all 
levels) now clearly took “foreigners” to imply “migrant workers” in contrast to displaced persons 
                                                
88 Hans Reimers to Sekretariat der KMK, “Sch. 151,” March 19, 1963, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
89 Baden-Württemberg had, as discussed below, actually already passed the law, although it would not come into 
force until the following school year. 
90 For a brief look at the crisis of the West German education system during the 1960s, see Ralf Dahrendorf, “The 
Crisis in German Education,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47. 
91 Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht für ausländische Kinder und Jugendliche in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland; hier: Bericht zur Vorbereitung der ad hoc-Konferenz 1974 der europäischen Erziehungsminister” 
(Bonn: KMK, May 24, 1973), B 304/3285, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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or homeless, stateless, or refugee children. By 1962, the number of “children of homeless 
foreigners” taking part in national supplementary instruction had sunk to 830. By 1964, 
discussions on national supplementary instruction had little connection to West Germany’s Nazi 
past, focusing now on the Länder responsibility to “foreign children” generally or the “children 
of foreign workers” specifically. The Länder Education Administrations continued to feel a 
responsibility for not forcing assimilation, in part because of that past although the new migrant 
groups in the country were relatively unconnected to the Third Reich.92 Yet, although debates 
about educational initiatives clearly focused on the newly arriving children of migrant workers, 
the wording of the official recommendations and general debates concerned “foreign 
schoolchildren.” The Länder Education Administrations were unclear at this juncture as to 
whether their new recommendations should apply to all children, or just groups associated with 
so-called guest worker countries.  
The third change evinced by the Kultusministerkonferenz’s debates was that trends within 
the European Economic Community were clearly leading toward emphasis on the equality of 
education access for all Member State nationals. It was this that the KMK’s School Committee 
claimed was the main impetus behind their eventual recommendation. “The development of the 
EEC into a common labor market,” the School Committee declared in their April 1963 meeting, 
was “leading a larger number of foreigners and their families [to stay] either temporarily or 
                                                
92 Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. Sitzung des Schulauschusses am 6./7. 02. 1964 in Rendsburg; hier: 12. Unterricht 
für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter: Beratung über eine Empfehlung,” Niederschrift (Rendsburg: KMK, February 
7, 1964), B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In many ways, the stance the KMK’s Education committee initially 
took regarding “the children of foreigners” mirrored its stance on “the children of homeless foreigners,” the 
schooling of whom it had been considering for over a decade. See, for example Schulausschuß der KMK, “17. 
Nationaler Ergänzungsunterricht für Kinder heimatloser Ausländer: Beteiligung der Länder an der Finanzierung,” 
Auszug aus der Niederschrift über die 75. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 8./9. 2. 1962 in Bremen (Bremen: 
KMK, February 9, 1962), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. See earlier meetings about refugee and homeless 
children’s education in the 37th Meeting (1955) as well as the 73rd Meeting (1961) among others (See B 304 folder 
2058 in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
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permanently in the Federal Republic.”93 If, like the stateless and homeless children from the 
1950s, they were going to remain in West Germany, the children of migrant workers needed to 
be able to succeed in the West German education system. Consequently, the Länder Educational 
Authorities should see “it as their responsibility to enable the enrollment of the children of 
foreigners into German schools and to ease the process through appropriate measures.” 
According to the KMK’s School Committee this meant that the main task of the different 
Education Administrations was to promote integration. Furthermore, West Germany’s 
relationship with the European Economic Community made the consideration of the requests of 
Foreign Governments regarding the education of their citizens important.  
Nonetheless, while the integration of “foreign children” into the West German school 
system was vital, some of the West German Education Administrations assumed – as did many 
families and most of the sending country governments – that a majority of the new foreign 
migrants were not permanent transplants. The Greek government was particularly adamant that 
its citizens would someday come “home.”94 Given these claims, the members of the 
Kultusministerkonferenz had to determine the extent to which different national minority or 
migrant (foreign) groups should be required to participate in a strictly (West) “German” 
education or be allowed to have replacement instruction in their mother tongue or attend national 
private schools. After all, if most of the children were indeed going to leave the country, their 
future access to employment and social inclusion in their “country of origin” was at stake.  
                                                
93Schulausschuß der KMK, “82. Sitzung des Schulausschusses; hier: 17. Unterricht fuer Kinder ausländischer 
Gastarbeiter,” Niederschrift (Berlin: KMK, April 5, 1963), B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Sekretariat der 
KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der BRD; hier: Anregung 
des kirchlichen Außenamtes der Evang. Kirche in Deutschland,” February 11, 1963, B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz. Through 1963, the topic would be canvassed continually in the KMK’s Education Committee’s meetings 
(in the 82nd, 84th, 85th, 87th, 88th). 
94 Discussed in Chapter 3.  
  107 
In order to resolve the uncertainty over temporary or permanent establishment in the 
country, the Kultusministerkonferenz’s eventual 1964 recommendations on the “Instruction for 
the Children of Foreigners” tried to bridge the two. The KMK’s School Committee had 
determined and the plenum agreed that both integration and cultural maintenance were 
absolutely necessary. To this end, the Committee recommended that the KMK adopt a set of dual 
goals. The first aim was the full integration of the foreign child into the German school within 
the framework of compulsory schooling. The second aim was the support of the foreign child in 
its native language.95 
Just as it had with displaced persons and refugees groups from the 1950s, the KMK 
outlined programs for both integration and cultural maintenance. To alleviate problems with 
initial enrollment for new migrants, the KMK outlined programs similar to Baden-
Württemberg’s preparatory classes.96 In West German schools, children were also entitled to 
extra German instruction. On the other side, because it was important that the children “not be 
cut off from their cultural heritage” and be able to return if desired, the KMK recommended 
setting up classes like North Rhine-Westphalia’s Italian consular courses, although the Länder 
representatives disagreed over how much funding West German states should provide.97  
To the Italian Consulate in Cologne’s delight, the Kultusministerkonferenz members’ 
support of the idea of preparatory classes prompted North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of 
                                                
95 KMK, “Arbeitsvorlage für die 88. Sitzung des SchA in 1964.” For an analysis of the 1964 Recommendations, see 
Rist, Guestworkers in Germany, 188–190.  
96 Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. Sitzung des SchA; TOP 12”; and Schulausschuß der KMK, “Unterricht für Kinder 
von Ausländern,” Arbeitsvorlage für die 88. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 6./7. 02. 1964 in Rendsburg, Punkt 12 
(Rendsburg, February 7, 1964), B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
97 Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. Sitzung des SchA; and TOP 12.” The preparatory classes had different names in 
different Länder. For the KMK, they were “Vorklassen,” “Vorbereitungsklassen” in Baden-Württemberg, and 
eventually “Übergangsklassen“ in North Rhine-Westphalia. See Sekretariat der KMK, “Vorbereitende Notizen für 
das deutsch-griechische Expertengespräch am 23. 3. 1976” (Bonn: KMK, March 1976), B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA. 
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Education to agree to develop local Italian classes in accordance with the suggested parameters 
(two-thirds Italian, one-third German). The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry specified that, in 
areas where there was a large number (at least 20) of Italian (and later Greek) “guest worker 
children,” preparatory classes should be arranged at the beginning of the school year. The classes 
were to be held in German schools under the leadership of the German principal and were to 
follow the local curriculum. The Italian General Consulate was entitled to select class teachers, 
who would teach two-thirds of the instruction. A German teacher was then to provide the 
remaining weekly hours of class time in the German language. Participation in these courses 
would be limited to one year, after which children were to be enrolled in the German class 
corresponding to their age.98 
Although by the end of 1964 the general framework for the “guest worker classes,” extra 
German language instruction, and mother language instruction were clear in both North Rhine-
Westphalia and in Baden-Württemberg, there were significant problems with implementation. 
The primary issue was that there was no stable, homogenous group of “children of foreign 
workers” to work with. Instead, the children who entered or left West Germany belonged to 
different age groups and had diverse backgrounds, as well as having disparate citizenships, 
nationalities, or mother tongues, all in addition to possessing unequal German language skills. 
These differences made the development of any single instructional class difficult, as any single 
group of 20 “Italian schoolchildren” usually had children with drastically different needs.  
                                                
98 Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen to Regierungspräsidenten, October 13, 1964, NW 388-16, 
Landesarchiv NRW. For the mention of the possibility of constructing such classes for “Greek guest worker 
children” (Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten, Erlaß, (October 20, 1964), NW 388-16, Landesarchiv 
NRW). For less that 20, then the Decree “Unterrichtung italienischer Gastarbeiterkinder” from 13 October 1964 (II 
C 36-6/1 Nr. 2995/64) remained valid.  
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Even where appropriate groups existed, there were still other hurdles the Länder 
Education Administrations and the local Consulates had to face in order to get classes of any 
type underway.99 A lack of resources – from classroom space, to teachers, to school materials – 
not infrequently prevented approved measures from even getting off the ground. Schools in 
which preparatory classes were technically supposed to be established sometimes refused to 
allow the classes on the basis of limited classroom space. Severe teacher shortages led to 
multiple instances in which there was no “German teacher” for German language instruction. In 
such cases, the relevant “foreign teacher” (who was also overburdened) often tried to make up 
the difference, but frequently did not actually have the German language skills to do so.  
The size of classes also quickly became an issue. The Länder Education Administration 
often denied permission to split classes until they had reached some 50 to 70 children, as there 
was often nowhere to put new classes and no teachers to instruct them. Furthermore, migrant 
workers and their families – particularly in these earlier years of the guest worker programs – 
often did not stay put. Foreign families moved frequently, meaning foreign schoolchildren 
enrolled in or left school in the middle of the year. This fluctuation made planning difficult, 
particularly in those Länder who had to budget for teachers, such as North Rhine-Westphalia. 
Just because local policy claimed foreign children were entitled to receive specific types of 
instructional support did not necessarily mean that there was money for it. 
Learning materials presented yet another type of problem. The lack of textbooks did not 
actually prevent the classes from getting off the ground. Instead, missing materials meant that 
                                                
99 For West Berlin, as of the end of 1963, when the KMK was gathering information on the numbers of children 
with foreign citizenship in West Germany and measures in place to educate them, there were 77 (15 Italian, 1 
Spanish, 10 Greek, and 51 “other”) such children. Falling under compulsory schooling law, each of the listed 
children attended public school. “Because of [this] limited number” of schoolchildren, there were no “measures for 
the school care of foreign children either planned or implemented.” Sekretariat der KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, 
“Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik,” Questionnaire Nr. 545/63, (June 7, 
1963), B 304/3244, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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many children simply did not have access to textbooks or handouts. The availability of materials 
was further complicated by the fact that relevant school texts often simply did not yet exist. This 
was true, for example, for classes teaching children German as a foreign language. The few 
books designed for use in West Germany were usually for adults and not conceptualized with 
children in mind. For the lessons taught by the foreign teachers, the issue was often handled by 
importing the German language books in use in the teachers’ countries of origin. It was, 
however, considered a poor stop-gap and did not solve the issue for the courses taught by West 
German teachers. 
The development of preparatory classes directly reflected the question of balancing 
integration with cultural maintenance. These classes, funded by the local Länder governments, 
were supposed to be about moving children into the West German school system. They were not 
intended to last more than one year and were supposed to facilitate German language acquisition 
while preventing children from missing any education. After that, however, the children were 
supposed to enroll directly in West German schools and, preferably, take an extra five hours of 
language instruction. That balance reflected the increasing assumption across the European states 
that the state was responsible for creating equality for all children by educating them within the 
local system. Nonetheless, while the different state governments in the European Community 
generally agreed that all children needed to have equality within the host country system, they 
did not necessarily agree on what that entailed.  
Shaping Compulsory Schooling in the European Community and West Germany  
Although the Italian legations praised the extension of consular instruction and 
preparatory classes in 1963, the Italian government continued to press for full inclusion under all 
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West German Länder compulsory schooling laws.100 After all, as the Italian Consulate in 
Cologne claimed, the extension of compulsory schooling was necessary in order to force schools 
to accept schoolchildren with Italian citizenship. Some school principals, the Consulate claimed, 
“neglected school children with limited German language knowledge.”101 Compelling school-age 
children to attend and compelling the schools to accept the children was vital to fulfilling their 
right to education and ensuring scholastic success.102 
The Italian Consulate’s requests were part of an ongoing debate over the meaning and 
necessity of compulsory education and integration in West Germany and the European 
Community between 1963 and 1965. Within the Länder, individual Education Administrations 
discussed the connection between the state, the individual, and a public education. At the 
European Community level, Member States debated whether or not education was supposed to 
be a purely sovereign issue, or if the connection between primary schooling and vocational 
training was strong enough to warrant European Community regulation. Among the West 
German states, Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were two of the only Länder 
that had not expanded compulsory schooling laws in the 1950s. Discussing the issue in the 
1960’s, their Education Administrations’ arguments on the subject built on their consideration of 
                                                
100 “3. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des zwischen Italien und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Kulturabkommens, Rom, 23., 24. und 25. Januar 1963,” Protokoll 
(Rome, January 25, 1963), 5–7, B 97, Bd. 197, PA AA.  
101 Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten, “II C 36-6/1 Nr. 2483/83,” 83. For the stance of the Italian 
Consulate, see Consolato d’Italia, Colonia and Cerchione to Mikat and Kultusminister Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
“14768.” 
102 “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission”; and Consolato Generale d’Italia, Colonia to 
Kultusministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen and Schültz, “No. 04618, Pos. F-12/19,” 19. The Dutch 
Consulate in Cologne agreed, explicitly adding its voice to the Italian Government’s in 1962 with a letter stating that 
it was aware of Italian efforts regarding the inclusion of foreign nationals under compulsory schooling and it too 
wanted the same. See Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Schulpflicht für niederländische Kinder, die in der BR 
wohnen” (Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, January 15, 1963), NW 1223-296, Landesarchiv NRW; 
and Kultusminister NRW, “Vermerk” (Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium NRW, May 17, 1962), NW 1223-296, 
Landesarchiv NRW. 
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both consular instruction and preparatory classes. For the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of 
Education, compulsory education was about teaching culture and human rights. For Baden-
Württemberg, compulsory schooling was an issue of state responsibility.103 Across each of these 
regional and supranational levels, however, the discussion centered on the perception of equality 
and rights. 
Although appreciative of the Italian Consulate’s continued requests for school reform, the 
North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s representatives continued to balk at the idea of 
including all children with foreign citizenship between 1960 and 1965. Because the Ministry 
claimed a child’s right to education in order to develop their selfhood (and clear ethno-national 
identification), education was not only about success in the school system. Furthering that claim 
was the role of schooling in teaching minors to be good citizens. Part of the reason the NRW 
Ministry of Education had encouraged consular instruction was because “guest worker children” 
(including from Italy, Greece, and Spain) were not supposed to be – nor could they legally 
become – German. Furthermore, in contrast to displaced persons and refugees from the 1950s, 
“guest worker children” were possibly temporary residents who might return to their countries of 
citizenship. Hence, as foreign citizens, the right to developing selfhood needed to include 
national association, which meant access to consular classes. After all, NRW’s Christian 
Democratic government claimed that its goal in the care of “guest workers” was to ensure the 
“human dignity of their guests.”104 
                                                
103 It would take legislature in Saarland until 1972 to officially alter its law. The Ministry of Education in Saarland 
argued – and would continue to argue for some years – that the state did not have enough schoolchildren with non-
German citizenship to make changing its laws worthwhile. Saarland would, however, provide some mother language 
and cultural instruction and release a decree in 1966 on the “school instruction for children of foreign guest 
workers” in 1966 (Kultusministerium Saarland, “Erlaß betr. Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” 
Amtliches Schulblatt für das Saarland V/III-10-, no. 9 (June 13, 1966): 165–66).  
104 Yet, whatever actions the state took, state support was only to be secondary to churches and charities’ assistance. 
Erbstösser, “Probleme des Unterrichts für Kinder von ausländischen Gastarbeitern.” 
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Nonetheless, in 1963 the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education acknowledged 
that it needed to change its compulsory schooling law to encompass all legal residents. Pressure 
from local Church groups as well as the Council of Europe over the concept of equality meant 
that continued exclusion contravened international norms. New developments within the 
European Community also meant that, at least for Italian – and Dutch – citizens, compulsory 
schooling would be extended regardless.105 For the following three years, however, the Ministry 
of Education would waffle over whether or not that inclusion under schooling laws meant 
exactly the same treatment as the ethno-national majority, or if there should be exceptions. Did 
equality permit difference? 
The importance of the question of whether or not equality permitted difference stemmed 
in part from the fact that educators across West Germany had been pressing for education reform 
since the 1950s with increasing fervency. The concern became widespread in 1964 when the 
theologian and educationalist Georg Picht published an a book on the “Deutsche 
Bildungskatastrophe” (“German Education Catastrophe”). The book’s publication ignited public 
alarm over the issue and leading to a widespread outcry.106 Picht, an ethno-German protestant 
minister, claimed the West German system was inherently discriminatory and argued that the 
limited number of schoolchildren entering the higher levels of secondary school left the country 
                                                
105 Part of what the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry focused on was the concept of equality. The right of every 
child in North Rhine-Westphalia to education was laid-out in Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the state constitution. This 
provision realized the normalized right of the individual to the free development of their personality according to 
his/her individual physical and mental abilities as set out in Article 2 Paragraph 1 of the Bonn Basic Law. It further 
protected the selfhood of the individual regardless of his/her citizenship and forbade any assault on human dignity. 
The state constitution supposed every individual was equal whether or not s/he was a West German citizen. Hans 
Heckel and Paul Seipp, Schulrechtskunde: Ein Handbuch für Lehrer, Eltern und Schulverwaltung, 2nd ed. (Berlin: 
Luchterhand, 1960), 199. 
106 Georg Picht, Die deutsche Bildungskatastrophe: Analyse und Dokumentation. (Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1964). 
Picht (1913-1982) was an ethnic German pastor and pedagogue.  
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without enough trained workers.107 The resulting public uproar over the “crisis in German 
education” meant that the Länder governments were particularly concerned about making sure 
all relevant schoolchildren were ensured their right to equal opportunities.108  
Even before Picht’s 1964 book, the SPD and its youth organizations, the German 
Federation of the Trade Unions Unions, as well as West German Catholic and Protestant Church 
groups and charities had pushed for education equality regardless of citizenship or class. The 
main church groups (predominately Catholic and Protestant) and charities were among the first 
to provide and advocate for school initiatives for children with foreign citizenship. Through the 
late 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, as the number of children with non-German 
citizenship increased, various church and charity organizations took an active interest in these 
children’s welfare. The Catholic Church advocated for its parishioners’ children (from Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal), providing some language classes and cultural instruction, as well as some 
extra religious training. In 1961, the Evangelical Church in West Germany assumed some level 
of responsibility for children with Greek citizenship, as there were no large Protestant groups 
migrating to West Germany at the time. The Evangelical Church felt that Greek Orthodox 
                                                
107 The Ambassador wrote about the “therewith associated national structure.” Ambassade Royale de Grèce en 
Allemagne and Alexis Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der griechischen Gastarbeiter,” July 
30, 1964, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW. 
108 Kultusminister NRW to Sekretariat der KMK, “Deutsch-griechisches Kulturabkommen,” October 21, 1964, NW 
141-115, Landesarchiv NRW; Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 
3452/64,” November 10, 1964, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW; and Gerhard Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium 
des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der BRD,” May 29, 1964, B 304/2058/2, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In a October 1964 the Greek Embassy’s Sozialrats Chryssochon would reiterate the Greek 
government’s wish for private schools in a the meeting with NRW’s Ministry of Education, the Inneren Mission, 
and Evangelische Hilfswerk Rheinland, the Greek Embassy’s Sozialrats Chryssochon explained, because “Greek 
guest workers in Germany would only be [in the FRG] for a short while – likely some two years.” 
  115 
children had been ignored and sought to fill that gap, providing education programs for 
schoolchildren with Greek citizenship.109  
Alongside offering school programs, the church groups demanded equality of opportunity 
for all children, just like the state claimed should exist. Unlike the state, however, the churches 
did not limit the concept of “everyone” to citizens.110 From 1961 onward, already having taken 
up advocacy on behalf of Greek children, the Protestant Inner Mission began campaigning for 
the extension of compulsory schooling to all foreign ethno-national groups in addition to extra 
language instruction.111 The Inner Mission decried unequal treatment in the schools for Greek 
children in contrast to the children and youths of “Spätaussiedler,” ethnic Germans from Eastern 
Europe, who immediately received West German citizenship. Furthermore, “one could also not 
compare [the children of Greek citizens] with the children of stateless foreigners, because these 
too had the right to schooling.” According to the protestant welfare organization Innere Mission, 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s contemporary school law created a discrepancy between children’s 
care and denied them (foreign children) equal treatment, which the Innere Mission argued was 
insupportable.112  
Listening to the various church demands for equality of opportunity for all children and 
the Italian and Dutch legations’ requests regarding a right to education, the North Rhine-
                                                
109 Church Committee on Migrant Workers in Western Europe, Presseveroeffentlichung (Geneva, October 29, 
1965), ADW, HGSt 2990. See also ADW, HGSt 3020 and 3933.  
110 Discussed in Chapter 1. 
111 Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Kirchliches Aussenamt and Gerhard Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium 
and Pietsch, “9609/62,” August 31, 1962, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Schulausschuß der KMK, “88. 
Sitzung des SchA; and TOP 12.” 
112 Welsch, “Unterricht für griechische Kinder,” Vermerk II E 1. 36-6/1 Nr. 2609/61 (Kultusministerium NRW, 
September 25, 1961), NW 141-106, Landesarchiv NRW. 
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Westphalian Ministry of Education began reexamining its compulsory schooling law.113 In a 
thirteen-page report on the issue in 1963, more than half the document was taken up with 
considerations of “rights” (human and individual). According to the Ministry of Education, the 
state government needed to decide if (a) North Rhine-Westphalia should maintain its current 
regulations, under which only specific groups of “foreigners” fell under compulsory schooling 
law. The state government also had to, (b), decide if it was legally appropriate and permissible 
for all children, irrespective of their citizenship, to fall under the compulsory schooling law. The 
answer to the question of legal permissibility was to be determined by an examination of whether 
domestic or international law could be read as prohibiting the extension of compulsory education 
to “foreign children.”114 
The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education cited international standards of 
human rights to argue that all children – even the foreign and stateless children – had a right to 
education.115 The Education Administration argued that the state’s continued use of the Nazi 
compulsory schooling law (Reichschulpflichtgesetz, 1938) contravened these basic human rights. 
As the National Socialists had not been concerned with the dignity of man, they had not 
recognized general civil rights and had not seen any reason to align school laws therewith. 
According to the Ministry of Education, it was therefore understandable that the former regime 
                                                
113 Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Kirchliches Aussenamt and Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium and 
Pietsch, “9609/62”; and Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, Kirchliches Außenamt and Gerhard Stratenwerth to 
KMK, “14. Konferenz für Ausländerfragen,” February 4, 1963, MK 62244, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv.  
114 Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Entwurf eines Landesschulpflichtgesetzes.” 
115 As defined by the Rome Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms from 4 
November 1950, which was amended by Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Paris on 20 March 1952.  
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had excluded foreigners and stateless persons from compulsory education.116 What was not 
acceptable was for the current government to continue using Nazi laws. To be in line with basic 
human rights treaties, agreements, and conventions (i.e. the “European Convention on 
Establishment” from 13 December 1955), the North Rhine-Westphalia’s government needed to 
change the state’s school law.  
While the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education, under Christian Democrat 
control until 1966, acknowledged that the fulfillment of human rights dictated that all children be 
included under the compulsory schooling law, the Ministry still saw a problem with the 
extension of the law due to what it viewed as the purpose of public schooling. The main point of 
a state-funded education, according to both the NRWgovernment and the members of the 
Council of Europe, was to make it possible for a democratic regime to function.117 In a 
democratic country, the point of a compulsory education was to teach children how to be 
citizens. What then was the place of a foreign citizen in a local school? If foreign nationals 
attended school in West Germany, they would learn how to be (West) German and not how to be 
a citizen of their own country.  
In contrast to North Rhine-Westphalia’s focus on the right to education and the 
fulfillment of personhood, Baden-Württemberg’s Christian Democratic Minister of Education 
Gerhard Storz made his official case for changing compulsory schooling law to the other 
Ministers and Bundestag in 1963 on the basis of state responsibility. He argued that the 
government’s role, as defined by the state’s legal code, included the maintenance of social order 
                                                
116 Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Entwurf eines Landesschulpflichtgesetzes.” They also mentioned Kindergarten 
at the meeting. As I am focusing on public schools, I will not do a full examination of preschools. See 
Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulische Betreuung der Gastarbeiterkinder im Landes NW,” Vermerk (Düsseldorf: 
Kultusminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, July 1, 1963), NW 141-114, Landesarchiv NRW. 
117 Kultusministerium NRW II B 2, “Entwurf eines Landesschulpflichtgesetzes,” I.1.2. 
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and the requirement to uphold local law. Storz had already directed his staff and schools 
throughout Baden-Württemberg to treat all foreign nationals as if they were already under the 
compulsory schooling law.118 Now, however, the sharp increase in foreign schoolchildren would 
threaten Baden-Württemberg’s social order unless they were to attend school. Hence, local 
school law needed to cover the “children of guest workers.” He further informed the Ministers 
that, in upholding that new law, the Ministry of Education would be responsible for providing 
school programs – like the preparatory classes – enabling all children to attend and effectively 
participate in Baden-Württemberg’s public schools.119 
Some of Baden-Württemberg’s Members of Bundestag expressed reservations to Storz’s 
suggested revisions. One of their concerns centered on the fact that a portion of the migrant 
youths arriving in West Germany had already completed compulsory schooling in their countries 
of origin. Some officials suggested that this could mean that these children did not need to fall 
under Baden-Württemberg’s compulsory schooling laws and therefore did not need to fill seats 
in the already-overfull regular classrooms. Baden-Württemberg had a pressing teacher shortage, 
after all, and if these children did not need to add to the existent teachers’ burdens, why send 
them to school? Storz replied that some of the main countries of origin (i.e. Greece and Turkey) 
had only four or five years of compulsory schooling, meaning that many youths with school 
certificates were only eleven or twelve. West German child labor laws dictated that these 
children and youths could not be employed until the age of fourteen. Excluding them from 
schools would leave them in the streets before their fourteenth birthdays. Compulsory schooling 
                                                
118 The exception being that the schools were not to dispatch truancy officers or compel the attendance of 
schoolchildren with foreign citizenship.  
119 On 15 January 1963, a talk took place with representatives of the Ministry of Education at the recommendation of 
the Ministry of Labor regarding “the question of the schooling and cultural care of children of foreign workers.”  
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was therefore particularly necessary in order to prevent them from becoming criminals. 
Presented with these concerns, the dissenting Members of Bundestag agreed that compulsory 
schooling to the children of all foreign workers was clearly necessary.120  
On 21 April 1964 Baden-Württemberg’s Landstag officially changed its schooling law, 
which came into effect on 1 April 1965. As the Ministry of Education had planned since 1963, 
the new compulsory schooling law’s § 41 extended general compulsory schooling to all children 
and youths that had their residence, place of employment, or school in the state.121 It further 
declared that compulsory schooling required the regular attendance of instruction and other 
school activities and stipulated that schooling meant attendance in a “German school.” As laid 
out in the West German Basic Law, only the school regulatory authorities could permit 
exceptions.122  
Throughout the discussions, first Storz and then Wilhelm Hahn (CDU), who served as 
Minister of Education between 1964 and 1978,123 stressed the importance of compulsory 
schooling law because of the relationship between the state and the individual. Both men 
emphasized the ongoing residence of migrant children in the Federal Republic. Regardless of 
whether they would someday return to their countries of citizenship, the children needed to be 
                                                
120 Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 3/2524.” See also Erbstösser, “Probleme des Unterrichts für Kinder von 
ausländischen Gastarbeitern”; and Kultusministerium BW to Späth, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von 
ausländischer Kinder, insbesondere von Kindern ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” January 21, 1969, EA 3/609 Bü 70, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
121 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Einschulung ausländischer Kinder in die 
Volkschule,” January 30, 1965, EA 8/201 Bü 672, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
122 Gesetz zur Vereinheitlichung und Ordnung des Schulwesens in Baden-Württemberg, SchVOG. See Landtag von 
BW, “Drucksache 4/2044”; and Kultusministerium BW and Nothardt, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch 1965.”  
123 Dr. Wilhelm Hahn (1909-1996) was a Lutheran Theologian and CDU Politician appointed by Kiesinger as 
Minister of Culture in 1964. He served until 1978. 
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able to operate in West German society while in the country.124 The state, in turn, had a 
responsibility for ensuring that the children were able to function in West German society. 
Toward that end, as soon as the new law came into force, Hahn sent out a decree to the Regional 
School Boards expanding on what the law was supposed to mean in practice.125 The decree 
specified that small groups, as well as first and second year schoolchildren, were to be enrolled 
directly into regular classes. In contrast, for large numbers of foreign citizens from a single 
foreign nationality, local schools were to set up preparatory classes, as well as extra German 
language instruction and consular courses. In contrast, although specifying that in Baden-
Württemberg there was no legal right for foreign language and cultural instruction, the Ministry 
under Hahn acknowledged that the children had a right to it if a non-governmental party footed 
the bill. In order to ensure the provision of the Italian (or Greek, Spanish, and Turkish) language 
and cultural instruction the Ministry of Education also agreed to continue providing limited 
financial support specifically for personnel and travel costs.126  
The European Economic Community took an arguably similar stance to Baden-
Württemberg. The EEC declared in July 1961 during a meeting in Bonn that the Six Member 
States, “inspired” by their desire to “confirm their spiritual values and political traditions,” had 
                                                
124 Schulausschuß der KMK, “87. Sitzung des Schulausschusses; hier: 11. Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer 
Gastarbeiter,” Protokoll (KMK, December 17, 1963), NW 388-13, Landesarchiv NRW. 
125 Kultusministerium BW to Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg (Stuttgart), Nordbaden (Karlsruhe), Südbaden 
(Freiburg), Südwürttemberg-Hohenzollern (Tübingen), “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von Ausländerkinder, 
(insonderheit) von Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Erlaß U II 2111/29, (April 14, 1965), EA 8/201 Bü 672, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
126 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Einschulung ausländischer Kinder in die 
Volkschule.” Ministerial Piazollo from the Ministry of Education also noted that the next meeting of the KMK 
would be addressing these questions, particularly regarding the conclusion of further cultural agreements. Based on 
the newly created Titel 605 in Chapter 04 02 of the Education Administrations, the Ministry of Education agreed not 
only to assist with the costs for 1964, but also reimburse some monies for the 1963 classes.  
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decided that they needed “to strengthen their political, economic, social, and cultural ties.”127 On 
that basis, these states announced that their relationship “must extend beyond the political frame 
in its narrow sense.” Henceforth, their cooperation would include “the fields of education, 
culture, and research, where it [would] be guaranteed by periodical meetings of the Ministers 
concerned.”128 The EEC would nonetheless not make a clear step into the realm of education 
until 1964.  
The gap in the European Community’s efforts was partly on account of unclear 
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, The Member States used the Treaty of Rome’s Article 128, which 
stipulated the European Community Member States work toward the development of a common 
vocational training policy, to begin discussing compulsory schooling.129 The European 
Community Member States debated the issue in 1961 and 1962, considering stipulations in their 
Regulations and Directives laying out the importance of compulsory schooling for all Member 
State nationals, but the wording vanished from the final texts.130 Only after the European 
                                                
127 Underlining in original text. The six included Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. 
128 Declaration released after their 18 July 1961 meeting in Bonn. See Committee of Senior Officials, Declaration by 
the Heads of State or Government of the EEC Countries Issued after Their Meeting in Bonn on 18th July 1961, 
Information Document, Third Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, 
September 27, 1961), Box 2428, Council of Europe. Underlining in original document.  
129 In accordance with Article 128 of the Treaty of Rome stipulating that “the Council shall, acting upon a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for 
implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of 
the national economies and of the common market.” See Nigel Johnson Principal Lecturer in Law, “From 
Vocational Training to Education: The Development of a No‐Frontiers Education Policy for Europe?,” Education 
and the Law 11, no. 3 (September 1, 1999): 200. 
130 European Economic Community Regulation Nr. 15 (16 August 1961) published in European Economic 
Community, “Règlement n° 15 relatif aux première s mesures pour la réalisation de la libre circulation des 
travailleurs à l'intérieur de la Communauté,” Official Journal P 57 (August 26, 1961): 1073–84. It was likely 
stricken because of insufficient authority based on Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome. See Kozlowicz, 
“Schulische Betreuung für Kinder ausländische Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik” (Bonn: Bundesminister für 
Arbeit und Sozialordnung, April 23, 1965), B 304/3244/1, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Landtag von BW, 
“Drucksache 3/2524,” 4830. 
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Community developed policies on vocational training in 1963 claiming the training could only 
be undertaking with a solid “basis of a general education” could the Member States draw a clear 
jurisdictional right.131 In their 1964 Council Regulation 38/64 on the free movement of workers, 
the six Member States included declared that the children of Member State nationals who lived 
and worked in another Member State fell under the same rules and conditions as the host country 
nationals regarding participation in general instruction as they already did for vocational 
education.132 The Regulation further specified that the Member States were responsible for 
providing measures to enable these children to take part in said instruction.133  
Despite the supposed inevitability of the issue in 1963, only in November 1965 did the 
North Rhine-Westphalian CDU government change its compulsory schooling laws to include 
children with foreign citizenship. The new law came intro effect in December 1966, in the same 
month when the newly elected Länder government under the SPD Prime Minister Heinz Kühn 
came into power (1966-1978). The new school law required all resident children and youths, 
                                                
131 With a clear connection between the labor market and job training, the European Economic Community could lay 
“down [ten] general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy.” Among other points, the 
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only the Länder governments could enable entry into the schools. Kozlowicz, “Schulische Betreuung für Kinder 
ausländische Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik”; and Auswärtige Amt, Mitteilung an die Presse, February 23, 
1965. 
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which the Ministry of Education explicitly noted included the “children of guest workers,” attend 
West German public schools.134 In addition, however, the Ministry of Education supplemented 
the law with a decree guaranteeing the children supplemental mother tongue and cultural 
instruction (when there was a large enough group). CDU Minister of Education Paul Mikat, in 
office until December 1966, claimed that the changes in the law and relevant regulations 
permitted a compromise “between on the one side the legitimate wishes of the foreigners for the 
protection of their way of life, on the other side the support of equal educational chances for all 
children, and finally the necessities regarding German school regulations.”135  
For the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education in 1965/66 it was important to in 
no way imply that all children were the same even if they were now equal in the eyes of the law 
(unregistered and paperless schoolchildren excluded). On that basis, the Ministry declared that it 
did not intend to distance the children from their ethnicity or their nationality.136 The Ministry 
announced that instruction in German classrooms should “under no circumstances integrate 
[foreign schoolchildren] into the German people, but encourage the development of a friendship 
between the peoples.” The compulsory schooling law and associated regulations were supposed 
to enable the children to maintain “a connection to their home and people.” To maintain this link, 
the “guest worker children” were to continue to receive the extra mother tongue and cultural 
                                                
134 Kultusministerium NRW and III A 2 to IV A, “Beschulung der Gastarbeiterkinder,” November 5, 1965, 2, 
Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulbesuch der Gastarbeiterkinder,” Erlaß (Düsseldorf: 
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110, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulbesuch der Gastarbeiterkinder.” 
136 Kultusministerium NRW, “Gesetzlichen Grundlagen zum Schul- und Berufsschulbesuch von jugendlichen 
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instruction under the parameters initially established in 1962 for children with Italian 
citizenship.137 
While approaching the issue from different directions, both Baden-Württemberg and 
North Rhine-Westphalia ended up with similar compulsory school laws and education initiatives 
for the children of foreigners or foreign guest workers. As of 1966, both Länder supported extra 
German language instruction, preschool, and native language and cultural courses. Yet despite 
more commonalities in their programs than differences, disparities in approaches to the relevant 
questions and outlook would eventually lead to significant divergences between their handlings 
of children with non-German citizenship. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education’s claim 
that its role was to ensure compulsory education meant that the state was willing to fund 
preparatory courses and German language instruction. The funding that the state did provide for 
consular instruction was paid to the relevant consulate, and then only as a subsidy. In contrast, 
The North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s insistence that the children were 
inherently foreign and hence needed to learn to be foreign meant that the state was more willing 
to fund programs for cultural instruction.  
These different approaches to compulsory schooling demonstrate changing views of the 
foreign citizen and the role of the host country. The various European supra-national 
organizations and state level institutions agreed that all children should be educated – and that 
the host country state had a responsibility for providing that education. Agreeing on that as a 
standard meant in this early period of educational reform in all Western European countries that 
compulsory education was no longer solely about learning citizenship, but also associated with 
equality of opportunity and entry into the labor market. The various government bodies involved 
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in the discussion between 1960 and 1966 thus agreed that compulsory education was paramount, 
particularly in a society, which claimed that all members had a right to equality of opportunity. 
What that education was supposed to entail continued to be a source of some contention.  
It should be pointed out that during the joint German-Italian Commission Meeting in 
Rome on 25-27 May 1966, for that brief moment, it could reasonably be said that the wishes of 
the Italian side regarding the care of Italian guest workers had been realized.138 With the firm 
inclusion of the children of Italian workers under a compulsory schooling law (even if North 
Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland would take more time to officially change their laws) and native-
language instruction expanded across West Germany, the Italian government’s requests 
regarding the schooling of their citizens would shift toward requests toward expansion of 
services, closer monitoring, kindergartens, and vocational education, as discussed in the next 
chapter.139 The following years would be about expanding and improving services, but the 
overall goals – integration and general cultural maintenance – would not change.140 
Conclusion  
Across Western and Central Europe in the early 1960s – as demonstrated by the 
recommendations coming out of the Council of Europe and the European Community – there 
                                                
138 Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der KMK, “Türkische Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik; hier: Entsendung von 
türkische Volksschullehrern,” IV 4 - 80.10/1, (July 25, 1966), B 304/3245, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
139 For a list of the Italian government’s requests from the end of 1965, see Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Sozialordnung to KMK, “Deutsch-italienische Vereinbarung über die Anwergung und Vermittlung italienischer 
Arbeitnehmer nach der BRD; hier: Niederschrift über die Tagung der deutsch-italisenischen Gemischten 
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140 Oberschulamt Nordbaden to Kultusministerium BW, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von Ausländerkinder, 
insbesondere von Kindern ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” December 10, 1965, EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart. The European Community also established European Schools in Karlsruhe (and other places). In 1965, 
there were around 110 schoolchildren with Italian citizenship attending. Alongside German instruction, the children 
received eight hours of instruction in Italian weekly. For a discussion of the early development of the Europa-
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was a sense that all children needed to be educated within the host country system regardless of 
their citizenship. That general agreement did not mean, however, that the state governments 
involved agreed on what the state’s responsibility was toward children with foreign citizenship 
or what the place of those children in the public school system was.  
In West Germany, the situation was complicated by the Education Administrations’ 
assumption that the child’s place in the school system differed based on their reason for entering 
the country, their ethnicity, and their citizenship status, as well as their connection to the 
European Community. Migrants had been coming to West Germany for jobs since the state’s 
establishment, as evidenced by the minority in the country with Dutch citizenship. Those 
migrants, however, arrived as spontaneous migrants, neither fleeing oppression nor invited 
through bilateral labor agreements. As such, the West German states did not have any special 
responsibility toward them. In contrast, the children of so-called guest workers, including Italian 
citizens, were predominately in the country because of German action, meaning they were 
entitled to some measure of state support.  
Added to that, schoolchildren with Italian citizenship were European Community 
Member State nationals. It was unclear, however, in the 1960s how much that legal difference 
should matter for the new migrants arriving as migrant workers. By the mid-1960s, European 
Community membership legally included a right to residence and inclusion under a compulsory 
schooling law. Yet West Germany responded by expanding that compulsory schooling to all 
children of migrant workers. Nonetheless, what would prove important both in the early 1960s 
and later years was the right to residence. That right influenced both the Italian state and 
migrants with Italian citizenships’ expectations regarding their permanency of residence and 
hence the importance of integration. 
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State support based on the school initiatives developed in the 1950s for stateless and 
homeless children could include both integration and cultural maintenance. Although looking 
back at those programs, the Länder Education Administrations treated new foreigners as a new 
and distinct category. To handle their education, ensure their rights, and extend a friendly hand to 
the foreign government in question, the Länder governments developed new policies and 
programs explicitly with Italian citizens in mind. Yet, categorized as so-called guest workers, the 
Länder felt they had to include all children with citizenship to one of the states with bilateral 
labor agreements with West Germany under those new policies. The other guest-worker state 
governments, however, were not European Community Member States in the 1960s. That 
difference meant those other governments often had different rights than Italian citizens, 
changing their migrants’ situation in West Germany and the countries of origin’s goals. 
 
CHAPTER 3: EDUCATION REFORM, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, AND PLANS FOR 
RETURN MGRATION (1962-1969) 
Between 1962 and 1965, more than 240,000 migrants with Greek citizenship moved to 
West Germany.1 The Greek government argued that each one of those individuals would return 
to Greece. Given that in the same period, over 110,000 Greek citizens migrated out of Germany, 
mostly back to Greece, return migration was a concern. On account of the expectation of return 
and in order ensure those migrant citizens’ equality of opportunity, the Greek government 
requested permission to build national private schools in West Germany. Without a Greek 
education, the Greek government argued, these children would be doomed to illiteracy as well as 
unskilled or semi-skilled labor in Greece. The children’s short residence in West Germany was 
not supposed to ruin their future chances in Greece.2 
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account for circular or pendular migration. Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die 
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In contrast, during the same period, the Turkish government stressed the importance of its 
emigrants’ integration into the West German school system.3 The Turkish government also felt 
that many of its citizens (over 180,000 arriving and in West Germany and 46,000 leaving 
between 1962 and 1965) would probably return to Turkey.4 The state was, however, battling 65 
percent illiteracy and could only offer uneven access to secondary schools or vocational training 
in Turkey.5 For its emigrants in West Germany, therefore, the Turkish government argued their 
best chances for future opportunity were to be found in the West German public schools and 
vocational programs. With that education in hand, any young Turkish citizens remaining in West 
Germany or returning to Turkey would have the possibility of finding semi-skilled or skilled 
labor.6 
In West Germany, where thousands of Greek and Turkish workers found jobs in the 
1960s and 1970s, most Länder Education Administrations had developed their policies for 
foreigners based predominately on the Italian state’s requests and with an eye toward European 
Community development and equality goals. Emphasizing integration, the Länder Education 
Administrations stressed attendance in a specifically German school. The children of so-called 
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Immigrants in EU - Erzan: Determinants of Immigration and Integration (London: Routledge, 2013). 
4 Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1965, 73; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1966, 77; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1967, 73; and 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1968, 64. 
5 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1964 Türkei” (Ankara: 
Auswärtige Amt, April 7, 1965), 9, B 97, Bd. 168, PA AA. 
6 It should be noted that despite compulsory schooling requirements including some vocational training, 
schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship only infrequently entered the vocational tracks because of missing 
qualifications from primary and lower secondary schooling (Hans Huber, “Berufliches Bildungswesen in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” in Das europäische Bildungswesen im Vergleich: Türkei, ed. Wolfgang Eltrich 
(Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Akad. für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 1984), 88–92. For more on Turkish children 
in the German school system from the Turkish perspective, see Hamdi Binay, “Türkische Kinder im deutschen 
Bildungssystem aus türkischer Sicht,” in Das europäische Bildungswesen im Vergleich: Türkei, ed. Wolfgang 
Eltrich (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Akad. für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, 1984), 118–37. 
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guest workers were welcome to take consular instruction based on the Italian model, but they 
needed to attend public schools in order to someday participate in the West German workforce.  
Each of these state governments’ Education Administrations increasingly stressed the 
vocational aspect of equality of opportunity in a period where most of the educational reform 
across Europe was driven by the booming labor market.7 The Council of Europe’s member 
states’ representatives, including those from West Germany, Greece, and Turkey, agreed that 
education in the nineteenth century had focused on reading, writing and arithmetic. In contrast, 
“European Countries today have realized that they must give all children of all social classes the 
chance of pursuing studies that will provide them with a general and vocational education which 
as a whole will ensure full and free individual development and supply the knowledge necessary 
for the practice of a vocation.”8 The Council of Europe’s Member States argued that, in an 
increasingly technologized society, schooling was vital in order to obtain first vocational training 
and then skilled labor. In order for all children to have the equality of opportunity that a 
democratic, post-class society was supposed to offer, they had to have the same opportunities in 
school.9 
Yet, the Greek government was not wrong. Many labor migrants expected, in theory, to 
return to their countries of origin. Depending on the relationship between the host country and 
country of citizenship, that schooling in the host country could prove worthless or incredibly 
                                                
7 During the 1960s, the Council of Europe pressed the host countries to admit migrants and foreign citizens into the 
public school system on the same basis as host country nationals in order to avoid discrimination. The West 
German, Turkish, and Greek states were all members.  
8 Committee of Senior Officials and Jean Thomas, “Educational Problems Common to European Countries,” 
Collective Report ESC/HF (61) 3, Third Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of 
Europe, October 16, 1961), Box 2428, Council of Europe. 
9 European Commission and Luce Pépin, The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe 
in the Making - an Example (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), 
43–58. The International Bureau of Education and UNESCO made the same argument. IBE, “Educational Trends in 
1970: An International Survey” (Geneva: IBE, 1970), 8. 
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valuable. Depending on the situation in the country of origin, compulsory schooling in West 
Germany could, in theory, prove detrimental to a child’s opportunities upon return to their 
countries of citizenship. In such a case, what kind of education did the children need? Each 
government actor involved answered that question differently, based on local circumstances and 
personal assumptions about the children’s futures.  
A Question of Return Migration and Greek National Education in Teaching Identity 
In October 1964 the Greek Embassy’s Social Council laid out the Greek government’s 
desire for private schools in a meeting with North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education and 
the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the Diakonisches Werk, a protestant welfare organization, 
in the Rhineland. The Greek government had begun a long campaign for national private schools 
in 1962, when only around five hundred school-age children with Greek citizenship were in the 
country.10 Now, as the number of schoolchildren reached into the thousands, the Embassy’s 
Social Council argued that the issue was “urgent” (see Table 3.1). On behalf of the Greek 
government, he explained that the Kingdom of Greece’s government wanted these schools 
because “Greek guest workers in Germany w[ould] only remain [in the Federal Republic] for a 
short time – likely two years.” He claimed that through attendance in Greek schools (grades one 
through five) in Germany, the Greek government aimed to maintain the connection between 
these children and their home, which he told the German delegation Greek parents also wanted.11 
                                                
10 Sekretariat der KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der 
Bundesrepublik,” Questionnaire Nr. 545/63, (June 7, 1963), B 304/3244, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
11 In addition, in the national private Greek schools, children would have received additional German language 
instruction in order to give the children “an important advantage in their futures.” Kultusminister NRW to 
Sekretariat der KMK, “Deutsch-griechisches Kulturabkommen,” October 21, 1964, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv 
NRW. 
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The Greek government was only one of several governments concerned about 
reintegration and the question of identity and national schooling. Of the eight states that signed 
bilateral labor agreements with West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, only Italy was a 
European Community member state. Technically, the bilateral agreements were designed for 
temporary labor, with the expectation that workers would return to their countries of origin after 
around two years. Without the right to movement for European Community member states, these 
“Third Country nationals” (non-European Community) initially had to renew their contracts to 
stay longer.12 Consequently, many of these governments expected a majority of their citizens to 
someday return. When they did, in the early 1960s, these governments did not want to have 
school-age citizens who were either illiterate in their mother tongue or who added to the rate of 
unemployment by being unable to participate in “home” systems.13 At the least, after all, many 
jobs, particularly skilled labor, necessitated a minimum of lingual fluency and literacy.14 
With thousands of workers migrating abroad during the 1960s these concerns over 
qualifications and literacy became pressing, particularly for individuals moving to countries like 
West Germany. On the European continent, the majority of migrant workers and their families 
moved from Southern and South-Eastern Europe and North Africa, where there was a surplus of 
manpower. Coming from diverse locations, they moved to find jobs in Central and Western 
European countries with rapidly growing economies. Having lost its colonies after the First 
                                                
12 Philip L. Martin, “Germany,” in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, ed. James Hollifield, Philip L. 
Martin, and Pia Orrenius, 3rd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 228; and Rainer Münz, Wolfgang 
Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt 
am Main: Campus, 1999), 42–48. 
13 For a discussion of West German foreign policy during the 1960s, see Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der 
Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge (Munich: Beck, 2001), 
206–223.  
14 For a discussion of cultural, social, and lingual capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education, Society, 
and Culture, trans. Jean Claude Passeron (London: Sage Publications, 1990).  
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World War, West Germany did not have access to labor from former or current colonies, making 
the country a primary destination for non-colonial labor migration.15 That relationship meant, 
however, that in contrast to some colonial migration, there was no prior relationship between the 
school systems. Each state involved – both origin and destination – had a distinct school system 
built on decades or centuries of tradition.16 With different emphases in the curricula, language 
requirements, and length of compulsory schooling, the systems were frequently incompatible, 
making movement for children between multiple countries challenging. As the Greek Social 
Council pointed out in West Germany, a child’s education in one country often did not count in 
another.  
For the Greek government, the desire for private national schools was premised on the 
expectation of return, but also on the state’s vested interest in its citizens’ future employment and 
national identification. As Dimitrios Zachos discussed, as with many countries, in Greece there 
was a “critical relationship between citizenship, ethnicity, and education.”17 For the Greek state, 
equality of opportunity for all its citizens was measured against those citizens in Greece. The 
Greek government’s education system was centralized, with the Greek government setting the 
national curriculum and publishing schoolbooks. In consequence, all Greek children theoretically 
                                                
15 Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 21–26; Monika 
Mattes, “Gastarbeiterinnen” in der Bundesrepublik: Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er 
Jahren (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2005), 27–50; and Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 
202–206. For more on decolonization and migration in Europe, see Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, 
trans. Allison Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 221–227; and Gert Oostindie, Postcolonial 
Netherlands: Sixty-Five Years of Forgetting, Commemorating, Silencing, trans. Annabel Howland (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press, 2012). 
16 Kern Alexander, Richard G. Salmon, and F. King Alexander, Financing Public Schools: Theory, Policy, and 
Practice (New York: Routledge, 2014), 5–6. See, for example, James Van Horn Melton, Absolutism and the 
Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988).  
17 Dimitrios Zachos, “Citizenship, Ethnicity, and Education in Modern Greece,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 
27, no. 1 (2009): 131–55. 
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learned the same material. Operating in the Greek work force necessitated specific qualifications 
and expected certain knowledge learned in the schools.18  
Table 3.1: Schoolchildren with Greek Citizenship enrolled in Primary and Lower Level 
Secondary Schools, 1963-197219 
 Bund! NRW! BW! Berlin! Bavaria! Hesse!
1963! 724! 100! 300! 10! 221! 34!
1965! 4,051! 1,338! 988! 44! 917! 387!
1966! 5,802! 1,521! 1,572! 63! 1,145! 628!
1967! 7,570! 2,804! 1,956! 89! 1,071! 855!
1968! 10,965! 4,129! 2,997! 173! 1,436! 1,179!
1969! 16,702 6,028! 5,087! 256! 2,293! 1,414!
1970! 25,471! 9,126! 7,317 454! 3,447! 2,797!
1971! 34,109! 12,624! 9,921! 653! 4,713! 3,182!
1972! 36,747! 14,160! 10,673! 629 4,140! 3,678!
 
In addition, for the Greek government and many members of Greek society, “Greekness” 
was tied to language, religion, and tradition.20 As the Greek Ambassador wrote the North Rhine-
Westphalian Minister of Culture in 1964 on behalf of the Greek government, he paid “attention 
to the Greek children, concerned about the maintenance of their mother language, religion, and 
                                                
18 For a brief discussion of the system in the mid-1960s, see IBE, “Greece,” in International Yearbook of Education 
(Geneva: IBE, 1966), 149–53. For an overview of the system’s development, see Anna Frangoudaki, “Greek 
Education in the Twentieth Century: A Long Process Towards a Democratic European Society,” in Greece in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Theodore A. Couloumbis et al. (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 198–216. 
19 Volksschulen/Grund- und Hauptschulen. KMK, “Der Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1965/66 - 1972/73: Allgemeinbildende Schulen” (Bundeseiheitlichen Schulstatistik, 1974), 7–9, 12, 14, 
18. The numbers for 1963 are approximate. In part because schooling was not compulsory, the Education 
Administrations in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were unsure as to how many children with 
foreign citizenships of any sort they had enrolled in their public schools, much less in their territories generally. 
Sekretariat der KMK to Mitglieder der KMK, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der 
Bundesrepublik,” 63; and Schulausschuß der KMK, “87. Sitzung des Schulausschusses; hier: 11. Unterricht für 
Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Protokoll (KMK, December 17, 1963), NW 388-13, Landesarchiv NRW. 
20 Dascalakis, “Education of Children Over the Next Four Decades: Role of the Humanities,” Working Paper, Third 
Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, August 7, 1962), Box 2430, Council 
of Europe. 
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their traditions as well as their connection to the [Greek] national structure.”21 According to the 
Greek government, children with Greek citizenship needed to learn each one of those points in 
order to be fulfilled as individuals and to successfully integrate upon return. As such, the 
children needed more than the paltry five hours of weekly instruction that consular instruction 
(based on the Italian model) offered.22  
Although several governments directly associated national identity with public school 
attendance in the 1960s the Greek government’s emphasis on the importance of ethno-national 
identification surpassed that of many other nation-state governments.23 The Greek state had a 
long history of encouraging its nationals’ association with the state and supporting their 
migration to Greece.24 From the early development of the new state in the nineteenth century, the 
government promoted a Greek identity for its citizens and for ethnic Greeks abroad.25 Initially, 
the idea of Greekness was intimately tied to Greek Orthodoxy.26 The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne 
                                                
21 Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne and Alexis Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der 
griechischen Gastarbeiter,” July 30, 1964, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW. 
22 Discussed in Chapter 2. Andreas M. Kazamias, “Modernity, State-Formation, Nation Building, and Education in 
Greece,” in International Handbook of Comparative Education, ed. Robert Cowen and Andreas M. Kazamias, vol. 
22 (Springer Netherlands, 2009), 239–56. 
23 The French system was also centralized. In association, schooling was central in teaching French citizens 
Frenchness. Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 85–113; and Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the 
Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 112–140.  
24 Adamantia Pollis, “Greek National Identity: Religious Minorities, Rights, and European Norms,” Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies 10, no. 2 (1992): 171–96; and Anna Triandafyllidou and Mariangela Veikou, “The Hierarchy 
of Greekness Ethnic and National Identity Considerations in Greek Immigration Policy,” Ethnicities 2, no. 2 (June 1, 
2002): 189–208. 
25 Elpida Vogli, “A Greece for Greeks by Descent? 19th-Century Policy on Integrating the Greek Diaspora,” in 
Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture, ed. Dēmētrēs Tziovas (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 99–110; and Dimitris Christopoulos, “Defining the Changing Boundaries of Greek 
Nationality,” in Greek Diaspora and Migration Since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture, ed. Dēmētrēs Tziovas 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), 111–23. 
26 George Mavrogordatos, “Orthodoxy and Nationalism in the Greek Case,” West European Politics 26, no. 1 
(January 1, 2003): 117–36. 
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emphasized that understanding of Greekness when it legitimized the compulsory Greco-Turkish 
population exchange primarily on the basis of religious affiliation.27 Increasingly, however, the 
Greek language became central to the state’s understanding of Greekness, in part due to 
territorial expansion and an influx of minorities. From the 1920s onward, schooling played an 
important role in assimilation, particularly regarding language.28 By the 1960s, both language 
and religion were vital for understanding Greekness, even if language was beginning to 
supersede religion. That direct tie between religion, language, and citizenship meant that the 
issue of literacy and cultural capital was more pressing for the Greek state than for many others. 
Greek religious instruction raised issues, but was relatively simple to solve. The West 
German Education Administrations did not have a problem with Christian religious instruction, 
particularly in religious teachings stemming from a clear hierarchy. The West German public 
school system included religious instruction, but that instruction usually meant either Protestant 
or Catholic instruction directed by Church leaders.29 Where the Italian and West German states 
argued that schoolchildren with Italian citizenship could receive sufficient religious instruction 
alongside ethnic German schoolchildren, most Greek citizens identified as Greek Orthodox, 
instruction in which the German system did not offer. As a central component of “Greekness,” 
                                                
27 For more on the tragedy, see Renee Hirschon, ed., Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory 
Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey, Studies in Forced Migration, v. 12 (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2003). 
28 Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
288–320. 
29 Some of the Länder began offering “ethnics” instruction instead of explicitly religious instruction. In additional, 
families could, in theory, opt out of religious instruction entirely. For schoolchildren with Italian citizenship, religion 
was not a significant concern as the majority was Catholic (in 1961, 44.1 percent of West German residents 
belonged to the Catholic Church, 50.5 to the Evangelical Church in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 
ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1968), 42)). For more 
on the relationship between the German Protestant and Catholic churches and the West German school system, see 
Karl Dienst, “Die Rolle der evangelischen und katholischen Kirche in der Bildungspolitik zwischen 1945 und 
1990,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, 
and Carl-Ludwig Furck (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 110–28. 
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the Greek state argued its citizens needed access. Although following different paths, some 
lengthening after school instruction while others permitted Greek Orthodox instruction in the 
schools, the Länder Education Administrations agreed to the Greek state’s demands and 
permitted Greek Orthodox instruction in those areas with enough schoolchildren to warrant 
classes.30  
Theoretically, the Länder Education Administrations could appreciate the Greek 
government’s desire to promote national identification. Although the concept of “Germanness” 
was less defined, there was a sense that, to be German, children needed to have German 
paternity, perhaps speak the language, and perhaps identify as Catholic or Protestant. Yet none of 
those individual components, except ancestry, were actually required in the 1960s.31 In part 
because of the cultural wars from the late nineteenth century, cultural heritage was supposed to 
be transmitted through the appropriate church, if relevant, and a child’s parents and guardians.32 
Hence, while public schools taught some of the central components of Germannness, particularly 
in regards to citizenship, there was supposedly a barrier between the state and culture.33  
                                                
30 Baden-Württemberg officially recognized the Patriarchate in 1978 (Kultusministerium BW, “Bekanntmachung 
des Kultusministeriums über die Verleihung der Körperschaftsrechte an die Griechisch-Orthodoxe Metropolie von 
Deutschland,” Gesetzblatt Baden-Württemberg, no. 9 (1978): 202). 
31 For an exploration of the concept of citizenship and Germanness in Germany, see the essays in Jan Palmowski, 
ed., Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); 
and Kathleen Canning, “Reflections on the Vocabulary of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Germany,” in 
Citizenship and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Jan Palmowski (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008), 214–32.  
32 Margaret Lavinia Anderson, “The Kulturkampf and the Course of German History,” Central European History 
19, no. 1 (March 1986): 82–115. For a discussions of parents rights, see Dirk Schumann, “Asserting Their ‘Natural 
Right’: Parents and Public Schooling in Post-1945 Germany,” in Raising Citizens in the “Century of the Child”: The 
United States and German Central Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Dirk Schumann (Berghahn Books, 
2010). 
33 For more on the development of the public school system and relationship to the German state, see Marjorie 
Lamberti, The Politics of Education: Teachers and School Reform in Weimar Germay (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2002). 
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The value the Greek government placed on its citizens’ education abroad reflected its 
importance in Greece. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Greek government aggressively 
battled illiteracy through the expansion of schools and education programs for adults and 
children alike. The state’s efforts between 1951 and 1964 resulted in a decline in illiteracy rates 
from 24 to 15 percent.34 The leftist Minister of Education and later Prime Minister Georgios 
Papandreou’s further attempts to implement significant school reforms in the early 1960s were 
less successful.35 Despite his efforts, financial limitations, conservative resistance, and broader 
political problems, including the Royal Coup (Apostasia) in July 1965 and Papandreou’s forced 
resignation as Prime Minister, prevented the majority of his proposed changes.36 Even the 
reforms that initially appeared to move forward were slowly dropped, one after another. Among 
them, a program for new schoolbooks fell through, as the needed millions of drachma were 
unavailable. The new conservative government under Prime Minister Georgios Athanasiadis-
Novas, appointed by King Constantine, did temporarily extend compulsory schooling to nine 
years, three of which were to be filled at a secondary school on par with a Gymnasium and 
                                                
34 The leftist Papandreou government also pushed curricular reform and changes to the structure of the vocational 
and university systems. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht; hier: 
Ergänzung,” Cultural Report (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, August 28, 1964), B 97, Bd. 117, PA AA; and Botschaft der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht; hier: Organisation der Kultur und Erziehung 
im Gastland,” Cultural Report (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, February 26, 1965), B 97, Bd. 117, PA AA.  
35 Andreas M. Kazamias, “The ‘Renaissance’ of Greek Secondary Education,” Comparative Education Review 3, 
no. 3 (February 1, 1960): 22–27. Georgios Papandreou (Γεώργιος Παπανδρέου, 1888-1968), Greek politician, 
served three times as Prime Minister of Greece (1944-1945, 1963, and 1964-65). In 1961, he founded the Center 
Union party (EK), with various liberal and dissatisfied conservative politicians. The party would split in 1965, 
although exist nominally until 1977. During his long political career, he served in multiple ministries, including the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Education. In the 1920s, he reformed the Greek 
education system and, in the 1950s and 1960s, tried to continue those reforms (Harris M. Lentz, Heads of States and 
Governments Since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1452–1453). 
36 Papandreou resigned in 1965 during the Royal Coup (a.k.a. the July Evens or the Apostasia) and King Constantine 
II appointed Stephanos Stephanopoulos (Greek: Στέφανος Στεφανόπουλος, born 1898, died 1982) from the Center 
Union as Prime Minister. See Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 
1965,” Cultural Report (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, March 1, 1966), 2, B 97, Bd. 117, PA AA; and Botschaft der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1966” (Athens: Auswärtige Amt, February 15, 1967), 
1–3, B 97, Bd. 117, PA AA.  
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limited the number of years at Lyzeum to three.37 However, illiteracy among adults continued to 
hover around 15 percent, and the growing population in the cities made expanding secondary and 
vocational schools increasingly difficult. The new military government established in 1967 rolled 
back the remaining reforms, ending plans to further spread secondary schools.38 
Papandreou’s planned reforms included a blueprint for altering the entire framework of 
Greek literacy. In Greece, literacy was a complicated and controversial issue, which was part of 
the reason the Greek state argued for permission to build national private schools in West 
Germany. Not only was the Greek writing system unique, but the scholastic written language 
(Katharevousa) differed in form from the modern Greek (Demotic Greek, or dimotiki) spoken in 
homes. Katharevousa, a ‘puristic’ language taught in schools, was a compromise between 
ancient and modern Greek developed in the nineteenth century and used in official and various 
formal purposes. Katharevousa was rarely spoken, but any schooling beyond compulsory 
education required fluency (as did legal courts).39 Part of the leftist Papandreou government’s 
desired reforms was to use Demotic Greek instead of Katharevousa in the schools.40 The failure 
of the reforms, however, meant that to be counted literate in Greek, schoolchildren living in 
                                                
37 Wallace Graves and Cosmas P. Stivaktas, “Public Secondary Education in Greece,” The High School Journal 45, 
no. 8 (May 1, 1962): 329–34; and reas M. Kazamias, “Plans and Policies for Educational Reform in Greece,” 
Comparative Education Review 11, no. 3 (October 1, 1967): 331–47. Georgios Athanasiadis-Novas (1893-1987), 
lawyer and member of the Center Union (EK), was appointed Prime Minister by King Constantine in 1965. He tried 
to form a government, but failed to get a vote of confidence and was replaced the same year. He would be among 
the politicians involved in brokering the end of the Military Junta in 1974 (Lentz, Heads of States and Governments 
Since 1945, 333–334). 
38 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1967” (Athens: Auswärtige 
Amt, February 22, 1968), 2, PA AA.  
39 Regierungspräsident Köln to Kultusministerium NRW, “Sprachkurse für Kinder griechischer Nationalität 
innerhalb des Regierungsbezirks Köln,” November 23, 1962, NW 141-114, Landesarchiv NRW. Citing that 
agreement, the Regierungsbezirk set the recommended weekly hours at five and told the Greek Consulate that it 
would pay the teachers the Greek Ministry of Education’s selected (with approval). 
40 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1965,” 2; Botschaft der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1966,” 1–3 Mackridge, Language and National 
Identity in Greece, 1766-1976, 315–317.  
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Greece or West Germany had to learn Katharevousa.41 In effect, a child in West Germany 
needed to learn Demotic, Katharevousa, and German in primary school. In higher levels of 
secondary school they would have had to add English and possibly a second foreign language as 
well. 
Because of the importance of identity and literacy, in 1962 the Greek government only 
briefly accepted consular instruction as sufficient for its citizens in West Germany. That year, 
across West Germany, local Greek consulates requested and received permission to set up 
classes similar to the Italian consular courses.42 Within the year, however, those same consulates 
pressed for permission to build private schools.43 Ideally, the Greek government wanted to 
establish Greek full-day classes wherever there were 20 to 30 children living in proximity. 
Instruction would have been in Greek, with a few additional hours of German per week in order 
to provide them with an “important advantage for their futures in Greece.” The Greek 
Government was willing to fund the classes, although the Greek Embassy in Bonn suggested that 
the West German governments provide the necessary schoolrooms as well as select and pay the 
teachers for German language instruction.44 
                                                
41 Katharevousa would be replaced by Demotic Greek in 1976 as the official langauge of Greece. In 1981, Andreas 
Papandreou would abolish the polytonic system of writing. For more information, see Frangoudaki, “Greek 
Education in the Twentieth Century: A Long Process Towards a Democratic European Society”; and Nikos M. 
Georgiadis, “Trends in State Education Policy in Greece: 1976 to the 1997 Reform,” Education Policy Analysis 
Archives 13, no. 9 (January 27, 2005), http://eric.ed.gov/. 
42 Regierungspräsident Köln to Kultusministerium NRW, “Sprachkurse für Kinder griechischer Nationalität 
innerhalb des Regierungsbezirks Köln”; and Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus and Stöhr, 
“Unterricht für Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter; hier: Unterricht in griechischer Sprache,” zu IV 111926, 
(December 17, 1962), MK 62244, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv. 
43 Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne and Kyrou to Kultusminister NRW, “Schulung der Kinder der 
griechischen Gastarbeiter.” 
44 Gerhard Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer 
in der BRD,” May 29, 1964, B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to 
Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 3452/64,” November 10, 1964, 64, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW; and 
Kultusminister NRW to Sekretariat der KMK, “Deutsch-griechisches Kulturabkommen.”  
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In contrast, for the Italian government, five hours of weekly consular instruction (usually) 
sufficed, in part because the promotion of “Italianness” was not a vital component of schooling 
in Italy. In Italy, most people identified according to their regional and familial ties. As historian 
Roberto Sala and others have shown, the Italian state’s promotion of “Italianness” was largely a 
project to encourage continued identification among citizens abroad. With state-funded radio 
programs and afterschool classes in places like West Germany emphasizing Italian identification, 
only after arrival did many Italian citizens began to identify as Italians (if even then).45 
Furthermore, with local governments in charge of schooling, the specific cultural and social 
capital to be inculcated in schoolchildren was not specified by the state, leading to greater 
flexibility in education content.46  
With schools under central control, Greek identity markers were not the sole concern of 
the Greek state regarding its citizens’ education. The amount of time spent in specific subjects 
mattered. Where children in West German learned different material depending on which of the 
Länder they resided in, all children in Greece theoretically learned the same material. For a child 
living in West Germany, the Greek government felt their education in primary school was too 
limited. The West German school week, with half-day instruction, averaged 25 hours a week 
(different every year), while the Greek school week averaged thirty.47 In addition, the Greek 
                                                
45 Roberto Sala, “Selbstverortungen von Italienern in der ‘Gastarbeiterära,’” in Dolce Vita?: Das Bild der 
italienischen Migranten in Deutschland, ed. Oliver Janz and Roberto Sala (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 
2011), 223–41.  
46 UNESCO, World Survey of Education: Education Policy, Legislation and Administration, vol. 5 (Paris, 1971), 
649–658; and Christina Allemann-Ghionda, “Contrasting Policies of All-Day Education: Preschools and Primary 
Schools in France and Italy since 1945,” in Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool, 
and Primary Education in Europe, ed. Karen Hagemann, Konrad Hugo Jarausch, and Christina Allemann-Ghionda 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 196–219. 
47 Karen Hagemann, “A West-German ‘Sonderweg’? Family, Work, and the Half-Day Time Policy of Childcare and 
Schooling,” in Children, Families, and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool and Primary Education in 
Europe, ed. Karen Hagemann, Konrad H. Jarausch, and Cristina Allenmahn-Ghionda (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2011), 275–300. For information on the recent development of all-day schools in Greece, see Ailina Gkoratsa, “The 
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school week featured an average of three hours a week more science and math than the German. 
That difference, added to different content in language, history, and religion meant that a 
primary-school-age child returning to Greece from West Germany did not have the necessary 
knowledge in any subject to participate in public school classes.48 In consequence, while the 
West German government did not recognize the Greek diploma or qualifications, the Greek 
government refused to recognize even a single year of schooling in West Germany.49  
The Greek government continually reiterated its requests to establish Greek schools in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Yet, in 1963/64, there were very few places in West Germany 
were Greek national schools actually made sense. Even in North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-
Württemberg, where more than 50 percent of the schoolchildren with Greek citizenship lived in 
the mid-1960s (see Table 3.1), families with Greek citizenship were too spread out. The Greek 
Embassy recommended busing in some cities inorder to overcome the prohibitive distances 
involved, but even then only a handful of classes would have been possible. The Greek 
government conceded that, in locations where Greek classes could not be set up, the introduction 
of a few weekly hours of Greek mother tongue and cultural instruction by a Greek teacher would 
be “an adequate alternative solution.”50 Wherever there were sufficient numbers, however, the 
Greek government insisted that private national schools were necessary.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Impact of Greek ‘All-Day’ School on Teachers’, Students’ and Parents’ Lives” (Ph.D., Brunel University (United 
Kingdom), 2014). 
48 M. Arend, “Les programmes d’études des enseignements primaire et secondaire, Rapport, Deuxième Confèrence 
des Ministres Respondables des Problèmes de l’Éducation” (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, March 1961), B 91, Bd. 
110, PA AA. 
49 Ibid., Annex II. 
50 Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der 
BRD”; and Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 3452/64,” 64. The Greek 
Ambassador was also quick to agree that in areas where the construction of independent Greek schools was not 
possible, the introduction of a few weekly hours of Greek instruction by a Greek teacher would be a sufficient 
alternative solution. 
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As the decade progressed, however, the number of schoolchildren in West Germany with 
Greek citizenship rose to more than 15 thousand (see Table 3.1). Often living in concentrated 
communities, there were soon several locations were Greek national private schools were 
theoretically possible. With more than half of its citizens in Germany living in two of the states 
without compulsory schooling laws covering its nationals (until 1965 in Baden-Württemberg and 
1966 in North Rhine-Westphalia), the Greek government took matters into its own hands and 
tried to provide unofficial access to Greek instruction for its citizens.  
For those states, like the Greek, that expected their citizens to someday return, worries 
over the exact educational attainment of their citizens were legitimate. The entire concept of 
return migration necessitated return integration, which the West German and European 
Community’s perception of education equality did not support. The West German understanding 
of equal opportunities specifically meant within West Germany – as it was understood during the 
Italian and Dutch fight for inclusion.51 The two governments expected the majority of their 
citizens to remain in West Germany, meaning that the children needed to be able to operate in 
the German workforce. For other groups, however, if they took return seriously, the question of 
how much they should actually integrate became pressing. Because the Greek government was 
one of the first to seriously raise this issue in West Germany, its requests would shape early 
debates on return migration among West German Education Administrations.  
Considering National Private Schools within the Länder Education Administrations  
The West German Länder governments, while taking the Greek legates’ concerns 
seriously, almost all argued that promoting equal opportunities meant enrolling in local public 
schools. For the West German Ministries, this meant, at bare minimum, the ability to enter the 
                                                
51 Discussed in Chapter 2. 
  144 
school (primary and lower secondary) system and eventually to attend vocational training. For 
both the Greek government and the Länder, the permissibility of private schools was tied into the 
question of compulsory schooling and the meaning of equality of opportunity. Furthermore, the 
construction of non-state schools was strictly regulated, as discussed in Chapter 1, by Article 7 of 
the Basic Law. The Greek state might argue that its school age citizens needed a specifically 
Greek education, but by the mid-1960s the Länder Education Administrations viewed 
themselves as committed to ensuring equality of opportunity in the Federal Republic, which did 
not necessarily permit difference.  
The general situation regarding schools in West Germany made the extension of 
“equality” particularly germane. When the widespread concern over the “crisis of the German 
education system” became a firestorm in 1964, private schools did not fit into the Länder 
governments’ envisioned reforms for wider inclusion in part because of the connections between 
the public secondary school system and vocational training.52 Children in private schools, 
including Greek, would not necessarily have the correct training to attend vocational school, 
which would defeat one of the core goals of compulsory schooling and the envisioned 
educational reforms. Yet, one of the other primary goals of education was to teach citizenship, 
which is to say how to be German. Hence, as in these West German officials’ minds, “guest 
worker children” were clearly not (West) “German children” because of their citizenship status, 
they therefore needed different treatment at some level. Just not necessarily a complete, private 
education.  
                                                
52 As discussed in Chapter 2. See Georg Picht, Die deutsche Bildungskatastrophe: Analyse und Dokumentation. 
(Olten: Walter-Verlag, 1964); and Ralf Dahrendorf, “The Crisis in German Education,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 2, no. 3 (July 1967): 139–47. 
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Challenging that assumption, however, was a decrease in emphasis on teaching national 
identity as the European Community and Council of Europe member states stressed equality of 
opportunity across Western, South, and South Eastern Europe. This trend that was reflected in 
the agenda of the educational reforms started all over West Europe. Within a democratic 
structure and human rights regime, all children needed equal chances. Toward that end, most of 
the western European states began extensive school reforms in the 1950s that would extend 
through the 1960s and 1970s.53 Included in those reforms were extensive building projects by 
which many states tried to make education more accessible. For the extension of compulsory 
schooling and a more accessible higher education for broader social strata, after all, new school 
buildings and more teachers were necessary.54 The West German Länder were among those 
Education Administrations that were extensively reforming their systems, increasing the years of 
compulsory schooling, extensing early childhood education, and trying to make access equitable 
(see Chart 4.1).55  
 
 
 
                                                
53 Alexander King, “Investment in Education,” Third Conference of Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: 
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54 Wohlgemuth, “Supplementary General Education, Preliminary Comparative Study, Third Conference of 
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55 As discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Chart 3.1: The West German Compulsory School System in the late 1960s and 1970s 56 
 
 
 
Among the school reforms, most of the Länder Education Administrations expanded the 
length of compulsory schooling from eight years to nine or ten. Furthermore, most built more 
higher level secondary schools and increased the number of schoolchildren who attended. In 
many Länder, with the notable exceptions of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, the number of 
total schoolchildren in West Germany enrolling in Gymnasium reached 30 percent. The percent 
of children in the lowest level of the secondary school, the Volksschule, declined from 80 percent 
in 1952/63 to 50 percent in 1969/70 (and 30 percent in 1995/96). Partly in consequence, lower 
secondary school, which had previously been viewed as the standard course of study, developed 
                                                
56 Hans Döbert, “Germany,” in The Education Systems of Europe, ed. Wolfgang Hörner et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 
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a reputation for taking the left-over students. Over the 1970s and 1980s, those schools (lower 
secondary) would increasingly become known among the public as schools for foreigners.57  
Within this atmosphere of emphasis on access for all, the West German Länder 
Educational Administrations had to decide how much difference in education was either desired 
or tolerable while at least acknowledging the foreign governments and ethno-national minority 
groups’ demands. Hardly a major political or social issue for the West German public in the mid-
1960s, the schooling of non-nationals was primarily a concern for government officials: the local 
school administrations, the Länder Ministers of Education, the West German Federal Foreign 
Missions, and Foreign Consulates (as well as the Foreign Missions of the major religious 
institutions). For these groups, this was a question of practical considerations, international 
reputations, and bi-lateral relationships, as well as the right to an education.  
By 1965, these different entities already held divergent views on the issue of private 
national schools. The Greek government had been pushing each of the relevant Länder 
(particularly Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and North Rhine-Westphalia) for permission to build 
private schools as well as submitting generalized requests to the West German Foreign Office. 
With each application, the Greek legates pressed for their goals separately, trying to convince 
one government to grant what another refused.58  
The West German Foreign Office enthusiastically supported the idea of foreign national 
schools in West Germany. The Federal Republic had a large network of German schools spread 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 Stratenwerth to Bundesministerium des Innern, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der 
BRD”; and Ambassade Royale de Grèce en Allemagne to Kultusminister NRW, “Notiz 3452/64,” 64. The 
discussions between the Greek Consulate in Berlin and the West Berlin Senator for Education reached this 
conclusion as well, deciding that in the 1960s, Greek schools did not make sense in West Berlin (Senator für 
Schulwesen to Leonidas Evangelidis, Griechische Militärmission, and Gerd Effler, “Unterricht für griechische 
Kinder,” September 8, 1971, B Rep 002 23582, Landesarchiv Berlin). 
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across the world. These schools were funded and maintained partly in order to spread German 
culture, but also to provide larger communities of Germans abroad (usually the children of 
diplomats or workers associated with international projects) with access to the German education 
system. While these schools often taught predominately local or international non-German 
pupils, schoolchildren with West German citizenship were by and large expected to eventually 
return to West Germany and participate in higher levels of secondary and/or post-secondary 
schooling. Depending on the country hosting the schools, teachers sent from West Germany tried 
to adhere as closely to West German curricula as possible. The Foreign Office viewed the Greek 
and Turkish governments' requests for national schools in light of its negotiations over the West 
German schools in those countries: the more leeway the Länder granted foreign schools in the 
Federal Republic, the more control the Federal Republic would likely have over German schools 
in Greece and Turkey.59  
The Länder Education Administrations’ were less enthusiastic. Their approaches to 
national schools were informed by their specific interpretations of equality of opportunity and 
degree equivalency. Article 7 of the Basic Law did permit private schools, as did the majority of 
the individual Länder’s school laws. But (as discussed) these laws stipulated that, in order to 
create a private school, a special pedagogical interest which necessitated such had to exist.60 The 
Länder Education Administrations were concerned that differences between the West German 
system and other national school systems would mean that private schools following the country 
                                                
59 Auswärtige Amt to Kultusminister NRW, “Unterrichtung griechischer Kinder in Düsseldorf,” May 10, 1968, 388-
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of origins’ systems would effectively limit a child’s choices in West Germany to unskilled or 
semi-skilled labor. Hence, based on most of the Länder’s understandings of equality of 
opportunity, private national schools would decidedly not promote equality. Furthermore, the 
Education Administrations mostly held that, as the “foreign children” would at least remain long 
enough to enter the labor market, they could not have a special pedagogical interest beyond a 
few hours of extra instruction. After long debates, most of the Länder Education Administrations 
argued that these schoolchildren did not need private schools. 
The Bavarian Ministry of Education was the one significant exception. It viewed the new 
migrants' status as comparable to the “homeless and stateless foreigners” (i.e. displaced persons 
and exiles from the Second World War).61 In the 1950s, the Bavarian Ministry of Education had 
permitted the construction of a small number of private national schools as well as excused 
ethno-national minority groups from compulsory education in German public schools.62 As all 
foreign groups were entitled to the same treatment, the Ministry recognized all migrant groups’ 
special pedagogical need for private schools. To maintain equivalence across citizenship and 
national lines, the Bavarian government approved national schools in Munich and Nuremberg for 
children with Greek citizenship. The Ministry further supported these schools by providing up to 
20 percent of the teachers' wages.63 
                                                
61 Mayer and Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to Regierungen, “Schulpflicht der Kinder 
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The Berlin Senate for Education also technically approved private schools, but the point 
was moot in 1965 as the state did not host enough foreigner children to make this approval 
relevant. Berlin's compulsory schooling law permitted private schools and enabled the state 
government to provide financial backing.64 In practice, however, the Greek Consulate informed 
the Senate for Education that extra language and cultural classes were sufficient due to the low 
number (ten in 1963, eighty-nine in 1967, see Table 3.1) and wide separation of children with 
Greek citizenship.65 Arguably, even bussing would have produced too small a class. The Senator 
for Education was prepared to consider a Turkish school along similar lines, but the Turkish 
government did not pursue the issue.66 It should be noted, however, that the state already hosted 
private French and American schools with predominately international pupils, often the children 
of business men and women or the American and French armed forces.67 
In contrast, as the governments in Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia 
wrote and then passed their new compulsory schooling laws (in 1965 and 1966 respectively), 
their Education Administrations explicitly tried to discourage the development of national 
private schools. Yet before those laws passed, neither state could require foreign children’s 
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attendance in West German schools and could not legally prevent them from attending other 
schools. With the Länder governments unable to prevent their creation or discourage enrollment, 
a few unofficial “Greek schools” sprang up with Greek state support in both Länder. A portion – 
it is unclear how many – of the rising numbers of children with Greek citizenship simply 
attended these classes, sidestepping German schools entirely. 
Although Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administrations 
technically disapproved of private national schools, they provided the unofficial Greek schools 
with varying degrees of support. By 1964 there were nine Greek school classes in North Rhine-
Westphalia. Without clear instructions from their Ministry of Education, the local school offices 
handled them differently. Three of the local school offices financed three private Greek schools 
in full for 20 hours of weekly instruction. Another school office supported twelve hours of 
private Greek instruction and the rest (five) were given support from the Ministry of Education 
for six to nine instructional hours. The Greek Embassy planned to establish a further four classes 
in the following months, for which the Embassy hoped for financial support.68 Increasingly, 
however, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education used established guidelines for the 
five hours of after school consular instruction as an excuse for not supporting national private 
classes.69 
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Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration attempted to end its unofficial Greek 
schools after passing its new 1965 compulsory schooling law.70 Arguing that most children 
would have a long residency in West Germany, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education 
declared that all children with their residence in Baden-Württemberg needed to attend German 
schools unless they received individual exceptions through written application to the Ministry.71 
After the new law came into power, the Ministry declared that any Greek classes that overran the 
approved five hours for extra mother tongue instruction were required to transform into one-year 
preparatory classes and prepare the children to attend West German schools. 72 Yet, once they 
were in regular instruction, the Ministry officials worried about too much instruction. To prevent 
the children from being overwhelmed by any extra class time, the Baden-Württemberg 
Education Administration recommended that schools cut normal instruction as much as possible 
in those subjects in which the children also received instruction in their mother tongue. 73  
Yet, legally, the Baden-Württemberg Education Administration’s distaste for private 
schools did not necessarily negate the possibility of purely Greek classes through so-called 
“supplementary schools.” In English (and for the Greek government), these schools would count 
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as private or charter, as they followed their own curriculum. In the German system, however, 
there were some important distinctions. In the German system, “private schools” charged pupils 
tuition and/or received support from the state while following a different curriculum. 
Supplementary schools, in contrast, were organized and funded entirely by the responsible party 
running the school.74 In addition, the West German Basic Law stipulated that supplementary 
schools did not require special state approval, although school-age children did need 
authorization from the relevant West German authorities to attend.75 Nonetheless, depending on 
local Länder school laws, supplementary schools usually came under from some form of 
government oversight and faced certain restrictions.  
In 1966, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education (and that of Hesse, which hosted a 
Lithuanian Gymnasium in Frankfurt am Main) indicated that it might be willing to permit 
supplementary schools for the children of migrant workers with certain restrictions. That 
tentative permission came in response to several Greek parent groups and the local Greek 
Consulates’ concerns about the removal of the Greek schools. The parents argued that they 
would be returning and wanted their children to be prepared to reintegrate into their home school 
system.76 The Ministry of Education qualified their permission, however, establishing a set of 
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required parameters for those foreign states, like Greece, interested in applying. First and 
foremost, any national supplementary schools had to run a minimum of eight (later nine) years, 
even if the foreign state’s school system only ran five or six (like the Greek). The school 
curriculum also had to offer at least five hours of German language instruction a week, and 
include the educational goals needed for eventual attendance in a West German vocational 
school. Otherwise, the responsible party (i.e. the Greek Government) could use its own 
curriculum under its own oversight.77 
Even as Baden-Württemberg’s Education Administration outright rejected Greek private 
schools and then made exceptions between 1964 and 1965, the North Rhine-Westphalian 
Ministry of Education hesitated over making any decision, just as it did regarding preparation 
classes.78 Part of the Ministry’s indecision stemmed from its intention to eventually extend 
compulsory schooling to all children regardless of citizenship. For the North Rhine-Westphalian 
Ministry of Education, this meant placing children with foreign citizenship under the same laws 
and guaranteeing them the same rights and options as those children with West German 
citizenship. On the other hand, just as in Baden-Württemberg, regular public schools and the 
Greek Legations reported that the children’s parents and guardians wanted Greek foreign 
schools.79 With more than 1,300 schoolchildren with Greek citizenship in North Rhine-
                                                
77 Kultusministerium BW to Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Saloniki, “Eröffnung einer 
griechischen Privatschule in Stuttgart,” UA II 2111 - 3/26, (March 13, 1969), EA 3/609 Bü 97, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart. See also Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Einrichtung von 
Vorbereitungsklassen für griechische Kinder im Kreis Ludwigsburg,” February 16, 1968, EA 3/609 Bü 97, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. The private school law was changed in 1968, (“Privatschulgesetzes in der Fassung vom 
14. Mai 1968 (PSchG),” Gesetzblatt für Baden-Württemberg, May 14, 1968, 223). To attend, the children had to be 
individually released from their compulsory schooling requirements at a German school (Article 41 Paragraph 5 
SchVOG) (Jochen Abr. Frowein, Zur verfassungsrechtlichen Lage der Privatschulen: Unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der kirchlichen Schulen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979), 11). 
78 Discussed in Chapter 2.  
79 Greek foreign schools were those in which Greek teachers taught based on the Greek curriculum. 
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Westphalian schools, the number of requests was substantial (see Table 3.1). Unsure of its 
course, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education again announced that its decisions 
would follow the KMK’s recommendations.80 
Table 3.2: Total Schoolchildren with Foreign Citizenship in Public Primary and Lower 
Secondary Education, 1965-197281  
 BW! Berlin! NRW! Bavaria! Hesse! Total!
1965! 8,793! 604 10,574! 4,662 3,767! 32,232!
1966! 13,178! 926! 12,595! 6,317! 5,581! 46,121!
1967! 16,528! 761! 14,494! 6,730! 6,868! 53,993!
1968! 20,646! 1,702! 22,535! 9,958! 8,849! 76,700!
1969! 27,815! 2,657! 30,360! 14,163! 11,213! 102,866!
1970! 36,559! 5,652! 39,806! 18,825! 15,550! 137,706!
1971! 46,419! 8,098! 58,276! 24,909! 20,065! 185,923!
1972! 53,101! 10,646! 70,802! 29,093! 24,091! 222,235!
 
In 1965, the Kultusministerkonferenz and its Education Committee approached the issue 
of private national schools for the children of migrant workers in terms of equality of opportunity 
and fulfillment of the right to education. From the get-go, the General Secretary of the 
Kultusministerkonferenz, Social Democrat Hans Reimers from the Ministry of Education in 
Hamburg, set the tone of the discussions with the argument that children with non-German 
citizenship were best served by West German schools, with extra instruction in their own 
language and other relevant subjects.82 He argued it was imperative for all children to receive a 
                                                
80 Kultusminister NRW II C 3 (Bermann) to II A (im Haus), “Unterricht für Kinder von Ausländern,” March 25, 
1965. This was further complicated by the fact that there would be no possibility for NRW’s school administrations 
to oversee these schools as the relevant authorities did not have the language skills necessary.  
81 Volksschulen. KMK, “Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler, 1965/66 - 1972/73,” 7–9, 12, 14, 18. 
82 Hans to Gerhard Stratenwerth, “Sondersitzung der Referenten für die schulische Betreuung der ausländischen 
Gastarbeiterkinder, 31. 03. 1965 (Sch. 159),” April 9, 1965, B 304/2058/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. Dr. H. Reimers 
also served as the West German representative to the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education and 
hosted the second meeting in Hamburg in 1961. 
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West German education in order to open doors to vocational possibilities. Furthermore, 
according to Reimers, institutions like one-class schools would almost certainly have lower 
success rates than West German classes.83 Hence, to ensure equality of opportunity, children 
with non-German citizenship needed to be in local schools and not in private national schools or 
spending too much time in supplemental schools.84 
The Kultusministerkonferenz would take its Education Committee's advice that “founding 
national schools” was “inadvisable.” 85 Using the argument that schools following curricula other 
than the approved West German program of study would not lead to the qualifications necessary 
for vocational training, the KMK recommended permitting only supplementary schools, if 
anything. In order to discourage foreign states from putting together such classes, the KMK also 
recommended against providing any West German financial support, personnel, or rooms. 
Possible exceptions were built into the final recommendations primarily on account of the 
private schools already receiving Bavarian state support.86  
As in regards to preparatory classes, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education 
used the Kultusministerkonferenz’s decisions to justify its subsequent compulsory school laws.87 
The Ministry specified that all children with their residence in North Rhine-Westphalia had to 
                                                
83 KMK, “Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler, 1965/66 - 1972/73,” A.1.1. Note that basic education includes 
primary as well as all three levels of secondary schools (and occasionally middle school), making the total number 
higher than those in the chart for solely Grund- and Hauptschulen. 
84 Hans Reimers to Stratenwerth, “Sch. 159.” The Kulturministerkonferenz’s School Committee held a special 
meeting to discussion the issue on 31 March 1965 in Bonn. 
85 Schulausschuß der KMK, “97. Sitzung des Schulausscuhsses am 1./2, April 1965 in Bremen; hier: 1. 
Gastarbeiterkinder: Ergebnisse einer Arbeitsbesprechung am. 31. 03. 1965” (KMK, April 20, 1965), B 304/3244/1, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Kultusministerium NRW to Herrn Minister über Herrn Staatssekretär and Abt. Leiter III im Hause, 
“Schulunterricht für die Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter,” December 10, 1965, NW 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW. 
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fulfill their school requirements in German Volksschulen (primary and lower secondary schools) 
and vocational training schools.88 Exceptions were only possible with official permission upon 
by application of the relevant schoolchild’s guardian.89 Regardless, NRW’s Ministry of 
Education was averse to giving the necessary permissions, claiming attendance in foreign 
schools would “make compulsory schooling illusionary.”90 
For the majority of the Länder, the issue of equality of opportunity and the longer 
residence of many of the children meant that education in a West German school trumped 
preparation for return. Children with non-German citizenship did not, according to the majority 
of the Länder, offer a pressing enough pedagogical basis for making exceptions to the 
compulsory schooling law requirements for attendance in public school advisable. Private 
national schools were to be discouraged if not outright banned. Yet, even as the majority of the 
Länder Education Administrations agreed and held to that decision, there were still exceptions, 
reinterpretations, and alternatives, including supplementary schools depending on the specific 
group, location, and request involved.  
Despite the Greek government’s arguments, the Länder Education Administrations, with 
the exception of the Bavarian, agreed that equal opportunity within West Germany required 
                                                
88 Landesregierung NRW, “Gesetz über die Schulpflicht im Lande Nordrhein-Westfalen (Schulpflichtgesetz-
SchpflG),” \iGesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 20, no. 50 (June 14, 1966): 365–68; 
and “Schulpflicht nun auch für Gastarbeiterkinder: Prof. Mikat in Nordrhein-Westfalen seit dem 15. Juni,” 1966, BR 
2068-367, Landesarchiv NRW. 
89 Article 1 (2) SchpflG 
90 Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulunterricht für die Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter,” Vermerk III A 36-6/1 Nr. 
3792/65 (Düsseldorf, November 30, 1965), 388-14, Landesarchiv NRW. The Greek government had not liked 
NRW’s guidelines on “the schooling of the children of guest workers” (Decree from 20 October 1964 - II C 36-6/1 
NR. 3205/64) either. The Greek Embassy expressed its desire that either the previous status quo be upheld or an 
exception made specifically for Greek citizens. The Greek government still wanted their own schools following their 
curriculum under their own oversight. The Ministry of Culture felt that the special exception was impossible. 
Anything given to the Grek state would have to be extended to all of the sending countries (Kultusministerium 
NRW and Brikkötter, “Über die Besprechung am 31. 10. 1967 im Dienstzimmer des Herrn Min. Rat Domhof,” 
Protokoll (Düsseldorf, October 31, 1967), 388-21, Landesarchiv NRW).  
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attendance in a West German public school. Without that education, regardless of how German a 
schoolchild learned to be, there would be no chance that the child would be able to enter the 
West German labor market. Without that opportunity, the state would be denying the child their 
rights as an individual. Even North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education, which 
emphasized the children’s right to be foreign, argued that children who remained in West 
Germany for a substantial length of time needed to be in West German public schools.  
Supplementary Schools and Diaspora for the Greek Government and Parent Groups  
In 1966, the Regional School Administration in North Württemberg (where the majority 
of children in Baden-Württemberg with Greek citizenship lived) and the school office in 
Stuttgart reported that the Greek guest workers exhibited a “striking sense of belonging” and 
“strove to maintain their Greek way of life as well as to pass it on to their children.”91 On 
account of this, many parents disregarded the new compulsory school law (if they were even 
aware of it) and sent their children to consular and private classes amounting to Greek schools 
instead of to West German public schools. Their children, the parents claimed, needed a Greek 
education because of their imminent (in three years or less) return to their country of origin. 
Since the Greek Ministry of Education did not recognize their West German education, children 
without a Greek education abroad had problems entering the Greek school system.92  
After listening to arguments for over three years from the Greek government (as well as 
others) and multiple minority parents groups, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education 
acknowledged the possibility that migrant children might return to their countries of citizenship. 
                                                
91 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Einschulung der Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter; 
hier: Freistellung zum Besuch einer sechsklassigen griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt,” July 
14, 1966, EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
92 Staatl. Schulamt Stuttgart, “Griechische Gastarbeiterkinderkinder”; and Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg, 
“Anerkennung der griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.” 
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Consequently, the Ministry conceded that some families might legitimately want national 
instruction or additional consular instruction. Adding an internal element to the equation, several 
German schools reported problems with incoming “Greek schoolchildren unable to understand 
German school instruction,” creating barriers to integration. These schools, as well as the 
Regional School Administrations, supported the development of Greek national schools.93 With 
its compulsory schooling law now firmly in place, the Baden-Württemberg Education 
Administration seriously considered alternatives to public school that would still ensure the 
children’s equal opportunities.  
Before Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education entertained the possibility of 
permitting expanded Greek instruction, several parent groups looked for (unofficial) loopholes in 
order to continue national classes. In the name of maintaining their cultural heritage and enabling 
their children to reintegrate smoothly into Greek society, these parent groups either developed 
their own schools or sent their children to unofficial schools run by private institutions, such as 
the “Griechische Erziehungsgesellschaft König Otto von Griechenland e.V.” (King Otto Greek 
Association for Education).94 These unofficial schools (unapproved by either Baden-
Württemberg’s Ministry of Education or any of the Regional School Administrations) did not 
follow a West German curriculum and usually provided no German language instruction.95  
After the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education announced the possibility of 
establishing supplementary schools, some of these parents groups requested official 
                                                
93 KMK, “107. Plenarsitzung der KMK am 28./29. April 1965; hier: 32. Schulische Betreuung von Kinder 
ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Auszug aus der Niederschrift (KMK, April 29, 1965), 29, MK 62244, Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv. 
94 Schulausschuß der KMK, “97. Sitzung des SchA.” 
95 KMK, “32. Schulische Betreuung von Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” Auszug aus den Vorausmitteilungen 
über die Sitzung (Nr. 108) des Plenums der KMK am 7./8. 07. 1965 (KMK, July 7, 1965), B 304/3244/2, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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legitimization for their schools. Backed by the local Greek Consulate, one group of parents asked 
to turn three Greek classes at the German Schiller School in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt into an 
actual school, a request the Stuttgart school office supported. These three classes (first and 
second, third and fourth, and fifth and sixth grades) provided 25 hours of weekly instruction for 
155 children. The classes lacked any German language instruction, as the three teachers had only 
a limited mastery of German.96 With the full support of the Greek Embassy, and because the 
school office argued that integrating 155 children into the local system would be difficult, in late 
1966 Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education acceded to the parents’ requests and opted to 
recognize the classes as a Greek supplementary school. The Ministry would eventually also 
recognize a supplementary school in Ludwigsburg and some other select locations.  
In order to try and ensure the children’s equal opportunities as well as social order, 
however, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education placed restrictions on the 
supplementary schools. The Ministry acknowledged that some children might return to their 
countries of origin after a short stay, necessitating national instruction. That some, however, was 
not all. Long-term residents still needed to integrate in order to have equal opportunities in West 
Germany.97 To try and separate out the groups, the Ministry of Education directed its local 
                                                
96 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Einschulung der Kinder griechischer Gastarbeiter; 
hier: Freistellung zum Besuch einer sechsklassigen griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt,” June 
14, 1966, EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. On account of these constant claims and demands, the 
Regional School Administration in North Württemberg, recommended that the Ministry of Culture permit the 
construction of a supplementary school under Article 45 Paragraph 1 of Baden-Württemberg’s School Law. 
Permission for attendance, however, was to be limited to those families planning only short stays in the Federal 
Republic. 
97 The Ministry refused to grant any financial support. See Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg and Schradi to 
Aufsichtsstelle der Griechische Kommission in Baden-Württemberg and A. Chatziandreu, “Errichtung eines 
Kulturheimes für griechische Kinder in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt; hier: Errichtung einer sechsklassigen griechischen 
Ergänzungsschule,” U II O 973/5-11 T (U II A 2111), (June 8, 1966), EA 3/609 Bü 97, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; 
and Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg and Teufel to Aufsichtsstelle der Griechische Kommission in Baden-
Württemberg, “Zulassung griechischer Kinder in die von Ihnen errichtete Ergänzungsschule,” U II A 2111/107/3 T, 
(June 8, 1966), EA 3/609 Bü 97, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
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school office to grant permission to attend Greek national schools only to those children whose 
parents were committed to leaving West Germany within a three year timeframe. Aware that 
migrants often changed their plans, the Ministry of Education limited permission to attend 
national private schools for up to three years during the relevant family’s first three years of 
residence in the Federal Republic. If the family stayed in West Germany longer than three years, 
the Ministry of Education officials felt that the family needed to integrate.98 
Nonetheless, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education acknowledged that even long-
term residents might want to eventually return to Greece (or to other countries of origin). To 
facilitate their possible emigration, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education first tacitly and 
then officially approved the expansion of Greek extra consular instruction from five hours 
weekly to up to ten in December 1966 for children eligible to attend consular instruction who 
were enrolled in public schools, That ten hours could only be given up to three afternoons a 
week.99 The extended hours were supposed to permit children time to not only learn the 
language, but also to receive two hours of weekly religious training.100 
Even with these kinds of concessions, many parents and guardians, as well as children 
with Greek citizenship, did not necessarily adhere to the Länder Education Administration’s 
rules and regulations, arguing that Greek national instruction was simply more important. 
                                                
98 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg, “Anerkennung der griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt”; 
and Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg and Schradi to Aufsichtsstelle der Griechische Kommission in Baden-
Württemberg and A. Chatziandreu, “Errichtung einer sechsklassigen griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Stuttgart-
Bad Cannstatt; hier: Zulassung schulpflichtiger griechischer Kinder und Lehrplan,” U II O 973/5-112 T (U II A 
2111/107), (June 8, 1966), EA 3/609 Bü 97, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
99 Kultusministerium BW to Oberschulämter Nordwürttemberg, Südwürttemberg-Hollenzollern, Nordbaden, 
Südbaden, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von Ausländerkinder, insbesondere von Kindern ausländischer 
Gastarbeiter; hier: Unterricht in der Muttersprache (s. Erlaß U II 2111/29 v. 14. 04. 1965 Abschn. IV),” December 
23, 1966, EA 3/609 Bü 69, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
100 Kultusministerium BW, “Schulische Betreuung der Gastarbeiterkinder” (Stuttgart, January 14, 1966), EA 3/609 
Bü 67, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
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Protesting their limited access to Greek language instruction, various parent groups wrote letters 
to the Education Administrations and took action on their own.101 In Ludwigsburg, at the 
beginning of 1968, the local school office and the Regional School Administration Nord-
Württemberg reported that “only a minority” of schoolchildren with Greek citizenship actually 
attended West German schools.102 The majority went instead to Greek supplementary schools, 
although some visited German public schools in the morning and then the Greek school in the 
afternoon. Taken together, these children received some 40 hours of instruction per week 
(compared to 20 to 30 hours of typical public school instruction), which the Regional School 
Administration believed overwhelmed the children.103  
Bowing to widespread parental demands, continued pressure from the Greek state, and 
the recommendations of its School Administrations, in 1968 Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of 
Education changed its private school law to permit the construction of additional supplementary 
schools. The Ministry of Education continued, however, to instruct the regional school 
administrations to only grant permission for attendance to children whose parents were 
committed to leaving the country within a three-year period.104 Based on the new law, these 
schools did not need special approval for construction, but fell under disclosure requirements to 
                                                
101 For example, there was a group of Greek guest workers in Düsseldorf who, even after their children learned the 
German language in preparatory classes continued to send their children for instruction in Greek by Greek teachers 
instead of German classes. Kultusminister NRW to Auswärtige Amt, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer 
Gastarbeiter,” June 5, 1968, 388-21, Landesarchiv NRW. 
102 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Einrichtung von Vorbereitungsklassen für 
griechische Kinder im Kreis Ludwigsburg.” 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. The private school law was changed on 14 May 1968 (Kultusministerium BW, “Privatschulgesetzes in der 
Fassung Vom 14. Mai 1968”).. To attend, the children had to be individually released from their compulsory 
schooling requirements at a German school (Article 41 Paragraph 5 SchVOG). 
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reveal curricula, etc., to the local Education Administration.105 The responsible parties – here the 
Greek Government – had to carry the costs in full, a stance the Ministry of Education upheld 
partly with an eye to discouraging the establishment of such schools.106  
By the 1967/68 school year, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education had 
made similar concessions in response to parental demands on the school offices, school office 
recommendations, and foreign state pressure.107 Under North Rhine-Westphalia’s new school 
law, Greek schools run by the Greek government were permissible as supplementary schools if 
the Greek state was willing to cover the costs on its own.108 As in Baden-Württemberg, these 
supplementary schools did not need approval, but fell under disclosure requirements. In contrast 
to the system in Baden-Württemberg, however, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of 
Education declared that it would release schoolchildren in groups instead of based on individual 
applications (lists sent to the relevant Educational Authority), making it easier for guardians to 
obtain permission for their children to attend.109 The children would only be released from West 
German school attendance, however, if the relevant West German officials were convinced that 
the educational goals established for the West German lower secondary school were met.110 
                                                
105 Article 13 of the new law (Kultusministerium BW to Königlich Griechische Generalkonsulat, Stuttgart, 
“Errichtung einer griechischen privaten Grund- und Hauptschule in Stuttgart,” UA II 2111-3/41, (June 1970), EA 
3/609 Bü 97, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart). 
106 Kultusministerium BW to Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Saloniki, “Eröffnung einer 
griechischen Privatschule in Stuttgart.” Despite permission for supplementary schools, Baden-Württemberg’s 
Ministry of Culture maintained its general position against private schools.  
107 Kultusminister NRW to Auswärtige Amt, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausl. Gastarbeiter.” 
108 Article 36 of the Schulordnungsgesetz (Landesregierung NRW, “Gesetz über die Schulpflicht im Lande 
Nordrhein-Westfalen (Schulpflichtgesetz-SchpflG)”). 
109 Under Article 1 (2) of the Schulordnungsgesetz 
110 Kultusminister NRW to Auswärtige Amt, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausl. Gastarbeiter.”  
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Even as Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administrations 
made concessions regarding expanded Greek national schools and instruction, the Greek 
government collapsed during the 21 April 1967 Coup of the Colonels.111 Responding to internal 
instabilities and frustration, a conservative group of colonels decided that, to save the Kingdom, 
they needed to step in. Within months of taking control, the new government rolled back the 
remaining education reforms of the early 1960s. Intending to renew the national Greek-Christian 
spirit in the country, the Junta government also instituted flag salutations as well as obligatory 
religious services.112 
In West Germany, Chancelor Kurt Georg Kiesinger’s government, the first Grand 
Coalition of CDU and SPD (1966-1969) was shocked by the authoritarian military coup and 
imposed sanctions.113 Yet, several Christian conservative politicians in the Federal and Länder 
governments appreciated the military government’s anti-communist rhetoric, which harked back 
to the Greek Civil War.114 The colonels had been afraid that a victory by the leftist Center Union 
could lead to a government coalition with the Greek Communist Party. Some conservative 
branches of the CDU and CSU, as historian Alexander Clarkson discusses, took up the Greek 
junta’s logic, willing to accept the claims for exceptionalism forwarded by Francoist Spain and 
the successive Turkish military governments.115  
                                                
111 Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 160–166.  
112 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht 1967,” 2. 
113 For a discussion of the two countries relations’ in the 1950s and 1960s, see Dimitrios K. Apostolopoulos, 
“Greece and Germany in Postwar Europe: The Way towards Reconciliation,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 21, 
no. 2 (2003): 223–43. 
114 Alexander Clarkson, Fragmented Fatherland: Immigration and Cold War Conflict in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1945-1980 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 123–127. 
115 Ibid., 123–124. 
  165 
In its battle against the specter of communism, the Greek military government’s intent to 
renew the Greek-Christian spirit extended to Greek citizens abroad. On account of the coup, 
migration from Greece had picked up and the number of workers and their families moving to 
West Germany increased significantly (see Table 3.1). In 1969, concerned that these same Greek 
citizens were being improperly educated in Greekness, the military government argued that its 
citizens were in danger of a receiving substandard schooling in West Germany. As the Greek 
government continued to claim all of its citizens would return imminently, that schooling was a 
problem. The Länder Education Administrations’ arguments about the lengthening residence of 
some members of the growing Greek population in West Germany were pushed aside with the 
reiterated claim that a West German education effectively prevented returning schoolchildren 
from participating in higher levels of secondary schools in Greece. To alleviate this pressing 
dilemma, the Greek government wanted to create more Greek national schools following the 
Greek education plan with the financial support of the Federal Republic, as was already the case 
in Bavaria. They further hoped to extend the national preparation classes in Baden-Württemberg 
and North Rhine-Westphalia from one year to six.116 
The Greek military government’s reversal of education reforms and nationalistic stance 
changed the tone of its relationship with West Germany, but not its substance. In fact, despite the 
coup and conservative education reform, the Greek government’s material requests remained 
fundamentally static through the end of the decade. The successive Greek governments each had 
a different vision of education within Greece, but they each maintained the necessity and 
                                                
116 “5. Tagung des Ständigen gemischten deutsch-griechischen Ausschusses nach dem Kulturabkommen vom 17. 
Mai 1956 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Griechenland,” Protokoll (Athen, November 5, 1969), B 
96, Bd. 876, PA AA; and Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Errichtung einer privaten 
griechischen Hauptschule (Ergänzungsschule),” U II A 2111/444-1, (November 6, 1971), EA 3/609 Bü 97, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
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importance of receiving a purely Greek education abroad. Rigidly adhering to supposedly 
traditional school forms, the new military government was unwilling to even consider any 
concessions regarding the education of its citizens abroad. Indeed, fledgling discussions about 
degree equivalency between Greece and West Germany (the two sides had gotten as far as 
agreeing they should work on it) were effectively derailed.  
In contrast, with both the West German and Italian school systems decentralized and 
requiring a minimum of eight (later nine or ten as the two systems underwent reform) years of 
compulsory schooling, considerations of equivalency were simpler between than with other guest 
worker countries. Over the course of the 1960s, the Italian and West German states explored the 
possibility of degree equivalency even as both countries reformed their secondary school 
systems.117 The Italian government opted to move first, recognizing the West German secondary 
school certificate in order to support those Italian citizens who did return in the mid-1960s.118 
West Germany, in contrast, would not recognize the Italian secondary certificate until the early 
1980s. Even then, the agreement disappointed the Italian government as the West German only 
recognized the Italian school certificate at a lower secondary school level. The Italian 
                                                
117 “3. Sitzung Deutsch-Italienisch Gemischte Kommission; hier: IV. Unterricht der deutschen Sprache in 
italienischen Schulen und der italienischen Sprache an deutschen Schulen,” Protokoll, (January 23, 1963), 8, B 90, 
Bd. 815, PA AA; “6. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des zwischen 
Italien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Kulturabkommens, Bonn, 3.-5. April 1968,” Protokoll 
(Bonn, April 5, 1968), 9, B 97, Bd. 270, PA AA; and Wohlgemuth, “Supplementary General Education, Preliminary 
Comparative Study, Third Conference of European Ministers of Education,” 8.  
118 Auswärtige Amt to Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Rom, “Anerkennung der von italienischen 
Schülern deutscher Schulen in Italien erworbenen Reifezeugnisse durch die Italienischen Behörden,” November 14, 
1967, PA AA. The Italian Consulate in Cologne informed the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education that 
as long at the school transcript included a note verifying participation in Italian instruction in West Germany then 
the West German school certificate would be considered valid without a test in Italy.  
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government felt that it should be valued at least at the level of the Realschule (lower level of 
higher secondary, below the Gymnasium).119 
Because of the rigid structures of both the West German and Greek school systems, the 
Greek government argued that children with Greek citizenship and their parents or guardians had 
to choose either the Greek or German system. By attending a West German school with only 
afterschool instruction in Greek (between five and ten hours a week), the children were unable to 
reintegrate into the system upon return to Greece. Their futures were hence tied to the German 
system, a system in which they were usually already behind unless they began in the first or 
second class. In contrast, without the specific West German qualifications required in either 
vocational training or institutions of higher education, those children attending Greek national 
schools had little to no chance of anything other than unskilled labor in West Germany. Both sets 
of concerns were quite serious. Children with Greek citizenship had documented problems 
reintegrating into the Greek school system after attendance in West German schools. Yet, not all 
children returned to Greece. Those who did remain, in turn, were unlikely to finish their 
secondary schooling in West Germany unless they started their education in the country. Either 
way, the majority of these children were effectively cut off from higher education tracks or 
vocational education in either system.  
The situation facing Greek citizens was more explicitly nationalist than most of the other 
ethno-national minority groups migrating to West Germany during this period. While smaller 
than many of the other minority groups, the voracity and extremity of their demands in contrast 
to governments like Italy’s shaped many of the Länder Education Administrations’ policies. The 
                                                
119 The Italian delegation requested an inquiry in 1972 (“8. Siztung des Ständigen Gemischten Ausschusses zur 
Durchfürhung des Kulturabkommens zwischen der Bundespurelibk Deutschland und der Italienischen Republik, 
Berlin, 5.-7. Juni 1972,” Protokoll, (June 7, 1972), 12, B 304/3245/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
  168 
contrast between the Italian and Greek governments and communities’ requests fostered the 
double goals most Länder Education Administrations had developed. On the one hand, they 
stressed integration with cultural maintenance, on the other they emphasized the reverse balance 
– all in the name of equality of opportunity. For both, some level of integration and cultural 
maintenance was advisable, but the result was entirely different. With different citizenship 
groups facing different possible futures and likely tenures of residence in West Germany, the 
Education Administrations did not want to refuse to an entire group the possibility of either 
success in the West German system or return.  
Turkey, Literacy, and Qualified Labor 
Not all state governments were as decided in their goals for their citizens abroad as the 
Greek or Italian. In 1967, the Turkish delegation at the Joint West German-Turkish Cultural 
Commission meeting in West Berlin took a moment at the tail end of the three-day session to 
underline the “growing importance of the question of the instruction of the children of Turkish 
guest workers” in West Germany. They made sure to include a mention of the value of the 
children’s technical and cultural education as well as the importance of the Turkish college and 
university student groups. On the occasion, the Turkish delegation expressed its “lively 
satisfaction at the facilitation and assistance from various German organizations and hoped that 
the cooperation and support will be continued into the future.”120  
The brief 1967 addendum on the schooling of its citizens abroad reflected the Turkish 
state’s comparatively limited engagement with the topic during the 1960s in contrast to the 
Greek or Italian governments. Where the Italian and Greek governments took the initiative, 
                                                
120 “4. Sitzung des mit der Durchführung des deutsch-türkischen Kulturabkommens Beauftragten Ständigen 
Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” Protokoll (Ankara, 1967), 9, B 97, Bd. 309, PA AA. 
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approaching the West German Education Administrations, the Turkish government became 
involved in the conversation when Länder Education Administrations alerted the “sending 
country governments” about the 1964 Kultusministerkonferenz recommendations.121 Unlike the 
other two states, the Turkish government did not have a long history of diaspora formation, 
meaning that in the 1960s it had to establish a system for addressing emigration and return 
migration for the first time in the state’s history. Furthermore, in the 1960s, the Turkish 
government was in the middle of trying to combat illiteracy and reform its own education system 
even as it addressed massive social unrest and political instability.122 It was then that the Turkish 
legations happily took the West German Kultusministerkonferenz and Länder regulations as the 
foundation of its own programs for its citizens in West Germany.  
The Turkish state’s educational goals in the 1960s vacillated as the government changed 
and society shifted dramatically, influencing discussions of schooling for its emigrants. At the 
beginning of the decade, the Turkish government was combatting illiteracy, which hovered at 
around 50 percent.123 The Turkish compulsory school system featured five years of compulsory 
schooling at 26 hours of instruction a week, but not all children had access to a school or, if they 
did, class sizes of upwards of 50 pupils often made learning difficult. In consequence, as 
discussed above, at the beginning of the 1960s the country faced illiteracy rates of approximately 
50 percent and the government was trying to make access to primary schools widespread. 
                                                
121 As discussed in the previous chapter, the eight official “guest worker countries” included Italy, Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. See Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, “Guest Workers and 
Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 until Its Halt in 
1973,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 187–218. 
122 Ali Arayıcı, “Les disparités d’alphabétisation et de scolarisation en Turquie,” International Review of Education 
46, no. 1–2 (May 2000): 117–46. For more on education reform, see Sam Kaplan, The Pedagogical State: Education 
and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 39–56. 
123 Özgür Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 20–25. 
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Teacher shortages, however, made that an almost-unattainable goal.124 That deficit led in turn to 
a shortage of qualified workers and training programs (as well as a continued lack of teachers). 
This development contributed to student unrest at the end of the 1960s, which in turn was one 
reason for the 1971 military coup.125 Working in these conditions, until the end of the decade, the 
Turkish government’s discussion of its citizens in West Germany’s schooling stressed 
integration, literacy, and vocational training, rarely mentioning equality of opportunity. With 
internal struggles and limited resources, instruction for its citizens abroad temporarily took a 
back seat. With limited primary school distribution and circumscribed emigration, the Turkish 
state had yet to establish cultural indoctrination as a primary goal for citizens abroad. The 
Republic of Turkey, founded in 1920, initially cut off most avenues for emigration, concentrating 
on developing its interior. Until the Korean War (1950-1953), which ended nearly 30 years of 
virtual non-involvement in world affairs, relatively few Turkish citizens migrated abroad for any 
reason.126 Within the decade, however, part of Turkey’s opening included bilateral labor 
agreements with multiple Western and European states.127 As these workers moved abroad and 
                                                
124 Technically, as of 1961, Turkey expanded its compulsory schooling laws from five years to eight. Without the 
necessary infrastructure, however, the law was not implemented. See IBE, “Turkey,” in International Yearbook of 
Education (Geneva: IBE, 1970), 146–47; and OECD, Reviews of National Policies for Education: Basic Education 
in Turkey 2007 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), 30–31, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/. 
125 Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey, 154–157; and Senol Durgun, “Left-Wing Politics in Turkey: Its 
Development and Problems,” Arab Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 9–32. 
126 John M. Vander Lippe, “Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey’s Participation in the Korean War,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 92–102. 
127 Mehmet Dösemeci, “The Turkish Drawbridge: European Integration and the Cultural Economics of National 
Planning,” Contemporary European History 22, no. 4 (November 2013): 627–47; Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in 
Europe: From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 1–111; and Jennifer A. 
Miller, “Postwar Negotiations: The First Generation of Turkish ‘Guest Workers’ in West Germany, 1961--1973” 
(Ph.D., Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick, 2008). 
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either began families abroad or had their children follow them, the Turkish government lacked a 
system in place for addressing their schooling.128  
Adding to that dilemma, the Turkish government and the diverse Turkish population did 
not have a cohesive concept of “Turkishness.”129 When the Republic of Turkey was declared in 
1923, Ataturk and the other founding fathers verbally tied “Turkishness” to secular Kemalism.130 
For the government, “Turkishness” was about the desire to live together, compatible with 
religious and ethnic diversity.131 Yet, at the same time, the aggressively nationalistic government 
(like many other states during the period) pressed for the assimilation of new migrants into its 
highly heterogeneous population. As its Christian population rapidly shrunk after the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923, the concept of “Turkish” increasingly emphasized ethnic assimilation and 
included Islam despite government protestations of secularism.132 With 96 percent of the 
population being Muslim by 1945, perhaps it was unsurprising. Highlighting that connection, the 
                                                
128 For more on female and family labor migration, see Esra Erdern and Monika Mattes, “Gendered Policies - 
Gendered Patterns: Female Migration from Turkey to Germany from the 1960s to the 1990s,” in European 
Encounters: Migrants, Migration, and European Societies Since 1945, ed. Rainer Ohliger, Karen Schönwälder, and 
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 167–85. 
129 Mustafa Saatci, “Nation–States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish–Kurdish Conflict,” 
Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 4 (October 1, 2002): 549–64. 
130 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) was an army officer credited as the founder of the modern Republic of 
Turkey. He officially served between 1923 and 1938 as the first President of the country. See Soner Cagaptay, 
“Passage to Turkishness: Immigration and Religion in Modern Turkey,” in Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: 
Challenging the Nation-State, ed. Haldun Gülalp (Taylor & Francis, 2006), 61–82. 
131 Kaplan, The Pedagogical State, 41–43, 65–66; and Niyazi. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey 
(Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). 
132 It should be noted that the Christian population shrank in part because of the forced population transfers between 
Greece and Turkey in 1923 in association with the Greco-Turkish war and the Treaty of Lausanne. Allied and 
Associated Powers (1914-1920)., George II, and Atatürk, Treaty of Peace with Turkey: And Other Instruments 
Signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, Together with Agreements Between Greece and Turkey Signed on January 30, 
1923, and Subsidiary Documents Forming Part of the Turkish Peace Settlement. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 
1923).  
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Turkish state’s naturalization practices in the interwar period required a high level of cultural and 
religious assimilation.133  
Nonetheless, within that Muslim majority, a significant portion of the population did 
view themselves as ethnically Turkish, something the government was invested in reforming.134 
Other groups of citizens identified as Kurdish or as part of the country’s other minority groups 
rather than Turkish.135 Many citizens did not speak Turkish and, although the majority of the 
people identified as Muslim, they practiced different forms if they practiced at all.136 State 
policies also tried to promote some form of homogenization through a centralized school system 
and other regulations.137 Yet, the implementation of policy (particularly in rural communities) 
often proved problematic due to limited resources and the spread of the population within the 
large country.138 Even if the state had had a clear consensus on what Turkishness was supposed 
to be, with uneven dissemination of even primary schooling the state could not effectively 
promote it.  
Without a clear ability to promote Turkishness and with a focus on disseminating basic 
literacy, the Turkish state viewed its citizens schooling abroad as a important but not pressing. A 
                                                
133 Cagaptay, “Passage to Turkishness: Immigration and Religion in Modern Turkey.” 
134 Nurcan Kaya and Clive Baldwin, Minorities in Turkey (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2004). 
135 Amir Hassanpour, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, and Michael Chyet, “The Non-Education of Kurds: A Kurdish 
Perspective,” International Review of Education 42, no. 4 (January 1, 1996): 367–79. 
136 Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey (Durham, NC: Duke 
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137 Başak İnce, “Citizenship Education in Turkey: Inclusive or Exclusive,” Oxford Review of Education 38, no. 2 
(April 1, 2012): 115–31. 
138 For a discussion of some of the major challenges the government faced regarding primary and middle school 
reform, see Hamdi Binay, “Hauptprobleme der Grundausbildung und des Mittleren Bildungsweges,” in Das 
europäische Bildungswesen im Vergleich: Türkei, ed. Wolfgang Eltrich (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, Akad. für 
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child with any education was often better qualified than a large portion of their fellow citizens. 
Hence, while there was no direct equivalency of degrees between Turkey and West Germany at 
the time, children attending West German schools were not considered to be at a disadvantage if 
they returned to Turkey (unlike children with Greek citizenship).139 The Turkish government 
also encouraged integration into West German schools because of associated avenues for 
vocational training. The Turkish government hoped that workers traveling to West Germany 
would learn skills to bring back home with them.140 
The shortage of qualified workers in general and teachers in particular meant that the 
Turkish state’s early discussions about education in meetings with West German representatives 
or within the Council of Europe emphasized vocational training. The Turkish government was 
interested in arranging training for Turkish teachers and recruiting foreign instructors to fill 
needed positions in Turkish schools. The Turkish government asked West Germany to send 
teachers (particularly secondary and vocational) to Turkey and applied for support from the 
Council of Europe. To assist their long-time friend, West Germany did in fact begin sending 
instructors “East,” particularly those trained in the sciences and for vocational training.141 The 
                                                
139 There were unofficial agreements between the Turkish and West German government in the early 1970s 
regarding the recognition of secondary school certificates as prerequisites for entering colleges and universities 
based on discussions during meetings of the Joint West German-Turkish Cultural Commission such as “6. Sitzung 
des mit der Durchführung des deutsch-türkischen Kulturabkommens beauftragten Ständigen Gemischten 
Kulturausschusses,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 25, 1971), 4, B 85, Bd. 771, PA AA. 
140 “1. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” Protokoll (Ankara, June 13, 
1959), B 90, Bd. 807, PA AA; and “2. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” 
Protokoll (Bonn, February 11, 1961), B 90, Bd. 859, PA AA.  
141 “2. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” 4, 7; Auswärtige Amt, “Besuch 
des türkischen Erziehungsministers,” Vermerk (Bonn, April 17, 1961), B 90, Bd. 859, PA AA; and “5. Sitzung des 
mit der Durchführung des deutsch-türkischen Kulturabkommens beauftragten ständigen Gemischten deutsch-
türkischen Kulturausschusses,” Protokoll (Ankara, November 19, 1969), 6–7, B 85, Bd. 771, PA AA. According to 
the Foreign Office, the Turkish and German governments had been friends for more than 30years, going back to 
their cooperation during the First World War. See Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Lage des 
Türkischeunterrichts an der detuschen Schule Istanbul” (Istanbul: Auswärtige Amt, February 4, 1961), B 90 859, PA 
AA. 
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Council of Europe’s Council of Cultural Cooperation (CCC) also established a program for the 
further education of Turkish teachers, funding their training in several other countries, including 
West Germany.142  
The emphasis on basic literacy and vocational training did not mean the Turkish state and 
migrants with Turkish citizenship were uninterested in cultural education. After all, in 1964, the 
number of “Turkish guest workers” had reached some 80,000, and by 1965 the number of 
schoolchildren enrolled in West German public schools rose to almost 3,000 (see Table 3.3). 
Thus, when the Turkish government received the West German Kultusministerkonferenz 
framework for “school instruction for the children of foreign workers” in 1964, the Turkish state 
responded almost immediately. The Turkish Consulates in Baden-Württemberg and North 
Rhine-Westphalia, where the largest residency groups with Turkish citizenship lived, inquired 
into the details of establishing the consular courses and preparation classes laid out in the 
Recommendations and even looked into the option of setting up Turkish private schools.143 Some 
parent groups and private Turkish organizations also looked into the possibility of establishing 
Turkish schools. At the behest of these parent/guardian and private groups, the West German 
Embassy in Ankara and the Turkish Government requested information from the West German 
                                                
142 Among the first of the Council of Europe’s programs through the Council of Cultural Cooperation (CCC) was for 
the “Weiterbildung türkischer Lehrer.” Under this program, some one hundred Turkish teachers with different 
subject specialties were sent to twelve different participating Council of Europe Member States for two-years further 
education programs at the cost of the host country between 1964 and 1970 (seventeen of these were sent to the 
FRG). See Arend, “Les programmes d’études des enseignements primaire et secondaire,” Annexe V (B); and 
Auswärtige Amt, “Dienstinstruktion für den neuen Deutschen Botschafter in Ankara” (Bonn, February 25, 1966), 6–
7, B 97, Bd. 134, PA AA.  
143 Arbeits- und Sozialminister NRW and Wolf to Bergmann and Kultusminister NRW, “Schulunterricht für 
ausländische Kinder,” March 10, 1965, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv NRW. For the request from Turkey, see 
Türkische Botschaft to Kultusminister NRW, “952/331,” April 6, 1965, NW 141-115, Landesarchiv NRW. In April, 
the Turkish Embassy wrote to the KM-NRW to say that the staff appreciated knowing about the rules from 1964 and 
were looking into where instruction was possible. Made aware of the 14/15 May 1964 Recommendations, the North 
Rhine-Westpahlian Minister of Labor Dr. Wolf during the opening of the Turkish Center in Bonn. There he asked if 
the “Turkish children” could receive extra instruction in addition to the lessons in the German school to the tune of 
five weekly-hours by a Turkish teacher paid by NRW, just like Italian children. 
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Foreign Office about the possibility.144 The number of inquiries, however, were relatively few in 
comparison with Greek parent groups despite comparable numbers of school age citizens (in 
1965, over 4,000 schoolchildren with Greek citizenship and under 3,000 with Turkish compared 
to 1967, when both had more then 7,000. See Tables 3.1 and 3.3.  
Table 3.3: Schoolchildren with Turkish Citizenship enrolled in Primary and Lower 
Secondary schools, 1965-1972145  
 Total NRW Berlin BW Bavaria Hesse 
1965 2,956 704 41 812 676 320 
1966 5,119 1,112 112 1,453 1,094 616 
1967 7,191 1,608 203 2,122 1,200 864 
1968 10,402 2,428 468 2,957 1,763 1,089 
1969 15,868 3,863 1,120 4,072 2,606 1,646 
1970 25,533 6,117 2,725 6,028 4,040 2,486 
1971 41,397 11,176 5,025 8,463 5,925 3,790 
1972 57,261 16,533 6,825 11,046 8,045 4,955 
 
The Turkish government’s and parent groups’ inquiries into private schools generated the 
varied, complicated responses the Greek government had also received. The West German 
Foreign Office responded enthusiastically, encouraging the Länder governments to assist 
(financially and otherwise) the Turkish government’s efforts, in part to gain leverage over the 
German schools in Turkey. Nonetheless, the Länder Education Administrations balked at 
making any new financial concessions, agreeing only to provide consular classes or language 
                                                
144 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara to Auswärtige Amt, “Türkische Schulen in Deutschland,” 
October 8, 1964, B 304/2058, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and “Errichtung von Schulen für Kinder türkischer 
Gastarbeiter in der BR,” Questionnaire GS-1274/64, (October 22, 1964), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. The 
West German Embassy in Ankara encouraged permitting the construction of such schools, mentioning (as a side 
note) that permitting private Turkish schools in Germany would ease the situation of the German school in Istanbul 
under the spirit of reciprocity. Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkische Schulen in 
Deutschland” (Ankara: Auswärtige Amt, October 6, 1964), B 304/2058/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
145 “5. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-griechen Kulturausschusses (1969)”; and Oberschulamt 
Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Errichtung einer privaten griechischen Hauptschule 
(Ergänzungsschule).” See also KMK, “Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler, 1965/66 - 1972/73,” 7–9, 12, 14, 18. The 
KMK and many of the Länder still included schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship under ‘other’ in 1963. 
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assistance based on established regulations.146 The Länder Education Administrations felt, after 
all, that any concession extended to one sending country government had to be extended to all of 
them.147 In following, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education outlined the same 
options it gave the other state governments, including payment for Turkish teachers on the same 
basis as its own. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education, in turn, acknowledged that the 
Turkish government did have options for establishing consular courses or supplementary 
schools, if it chose to apply. As with all national supplementary schools, however, the Baden-
Württemberg Ministry of Education would only fund the preparation classes for integration. If 
the Turkish government wanted consular instruction, it would have to finance the classes.148 
The Turkish government dropped its inquiries into national private instruction, but 
maintained an interest in language and cultural classes through the end of the decade. Private and 
supplementary schools were simply too complicated and expensive for the Turkish state to 
commit to. Only after the 1971 coup would the new Minister of National Education again raise 
the issue.149 In contrast, the Turkish government tried to set-up consular and preparation classes 
across West Germany, particularly (although not exclusively) in those Länder like North Rhine-
                                                
146 Several Länder recommend strongly against the conclusion of a relevant agreement (entsprechenden Abkommen) 
with Turkey. See KMK and Möllenkamp to Auswärtige Amt, Kulturabteilung, “Errichtung von Schulen für Kinder 
türkischer Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” 
147 Ibid. The KMK tried to let the Foreign Office know about the rules for establishing private schools for Turkish 
children in the Federal Republic. In 1965, there were relatively few private national schools. Bavaria had permitted a 
select few for migrant groups. Otherwise, the main three private national schools included the French and American 
schools in Berlin as well as the Lithuanian Gymnasium in Frankfurt am Main. 
148 Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der Ständigen Konferenz der KMK, “Türkische Schulen in Deutschland,” 
December 10, 1964, B 304/3244/2, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
149 “6. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses (1971),” May 25, 1971, 5–7. The 
Turkish government went through rapid personnel changes in the 1960s and 1970s and had six Ministers of National 
Education between 1967 and 1973 (Mehmet İlhami Ertem, 1 April 1967–3 November 1969; Orhan Oğuz, 3 
November 1969–26 March 1971; Şinasi Orel, 26 March 1971–13 December 1971, İsmail Hakkı Arar, 13 December 
1971–22 May 1972; Sabahattin Özbek, 22 May 1972–15 April 1973; and Orhan Dengiz, 15 April 1973–26 January 
1974).  
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Westphalia that financed the instruction directly.150 To work with Länder Education 
Administrations and staff the programs, the Turkish Government (through its Embassy in Bonn) 
created a “Working Program” in 1965 to address the problems that “naturally” arose from the 
growing number of “Turkish workers” employed in the Federal Republic. Through the Working 
Program, the government intended, among other things, to send 15 primary school teachers. 
These instructors were to teach “additional special mother tongue instruction” to Turkish 
schoolchildren attending German schools.151  
Multiple problems arose, however, in arranging for Turkish teachers to go to West 
Germany, effectively limiting their number for the subsequent five years.152 Arguments about 
who should pay for travel costs, disappearing visa applications, and concerns regarding spousal 
accompaniment meant multiple-month delays before the first teacher even arrived in West 
Germany.153 In addition, the Turkish state’s budget prevented it from sending many teachers to 
Länder, like Baden-Württemberg, which required Turkey to pay their salary. Even when it did 
                                                
150 For NRW, Dr. Schnoor answer described the acceptable Übergangsklassen that the Turkish Government could 
establish in NRW: for a minimum of 20 children of the same language for preparation to transfer into German 
schools, or the afterschool instruction (mother language, Landeskunde, history, and religion of their “home” (23. 09. 
1965 - III A 36-6/1Nr. 2964/65). The teachers were paid by the Ministry of Culture (Kultusministerium NRW and 
Schnoor to Sekretariat, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder türkische Gastarbeiter; hier Entsendung von türkische 
Volksschullehrern,” III A 36-6/1 Nr. 2721/66, (August 15, 1966), B 304/3245/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
151 The Turkish Embassy includes a list of places where it thinks that the teachers should be employed. Included one 
in Hamburg; one in Bremen; one in Niedersachsen; six in NRW; one in Hesse; one in Saarland; two in Baden-
Württemberg; and two in Bavaria (Botschaft der Türkei, “Verbalnote 4581/1080,” (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Türkische 
Botschaft, December 9, 1965), B 304/3245, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
152 Among other concerns, there were multiple problems with visas, questions about spousal accompaniment, as well 
as Turkish government changes. The 57th meeting of the KMK’s Subcommittee on Foreigners from December 1966 
mentions that there are problems with the Turkish teachers. Part of the issue was the expectation from the Turkish 
side that the Länder would pay for travel costs. Ibid.; and Auswärtige Amt and Rummel to Sekretariat der Ständigen 
Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, “Türkische Gastarbeiter in der 
Bundesrepublik; hier: Entsendung von türkische Volksschullehrern,” January 6, 1966, B 304/3245, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz. 
153 Auswärtige Amt, “Türkei; and enthält u.a.: Einreise türkische Lehrer, 1970-1971” (Bonn, 1971), B 85, Bd. 1044, 
PA AA. 
  178 
fund teachers, remuneration proved problematic, as Turkish salaries did not match the various 
West German wage structures nor provide enough for living costs in West Germany.154 The 
Turkish schoolteacher’s salary was simply not comparable to the German. Consequently, some 
Turkish teachers left their posts after arrival, opting to work instead as “guest workers” for a 
higher salary. Combined with the teacher shortage in Turkey, these problems led the Turkish 
government to limit the numbers of teachers, despite continued requests from the Länder 
Education Administration when there were enough students for another class.155 
With the Turkish government focused on other issues, such as substantial internal student 
unrest, some of the Länder Education Administrations and private Turkish and German 
organizations began to organize and staff native language and cultural instruction for the children 
of Turkish migrant workers on their own. For example, while mother tongue and cultural 
instructional classes in Baden-Württemberg were technically only available at the application of 
the sending country government, the state did host a few private classes, often at the behest of 
local companies. In Pforzheim in Baden-Württemberg the social democratic Workers’ Welfare 
Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) sponsored a class run by a Turkish teacher. Fifteen children 
from the city and another eight from the area were taught every Saturday afternoon for two 
hours. Most other cities felt that the distance was too great for most of the children, although 
some firms, like Daimler-Benz in Mannheim (which employed a significant number of 
                                                
154 This would continually lead the Turkish legations in West Germany to advocate for West Germany to take over 
all of the consular teachers’ wages (Botschaft der Türkei, “4581/1080”; and Botschaft der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland,” IV 4 - 88 (Ankara, March 
2, 1971), B 93, Bd. 747, PA AA). 
155 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in 
Deutschland.” 
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employees with Turkish citizenship) expressed willingness to help despite problems with 
distance.156  
As the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education funded local consular classes, it 
took a different approach when local schools and Turkish parent groups expressed interest. 
Unable to procure sufficient teachers from Turkey, North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of 
Education began instructing its Regional School Administrations to accept applications from 
teachers with Turkish citizenship. These teachers had Turkish qualifications, but had migrated to 
West Germany to work in various (often auto) factories. Pointing to groups of schoolchildren 
with Turkish citizenship who did not have access to any Turkish consular instruction, these 
teachers first applied on their own initiative to set up classes within German schools. As the 
decade progressed, however, some school administrations advertised for qualified Turkish 
teachers through various news outlets instead of approaching the Turkish Consulate.157  
Depending on Länder regulations and financing, the Länder Education Administrations 
promoted Turkish cultural and language instruction for multiple reasons. To begin, once the 
school initiatives were regulated, children with the relevant citizenship status were technically 
entitled to the stipulated consular instruction. Parents or guardians with Turkish citizenship could 
still request the classes, even if the Turkish state was not providing them. In Baden-
Württemberg, the Ministry of Education’s stance that the state was not responsible for the classes 
                                                
156 Staatl. Schulamt Mannhaim-Stadt, February 21, 1967, EA 3/609 Bü 69, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; and M. 
Gokay, “The Teaching of Modern Languages to Migrant Workers. (Turkey), 1971-72,” June 19, 1972, 
http://www.eric.ed.gov. For more on the relationship between German industry and Turkish workers, see Sarah 
Thomsen Vierra, “At Home in Almanya: Turkish-German Space of Belonging in West Germany, 1961-1990” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011), 33–86; and Karin Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr 
kehren wir zurück--”: Die Geschichte der türkischen “Gastarbeiter” in der Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2005), 100–187.  
157 Schulamt für die Stadt Köln and Oberreiguenrgsrat, “Beschulung Türkischer Kinder,” April 15, 1969, NW 388-
18, Landesarchiv NRW; and Türkisches Konsul, Essen to Franz Domhof, March 3, 1971, NW 388-18, Landesarchiv 
NRW.  
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and associated regulations meant that the Education Administration did not have to act, although 
some schools did draw money from their own budgets. Those groups that did try and provide 
classes, however, were often labor organizations. In contrast, according to the North Rhine-
Westphalian Ministry of Education, children were entitled to cultural and mother tongue 
instruction and needed to maintain connections to their cultural heritage, not assimilate. In 
consequence, the Ministry of Education felt responsible for offering the classes, regardless of 
country of citizenship involvement. Technically, however, the country of citizenship government 
still had the right to select teachers.158  
Despite the hurdles to sending teachers abroad, the Turkish government reconfirmed its 
interest in its citizens’ education and access to mother language and cultural instruction 
throughout the late 1960s. In 1966, both the West German and Turkish delegations agreed that 
they would be “happy, if Turkish children were offered the opportunity to secure and deepen 
their knowledge of their mother language as taught by Turkish elementary school teachers 
employed by the Länder Educational Authorities.”159 With similar language in 1967, the Turkish 
delegation would announce the growing importance of the question of the instruction of the 
children of Turkish guest workers in Germany during a meeting of the Standing Joint German-
Turkish Cultural Commission in Berlin.160 The state was unable, however, to commit to action, 
                                                
158 In Bavaria, Dr. Kessler, Ministerialdirigent, claimed there were not up to that point either from the Turkish 
Legation or from any other side applications for the establishment of extra instruction, support instruction, or any 
other school measures for the “children of Turkish guest workers.” Consequently, the Bavarian Ministry of 
Education had yet to establish any such measures (Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus and 
Kessler to Sekretariat, “Schulische Betreuung der Kinder türkische Gastarbeiter; hier Entsendung von türkische 
Volksschullehrern,” Nr. III/8 - 4/108 999, (October 11, 1966), B 304/3245/3, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
159 Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der KMK, “Türkische Gastarbeiter in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; hier: 
Entsendung von Türkischen Volksschullehrern,” March 22, 1966, B 97, Bd. 308, PA AA. 
160 “4. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses (1967).” As of 1967, the Turkish 
Government continued to support some efforts to support its citizens abroad, but also expended some pains to 
support German instruction in public schools in Turkey. In the first line were efforts to expand in German classes in 
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particularly as it cycled rapidly through new Ministers of Education, each of whom had to be 
apprised of the situation.161  
Only in 1968 did the Turkish state’s interest in the education and national identification 
of its nationals abroad truly begin to move beyond general advocacy, in part because of concerns 
regarding return amid growing internal unrest. Amid multiple boycotts and demonstrations, 
students in Turkey had “gotten their arms up” and, according to the West German Embassy’s 
Cultural Report on Turkey for 1968, “there was increased xenophobia directed particularly 
against American influence.” That sentiment was part of international movements against the 
Vietnam War and in protest of American Imperialism. According to the West German Embassy 
in Ankara, however, the students’ part in the unrest stemmed predominately from frustration due 
to limited seats in secondary and vocational institutions. The Turkish government promised some 
reforms, but given continued resource shortages, there was local and international skepticism 
over whether these would take place.162 The government was still committed to developing the 
primary school track, which made commitment to secondary and technical schools, as well as 
college and university tracks, difficult. The population was exploding and rural to urban 
migration was straining the schools in the cities. Instead of building vocational schools, the 
Turkish state was still trying to fight illiteracy among the youth. Consequently, private colleges 
                                                                                                                                                       
both of the teaching schools in Ankara and Istanbul, which trained German teachers for the mid level schools and 
the majority of those German teachers in the higher levels (Deutsche Botschaft Ankara, Groepper, and Kanzler, “4. 
Sitzung der Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturkommission in Berlin,” Bericht (Ankara, March 1, 
1967), 1, B 97, Bd. 308, PA AA). 
161 The Turkish government went through six Prime Ministers and a dozen Ministers of Education over the decade. 
For a description of the heads of states, see Lentz, Heads of States and Governments Since 1945, 763–771. See also 
Kemal H. Karpat, “Actors and Issues in Turkish Politics, 1950-1960: Prototypes and Stereotypes,” International 
Journal of Turkish Studies 17, no. 1/2 (2011): 115–57,281; Durgun, “Left-Wing Politics in Turkey”; and Jacob M. 
Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 1–48. 
162 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht für 1968 aus der Türkei” 
(Ankara: Auswärtige Amt, January 23, 1969), 1–2, B 97, Bd. 185, PA AA. 
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and technical schools (particularly engineering schools) were “spreading like mushrooms on the 
ground,” alleviating only a small portion of the problem, and students were still in the streets.163 
The 1968 Turkish student movements raised the question of schooling for emigrants 
among the Turkish press and politicians.164 In light of the local protests and widespread political 
unrest across Europe, Turkish politicians worried that the growing number of Turks abroad could 
incite more social unrest upon their return. Their fear centered in part around the possible 
exposure to new political ideals and the possibility of migrants becoming radical agitators. 
Turkish politicians found it particularly worrisome that Turkish citizens abroad could come into 
contact with communist ideologies.165  
Alongside their political worries, many politicians and local schools had cultural and 
social concerns. As some migrants returned to Turkey, there were clear issues with their 
reintegration into Turkish society. Although different groups in Turkey disagreed on what 
Turkishness should be, the clear cultural and social distance between these re-migrants and the 
local population made the returnees stand out as foreign others regardless of their citizenship.166 
                                                
163 Ibid., 2. Consequently, efforts to make German language instruction available in Turkey and continued interest in 
recruiting West German teachers continued to trump efforts to send Turkish teachers abroad (“5. Sitzung des 
Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses,” 10). 
164 “Stellungnahme der türkischen Presse zu dem Ausgang der Gespräch der deutsch-türkischen Gemischten 
Kommission” (Ankara: Deutsche Botschaft Ankara, May 16, 1968), B 85, Bd. 771, PA AA. 
165 Not only was the communist party legal and thriving in countries like France and Italy (see Donald L. M. 
Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, eds., Communism in Italy and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015)), 
but it was actually easier for a Turkish citizen in West Berlin to cross over to East Berlin for a West German citizen 
(Jennifer Miller, “Cold War Borders and Suspicious Persons: Turkish ‘Guest Workers’ Between East and West 
Berlin through the Eyes of the Stasi” (Berlin Porgram Summer Workshop: Germany Looks East, Berlin, 2013)).  
166 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Kulturpolitischer Jahresbericht für 1968 aus der Türkei,” 1–
2. 
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Yet, despite the Turkish Government’s active worries over its citizens abroad’ national 
identification, the state still had to address pressing concerns in Turkey.167  
With local concerns about and internal problems with education reform, it was not until 
1971 that the Turkish government would make a concerted effort to both ensure the availability 
of mother tongue and cultural instruction for its citizens abroad and reexamine the possibility of 
private schools. After the March 1971 “coup by memorandum,” in which the Turkish military 
effectively demanded that Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel resign, the temporary military 
government and later civilian governments pursued some control over the education of its school 
age citizens abroad.168 With almost 60,000 schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship in West 
German schools and with increasing state control over school ideology in Turkey, the issue could 
no longer be put aside (see Table 3.3). That measure of control, however, focused on access to 
mother tongue and cultural instruction.169 With only some 50 Turkish teachers (25 provided by 
the Turkish Ministry of Education) available for those thousands of children, the Turkish 
Ministry of Education was “understandably of the opinion that the number is not sufficient.”170 
The Turkish government wanted to work with the West German Ministries of Education on 
expanded recruitment.171 
                                                
167 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in 
Deutschland.” 
168 Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey, 16–19. 
169 “6. Sitzung des mit der Durchführung des deutsch-türkischen Kulturabkommens beauftragten Ständigen 
Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses (Bonn, 24. und 25. Mail 1971),” Protokoll (Ankara, May 25, 
1971), B 97, Bd. 311, PA AA. 
170 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für Gastarbeiterkinder in 
Deutschland.” 
171 Auswärtige Amt to Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ankara, “Türkischer Schulunterricht für 
Gastarbeiterkinder in Deutschland,” March 15, 1971, B 93, Bd. 747, PA AA. 
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Working on access to consular instruction, the Turkish government’s primary goal 
continued to be the integration of its citizens into West German schools. The Turkish 
Government did not address the education of its schoolchildren in the language of rights as 
Greece and Italy did. Instead, the focus was on needs and future advantages. The children should 
integrate into West German schools; they needed an education so that they could eventually 
participate in vocational programs. Until the end of the 1960s, the government rarely addressed 
its citizens abroad’s schooling in terms of identity or capacity for social participation. The state 
still wanted their citizens to be literate first and foremost – in any language – and secondly to be 
qualified to enter the labor market as skilled workers. To that end, private schools were not one 
of the Turkish Government’s primary goals and thus successive Ministers of Education dropped 
the issue.172 The negotiations between the two states would focus particularly on establishing 
class parameters, with particular attention paid to preparation classes for integrating newly 
arriving schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship into the West German school system.173 
Although the language the Turkish representatives employed differed from the Greek and 
Italian governments’, the Turkish government’s overarching goals were similar. The Turkish 
state combined political ideology with practical considerations to argue for the best possible 
treatment for its citizens. Because schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship came from the 
Turkish school system and had limited expectations from the school system, the Turkish 
government advocated what it saw as their best chances for a future. Not exactly equality of 
opportunity in either system, but something that would improve the children’s lots in Turkey, if 
                                                
172 Schulausschuß der KMK, “15. Gründung privater Volksschulen für Kinder türkischer Arbeitnehmer in der 
BRD,” 151. Sitzung des Schulausschusses am 26./27. 01. 1972 (Bonn: KMK, January 26, 1972), B 304/3734, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
173 “6. Sitzung des Ständigen Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Kulturausschusses (1971),” May 25, 1971, 5–7. 
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they returned, and thereby support the Turkish economy whether they remained in West 
Germany or returned to Turkey.  
Conclusion  
According to standard definitions of the right to education in the 1960s – or at least for 
the Council of Europe – all schoolchildren were supposed to be admitted into public schools on 
the same basis as host country nationals. All children needed to have access in order to have 
equality of opportunity in the technological age. Without equal chances in local schools, children 
would not have the same opportunities to participate in the labor market or to fulfill their 
personhood. The assumed need to include all children under school laws conflicted, however, 
with the role of public school as teaching children to be good citizens for migrant children, 
particularly for those who expected to return to their countries of citizenship. Depending on a 
child’s (or their guardian’s) future plans and the situation they came out of, varying solutions 
were necessary to attain these goals as best as possible. 
The political expectations surrounding children with Greek and Turkish citizenship living 
in West Germany during the 1960s demonstrated the complication of defining equality of 
opportunity. For the successive Greek governments, the meaning of citizenship and national 
identification was connected to language and religion as well as the cultural and social capital 
disseminated through Greek public schools. Added to that, the structure of the Greek system 
meant that a German education was largely useless in Greece. In consequence, both for 
ideological and practical purposes, children needed a Greek education to be Greek and to operate 
in Greek society. In contrast, although the Turkish government and many Turkish citizens 
expected to someday return to Turkey, limited access to education in Turkey and a more flexible 
understanding of Turkishness meant that a German education was acceptable in either country. 
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Turkish identification and language mastery was supported, but not viewed as essential for future 
success.  
In consequence, even as the West German Länder Education Administrations attempted 
to provide some level of equality of opportunity for all residents, there were different 
understandings of what that meant which differed partly according to citizenship. Regardless of 
personal preference, an Italian citizen had a right to permanent residence while Greek and 
Turkish citizens explicitly did not. Furthermore, the systems in the country of origin as well as 
the understanding of national identity played a role, influencing what a country of citizenship 
supported and what the migrants in West Germany wanted.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RISING NUMBERS OF MIGRANT SCHOOLCHILDREN, EQUALIZING 
ACCESS TO EDUCATION, AND THE QUESTION OF SUCCESS (1967-1974) 
In 1970, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers declared that all children were 
entitled to an education “even under difficult circumstances,” which explicitly “include[ed] 
international migration.”1 The Member States agreed that education was an inalienable, universal 
right, equally applicable to all. And, in order to ensure that right, the Council of Europe, 
alongside the United Nations, the International Bureau of Education, and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), determined that the host country needed to be 
answerable for that right. With that decision in hand, the members of these organizations 
expected the host country to provide initiatives to enable equality of opportunity and to evaluate 
success based on scholastic performance in the host country’s school system.  
The West German states agreed, in theory. Compulsory schooling laws across the FRG 
required all children with a local residence to attend school and granted parents and guardians 
the same rights as the ethno-national majority. The Länder Education Administrations did make 
some exception for “the children of guest workers,” encouraging consular instruction and even 
permitting some national private or supplementary schools, but by and large children with non-
German citizenship were supposed to receive the same education as citizens. Furthermore, to 
help children integrate into the classroom when the number of non-German speakers in one class 
was too large for rapid integration (at least 15 in one grade level), school regulations across the 
                                                
1 In its November 1970 Resolutions (Committee of Ministers, “School Education for Children of Migrant Workers,” 
Resolution (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, November 27, 1970), Box 2443, Council of Europe.  
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country stipulated that children were supposed to have access to national preparatory classes as 
well as German language support in the schools. With regulations in place to meet the idealized 
goal of equality, members of the various West German Education Administrations felt the 
system was set.  
Yet creating the regulations was only a first step. The Länder Education Administrations 
also had to provide the promised assistance for integration and cultural maintenance, far from a 
simple task. To even start, the Education Administrations had to enforce their compulsory 
schooling laws, ensuring that children with non-German citizenship attended school. Once they 
were in the classroom, the state had to provide teachers and teaching materials. Both proved 
difficult, first because of the unpredictability of the diverse migrant groups and second because 
of severe teacher and material shortages in the face of expanding local populations. 
Adding to those difficulties, the entire conceptual framework behind the school system 
changed with a refashioned understanding of several terms that defined educational policy. One 
of the most important of these changes was that the international community, in response to 
larger global trends, redefined the concept of compulsory schooling to include secondary 
education for all children. This made new school reform programs necessary all over Western 
Europe. The West German Länder Education Administrations’ school initiatives that had been 
constructed to assist national groups of children with non-German citizenship in learning 
German were no longer sufficed, because “equal access” now referred to enrollment in higher 
levels of secondary schools as well as lower.2  
                                                
2 Include citation to that 1960s report from CE about goals of education (Secrétariat du Conseil de l’Europe, “The 
Council of Europe’s Educational Programme and the Resolutions of the Hamburg Conference,” Third Conference of 
Ministers of Education (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, September 12, 1962), B 91, Bd. 111, PA AA. 
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Further complicating the situation, silence about the atrocities of the past during the post-
war years led to the social and political unrest across Europe that burst into the streets during the 
late 1960s, casting a new light on the politics involved in consular instruction. The 1967 Greek 
Junta, followed by the social and political unrest across Europe in 1968 and 1969, meant that the 
politics of memory and the state were a major social concern. In West Germany, for example, the 
social unrest was partly in response to Kurt Kiesinger’s tenure as West German Chancellor 
between 1966 and 1969, as he was former Nazi.3 In response, thousands of youths took to the 
streets, decrying the state’s complacency and the continued role of Nazi leaders in prominent 
posts. Combined with multiple new trials of former Nazis and information on the abuse of the 
Third Reich’s minority groups and foreign workers, public concern ignited over the schooling of 
the new West German minority groups for the first time, particularly as an increasing percentage 
of the ethno-national majority came into contact with them for the first time. The combination of 
social unrest and public attention meant that consular instruction took on a new meaning, as 
these classes were designed to maintain ties to fascist Greece, Spain, and Portugal or to an Italy 
whose communist party received record-breaking numbers of votes.4  
At the same time, first economic stagnation in 1977/67 and then recession following the 
1973 Oil Crisis placed political pressure onto host country governments, like the West German, 
to encourage return migration. The debate over the permanency of the various West German 
migrants was contentious, with some conservative governments (including in Bavaria and 
Schleswig-Holstein) pushing for limitations on residency rights and forced rotation. Others, 
                                                
3 Kurt Georg Kiesinger was a lawyer and member of the CDU. During the Third Reich, he was a member of the 
Foreign Office and ran radio programs. In 1958, he became Minister President of Baden-Württemberg, which office 
he held until he became West German Chancellor on December 1, 1966 (Philipp Gassert, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
1904-1988: Kanzler zwischen den Zeiten (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006).). 
4 !!! 
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usually with Social Democratic governments, pushed to integrate West Germany’s migrant 
communities better and to provide more services. In September 1969, the first Social Democratic 
(in coalition with the Federal Democratic Party) led government under Chancellor Willi Brandt 
was elected. The new government’s agenda included educations reform. Yet, regarding the 
question of education for children with non-German citizenship, the Brandt administration took 
an ambivalent stance. In particular, when unemployment rose in connection with the first oil 
crisis, the Federal Government came under pressure. In response, the SPD-FDP government 
officially declared that West Germany was not a country of immigration.5 Such political 
statements might have easied the fears expressed in the media. They did not, however, reflect 
reality, particularly as the Federal Government eschewed forced rotation for migrant workers. As 
scholars like Klaus Bade and Hermann Korte have shown, with high rates of permanent 
immigration that outstripped emigration, West Germany was already in the early 1970s a country 
of immigration.6 
Nevertheless, the economic crisis that had started in 1966/67 had an effect on migration. 
Although the overall number of migrants rose during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the total 
number of workers decreased. Due to family migration, however, the total number of non-
German citizens in West German continued to rise. The overall number did dip between 1973 
and 1975 in response to the complete Recruitment Stop in 1973, but the corresponding increase 
                                                
5 Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Becoming Multicultural Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and 
Germany (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 79–81. Willy Brandt (1913-1992) became leader of the Social Democratic 
Party of West Germany in 1964 (until 1987) and served as Chancellor of West Germany between 1969 and 1974. 
Before becoming Chancellor, he held the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs under Kiesinger, during which time 
he gave a speech to the KMK on the value of consular instruction (“Brandt: Kulturpolitik eine Säule der 
Außenpolitik,” March 20, 1969, B 90, Bd. 1015, PA AA). 
6 Hermann Korte, “Guestworker Question or Immigration Issue? Social Sciences and Public Debate in the Federal 
Republic of Germany,” in Population, Labour, and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany, ed. Klaus J. 
Bade (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 163–88. 
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in Family Migration meant that by 1976 the total number of non-German citizens had grown 
once again.7  
The West German Education Administrations had to address each of these changes and 
concerns. They could not simply write regulations and sit back, but had to actively implement 
and revise their laws and policies. Social shifts and changes meant that Länder Education 
Administrations’ regulations, which had reportedly filled their purpose from 1964 to 1966, were 
considered deficient by the end of the decade. With limited resources and only partial success so 
far, the Länder Education Administrations asked what they could do and which groups they 
should concentrate on. If the focus was integration, just how equal were the non-nationals and 
how much should be expended on their education?  
Enforcing Compulsory Schooling and Complications with Promoting Integration 
The first step to enforcing equality of opportunity was requiring and enabling school 
attendance across the country. Yet, between 1967 and 1972, despite compulsory schooling laws, 
reports and rumors abounded (never with solid statistical support) about under-enrollment. 
Some, like the West German Federal Ministry for Science and Research, claimed that there were 
as many as “one in four school-age children” not attending school. Others thought that the 
number of children missing school was almost negligible. Regardless, West German police, 
concerned parent groups (both with and without German citizenship), and the relevant foreign 
consulates agreed that some portion of children were either playing truant or were not being 
registered at all. Educators and politicians speculated about possible reasons, several citing new 
migrant groups’ lack of information about the West German school system. Some expounded on 
                                                
7 Carolin Butterwegge, “Von der "Gastarbeiter"-Anwerbung zum Zuwanderungsgesetz,” Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung, 15 Match 2005, see: http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/dossier-
migration/56377/migrationspolitik-in-der-brd. (Accessed: July 28, 2015) 
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that claim, saying that the West German school system was simply too confusing for newly 
arrived migrants to understand (see Chart 3.1). Others, including the State Employment Center in 
South Bavaria, suggested that parents intending to return to their countries of origin “saw 
schooling in the Federal Republic as unnecessary … and instead kept school age youths home to 
care for younger siblings or to work.”8  
Whatever the reason for under-enrollment, the different players involved, from the 
Council of Europe to local parent groups, agreed that the issue needed to be addressed. They 
each felt that children living in West Germany needed schooling, even if they failed to agree on 
what that schooling should entail. Regardless of what education the children were supposed to 
have, part of compulsory education was forcing the children to attend. Yet, the West German 
state governments questioned the wisdom of compelling enrollment as they did with the local 
ethno-national majority from two sides in particular. First, forcing attendance could lead to 
international misunderstandings. Second, the Länder Education Administrations faced serious 
problems with providing the stipulated support (preparation classes and extra German 
instruction) that was supposed to enable them to fully participate. From teacher availability to 
                                                
8 Landesarbeitsamt Südbayern. In order to address the situation, some Länder, like Bavaria, began targeted 
informational campaigns to alert parents to the necessity of receiving a West German education (Landesarbeitsamt 
Südbayern, “Aktion für versärkten Schulbesuch von Gastarbeiterkinder,” Pressemitteilung (Munich, July 13, 1972), 
StK 14795, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv). School administrators also expressed concerns (Volksschule mit 
Realschulzug, Achem to Kultusministerium BW, “Erfüllung der Schulpflicht durch Schüler italienischer 
Staatsangehörigkeit,” November 28, 1969, EA 3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; Geschäftsführende Rektor 
Volks-, Mittle- und Sonderschule Rastatt-Baden to Staatl. Schulamt Baden-Baden, April 24, 1969, EA 3/609 Bü 92, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; Landtag NRW, “Drucksache 6/1778: Antwort des Kultusministeris auf der Kleine 
Anfrage Nr. 514 der Abg. Altewischer (CDU) betr. Beschulung ausländischer Kinder und Jugendlischer in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen” (Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW, February 10, 1970); and Landtag NRW, “Drucksache 7/927: 
Antwort des Kultusministers betr. Beschulung ausländischer Kinder” (Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW, July 7, 1971).). 
For an example of newspress on the issue, see “Giovani wird Benachteiligt: Nicht alle Gastarbeiterkinder besuchen 
die Schule: Der Teufelkreis von Ausbildung und Armut,” October 30, 1970, Landesarchiv NRW.  
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financing, problems plagued the Länder governments’ ability to support school access.9 Lacking 
that support, the Education Administrations questioned the point of attendance at all. 
An immediate difficulty with enforcing enrollment and providing the classes for 
integration was the exponential increase in schoolchildren with non-German citizenship (see 
Table 4.1). The West German Länder had designed preparatory classes and other support 
measures in the early and mid-1960s with the assumption that there would be a continual but 
small rise in the number of new migrant children.10 Yet, in the mid-1960s, due to rapid economic 
growth combined with a labor shortage, West German businesses “invited” increasing numbers 
of migrant laborers. As the West German government renewed their labor visas, these male and 
female workers brought or established families in the country.11 In consequence, even as 
economic growth slowed first in 1966/67 with a European-wide economic stagnation and then 
with the 1973 Oil Crisis and recession, the number of children with non-German citizenship in 
West German schools swelled.12 In those few short years, the Länder became home to hundreds 
of thousands of migrant school-age children, each entitled to a public education and support for 
participation (see Table 4.1). The West German school systems were simply unable to handle the 
influx.  
                                                
9 Oberschulamt Südwürttemberg-Hohenzollern, Oberschulamt Tübingen to Kultusministerium Baden-Württemberg, 
“Schulbesuch von Ausländerkinder; hier: Unterricht in der Muttersprache und Vorbereitungsklassen,” April 1, 1966, 
EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
10 With the exception of Bavaria, the West German education officials expected children living in the country for 
over one year to attend regular West German classes. 
11 Fore more on migration patterns, demographics, etc., see Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, 
Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 
1999), 28–79.  
12 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, 
Flüchtlinge (Munich: Beck, 2001), 216–230. 
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Table 4.1: Schoolchildren (Total and “Foreign”) enrolled in General Education in the 
FRG, 1969 and 197313 
Schools 
 
1969 1973 
  Total “Foreign” % Total “Foreign” % 
Preschool (Vorschule) 22,190 -  80,054 3,933 4.9% 
Primary and Lower 
Secondary (Volkschule or 
Grund- und Hauptschule 
6,112,327 94,291 1.5% 6,400,824 238,053 3.7% 
Special Schools 
(Sonderschule) 
290,846 1,101 0.4% 377,767 8,113 2.1% 
Realschule 826,201 3,925 0.5% 1,043,570 9,249 0.9% 
Gymnasium 1,352,065 10,316 0.8% 1,686,620 19,085 1.1% 
Comprehensive 
(Gesamtschule) 
- -  106,588 2,846 2.7% 
Vocational (Berufschule, full 
time) 
1,625,091 9,473 0.6% 
12,664 203 1.6% 
Vocational (Berufschule, 
part time) 
1,625,037 47,595 2.9% 
Total 10,786,043 131,465 1.2% 12,076,155 342,297 2.8% 
 
 
With thousands of new families migrating into and within the country throughout the 
school year, West German education officials debated how best to enforce compulsory 
schooling. Over the 1960s and 1970s, select minority communities (diasporas) usually in larger 
urban centers (famously Kreuzberg in Berlin) expanded to the point where some children were 
not exposed to any language but their mother tongue in their day-to-day lives. The German 
school featured as an increasingly important point of contact. To compel an education for West 
German citizens, the Länder governments’ practice was to arrest the negligent parent and or 
hand them over to the judicial system. The governments felt that it was inadvisable to do the 
                                                
13 KMK, “Der Schulbesuch ausländischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965/66 - 1972/73: 
Allgemeinbildende Schulen” (Bundeseiheitlichen Schulstatistik, 1974), B.1.1; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 
ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1975), 98–101; and 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1972), 73–76. Preschool attendance of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship not collected in 1969 
and Vocational schooling not separated by full or part time. Note that for the “Total” in both year, several specialty 
school attendance numbers are included.  
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same with migrant minority groups. There was too much room for misunderstandings or 
mistakes. Not only did many parents possess limited German language knowledge, but guest 
worker families were highly mobile, often moving between cities without registering. Because 
compulsory schooling was tied to city registration, if a family did not file paperwork in their new 
place of residence the school boards did not know where a child actually was.  
In order to avoid unpleasantness and to encourage parents to register their children 
without causing undue stress, the Länder governments and foreign consulates decided to work 
together to try educating the children’s parents about West German law and the organization of 
the school system. Beginning in 1967, the Länder Education Administrations produced leaflets 
explaining the legal and social importance of schooling in West Germany. In simple, un-
illustrated, and bulleted fliers and pamphlets printed in multiple languages, the Education 
Administrations outlined the general parameters of local compulsory school laws and the 
structure of the lower secondary and vocational education systems. Handed out in schools, these 
fliers laid out the necessity of attendance and tried to explain its necessity for future job 
options.14 The foreign consulates in turn produced their own information for their consular 
teachers and, if the parents actually registered with the local consulate, spoke directly with 
parents about schooling. These officials laid out the children’s need to enroll in West German 
schools, particularly emphasizing the connection between preparatory classes and West German 
schools.15  
                                                
14 The Ministries of Education requested that schools and the foreign consulates hand out the printed information to 
new families (Kultusministerium BW, “Schulpflicht der Gastarbeiterkinder,” Aktenvermerk (Stuttgart, April 6, 
1966), EA 3/609 Bü 68, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; and Sekretariat der KMK, “2. Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe 
‘Unterricht für Kinder von ausländischen Arbeitnehmern’ am 27./28. April 1971 in Winkel im Rheingau,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Winkel im Rheingau: KMK, April 28, 1971), B 304/2057, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
15 Consolato d’Italia to Kultusministerium BW, November 6, 1967, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
The Italian Consulate in Stuttgart sent around a letter instructing Italian teachers in Baden-Württemberg as to how to 
explain the school system. Sadly, I never found the letter. 
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Education for parents did not solve the problems with providing preparatory classes.16 
Those classes were supposed to fulfill the states’ obligation to enable new migrant children 
access to the West German classroom by teaching them enough about the German school system 
to participate. Designed with two-thirds instruction in their mother tongue and one third in 
German, the classes were supposed to enable the students to learn German while not falling 
behind in their general education. West German educators expected that, after one year, the 
children should have mastered enough German to fully participate in West German schools. Yet, 
as the decade drew to a close, the Länder Education Administrations received continual reports 
from regional school boards that the preparatory classes were not working. 
The classes themselves were not, however, necessarily the problem. Instead, failure can 
be attributed in part to limited funding and classroom space as well as a shortage of trained 
teachers and difficulties with planning. Each year, the Länder Ministries of Finance budgeted a 
set amount for consular teachers’ wages, based on the Education Administrations’ predictions on 
how many schoolchildren would need preparatory classes. Yet, as the number of school age 
children with non-German citizenship doubled in a few short years (see Table 4.1), the number 
of teachers needed frequently exceeded the money set aside for their salaries. For example, in 
1968 (just after the 1967 stagnation) Baden-Württemberg ran into severe financial restraints. 
Unable to increase its budget, the Ministry of Education maintained the number of national 
preparatory classes from the previous year. Yet the Greek government alone requested seventy 
new preparatory classes. Unable to fulfill the request, the Ministry of Education suggested that 
                                                
16 As discussed in Chapter 2, the Länder Education Administrations developed individual regulations regarding 
preparatory classes, which, depending on the West German state, influenced or were based on the KMK’s 1964 
Recommendations. 
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Greek (and Italian) teachers needed to organize their time more efficiently and increase class 
sizes.17  
In more serious efforts, Baden-Württemberg's Ministry of Education tried to address the 
material and teacher deficits by encouraging enrollment directly in West German regular classes, 
for which there was a larger budget. To the Greek Consulate’s dismay, the Ministry of Education 
insisted that all first- and second-year schoolchildren attend normal instruction, as dictated by 
state regulation. Young six- and seven-year-old children were supposed to be able to quickly 
pick up German through contact with local schoolchildren. If they had problems they could 
theoretically receive afterschool instruction in German (although there were rarely enough 
trained teachers to provide the instruction). The Ministry also limited national preparatory 
instruction up through the fifth grade on the grounds that the consular teachers usually only had 
training to that grade level.18  
Compounding local concerns, foreign consulates were often unable to keep up with new 
demands for teachers and materials. Not only was there a dearth of teachers in the countries of 
citizenship, in part due to extensive education reform, but most of the consular teachers were on 
short-term contracts and were only supposed to remain in West Germany for around two years. 
The countries of citizenship had to continually find new qualified teachers. Even the Greek state, 
which poured significant resources into its emigrants’ education and actually passed local laws to 
                                                
17 Kultusministerium Baden-Württemberg and Hofsäß to Consolato d’Italia, Stoccarda, “Vorbereitungsklassen für 
italienische Kinder,” August 9, 1968, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; Kultusministerium BW, 
“Vorbereitungsklassen für griechische und italienische Kinder,” July 29, 1968, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart; and Haushaltsreferat, “Einrichtung von Vorbereitungsklassen für Kinder ausländischer Gastarbeiter,” 
Aktenvermerk (Stuttgart: Kultusministerium Baden-Württemberg, October 29, 1969), EA 3/609 Bü 70, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
18 As Baden-Württemberg required the sending county governments to pay for consular instruction, getting “foreign 
children” out of preparatory classes and into West German classroom instruction with afterschool consular 
instruction and German language instruction saved the state money.  
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try and guarantee sufficient teachers, often had difficulties supplying them. 19 Teachers for 
instructing both in German and the children’s mother language were in particularly short supply 
in both West Germany and in the countries of origin.20 
As the 1960s drew to a close, the West German state Education Administrations received 
pushback from foreign consulates and from local politicians concerned about program efficacy 
and access to German language instruction.21 In October 1969, after visiting a national 
preparatory class in Haagen in Baden-Württemberg, the Italian Consulate expressed concern 
that, with 65 pupils of diverse ages, the class was overfilled. The Consulate argued that “such a 
high number of pupils could not lead to a positive experience” and would not enable “rapid 
integration into German school.” The Consulate requested that the class in Haagen – and others 
like it – be split in two (or more, by age-group) and the children provided more than the three 
hours of German language instruction a week they were currently receiving.22  
In theory, Baden-Württemberg's Ministry of Education agreed. The state's 1965 
Regulation stipulated that newly arrived children should receive ten hours of weekly German 
instruction.23 In practice, however, the schools were unable to find the necessary bilingual 
                                                
19 “3. Tagung des Ständigen Gemischten Ausschusses des deutsch-griechischen Kulturabkommens vom 17. Mai 
1956 vom 29. bis 31. Oktober 1964 in Athen,” Communiqué (Athens, October 31, 1964), B 91, Bd. 74, PA AA. 
20 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Kultusministerium BW, “Vorbereitungsklassen für griechische Kinder,” July 
26, 1966, EA 3/609 Bü 69, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
21 For example, in December 1969, the School Office in Backnang reported that it needed additional support. They 
had 146 schoolchildren who could not participate in West German classes because of their language abilities. Yet, 
the Ministry of Education claimed that based on their reckoning, 52 of the school children could attend German 
school classes and only 127 needed preparatory classes, equaling only four new classes. It was alright with the 
Ministry for there to be 30students or more in one class. The Ministry would refuse to split classes (Staatl. Schulamt 
Backnang, December 6, 1969, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart).  
22 Consolato d’Italia, Stoccarda to Kultusministerium BW and Ispettorato Scolastico Italliano per la Republica 
Federale Tedesca, October 22, 1969, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
23 Nothardt, “Schulpflicht und Schulbesuch von Ausländerkindern, insbesondere von Kindern ausländischer 
Gastarbeiter,” Kultus- und Unterricht, April 14, 1965, 176. 
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faculty. The problem was so widespread that in North Württemberg, where the highest 
concentration of foreigners in Baden-Württemberg lived, the regional school board complained 
that most children “only received two to three weekly hours of German instruction,” and 
sometimes no support at all. Both the foreign consulates and the local school boards concurred 
that this hardly sufficed to become competent enough in the language to join normal instruction 
within one year.24  
Even when there were enough teachers, inadequate learning materials for German 
instruction restricted programs designed to rapidly enable children to participate in regular 
instruction. While some country of citizenship governments sent their own German language 
materials (particularly Italy), these books’ contents focused on the relevant country’s cultural 
capital and were designed only for a single language group (i.e. Italian speakers). In the 1960s, 
those German-as-a-foreign-language books produced in West Germany were mostly aimed at 
adults.25 Expecting a high reading level or including content focusing on business and other 
issues, these books were usually inappropriate for children.26 Only in 1972 did the first 
schoolbooks for children, including "Komme bitte" by North Rhine-Westphalian publisher 
                                                
24 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Vorbereitungsklassen für Kinder italienischer 
Gastarbeiter,” U II A 2111/246, (September 23, 1968), EA 3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
25 It should be noted that teaching a subject like German as a foreign or second language in Germany was not a topic 
of concern until the late 1960s (Hans-Jürgen Krumm, Bernd Skibitzki, and Brigitte Sorger, “Entwicklungen von 
Deutsch als Frendsprach in Deutschland nach 1945,” in \iDeutsch als Fremd- und Zweitsprache: ein internationales 
Handbuch, ed. Hans-Jürgen Krumm et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 44–55). 
26 The Münchner Verlag (Munich Publishers) did release some teaching materials in 1970, but reports from the 
Stuttgart school administrations were negative (“the grammatical concepts presupposed too much”) and the 
materials were not widely used (Stadt Stuttgart, Bürgermeisteramt, Kultur- und Schulreferent to Kultusministerium 
Baden-Württemberg and Hofsäß, “Unterrichtung ausländischer Kinder in deutschen Schulen,” May 22, 1970, EA 
3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart). 
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Hermann Schuh, appear for wide dissemination.27 Yet even then, only a limited number of 
teachers had been trained for their use.28 
Both North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg tried several short- and long-term 
fixes to teacher and material shortages. Searching for an immediate solution, the regional school 
board in North Württemberg gave permission for teachers without the prescribed qualifications 
to provide the instruction, including German teachers with Italian (or other) language skills or 
the consulates’ translators. Trying to shift the onus, both Länder Education Administrations also 
urged the relevant foreign consulates to only send consular teachers who had German language 
competence. That goal proved impossible, as none of the six major sending countries (including 
Italy, Greece, and Turkey) had enough qualified teachers who spoke German.29 Invested in 
modern language acquisition, the Italian government attempted to comply by instituting summer 
training programs for further education. In 1967 they held a course for the German language 
teachers at the University of Urbino and in 1968 in Siena. There were further education courses 
in 1967 and 1968 in Monza, Caserta, Viareggio, and Rome for the Italian German teachers, in 
                                                
27 "Vorwärts" was also developed in NRW, while the Erdmann Verlag in Baden-Württemberg worked on some 
school material. For the Foreign Office’s review of the Erdmann-Verlag’s material, see Schmidt, “Beurteilng des 
vom Horst Erdmann Verlag, Tübingen, 1971 Herausgegebenen Audiovisuellen Unterrichtsprogramms für die 
Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer ‘Deutsch in Deutschland,’” Review (Bonn: Auswärtige Amt, 1972), B 93, Bd. 
745, PA AA. 
28 Kästner, “Genehmigung von Ausländischen Schulbüchern Für Den Unterricht von Kindern Ausländischer 
Arbeitnehmer,” Vermerk (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, October 26, 1972), B 304/3281, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. For 
a short description of NRW’s efforts to develop school materials for German as a foreign language instruction, see 
Landtag NRW, “Beschulung ausländischer Kinder,” July 7, 1971. 
29 Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Vorbereitungsklassen für Kinder italienischer 
Gastarbeiter.” Oberschulamt Nordwürttemberg to Staatliche Schulämter, “Vorbereitungsklassen für Kinder 
ausländischer Gastarbeitern,” UA II 2111/411, (May 13, 1970), EA 3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
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which 145 teachers took part, with more classes planned for the future.30 Nonetheless, there were 
still insufficient numbers from either Italy or the other major sending countries. 
North Rhine-Westphalia decided to tackle the problem head on by providing German 
language support for new consular teachers. The Ministry of Education instituted the programs in 
part because of complaints within the West German schools about the difficulty of coordinating 
with newly arriving foreign teachers who were unfamiliar with North Rhine-Westphalia’s school 
system and could not communicate with the primary classroom teachers. To overcome this 
difficulty, the Ministry of Education directed the local school administrations in the five 
regions31 to offer foreign teachers audio-visual German lessons as well as to encourage working 
groups for the teachers to discuss their experiences and challenges.32 The Regional Presidents 
quickly responded positively to these programs, citing improved cooperation between the West 
German and consular teachers. They complained, however, that given the temporary nature of 
the consular teachers’ employment, the districts and schools continually had to train and 
acclimate replacement instructors. 
In contrast, at the end of the 1960s, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education under 
Christian Democrat Wilhelm Hahn33 decided that the national preparatory classes were not 
                                                
30 “6. Sitzung der deutsch-italienischen Gemischten Kommission zur Durchführung des zwischen Italien und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland abgeschlossenen Kulturabkommens, Bonn, 3.-5. April 1968,” Protokoll (Bonn, April 
5, 1968), 8–9, B 97, Bd. 270, PA AA.  
31 Aachen was rolled into Cologne. 
32 Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten Aachen, Arnsberg, Betmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster, 
“Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: Lehrerfortbildung für die in Übergangsklassen tätigen 
ausländischen und deutschen Lehrer,” July 24, 1970, NW 388-18, Landesarchiv NRW; and Regierungspräsident 
Düsseldorf to Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: 
Lehrerfortbildung für die in Übergangsklassen tätigen ausländischen und deutschen Lehrer,” February 24, 1971, 
NW 388-19, Landesarchiv NRW. 
33 Wilhelm Hahn (1909-1996), a CDU politician and Lutheran theologian, served as Minister of Education in 
Baden-Württemberg between 1964-1978. He was initially appointed by Christian Democratic Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 
then Minister President of Baden-Württemberg (1958 to 1966), later West German Chancellor (1966 to 1969).  
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working at all and decided to replace them. Hahn claimed that this step was necessary, as he 
explained again and again in Baden-Württemberg’s Bundestag. He told the Members of 
Bundestag that, regardless of intent, an increasing number of migrants had already been in the 
country for over five years. Hence, in Hahn’s estimation, these so-called “foreign workers” had 
effectively become long-term residents, even if that was not their expressed intention. This 
meant that their children were to be treated the same as children with West German citizenship, 
who were entitled to support for rapid integration.34 Preparatory classes were not meeting that 
goal, often serving instead as private national schools. Hahn’s Ministry of Education decided to 
replace them with what they termed “international classes” instead. These international classes 
were to provide intensive German language instruction for same-age groups composed of 
different nationalities, thereby encouraging the children to learn quickly. Running 15 hours a 
week so as not to overwhelm pupils, the classes were supposed to enable newly-arrived 
schoolchildren to quickly transfer into the West German school system (which the preparatory 
classes had not been doing effectively).  
Hahn’s experiment largely fell through due to continual complaints and demographic 
logistics. The West German school administration and ethnic-German parents expressed 
concerns about space and flooding regular classes with too many non-German citizens too 
quickly. With tens of thousands of schoolchildren floundering in West German schools in the 
early 1970s, the West German media and ethno-national majority began for the first time to take 
                                                
34 For example, Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 5/1473: Stellungnahme des Kultusministeriums zu dem Antrag der 
Abg. Haase und Gen. (SPD) betr. Schulpflicht für jungendliche Gastarbeiter” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, 
November 29, 1969); and Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 6/3960: Schriftliche Antwort des Kultusministeriums auf 
die Kleine Anfrage des Abg. Hüglin (SPD) betr. Muttersprachlicher Unterricht der Gastarbeiterkinder” (Stuttgart: 
Landtag von BW, December 6, 1973). 
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an interest in their education.35 From the other side, foreign consulates (particularly the Greek) 
and some minority parent groups decried the cut-back in native language instruction. These 
foreign consulates and parent groups felt that the children had a right to preparatory classes, 
particularly with the restrictions on private schools.36 Despite these complaints, Baden-
Württemberg’s Ministry of Education might have held course if not for the demographic spread 
of the various migrant groups. Many areas had minority groups from a single country of origin, 
meaning that international classes frequently became de-facto national classes regardless of the 
Ministry’s plans.37 Facing these difficulties, the Ministry grudgingly re-permitted national 
preparatory classes, but also began to plan a complete overhaul of the school initiatives available 
for the children of migrant workers. 
The systems’ various deficits, from materials to teachers, meant that during the early 
1970s, the hundreds of thousands of the new migrant children arriving in West Germany 
received irregular and often inadequate schooling. Even when they enrolled, limited German 
language training meant that they had trouble following lessons. Many migrant schoolchildren 
dropped out of school without completing their degrees or even attaining a minimal level of 
German language competency.38 The Education Administrations tried different immediate fixes, 
but as the intentions behind compulsory schooling shifted, many of the Länder Education 
                                                
35 See, for example, H. Feidel, “Bildungsnotstand der Gastarbeitrkinder,” Allgemeine Deutsche Lehrerzeitung, 
February 1970; and “Giovani Wird Benachteiligt: Nicht Alle Gastarbeiterkinder Besuchen Die Schule: Der 
Teufelkreis von Ausbildung Und Armut.” 
36 Greece felt particularly strongly about this (Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der KMK, “Schulische Betreuung der 
Kinder türkischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” June 22, 1973, B 93, Bd. 860, PA AA). 
37 Kultusministerium BW, “Drucksache 6/338: Schriftliche Antwort des Kultusministeriums auf die Kleine Anfrage 
des Abg. Kiesecker (SPD) betr.: Erhaltung nationaler Klassen für Kinder von Gastarbeitern” (Stuttgart: Landtag von 
BW, August 10, 1972), EA 8/203 Bü 384, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
38 Statistics about exactly how many were leaving the system (versus migrating) would not be systematically 
collected until the end of the 1970s.  
  204 
Administrations decided to try rewriting their recommendations and policies. Whether or not the 
West German Education Administrations were to blame, the clear failure of the system raised 
questions about whether or not the Education Administrations were taking all the necessary steps 
to fulfill their obligations to children with non-German citizenship. Either way, the system had to 
change.  
Writing New Bars for Success and Encouraging Secondary Schooling 
The Länder Ministries of Education attempted to patch the gaps in their programs, not 
only because of deficits in material and personnel, but also because of a changing international 
consensus about what the right to education entailed. Tasked with tracking education 
developments and combatting inequality around the globe, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) showcased those new norms in a 1969 paper on 
“educational opportunity for all.”39 This 1969 report, written for the Standing Conference of 
European Ministers of Education’s sixth meeting in Paris, discussed the general trend toward the 
enrollment of all children in secondary school. The OECD then laid out how some European 
states (including West Germany) were reforming their systems to achieve that end, investing 
significantly in their secondary school systems.40 These states wanted to ensure equality and 
combat the problem of lower-ability and less-motivated groups dropping out or leaving early.41  
The OECD’s emphasis on the enrollment of all children in secondary school exemplifies 
an international change in the evaluation of scholastic success. Instead of viewing a state 
                                                
39 “DECS/1/LB/ck/1355,” Draft Agenda (Council of Europe, April 3, 1969), B 91, Bd. 302, PA AA. The conference 
took place between 20-22 May 1969 in Versailles.  
40 OECD, “Educational Opportunity for All: Paper Prepared by the O.E.C.D. on Development of Secondary 
Education Policy Implications,” Sixth Conference of Ministers of Education (Versailles, May 1969), 4, B 91, Bd. 
301, PA AA.  
41 Ibid., 2–3. 
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education as leading toward general literacy, a key goal of primary schooling, Education 
Officials across Europe saw a clear need to provide children with additional instruction. During 
meetings of the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education and the Council of 
Europe, education officials claimed that their goals were both ensuring the right to an education 
guaranteeing a minimal standard of living, and enabling children to eventually join labor forces 
in search of increasingly skilled workers.42 The ministers argued that, because technology had 
changed the world and the labor market, national school systems needed to expand in order to 
reflect that.43 West German Education Administrations, politicians, and the media each agreed, 
as demonstrated in their rhetoric and in new policies created in the early 1970s. 
That clear connection between compulsory education and labor meant that, by 1968, the 
European Community officially acknowledged the importance of including all children in local 
education systems in its Directive on freedom of movement.44 With a high rate of labor 
migration and international pressure for education reform, the members of the European 
Community agreed that guaranteeing equality in the labor market was meaningless without a 
primary and secondary school education. The West German representatives to the European 
Community, secure in their own efforts, agreed, including a line in the Declaration stipulating 
“the children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the territory of 
another Member State shall be admitted to that State's general educational, apprenticeship and 
                                                
42 Committee of Senior Officials, “Main Themes of Forthcoming Conferences and Priority Areas for European 
Action and Co-Operation in the Field of Education,” Draft Report (Strasbourg, France: Standing Conference of 
European Ministers of Education, October 26, 1970), 9, B 91, Bd. 303, PA AA.  
43 Ackermann-Kahn and Consultative Assemby of the Council of Europe, “Report on ‘20 Years of European 
Cultural Co-Operation’ (1)” (Council of Europe, September 30, 1969), B 91 302, Auswärtiges Amt. 
44 European Commission and Luce Pépin, The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe 
in the Making - an Example (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), 
61–64; and Gisella Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 19.  
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vocational training courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if such 
children are residing in its territory.”45 The Article fit within the sentiment of the period, 
demonstrating the assumption that integration was necessary for equality and that the host 
country was responsible for ensuring that equality of opportunity. In the European Community 
Member States’ opinion, that included full access and equal treatment.  
Part of the reason for the West German government’s as well as the other members of the 
European Community and Council of Europe’s decision that the host country should be 
responsible was because of concerns for social order. With workers from “first-world and 
developing countries” moving across Europe, host country governments needed to ensure that an 
under-class did not develop within their borders. To protect their own internal order, they needed 
to ensure new migrants equality of opportunity, which included equal access to education.46 In 
consequence, by 1970, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers agreed that the host 
country – not the country of citizenship or an international community – was responsible for 
ensuring the right to education from entrance to completion. Part of that, as stated in the 
                                                
45 Council of European Communities, “Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on 
Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Community,” Official Journal L 257, October 19, 1968, 0002–0012; 
and European Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 72–73.  
46 United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization, Records of the General Conference Seventeenth 
Session Paris, 17 October to 21 November 1972: Resolutions, Recommendations, vol. 1, 4 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie 
Polychrome, 1973); “Education for the Children of Foreign Workers: Observations by Mr. Fanz Domhof, 
Ministerial Counsellor (Düsseldorf), Regarding the December 1971 Recommendations of the Standing Conference 
of Ministers of Education of the Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Committee of Senior Officials: Ad 
Hoc Conference on the Education of Migrants: Summary Report of the First Meeting of Ad Hoc Working Party 
(Strasbourg, France: Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, May 26, 1972), Box 2443, Council 
of Europe; and “Activities of the European Communities in the Field of Education of Migrant Workers and Their 
Families,” Committee of Senior Officials: Ad Hoc Conference on the Education of Migrants: Summary Report of 
the First Meeting of Ad Hoc Working Party (Strasbourg, France: Standing Conference of European Ministers of 
Education, September 1, 1972), Box 2443, Council of Europe. 
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Council’s 1970 Resolutions, was providing the support necessary for integration, which included 
enabling children to reach their secondary school certificates.47  
The question of a developing lower or “ghetto” class was particularly important, as most 
of the European Community and Council of Europe Member States assumed that at least a 
portion of the migrants were permanent parts of their communities. Even if some migrant groups 
returned to their countries of citizenship, some would remain. In the majority of the both 
supranational groups’ member states, unlike in West Germany, migrant individuals had possible 
avenues for attaining citizenship. Furthermore, it was unclear how European Community 
membership would continue to evolve or how many countries would become members. With the 
1968 directive on freedom of movement, it was already clear that those nationals of the Member 
States were supposed to be treated almost like citizens, raising the question of what citizenship 
actually meant.  
The international community’s collective agreement that schoolchildren should not only 
enroll in but also complete secondary schooling directly impacted the Federal Republic’s 
valuation of scholastic achievement. During the period of the Grand Christian Democratic-Social 
Democratic Coalition (1966-1969), the conservative-social government under Chancellor 
Kiesinger had reformed the school system, in part with an eye toward encouraging the 
completion of higher levels of secondary schooling. Most West German Länder also removed 
fees for entry into the higher levels of secondary schools and greatly expanded the number of 
youths accepted.48 Under the new Social Democratic-Liberal government under Chancellor 
Brandt (1969-1974), the Federal Government and Länder poured money into education.49 
                                                
47 Committee of Ministers, “School Education for Children of Migrant Workers.” 
48 In some Länder, particularly those under SPD leadership (e.g. North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse), educators 
argued that the tripartite system was antiquated and discriminatory. They claimed that the divide between the three 
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The rising benchmarks for the scholastic success of German children combined with 
international opinion influenced how the West German educational communities discussed goals 
for the schooling of migrant and foreign children. Like many of his colleagues, for example, 
Member of Baden-Württemberg’s Bundestag from Willi von Helden (1964 to 1972, SPD)50 
expressed concern about the possible “ghettoization” of children and youths with foreign 
citizenship in 1969. He argued that these schoolchildren needed to “attend German schools and 
come out of the ghetto, in which they otherwise must live for their entire lives.”51 A few months 
later, Member of Bundestag Lothar Späth (CDU), Baden-Württemberg’s Minister President from 
from 1978 to 1991,52 argued that children with non-German citizenship were not receiving 
enough exposure to German schools. Fearing inadequate integration, he claimed that mother 
                                                                                                                                                       
types of secondary schools (Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium) promoted class difference instead of 
equality. To overcome this barrier, they opened comprehensive schools (Gesamtschulen) with an eye toward 
creating a single secondary school system (see Chart 3.1 for a graphic representation of the West German school 
system). For more on the history of the Gesamtschule, see Jürgen Oelkers, Gesamtschule in Deutschland: Eine 
Historische Analyse Und Ein Ausweg Aus Dem Dilemma (Weinheim: Beltz, 2006); Katrin Dahmen, ed., 
Gesamtschulen in Europa: Ergebnisse eines europäischen Kolloquiums (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1984); and Carl-
Ludwig Furck, “Das Schulsystem: Primarbereich - Hauptschule - Realschule - Gymnasium - Gesamtschule,” in 
Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-
Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 2 vols., 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 282–356. 
49 Dirk Schumann, “Asserting Their ‘Natural Right’: Parents and Public Schooling in Post-1945 Germany,” in 
Raising Citizens in the “Century of the Child”: The United States and German Central Europe in Comparative 
Perspective, ed. Dirk Schumann (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 217–218; and Lutz R. Reuter, “Rechtliche 
Grundlagen und Rahmenbedingungen,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, 
ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 37. 
50 SPD Member Willi von Helden was a teacher as well as serving as a Member of the Baden-Württemberg 
Bundestag from 1964-1972. 
51 Landtag von BW, “31. Sitzung des Landtags: Punkt 17 der Tagesordnung” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, April 24, 
1969), 1643. For an example of descriptions of “ghettoization” and “ghetto education” in public media, see Ulrich 
Bäder, “Hilfe für die ‘Getto-Kinder’: Opladen: Modellversuch soll Bildungschancen der ausländischen Schüler 
verbessern,” Neue Rhein Zeitung, May 25, 1973. 
52 Lothar Späth (born 1937) was a West German politician and manager. He first became a Member of Bundestag in 
1968 and then the chair of the CDU-Faction in 1972. He served as Ministerpräsident of Baden-Württemberg from 
1978-1991. See Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 5/536: Antrag des Abg. Späth zu dem Entwurf des 
Staatshaushaltsplans für 1969, Einzelplan 04/14: Kultusministerium: betr.: Erfüllung der Schulpflicht durch Kinder 
und Jugendliche ausländischer Staatsangehörigkeit” (Stuttgart, December 31, 1968). 
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tongue and cultural classes needed to be cut back.53 Like many of their colleagues across the 
political spectrum as well as many West German educators, both von Helden and Späth believed 
that without completing a full West German education, migrant children could not learn 
sufficient German. Without language skills, these children would be denied full participation in 
the labor market and society. Children with non-German citizenship would be forced to live 
apart from mainstream society in second-class communities. To preserve society, most West 
German politicians and educators agreed that all children, regardless of their nationality, needed 
to finish some version of compulsory secondary schooling.54  
What many politicians overlooked, but what disturbed educators, was the near-
impossibility of migrant children completing secondary school degrees in their host countries. It 
was hard enough for children born and raised in the country. During a 1973 working group 
meeting on the “schooling and further instruction of children of foreign workers” in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Franz Domhof, head of the Ministry of Education’s department for “the 
education of migrant workers’ children’s instruction in their mother tongue,”55 reminded the 
inter-ministerial group of that problem. Responding to concerns about the low percentage of 
schoolchildren with foreign citizenship completing their secondary school degrees, he pointed 
out that between 1971 and 1973 some 25 percent of German children never completed their 
                                                
53 Landtag von BW, “31. Sitzung des Landtags: Punkt 17 der Tagesordnung,” 1643. 
54 During this period, the West German Federal and Länder governments worked together to alter the West German 
secondary system, including abolishing school fees for higher levels of secondary. For the Länder, ensuring the 
children’s right to education then necessitated the state guarantee the possibility of success through appropriate 
programs. For more on education reform, see Jürgen Oelkers, Reformpädagogik: Eine kritische Dogmengeschichte 
(Juventa-Verlag, 2005). 
55 Everything in North Rhine-Westphalia that was done during Ministerialrat Domhof’s tenure regarding the 
schooling of children with foreign citizenship came back to him. See Franz Domhof, “Die Entwicklung des 
Unterrichts für ausländische Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Dissertation, Gesamthochsch., 1982). 
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certificates either.56 He acknowledged that there was a still a long way to go before equality was 
reached, as the percentage of children with non-German citizenship leaving school without their 
certifications was still considerable higher (851 of 1236 or almost 69 percent in North Rhine-
Westphalia in 1969/70). Yet, as Domhof reminded his audience, of these schoolchildren, only 
approximately eight percent actually attended West German schools for between six and nine 
years (as of 1971).57  
Domhof’s emphasis on the duration for which these schoolchildren had been enrolled in 
the West German system stemmed from the structural difficulties that newly arriving migrant 
children had to face. Because of the West German system’s design, it was almost impossible to 
earn even a lower secondary school (Hauptschule) certificate with fewer than four years of 
instruction in the West German system. As many new arriving children immigrated to West 
Germany after they had completed compulsory schooling in their countries of origin (for Greece 
and Turkey around the age of twelve), these children had little chance to acquire the necessary 
accomplishments and rigid certifications. While the push to enable schoolchildren with non-
German citizenship to achieve the same levels of scholastic achievement in the West German 
system as other children was admirable, it was also impractical – particularly when Länder 
support programs (e.g. preparatory classes) were designed only to enable general participation in 
the classroom. 
On that basis, in the late 1960s some politicians and individuals, like Baden-
Württemberg’s Gottfried Haase (a teacher and Social Democratic Member of Bundestag from 
                                                
56 Furthermore, 40 percent of the schoolchildren in Gymnasium and Realschulen only reached the mid-level 
certificate (Mittlere Reife, equivalent to a high school diploma but not sufficient for entering university) in ten years 
of schooling (Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes NRW, “Sitzung des Arbeitskreises III 
‘Schulische und weiterführende Ausbildung’ des Landesbeirats für ausländische Arbeitnehmer am 15. 1. 1973,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Düsseldorf, 1973), NW 670-142, Landesarchiv NRW). 
57 Landtag NRW, “Beschulung ausländischer Kinder,” July 7, 1971. 
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1964-1980), suggested releasing youths with non-German citizenship from compulsory 
schooling during the traditional vocational school age (15 or 16 to 20 or 21, depending on 
Länder).58 In 1970, Christian Democrat Franz Gurk, Member of the Baden-Württemberg 
Bundestag from 1952 to 1972, suggested the same thing.59 After all, these politicians from across 
the political spectrum argued, what was the point? These children could never earn their 
secondary school certificates. Most of the Länder Education Administrations, however, rejected 
the idea. Under Christian Democrat Wilhelm Hahn’s leadership (Minister of Education in 
Baden-Württemberg between 1964 and 1978), the Ministry’s official stance was that “foreign 
guest workers should be treated the same as German workers.” After all, Hahn argued, the 
successful training of these youths was both “in the interest of the guest workers as well as the 
state of Baden-Württemberg.” Even if it was difficult, he claimed that it was important that the 
“guest worker youths” attend West German schools in order to – at the very least – receive the 
German language instruction to which they were entitled. Without any form of compulsory 
schooling, Hahn believed many of them would simply fall through the cracks.60  
                                                
58 Gottfried Haase (1923-2014) was a German politician and member of the SPD. He served as a member of Baden-
Wuerttemberg’s Bundestag from 1964-1980. 
59 Franz Gurk (1898-1984) was a German politician and member of the CDU. Forced out of politics during the Third 
Reich, Gurk re-entered politics after the Second World War, serving between 1952 and 1972 in Baden-
Wuerttemberg’s Bundestag. Between 1960 and 1968, he was also Landtagspraesident. (Landtag von BW, 
“Drucksache 5/1473: Stellungnahme des Kultusministeriums zu dem Antrag der Abg. Haase und Gen. (SPD) betr. 
Schulpflicht für jungendliche Gastarbeiter” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, November 29, 1969); and Landtag von 
BW, “Drucksache 5/2860/I: Schriftliche Antwort des Kultusministeriums auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abg. Dr. Gurk 
(CDU) Betr.: Berufsschulpflicht von Gastarbeiterinnen Und Gastarbeitern,” Drs 5/2860/I (Stuttgart: Landtag von 
BW, September 15, 1970)). 
60 Under Baden-Württemberg School Law, youths were required to either attend three years of vocational training 
(Article 47 Paragraph 1) or finish the school year during which they turned 21 (Article 47 Paragraph 3). Youths with 
limited German language skills were to attend intensive German training. If there were not enough youths for a 
class, the youth could temporarily be freed until they achieved a sufficient language proficiency needed to 
participate in vocational training. Further release from compulsory schooling was not permissible, even if the youth 
had completed their vocational training in another country, such as Yugoslavia where compulsory vocational 
training ended with the eighteenth year (Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 5/1473: Stellungnahme des 
Kultusministeriums yu dem Antrag der Abg. Haase und Gen. (SPD) betr. Schulpflicht für jugendliche Gastarbeiter” 
(Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, November 28, 1969); and Landtag von BW, “Drucksache 5/2860/I: Schriftliche 
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In an effort to overcome the discrepancy between West German nationals’ performance 
and that of children with non-German citizenship, the Länder and Federal Government 
implemented new initiatives for assisting children already enrolled in West German schools. 
Among them, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBW), controlled from 1969 
to 1981 by the FDP-SPD coalition under Minister of Education Hans Leussink (1969-1972),61 
used the 1970 International Year of Education to promote “Homework Help for Foreign 
Children.”62 UNESCO had determined in 1968 to establish 1970 as the “International Year of 
Education” in order “to mobilize energies and inspire initiatives in education and training.”63 
Although most of the associated efforts worked toward promoting school initiatives for 
“developing countries,” the West German Federal Ministry of Education and Researcg felt that 
the schooling of its “guest worker groups” fell under the same rubric. With a tiny budget, the 
Federal Ministry of Education sent out brochures and pamphlets to encourage school 
administrators to establish local groups using volunteer labor (preferably the parents of children 
with German citizenship) to offer assistance with school homework. While the effects of the 
program were never clearly ascertained, it did prompt some Länder, such as North Rhine-
                                                                                                                                                       
Antwort des Kultusministeriums auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abg. Dr. Gurk (CDU) betr.: Berufsschulpflicht von 
Gastarbeiterinnen und Gastarbeitern” (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, September 15, 1970)).  
61 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, for more information on the role of the Federal Ministry of 
German education, see Christoph Führ, “Zur Koordination der Bildungspolitik durch Bund und Länder,” in 
Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-
Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 74–75. 
62 For more on the homework help programs, see Kultusministerium NRW to Regierungspräsidenten Aachen, 
Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster, “Schulunterricht für Kinder ausländsicher Arbeitnehmer; hier: Aktion 
‘Hausaufgaben-hilfe für Ausländerkinder,’” August 10, 1970, BR 1025-218, Landesarchiv NRW; Monika Bistram, 
“Verständigung durch Bildung: Hausaufgabenhilfe für Ausländerkinder,” Hamburger Lehrerzeitung 24.1971, no. 10 
(1971): 359–60; “Kultusminister Jürgen Girgensohn: ‘Helft ausländischen Kinder bei ihren Hausaufgaben,’” 
Nordrhein-Westfalen Pressemitteilung, January 9, 1971, Landesarchiv NRW; and “Hausaufgaben - Ausländerkinder 
brauchen Hilfe,” Das Diakonische Werk: Neue Ton-Bild-Reihe über ausländische Arbeitnehmer 4 (April 1972): 10. 
63 UNESCO, “Item 21.3 of the Provisional Agenda: International Education Year,” 15 C/53 (Paris: UNECO, 
September 12, 1968).  
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Westphalia and Berlin, to institute regular programs for homework help. Initially, the local 
schools bore the bulk of the costs because of the structure of the German school system. Over the 
next decade, however, the Federal and Länder governments heavily subsidized the programs as 
the social and political importance of secondary school completion climbed.64  
With the right to education judged within the West German context, rather than in the 
terms of their countries of origin, the pressure to enable children to succeed necessitated an 
emphasis on integration. West German and European politicians felt that guaranteeing the right 
to education had little meaning without implementation, even if realization proved difficult. 
Having expended significant efforts to overcome discrimination in the system, the idea that 
systematic disadvantage still affected thousands of newly-arriving migrant children was 
antithetical to the education movements of the period. Children with non-German citizenship 
certainly and clearly could not – or at least should not – be disadvantaged in West Germany. But 
the West German Länder felt that inclusion under compulsory school law combined with 
preparatory classes and after-school instruction fulfilled their responsibility as host country to 
ensure equal treatment. Or it would, if only they had the funding and staff for full 
implementation.  
West German Uproar over School Teachers, Textbooks, and Foreign Relations  
Although native language and cultural instruction was not the West German Educational 
Administrations’ main goal in the early 1970s, it continued to be a vital component of education 
for non-citizens. Yet, despite a decade or more of support, between 1970 and 1973 newspapers 
across West Germany published stories about “the controversy over Greek teachers” and how 
                                                
64 Essentially intensive tutoring available to both “German” and “foreign” children, although in later years there 
would be money specifically earmarked for the “foreign” school children (Kultusministerium NRW, “Schulversuch 
‘Silentien,’” Gemeinsames Amtsblatt des Kultusministeriums und des Ministeriums für Wissenschaft und Forschung 
des Landes NRW, July 7, 1971, 424). 
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“Anti-democratic imports [were] not tolerated.”65 Bundestagarians from acros the political 
spectrum expressed concern about the “foreign messages” disseminated within West German 
schools, possibly perverting innocent children. As Social Democratic Member of Bundestag 
Karl-Heinz Hansen inquired in 1970 (serving from 1969 to 1983), asking the Ministry of 
Education whether “the Federal Government [was] aware that Greek children of guest workers in 
German schools [were] taught from schoolbooks from the junta that distort history and glorify 
the dictatorship?”66 He and other West German Federal Bundestagarians demanded that Länder 
and Federal Education Administrations provide information about the possibility of “anti-
democratic messages” conveyed by foreign teachers or foreign textbooks.67 
Concerns over the content of schoolbooks non-coincidentally arose at the same time that 
it became clear that many of the new West German minority groups were not only permanent, 
but large. Additionally faced with a decline of job growth, some of the ethno-national German 
majority began worrying about the continued place of non-citizens in West German society. 
Responding to predominately conservative political pressure and the media, the Bradt’s 
administration took the stance that West Germany was not a country of immigration, even as 
many of the Länder Education Administrations argued that, regardless of political claims, West 
                                                
65 “Kontroverse um Griechische Lehrer: ‘Auch Gegner des Regimes sollen Unerrichten’: Girgensohn hingegen 
betont ‘Vertrauen der Heimatbehörden,’” General-Anzeiger für Bonn und umgegend, December 29, 1971, NW 353-
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1971, EA 3/505 Bü 408/3, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; and “Antidemokratische importe nicht dulden,” 
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66 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 6/1253: Mdl. Fragen Hausen betr. Unterrichtung von Kindern griechischer 
Arbeitnehmer in der BRD durch griechische Lehrer an Schulen außerhalb öffentlichen Schulwesens” (Bonn: 
Deutscher Bundestag, October 14, 1970), 19. 
67 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 6/2468: Schrftl. Fragen Engholm (SPD) Betr. Inhalte Der Im 
Muttersprachlichen Unterricht Verwendeten Lehrbücher Und Einstellung Ausländischer Lehrer Für Ausländerkinder 
in Der BRD,” Schrftl. Antw.: 190 Sitzung (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, June 9, 1972). 
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Germany clearly was.68 The latter, after all, were concerned with success rates and the situation 
on the ground. Nonetheless, that split meant that, while many Education Administrations focused 
on integration, the internal political value of preparation for return climbed, increasing tensions 
between integration and cultural maintenance.  
The minor uproar over school books from abroad ignited partly in response to concerns 
about how foreign governments – particularly the military government in Greece (1976 to 1974) 
– might be influencing children with foreign citizenship living in West Germany. Specifically, in 
1969 the Greek military government recalled of the bulk of its teachers from abroad for 
“pedagogical reasons.”69 The Greek military government was concerned about what its citizens 
were learning.70 Trying to reignite the Greek Christian-democratic spirit, the military 
government actually viewed providing a traditional Greek national education as even more vital 
than its predecessors had.71 Concerned about its teachers’ politics, the Junta Government wanted 
to ensure that its teachers were not preaching against the state. In 1967, shortly after the coup, the 
new government required all of its civil servants (including teachers) to take loyalty oaths. These 
were the teachers to replace the ones in West Germany. 
                                                
68 Klaus J. Bade, ed., Population, Labour, and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987), 1–14. 
69 “5. Tagung des Ständigen gemischten deutsch-griechischen Ausschusses nach dem Kulturabkommen vom 17. 
Mai 1956 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Griechenland,” Protokoll (Athen, November 5, 1969), B 
96, Bd. 876, PA AA; and “6. Tagung des Ständigen gemischten deutsch-griechischen Ausschusses nach dem 
Kulturabkommen vom 17. Mai 1956 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Griechenland,” Protokoll 
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70 Sekretariat der KMK, “Vorbereitende Notizen für das deutsch-griechische Expertengespräch am 23. 3. 1976” 
(Bonn: KMK, March 1976), 2, B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA. 
71 Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen to Auswärtige Amt, “Reorganisation des griechischen 
Bildungswesens,” November 10, 1969, PA AA; Anna Frangoudaki, “Greek Education in the Twentieth Century: A 
Long Process Towards a Democratic European Society,” in Greece in the Twentieth Century, ed. Theodore A. 
Couloumbis et al. (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 198–216; and EURYDICE, The Greek Education System (Office for 
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When the Greek government tried to replace the Greek teachers stationed in West 
Germany, schools across North Rhine-Westphalia, where consular instruction was integrated into 
the local school system (more so than in Baden-Württemberg), expressed their concerns. The 
German teachers and school boards worried about what would happen to the Greek teachers 
upon their return to Greece. They asked North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education if the 
schools could keep them employed. Bound by their agreement with Greece and their own 
regulations stating that the Greek Ministry of Education was entitled to select consular teachers, 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education told school leaders that they were welcome to 
keep the teachers in other positions, but they could not continue to teach consular classes.72 
Added to that change, the new Social Democratic-Liberal coalition in charge of the 
Federal Government in West Germany stood against the Greek Military government. In the mid-
1960s, the West German Grand Coalition government and Christian Conservative (CDU AND 
CSU) politicians had partly supported the Junta government as an anti-communist institution. 
The new Federal Government, in contrast, argued that the Junta government had connections to 
fascism.73 The spread of that political stance among the political left and, eventually, among the 
right as well, carried concerns about the classes’ messages into the Länder Bundestags and into 
the press.74 With particular frequency in 1970 and 1971, Federal and Länder SPD and CDU 
                                                
72 The Greek Legation would remind the various Foreign Office and Ministry of Education representatives, 
requesting that the West German administration keep the schools from hiring their own teachers (Auswärtige Amt to 
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Members of Bundestag, disturbed by the mere presence of possibly “‘junta-true Greek teachers,” 
repeatedly pointed to the possibility of “anti-democratic” content in the children’s instruction.75 
Asking the Federal Ministry of Education whether “the Federal Government [was] aware that 
Greek children of guest workers in German schools [were] taught from schoolbooks from the 
junta that distort history and glorify the dictatorship,” these Bundestagarians questioned the legal 
basis for such instruction.76  
Concerns over these textbooks reflected how citizenship was supposed to be defined for 
foreign citizens living in West Germany. These children were likely permanent residents, but 
they were citizens of another country without any realistic possibility of becoming German 
citizens.77 As these children and their education become a hot political and media issue, their 
place in West German society and their rights became a widely contested subject. The debate 
partly centered on minority rights, exploring the question of how foreign the children should be 
or how fully they should integrate in the name of individual rights and for the benefit of society. 
For West German politicians and educators, the question centered around the changing meaning 
of citizenship. 
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Part of the controversy over consular instruction arose because of the political nature of 
education. The Federal Republic’s government claimed that considerations about the schooling 
of children with non-German citizenship focused on pedagogical concerns and was not a 
political matter.78 Yet, as John Dewey, Pierre Bourdieu, and countless other scholars before and 
after them have shown, education was (and is) inherently political.79 The goal of education may 
have been to teach reading, writing, and arithmetic, but the content of lessons and schoolbooks 
reflected a political agenda. Many state governments controlled textbook production directly, 
with Ministries of Education printing the materials (i.e. Greece and Turkey). Others, like West 
Germany and Italy, allowed private organizations to develop the materials but required state 
approval. These materials, from the first class upward, depicted government and civil society, 
described politics, and outlined the meaning of concepts like “family.” The books designed for 
use in social studies, first readers, and early history books had clear political connections, as they 
described a country’s founding fathers or mothers and celebrated national poets. School 
materials for chemistry or math were not as explicit, but sample exercises listed units in Deutsch 
Marks or Lira and provided exercises featuring the number of bullets used in military maneuvers. 
For migrants’ education, in turn, foreign relations and internal affairs played a direct influence in 
the perception of what was in the pedagogical interest of the children. Regardless of the Federal 
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Republic’s government’s claims, decidedly political interests also influenced the shape of school 
initiatives as well as the willingness of any given group to fund the programs.80  
Although the West German and international Education Administrations were well aware 
of the cultural components of education, they nonetheless initially overlooked the centrality of 
discussions of civil participation, political parties, and voting in teaching citizenship (depending 
on the country). In consular instruction, schoolchildren with foreign citizenship in West 
Germany would, theoretically, learn not only what it meant to belong to a particular national 
ethnicity, but also about the political systems in which they were going to someday be active 
participants. Yet, some political stances or parties acceptable abroad were not socially acceptable 
or even legal in West Germany. In particular, the Federal Government had banned the 
Communist Party in 1956 and, of course, continued to denounce fascism and authoritarian 
regimes.81  
With the recall of Greek teachers, and worried about what a Greek authoritarian military 
government might teach its pupils, several West German politicians and education administrators 
wavered in their support of consular instruction. The fascist Spanish and Portuguese 
governments had signed agreements about cultural contact before sending teachers to West 
Germany, as had communist Yugoslavia.82 In contrast, the Greek government had undergone a 
transformation from a democratic to a military government that terrified many West German 
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politicians in the wake of social and student unrest in 1968.83 Added to that, there were a 
growing number of consular courses across the country, meaning that these possible messages 
received wider dissemination. In response, the West German public media, politicians, and 
school administrators demanded to know what foreign schoolbooks said and about foreign 
teachers’ lesson plans.84 In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, the Cultural Committee 
debated whether, given that the foreign ministries of education from the so-called guest worker 
countries (including Greece) selected consular teachers, who were then often paid by the relevant 
West German state, it was possible that these teachers held divided loyalties.85 This split loyalty 
could lead them to try and undermine West German ideals and goals. To clear up the issue, some 
politicians on both the national and regional levels suggested that schoolteachers from foreign 
countries be required to take loyalty oaths, swearing their adherence to the West German 
constitution. They argued that if Greek or other foreign teachers received funding from the West 
German Ministries of Education, they needed to adhere to the sentiments expressed in the West 
German constitution.86 
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Several organizations and institutions sent the Education Administrations 
recommendations on how to combat anti-democratic messages. In 1972, the Confederation of 
German Trade Unions (DGB), in a letter representative of many of those recommendations, put 
forward a possible solution.87 The Union suggested instituting a rule that teachers not be 
permitted to be recalled by the relevant foreign government for basing their instructional 
message on the FRG’s constitution, but to allow dismissal for teaching anti-democratic materials. 
They further demanded that the Länder Education Administrations take an active part of the 
supervision, selection, and final acceptance of the teachers.88 
The Länder Educational Administrations already had the right to visit classes and 
examine textbooks.89 Yet they rarely had the staff with the language skills necessary to perform 
such reviews and “cases would be difficult to establish.”90 Furthermore, as the West German 
Foreign Office pointed out in October 1971 in a letter to all the Länder Ministers of Education, 
bilateral relationships with West Germany’s partner countries and preparation for return 
necessitated the continued employment of consular teachers.91 The teachers never would have to 
take loyalty oaths in West Germany. Nonetheless, to reassure local citizens and the Bundestag, 
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North Rhine-Westphalia’s Cultural Administration declared in 1972 that “foreign teachers 
misusing their positions to incite against a free democratic basic order would be released from 
their positions.”92  
While the Länder Educational Administrations could not monitor what teachers said in 
every class, they could examine the textbooks that the foreign Ministries of Culture sent to West 
Germany. Yet, as with the teachers, when the outcry against possible anti-democratic messages 
began in 1969 the Länder initially had no capacity to actually examine the books. Several began 
by analyzing the pictorial content, which was judged to contain nothing inappropriate, even if the 
images were often militaristic. With a general need across the country, the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s Education Committee decided to take action and preform an in-depth 
examination of the materials. The KMK established a small committee, including representatives 
from Hesse, Schleswig Holstein, and North Rhine-Westphalia. The committee asked the Georg-
Eckert Institute for International Schoolbook Research (GEI) to join, but Georg Eckert 
responded that the Schoolbook Institute did not have any staff capable of reading the necessary 
Greek. Eckert, an SPD member and historian from Braunschweig who had founded the institute 
in 1951,93 was nonetheless interested in “participating in a theoretical way.”94  
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With no one inside the Länder Ministries of Culture capable of performing the analysis, 
North Rhine-Westphalia commissioned Principal Beckmann to examine the presentation of 
history, democracy, and politics in a Greek sixth-grade civics textbook.95 Beckmann, who had 
taught at a German School in Athens between 1957 and 1967, focused on the tone of the text. 
His report described the volume as naïve as well as highly nationalistic and Christo-Hellenic. 
From the first page onward, the book directed children to “celebrate their history” and told them 
how “the Greek national governments [had], in all its actions, the everlasting, immortal Helleno-
Christian ideals in view.”96 
Nonetheless, if more extreme than the West German committee preferred, Beckmann 
informed the committee that the book’s politics did not contravene West Germany’s Basic Law. 
The book celebrated democracy in theory, but claimed that democratic freedoms had to be 
limited as otherwise people would be unable to live together. The text also explicitly decried 
both communism and fascism, presenting the period from 1941 to 1949 as one of trials and 
repression, first from the Nazi hordes that invaded and then by the “Slavo-communisists.” The 
Communist Party was “illegal in our country as their entire ideology is anti-national.” While the 
book celebrated the Greek army that had heroically battled the Communist dictators, the 
textbook warned that “the Communist threat was not over, but continued to work in secret” and 
that “everything suggested that a communist storm [would] soon break out.” Though in West 
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Germany Willi Brandt had embarked on Ostpolitik, the Communist Party was still illegal and 
Communism a threat – a stance which theoretically agreed with the Greek text.97 
The communist threat the Greek texts warned about also concerned West German 
politicians and educators, which raised questions about Italian schoolbooks. Italian membership 
in the European Community overshadowed the majority of politicians’ concerns about the Italian 
government or possible lessons contravening the West German Federal and Länder constitutions. 
Nonetheless, particularly as social unrest grew in Italy during the “Years of Lead,” some West 
Germans worried about Italy’s Communist Party (PCI).98 The Communist Party was legal and 
quite alive within the Republic of Italy, and some politicians in Cold War West Germany found 
the specter of Communist revolution particularly frightening. As the Communist Party gained 
influence (earning over a quarter of the votes in the 1968 and 1972 elections), the Cold War 
West German governments and media occasionally voiced concern about the possibility of 
communist ideology affecting schoolchildren.99  
Interestingly, West German politicians and educational administrators were not overly 
anxious about the political changes going on in Turkey with regards to schooling. There were 
those politicians and media groups in West Germany who did express their concerns vis-á-vis 
Turkish language materials. They worried that, given the military takeover in Turkey, the state 
schoolbooks could once again contain anti-democratic messages. But, in contrast to Greece’s 
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coup, in the early 1970s the Turkish military was largely considered a secular, anti-communist 
force reigning in political corruption. The fact that the military rapidly returned the government 
to secular control also contributed to a positive West German perception of Turkey’s successive 
coups.100 Furthermore, the GEI had a long-standing relationship with the Turkish Ministry of 
Culture and had been exchanging textbooks since the 1950s. Consequently, despite successive 
coups and government instability, West German politicians and educators were more concerned 
about unrest among the adult population than schoolbooks or teachers.  
In the end, despite reservations, the Federal Government agreed with the Länder 
committee and judged the schoolbooks sent from the various foreign ministries of education 
acceptable, if nationalistic.101 In 1972, the Federal Bundestag and the Federal Office for the 
Protection of the Constitution examined excerpted translations of the school materials for any 
conflicts with the West German Constitution, and the investigation revealed no “prosecutable 
offenses.”102 even if they had found problematic content, as the Federal Ministry of Education 
explained to concerned Bundestagarians, it would have only led to banned texts in the truly 
extreme cases. The Federal Government took the stance that “return [was] under no 
circumstances to be made more difficult.” The materials were “based on the curricula of the 
sending country, to be used for the schoolchildren of that country” which encouraged 
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reintegration.103 Banning them or restricting foreign teachers would impede return and were 
consequently to be accepted. 
Regardless, many educators continued to express reservations about the texts even as 
they accepted the texts. Articulating the sentiment of his colleagues in 1971, Georg Eckert 
opined that foreign schoolbooks would necessarily “express the stance of repressive regimes.” 
Nonetheless, he also felt that it would be unwise to prohibit Greek-, Portuguese-, or Spanish-
language textbooks. Always aware of pragmatic considerations, Eckert pointed out that it was 
unfeasible to quickly create new foreign language or German texts. Additionally, as the West 
German Foreign Office also warned, any changes would also affect West Germany’s bilateral 
relationships with other nations.104 
To handle the issue without causing an international crisis or preventing preparation for 
return, several West German groups decided to develop their own materials for the permanent 
minority communities, usually in collaboration with the relevant foreign consulates. Among 
others, with funding from the Länder Education Administrations, the Schoolbook Institute in 
Soest (North Rhine-Westphalia) started working on materials. In collaboration with Hesse and 
representatives from the relevant consulates, the Soest Schoolbook Institute eventually produced 
materials to be used in consular instruction as well as in primary and lower secondary 
education.105 Nonetheless, consular teachers continued to use materials from the countries of 
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origin in native language and cultural courses for a number of years, particularly in the Länder in 
which the countries of citizenship paid for the bulk of the instruction (as in Baden-Württemberg).  
The materials the Länder funded could, however, only be employed in preparation 
classes or consular classes funded directly by the Länder governments. Länder such as Baden-
Württemberg, which only subsidized consular classes, had no control over class content. 
Consular teachers in those Länder usually continued to use textbooks from the relevant country 
of citizenship. Those state governments, however, also developed new instructional materials. 
Those materials also were improving by leaps and bounds as printing technology improved. New 
textbooks and exercise materials were printed on better paper, included more imagery, and 
employed new methodologies. But, with the exception of Bavaria, the Länder would not 
regularly examine the material.106 
The controversy over foreign textbooks highlights the contradictions and complications 
within West German official policy towards minority populations. Many individuals in 
government agreed that many, if not most, members of the various ethnic minority groups in the 
country were going to be permanent residents. That belief, combined with the individual right to 
an education, meant inclusion in West German schools on the same basis as host country 
nationals. Yet, pressure for return and the right to maintain minority identities meant that the 
schoolchildren should have access, at the least, to the consular instruction that explicitly taught 
children how to be foreign. Consequently, these complex pressures meant that the different 
Federal and Länder governments encouraged West German residents – many of whom were 
born in the Federal Republic – to learn to be “foreign” or “non-German” despite the distaste of 
many conservative politicians for foreign influences in West German schools. In consequence, as 
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the 1970s progressed, children with non-German citizenship were increasingly pressured to 
complete a West German secondary school certificate while building a non-German identity, 
leading to further strains on the integrative measures in place.  
Citizenship Status and Equalizing Access from Primary through Secondary Schooling  
In line with those divided goals and the European Community’s 1968 Directive on 
freedom of movement, the Kultusministerkonferenz members agreed on and published a new set 
of Recommendations for the “instruction of the children of foreign workers” in December 
1971.107 Claiming that “foreign schoolchildren had the same social and legal status as German 
schoolchildren,” the new Recommendations focused on facilitating school access. They outlined 
revised guidelines for preparing new migrant and minority children for integration into the West 
German classroom as well as for language maintenance.108 Even with that agreement, however, 
local laws and practices came into conflict with the assumption of equality. The different 
Education Administrations’ school initiatives specified specific communities or individuals for 
state support. Despite the rhetoric of inclusion, distinct groups were singled out for inclusion or 
exclusion.  
The continued claims that all children should be covered or included under compulsory 
schooling laws at the international and local levels were contradicted be the laws in place. Their 
language limited their coverage, despite many of their authors’ intents to cover every child. For 
the West German governments, while discussing the education of foreign children generally, the 
laws usually only covered the children of migrant workers specifically. On the European 
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Community level, restrictions in jurisdiction often meant that recommendations intended for all 
children usually specified European Community Member State nationals. Beyond those 
specifications, however, several governments, trying to provide the best education for the most 
number of schoolchildren, chose to focus on some groups and not others. Equality for all was 
limited by pragmatism, jurisdiction, and wording.  
Even the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1971 Recommendations, which promoted integration 
and equality, fell short of ensuring equal treatment without regard to background and citizenship. 
The KMK’s members felt that each Länder Education Administration implementing the 1964 
Recommendations in different ways arguably led to inequalities. In addition, the KMK’s 
members wanted new Recommendations on education for guest worker children to meet 
contemporary needs. Deciding to standardize Länder efforts across the country, the KMK 
directed the Secretary of the Kultusministerkonferenz, Franz Domhof, to lead a sub-committee on 
the issue.109 As primary author of the eventual December 1971 Recommendations, he claimed 
that the KMK’s main goal regarding “foreign children and youths” was “to enable successful 
participation in German schools.” As such, new Recommendations were supposed to help 
“realize educational opportunities in the German school system.” The classes outlined in the 
regulations, however, were not for “foreign children,” but rather for “the children of foreign 
guest workers.” At the time, this diverse group constituted the majority of West Germany’s 
minority groups, but that stipulation meant that the small but slowly-growing groups from places 
like Japan or India were excluded.110  
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To promote the Kultusministerkonferenz’s goals and to respond to contemporary needs, 
the new 1971 Recommendations expanded on the 1964 version. The Recommendations 
promoted improved teaching materials for both German and native language textbooks and 
additional teacher training for foreign language instruction. In addition, the 1971 
Recommendations provided suggestions for redesigning preparatory classes specifically to 
facilitate the transition into the West German classroom. Where previously the instruction had 
been divided into two-thirds and one-third, new guidelines pushed the integrational aspects of the 
programs by stipulating that consular teachers provide only half of the instruction. The other 
half, taught by a German teacher, focused on German language instruction. The guidelines also 
recommended that preparatory classes be taught in conjunction with local schools. Ideally, the 
guidelines suggested organizing the classes so that the children enrolled therein could take 
subjects like music (less dependent on language of instruction) with their age group in the 
regular classroom.111 “Thereby” Domhof claimed, “the beginnings of communication should 
successfully get off the ground and friendships develop between the German and foreign 
children,” thus avoiding “ghettoization.”112  
The 1971 Recommendations did not exclude consular instruction, but relegated cultural 
maintenance to a secondary goal with reservations. The authors recommended integrating native 
language and cultural instruction directly into the classroom, as North Rhine-Westphalia had 
attempted to do, so that children would not be overburdened. The goal, however, was supposed 
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to predominately be cultural maintenance, not necessarily preparation for reintegration upon 
return migration, unless those were the parents’ explicit goals.113 
Part of the 1971 Recommendations’ reserved support for reintegration preparation 
stemmed from several Education Administrations’ uncertainty over whether it was even possible 
to integrate and receive an education equal to the ethno-national majority if the children were 
also preparing for reintegration.114 According to these Education Administrations, including 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg’s Ministries of Education, children were 
reportedly overburdened by the “double goal” of integration and cultural maintenance. Pointing 
to regional school board reports, several of the Education Administrations’ representatives felt 
that extra consular instruction led to exhaustion, especially when preparing for return.115 Where 
most young children with West German citizenship had half-day schooling, with around eighteen 
hours of instruction, particularly in primary school, many children with non-German citizenship 
had an extra five hours. With permission for extra consular instruction in order to support return 
migration, some children with non-German citizenship, particularly those with Greek citizenship, 
often had upwards of 30 hours a week.116 
As all of its member states grappled with the question of defining and regulating equality 
of opportunity in the 1970s, the European Community became increasingly involved in the 
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Späth to Wilhelm Hahn, “Schulpflicht für im Land Baden-Württemberg wohnhafte Kinder ausländischer 
Gastarbeiter,” October 28, 1968, EA 3/609 Bü 70, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
116 Sekretariat der KMK, “2. Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Unterricht für Kinder von ausländischen Arbeitnehmern’ 
am 27./28. April 1971 in Winkel im Rheingau.” 
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question. Although the EC was limited in its jurisdiction to Member State Nationals, those 
individuals were entitled, based on the 1968 European Community Directive on freedom of 
movement (1612/68), to equal school access. The question of what that equal access meant 
would lead to a 1974 court case in the European Court of Justice that would influence the 
direction of the European Community as a whole. 
The case, Danato Casagrande v. the City of Munich, was, on its surface, about whether 
state support for attending higher levels of secondary school could be offered only to host 
country citizens. The plaintiff, Casagrande Donato (born 29 December 1953), was a young 
Italian national who had migrated to Bavaria with his father, who had subsequently died. During 
the 1971/72 school year (at age 17/18), Casagrande attended the Fridtjof-Nansen-Realschule in 
Munich and applied for state support allocated for “youths [in higher levels of secondary school] 
without sufficient means.”117 While Casagrande had clear financial need, the Fridtjof-Nansen-
Realschule denied his request, as the relevant Bavarian law specified “Germans, … stateless 
persons, or aliens benefiting from the right to asylum” as the intended recipients.118 Casagrande 
took the case to court, arguing that the law discriminated based on national background, thus 
contravening anti-discrimination treaties and EEC directive 1612/68 Article 12. In accepting the 
case, the European Court of Justice had to determine if Article 12 of Directive 1612/68 could be 
read as not only admittance to education “on the same basis as host country nationals,” but also 
                                                
117 Under Bavarian law children in secondary school between the fifth and tenth classes could apply for 70 DM a 
month as a “benefit for encouraging education.” Article 2 of the Bavarian Law on Educational Grants (Bayerisches 
Ausbildungsförderungsgesetz). Specifically, children without sufficient means.  
118 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Munich, 1974 European Court Reports (European Court of Justice 1974). 
Provided for in Article 2 of the Bavarian Law on Educational Grants. Stateless persons were defined under BGBl. I, 
p. from 25 April 1951 and as amended on 9 September 1965 BGBl. I, p. 1273.  
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“general measures intended to facilitate educational attendance.”119 On 11 February 1974, the 
Bavarian Administrative Court referred the case to the European Court of Justice.120 
While the European Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction over national law, it ruled 
based on EEC Treaty, Article 177 that it was within its rights to “supply the national court with 
the principles of interpretation arising from Community law” that could influence the assessment 
of national law. Furthermore, under the EEC Treaty, Article 189, the Court determined that all 
acts of institutions (regulations) had a “binding force regarding national authorities.” Finally, 
while the Court of Justice could not actually rule on Bavarian law, it was entitled to judge 
whether Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 referred to “measures relating to educational grants.” 
In many ways, the case was exploring the EEC’s reach into national culture and education, 
which was theoretically solely under the jurisdiction of the nation-state.121  
In examining the reach of Directive 1612/68 in 1974, the European Court of Justice had 
to decide what the Directive’s wording meant in practice. The Court decided that, as the host 
country was to “encourage all efforts to enable such children to attend courses” including 
secondary school classes “under the best possible conditions,” Article 12 applied to grants as 
well as general attendance. Funding, the judges felt, was a part of those conditions. On that basis, 
                                                
119 Commission of the European Communities, “Information on the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
No. XVI. 680/X/74.E.,” EU Commission - Working Document, (1974), 1612, http://aei.pitt.edu/36497/; and Council 
of European Communities, “Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on Freedom of 
Movement for Workers Within the Community.” 
120 Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht. The European Court of Justice is designed to ensure that European law is 
applied equally in each of the Member States. The Court has one judge from each Member State. For more on the 
European Court of Justice, see for example Maurice Adams et al., Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013); Dennis F. Thompson, Restoring 
Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business, and Healthcare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
318–321; and Klaus Dieter Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law: Including a 
Systematic Analysis of Article 13 of the International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006).  
121 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Munich, 1974 European Court Reports (European Court of Justice 1974). 
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in its final decision the European Court of Justice interpreted Article 12 of 1612/68 as 
“guaranteeing to the children in question equality with regard to all the rights arising from 
admission to Education.”122 Casagrande was entitled to the 70 Deutsch Marks a month.  
What is particularly interesting about the Casagrande case is how it extended the reach of 
European Economic Community Directive 1612/68. In its formulation, the EEC Member State 
representatives had hardly imagined that it might be used to apply the EEC’s treaties on anti-
discrimination beyond the labor force. Instead, having viewed education as important, the 
members had included Article 12 in part with an interest in family rights (in particular the right 
to reunification) and job training. The European Community’s member states claimed that “the 
right of freedom of movement, in order that it may be exercised, by objective standards, in 
freedom and dignity, requires ... that obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated, in 
particular as regards the worker’s right to be joined by his family and the conditions for the 
integration of the family into the host country.”123 As a prerequisite to vocational training, 
schooling was a part of that. 
With the Casagrande decision, the European Court of Justice effectively included 
education under all of the various European Community treaties and protections.124 Previously, 
the ban on discrimination had only applied to employees who were mentioned in the treaties. 
With the Casagrande case (9/74), the European Court of Justice expanded the reach of the 
                                                
122 Ibid.; and Commission of the European Communities, “Information on the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. No. XVII. 403/X/75.E.,” Working Document (EU Commission, 1975), http://aei.pitt.edu/36497/. 
Danato Casagrande v the City of Munich effectively confirmed the scope of the Community provision and its 
compulsory effect while leaving the Member States in charge of setting the conditions for application. See 
Commission of the European Communities, “Information on the Court of Justice of the European Communities No. 
XVI. 680/X/74.E.” 
123 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt Munich, 1974 European Court Reports (European Court of Justice 1974). 
124 At the time of that case (1974), education was not covered by the treaties (Ibid). 
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prohibition to persons not currently in the labor market. The ruling in 9/74 thus made 
discrimination against persons in the educational system illegal.125 Effectively, the Court sought 
to ensure the right to education.126  
The court decision was part of a move among the European Community’s six Member 
States in the early 1970s towards a “European model of culture correlating with European 
integration.” The six wanted to expand the Communities’ parameters from existence as a 
common market to a “much larger idea of the community” specifically including education.127 
The European Community’s 1972 summit built on the idea, emphasizing the “human dimension 
of Community integration.” With that spirit, the EC decided to establish its first social action 
program and briefly explored the possibility of developing a European-wide model of 
education.128 While dropping any attempt to develop such a model when the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1973, further meetings confirmed that there was “an interest in 
and need to establish cooperation in the field of national education and to deal with education 
problems at community level within that framework.”129 The education of the children of 
migrant workers was particularly important because of its association with ensuring equality for 
                                                
125 Ibid.; and Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education, 26–28.  
126 The European Court of Justice’s case Angelo Alaimo v Préfet du Rhône (68/74) from 29 January 1974 reiterated 
the sentiment, declaring that “children of migrant workers who are nationals of a Member State and employed on the 
territory of another Member State to be treated in the same way as children of the nationals of that State as regards 
educational allowances and grants. See .”Commission of the European Communities, “Information on the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities. No. XVII. 403/X/75.E.” 
127 Hywel Ceri Jones, “L'Éducation et la Communauté européenne” in Revue d’action sociale, no. 2, March 1984, 
page 31 cited in European Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 61.  
128 See Ibid., 61–62. For more on the European Schools see, for example, collection B 90 Bd. 1188 in PA AA.  
129 Ibid., 63–64. The Conference of Ministers of Education of Member States of the European Community would 
reaffirm that cooperation in the education sector was indeed a task for the European Community 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, “Conference of Ministers of Education of European Member 
States,” Reply to EP/4114/4 (Bonn, June 15, 1973), 2, B 91, Bd. 431, PA AA). The Federal Republic agreed in 
Council. 
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migrant workers and their families from Community Member states, who still made up a large 
portion of migrant workers. 
The European Community’s expansion of its ban on discrimination to persons not yet in 
the labor market and its desire to function as a “much larger … community” demonstrated the 
changes in assumptions about what was local versus international. While each country 
theoretically had a right to self-determination, international opinion and law directly influenced 
how a state viewed its right to establish the parameters of a government’s relationship to its 
residents and citizens. As an inalienable right, it was no longer acceptable – either legally or 
socially – to provide different educational opportunities for citizens versus “foreigners.” As 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin’s efforts demonstrate, however, that acceptability did not 
necessarily lead to all children having equal access in practice. Location and individual 
circumstances continued to shape a child’s choices.  
Despite general agreement among the European Community and West German Education 
Administrations that all children needed equality of opportunity and access, in implementation 
actors often decided to concentrate resources on specific groups. Worried that the children would 
receive a “ghetto” education unless properly integrated, North Rhine-Westphalia’s SPD 
government responded to problems with preparatory classes by turning their focus to younger 
children.130 The Ministry of Education obliquely announced that there was little-to-no hope for 
older migrant children to succeed in the West German system.131 According to the Ministry, the 
                                                
130 In North Rhine-Westphalia, CDU and NPD politicians pointed to the rights of West German parents and 
teachers, but the SPD-government focused on concerns regarding the possible disadvantage of the children of 
migrant workers in the Federal Republic. 
131 Landtag NRW, “Drucksache 7/3137: Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 1052 der Abg. Doris 
Altewischer (CDU) betr.: Berufsschulpflichtige Ausländer” (Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW, October 12, 1973); and 
Landtag NRW, “Drucksache 7/2837: Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 1066 der Abg. van Nes 
Ziegler (SPD) betr.: Anteil ausländischer Schüler an Grund- und Hauptschulen des Landes” (Düsseldorf: Landtag 
NRW, June 27, 1973). 
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children who did have a chance were those who were born in the country or migrated before they 
were seven or eight (well in time to prepare for secondary school). To facilitate these children’s 
educations and ensure their equality of opportunity led to Ministry support locally developed 
projects for pre-school and young school children. Among them, the state government financed 
the expansion of the Denkendorf Modell (named for the location of development), which 
promoted pre-school and young language acquisition.132  
The Denkendorf Modell reflected the conclusions of the Council of Europe and Standing 
Conference of European Ministers of Education. The 1969 Meeting of the European-Ministers of 
Education focused largely on the nursery school and primary school in relation to the demands of 
educational opportunity for all. This conference put forward the idea of pre-school education 
being increasingly important in compensating for a child’s socio-economic background in an 
attempt to set them on equal footing. They specified that this was a particularly important issue 
for the “children of migrant worker” who “have special needs.”133 
The City of Berlin took a different approach, concentrating within instead of across 
citizenship lines. Berlin's social democratic government placed the guarantee of equality of 
opportunity for children with West German citizenship above any claims of children with foreign 
citizenship. In some areas of the city, such as in Kreuzberg, the number of children with non-
German citizenship had risen to the point where they began to reach upwards of 20 percent in 
local schools. Several Berlin politicians and the Education Administration feared that the ethno-
                                                
132 The 1973 Denkendorf Modell for Language Assistance was premised on the idea that the number of “foreign 
children” was growing, particularly with in country births. The specific problems of foreign children in German 
classes are obvious. They need to learn the language – and that as early as possible so that they may someday learn a 
vocation. See “Sprachhilfe für ausländische Kinder: Denkendorfer Modell,” Bericht über das erste Arbeitsjahr, 
(November 1973); and Gert Bürgel, “Intensive Bemühungen um Ausländer-Integration: Kein Getto in Denkendorf: 
Ein Nahziel: Hauptschulabschluß für die Kinder,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten, September 13, 1975.  
133 The other main topic was the educational needs of the “less academically gifted child” (“European-Ministers of 
Education - 6th Conference,” Education and Culture, no. 10 (Summer 1969): 3). 
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national majority’s education might be endangered as a teacher’s time could be taken up by new 
migrant children needs. On these grounds, the major political groups and local school boards 
debated the efficacy of the established measures. Some argued that allowing the children 
increased access to mother language instruction would better enable them to maintain cultural 
connections and also mean less time in West German schools, benefitting children with German 
citizenship.134 
In a controversial move the West Berlin government decided to cap the percentage of 
children with non-German citizenship allowed in any one regular classroom. Ostensibly for the 
benefit of both “German” and “foreign” schoolchildren, the Social Democratic Senator for 
Education, Gerd Löffler (Member of the Berlin Bundestag from 1963-1990 and Senator for 
Education between 1970 and 1975)135 used studies claiming that foreign children “as a rule did 
not integrate successfully if there were more than 15 percent in a single class” to support his 
stance. To deal with the overflow, the state briefly considered bussing “in order to instruct the 
foreign schoolchildren in other schools” like the Americans did.136 The School Administrations 
only rarely employed that solution. Instead, the Senate decided that developing classes for only 
children with foreign citizenship (when regular classes reached up to 20 “percent foreign 
                                                
134 Landtag von BW, “31. Sitzung des Landtags: Punkt 17 der Tagesordnung.” Neither North Rhine-Westphalia nor 
Baden-Württemberg seriously implemented the quota system, although they did encourage schools to limit the 
number of schoolchildren with non-German citizenship in any one class. 
135 Löffler (1927-2004), who studied Education Research and Political Science, served as Senator für Wissenschaft 
und Kunst between 1975 and 1977. He was head of the Volkshochschule Schöneberg until 1970. 
136 Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Nr. 1656 Des Abg. Steinberg (SPD) über Betreuung Ausländischer Schüler,” 
Mitteilung Des Präsidents 61, no. V (January 6, 1971): 36.  
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schoolchildren”), regardless of their length of stay in Germany or linguistic competencies, to be a 
more appropriate course of action.137  
Even as the European Court of Justice decided in Casagrande’s favor, several of the 
European Community Member States were buckling down on new migration. Between 1973 and 
1974, the EC Members States ended their programs for labor migration, tightening their borders 
in response to world-wide recession and the 1973 Oil Crisis. Throughout Europe, those changes 
would influence the tone of discussions on migrants’ places in their host countries and hence 
their education. The growing emphasis on migration would become central to the discussion and 
– in connection – minority rights and cultural maintenance would become paramount.  
Nonetheless, as the Casagrande case also highlights, the question of higher levels of 
secondary school was becoming a marker of equality. Before the case, in West Germany the 
discussions on access and integration focused almost exclusively on primary and lower 
secondary schooling. After all, as Domhof pointed out to a meeting of the North Rhine-
Westphalian Ministers in 1973, a high proportion of these children did not attend a West German 
school long enough to complete any secondary school certificate.138 Some children with non-
German citizenship, however, did enroll in Realschule and Gymnasium (as depicted in Table 
4.1). As the decade rolled on, that number rose, as did the assumption that part of equal 
opportunity was enrollment in high levels of secondary education as well as completion of a 
secondary school certificate. 
                                                
137 Löffler, Schütz, and Diepgen, “Nr. 1374 Des Abgeordneten Diepgen (CDU) über Schulische Situation Der 
Kinder Ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in Berlin” (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus, July 3, 1973). 
138 Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales des Landes NRW, “Sitzung des Arbeitskreises III ‘Schulische 
und weiterführende Ausbildung’ des Landesbeirats für ausländische Arbeitnehmer am 15. 1. 1973.” 
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Conclusion  
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, most of the Länder Education Administrations, as 
well as the members of the European Community, agreed that education for all children was 
supposed to be equal. Part of that claim was rooted in the perception of human rights, but the 
galvanizing concern was the probable permanency of a large portion of the states’ new minority 
groups. Neither the host country nor country of citizenship governments wanted to develop an 
underclass through a “ghetto education.” The state governments had to decide what equal access 
meant and how different these groups remained.  
The intent to educate all foreigners on the same basis as host country nationals was, 
however, still tied to the question of citizenship. Public education was supposed to teach young 
children how to be good citizens – the meaning of which differed depending on the form of the 
state government. Some West German educators and politicians had encouraged children to 
prepare for return. That suggested that the children were, in theory, learning a different kind of 
citizenship and social participation than children in West German schools. West German 
citizenship laws rarely allowed non-ethnic Germans to naturalize, but the prospect of permanent 
or long-term residents learning the citizenship standards for another state, possibly bringing in 
foreign influences, also did not sit well with many West German politicians. Without a legal 
reason to prevent them, the state had to, within certain parameters, permit those outside 
influences.  
The legal ramifications of citizenship also influenced educational opportunity. European 
Community Directives and court decisions technically applied to Member State nationals. The 
West German Kultusministerkonferenz’s Recommendations, in turn, specified support for the 
children of foreign workers. Although the protections and guarantees of the associated 
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regulations and policies were often extended to other citizen groups, local communities and 
schools had no obligation to do so.  
Even as the different local and foreign governments involved specified, equivocated, and 
temporized, the situation for the children of migrant workers did actually improve. As the system 
shifted and changed, as bars for success rose, state support made it easier for many individual 
children to reach higher levels of secondary schooling or even complete their certificates. Cases 
like Danato Casagrande v. the City of Munich expanded the definition of equality, ensuring that 
more children actually had a wider range of education opportunities. 
 
CHAPTER 5: CITIZENSHIP, MINORITY RIGHTS, AND THE QUESTION OF 
RETURN (1973-1981) 
In 1974, a Greek father appealed to the regional school administration in Cologne (North 
Rhine-Westphalia) for permission to place his son back in a Greek national preparatory class. 
The boy had already spent the legal maximum of two years in a preparatory class, after which his 
father had sent him to Greece to continue a Greek education. Wanting his son close, the father 
brought his son back to West Germany, but still intended for the entire family to someday return 
to Greece. On that basis, he requested permission for his son to continue past the time limit in 
preparatory class. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education denied the father’s request, 
arguing that the boy’s residence in the Federal Republic was clearly of some duration and he 
needed to be prepared in the West German system as necessitated by West German law. 
Consular instruction would have to suffice for the boy’s national-cultural training.1 
Although the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry of Education’s answer, that the child 
with a long duration of residence in West Germany needed to integrate, was standard at the time, 
the emphasis on minority rights began to shift after the 1973 Recruitment Stop. With the 
recession, political and social pressure mounted precipitously to encourage children and their 
families to return to their countries of origin. The 1973 Oil Crisis and subsequent Recruitment 
Stop influenced people’s attitudes, transforming the ethno-national majority’s perception of large 
minority groups as being economically beneficial to being an economic hindrance, a possible 
second class in a supposedly classless society. The Recruitment Stop was supposed to reduce the 
                                                
1 Regierungspräsident Köln to Schulamt für den Kreis Düren, “Antrag des Herrn --- auf Genehmigung des weiteren 
Besuches seines Sohnes in der Vorbereitungsklasse,” November 4, 1974, BR 2068-116, Landesarchiv North Rhine-
Westphalia.  
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number of non-nationals in the country, and while it did briefly, by 1975 West Germany’s 
minority groups were again growing. This time, however, instead of predominately workers, the 
migrants were spouses and children as well as extended family members.  
In consequence, the second goal from the Kultusministerkonferenz’s recommendations 
regarding the instruction of children of migrant workers, namely maintaining cultural 
connections, received increasing attention. Responding to the growth in families, political parties 
began to take sides in the debate on the arriving children’s education. Although there was 
continual dissention within the parties, the Social Democratic party claimed that the children of 
migrant workers needed to integrate and maintain their status as minorities, while the Christian 
Democrats pressed to encourage return.2 According to both foreign consulates and West German 
politicians, preparation for return migration meant that the children of migrant workers needed to 
be able to reintegrate smoothly into their parents’ countries of origin, including their school 
systems.  
The entry of the public into the discussion and tension over return added additional 
elements of chaos to debates on the public schooling of the children of migrant workers. 
Although the Länder Education Administrations had been developing programs for non-
nationals for two decades, for many the 1970s were a test period. Government administrations 
and schools ordered pilot programs and research into the issue. The Council of Europe and the 
European Community, in turn, set aside monies to support pilot programs encouraging both 
integration and mother language development. None of the actors, from state government to 
education researchers, had much information at hand. What was clear was that no matter how 
                                                
2 For a discussion of the major West German parties and their stance on immigration, see Beauftragter für die 
Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, Bericht zur Ausländerpolitik (Bonn, 
1984), 39–48; and Klaudia Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien: Akzeptanz und Abwehr von 
Migranten im Widerstreit in der Programmatik von SPD, FDP, den Grünen und CDU/CSU (Berlin: LIT, 2008). 
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many migrants left, a large minority would remain in West Germany as well as in other 
European host countries. And, while almost impossible to enforce, international minority rights 
law stipulated that minorities had the right to remain minorities and also to pass cultures, 
languages, and beliefs on to their children.3 
The question of return was consequently tied together with the concept of national 
identity and minority rights, particularly in regards to the children and grandchildren of migrant 
groups born in the host countries. Yet, neither the different state governments involved nor the 
diverse minority groups agreed on what it meant to be a minority or the effect their status as 
minorities should have on education. Parent groups and the major sending country governments 
disagreed on the form new school initiatives should take, demanding programs to fit their 
specific interests. Stressing which aspects of their identities they thought vital to maintain, these 
groups put pressure on West German governments to create space for the development and 
maintenance of a national conscious, even as they constantly redefined what that identity 
entailed. Other parent and governmental groups felt that second- and third-generation children 
were, at their core, more “German” than “foreign,” begging the question of whether they should 
continue to be considered foreigners at all. 
                                                
3 For a discussion of international minority rights law, see Steven Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Jelena Pejic, “Minority Rights in International Law,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 19, no. 3 (August 1997): 666–85. To look at the right to education versus minority rights, 
see Holly Cullen, “Education Rights or Minority Rights?,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 7, 
no. 2 (August 1, 1993): 143–77; and Holly Cullen, “From Migrants to Citizens? European Community Policy on 
Intercultural Education,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45, no. 1 (January 1996): 109–29. For a 
discussion of negotiation of identities and the development of the national minority in West Germany, see Riva 
Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), 124–139.  
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Greek Plans for Return Migration and new Bilingual School Programs 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s school administrations continually received demands from 
parents passed on by local schools and District Presidents for permission to attend preparatory 
classes for longer than the approved one or two years. In 1975, several parent groups wrote 
directly to the Ministry of Education laying out their desire to maintain their cultural heritage. In 
the Greek Parent Committee of Dortmund’s 1975 memorandum, the members explained that, 
just because they were going to remain in West Germany for a long time, that did not mean that 
they wanted to integrate. “Greeks,” they explained, “have a long history of migration and always 
go home again.” In a move that many parent groups and governmental bodies used, the parents 
referenced international regulations and treaties, explaining that their desires “were not a 
nationalistic declaration” but in line with “UNESCO’s emphasis on the right to maintain national 
identity, peculiarities, and traditions,” which the “Kultusministerkonferenz’s decisions at least 
theoretically supported.” The few hours in Greek instruction, history, and religion planned were 
in no way sufficient to support national consciousness.4  
Regardless of their future plans, many parents wanted to pass on their own cultures and 
languages to their children. For Greek parents who wanted to go back, the possibility of return 
made a Greek education important because of school certificate equivalency issues.5 As this 
example shows, even parents who did not plan to return to Greece imminently often wanted 
extensive access to consular instruction. These families argued that they had the right as 
minorities to maintain their mother tongue and culture, often citing international laws and 
                                                
4 Griechisches Elterkomitee Dortmund, “Über die schulische Erziehung der griechischen Kinder in Dortmund,” 
Denkschrift an das Schulamt Dortmund (Dortmund, 1975), NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW.  
5 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
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regulations.6 Some parents wanted the local state to support those rights. After all, as one Greek 
parents group pointed out, they paid taxes in West Germany, which made the Federal Republic 
responsible for their welfare regardless of citizenship. According to these parents, those taxes, 
together with the possibility that – after return to Greece – they might come back again to West 
Germany, meant that the North Rhine-Westphalian government – not the Greek government – 
needed to grant their demands.7 
For the West German Education Administrations, that appeal demanded consideration. 
The Recruitment Stop in November 1973 had been implemented with the intention of not only 
limiting new migration, but encouraging those workers and their families already in the country 
to leave.8 The Greek families demanding their cultural rights couched their requests not only in 
the language of international law, but also within a framework of West German political and 
economic aims.9 Most of the Länder Education Administrations preferred to facilitate 
integration, but they could not ignore the political and social pressures exerted by local and 
foreign governments as well as interested migrant and minority parent groups. That concern was 
particularly salient in light of new psychological research claiming that children would be 
healthier and perform better in school if they learned their native language and were not cut off 
from their cultural backgrounds.10 The Länder Education Administrations thus had to decide if 
                                                
6 Discussed below. 
7 The parents had had renewable residency permits (Förderung von griech. Arbeitnehmern in Düsseldorf and Ioannis 
Floros to Kultusminister NRW, November 20, 1974, NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW). 
8 Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 62–
65. 
9 Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Becoming Multicultural Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and 
Germany (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012), 79–83. 
10 Barry McLaughlin and Peter Graf, “Bilingual Education in West Germany: Recent Developments,” Comparative 
Education 21, no. 3 (January 1, 1985): 241–55; and Ingrid Gogolin, “The Bilingualism Controversy: Les Préludes,” 
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they wanted to implement new programs to facilitate return migration and just what was in the 
best interest of the child.  
For the West German Greek diaspora in the mid- and late 1970s, the possibility of return 
and pendular migration was a real consideration, particularly with the fall of the Greek junta 
government in 1974.11 After the Polytechnic students’ uprising in Athens in 1973, the military 
government staged a referendum abolishing the monarchy and passed a new constitution in an 
attempt to institute a controlled democracy. But with Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in August 
1974, the military government completely collapsed. A new referendum finally abolished the 
monarchy and a new constitution (11 June 1975) declared Greece a presidential Bundestagary 
democracy.12 The Third Hellenic Republic’s first government featured a liberal-conservative 
government under New Democratic Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, who served until 
1980.13 With the return of democratic governance, West German residents with Greek 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Streitfall Zweisprachigkeit – The Bilingualism Controversy, ed. Ingrid Gogolin and Ursula Neumann (Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009), 23–30.  
11 For a discussion of out and return migration relating to Greece in 1975 and earlier, see Theodore P. Lianos, 
“Flows of Greek Out-Migration and Return Migration,” International Migration 13, no. 3 (July 1, 1975): 119–33. 
For a discussion of the diverse forms of European migration, see Russell King, “Towards a New Map of European 
Migration,” International Journal of Population Geography 8, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 89–106. 
12 The public voted on whether or not they wanted to restore the monarchy. They did not (Takis S. Pappas and Elias 
Dinas, “From Opposition to Power: Greek Conservatism Reinvented,” \iSouth European Society and Politics 11, no. 
3–4 (December 2006): 477–95; George Kaloudis, “Transitional Democratic Politics in Greece,” \iInternational 
Journal on World Peace 17, no. 1 (March 2000): 35–59; and Antonis Klapsis, “From Dictatorship to Democracy: 
US-Greek Relations at a Critical Turning Point (1974-1975),” \iMediterranean Quarterly 22, no. 1 (2011): 61–73). 
13 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis (Greek: Κωνσταντίνος Γ. Καραµανλής 1907-1998) had already served as Prime 
Minister from 1955 from 1963 with the exception of a few months. He would also serve twice as President. In 1974 
Karamanlis founded the New Democracy party, a main center-right party dedicated to “radical liberalism.” It 
became one of the two major parties, alongside the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). Konstantinos was for 
legalizing the Communist Party in Greece and working to diffuse tensions with Turkey (George Doukas, “Party 
Elites and Democratization in Greece,” Bundestagary Affairs 46, no. 4 (1993): 506–16). 
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citizenship who had left for or remained abroad because of political concerns began returning. 
Many of them, however, went back and forth between the two countries (pendulum migration).14  
Greek families and individuals returned to Greece for other reasons as well. Among these 
reasons were the continuing instability in the West German Economy and improvement in the 
Greek economy. “Some foreign workers,” as the North Rhine-Westphalia Ministry of Education 
claimed in 1976, planned to leave West Germany because the country “was experiencing 
economic instability.”15 Other families intended to go back someday, for retirement or to rejoin 
family. While not all parents agreed, for many, their future lay in Greece, which in their view 
necessitated a Greek education. Even for those Greek parents who did not intend to leave West 
Germany, however, it was still important to maintain their identity as “Greek.”16  
Yet, although the rate of return migration had increased, both Baden-Württemberg and 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministries of Education emphasized that, regardless of “Greek claims 
of a rapid return,” the majority of Greek children had an extended residency in the country. In 
Baden-Württemberg, “only 5-10 percent of youths returned to their Greek home,” based on the 
Ministry of Education’s estimation in 1981, although “exact statistics were unavailable.” For 
Baden-Württemberg, this meant that the majority of the school age children and youths would 
remain in the country. In accordance, the Ministry claimed “the Greek parents’ wishes and 
reality were far apart.”17 Nonetheless, between 1973 and 1980, the total population with Greek 
                                                
14 David Close, Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy, and Society (London: Longman, 2002), 139–219. 
15 Meis to Kultusminister NRW and Staatsekretär NRW, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: 
Sitzung des Kulturausschusses am 2. 6. 1976,” May 31, 1976, NW 388-51, Landesarchiv NRW. 
16 As the Coordinating Committee for Foreign Workers from Altena (Koordinierungskreis für ausländische 
Arbeitnehmer von der Stadt Altena) pointed out on 11 March 1975. 
17 Kultusministerium BW, “Unterricht für griechische Kinder und Jugendliche in Baden-Württemberg,” 
Aktenvermerk (Stuttgart: Kultusministerium Baden-Württemberg, July 15, 1981), EA 3/609 Bü 101, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
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citizenship in Baden-Württemberg would fall by 30 percent (1973 around 103,000 and in 1980 
less than 74,000).18 The majority were settled, but a significant minority were in fact leaving. 
Furthermore, circular migration threw the clarity of the statistical analysis off, as some returned 
and were replaced by new migrants.  
In addition, it is important to remember that not all parent groups with non-German 
citizenship wanted to maintain a strict allegiance to their cultural background. For example, the 
District President in Düsseldorf reported that, while Greek and to some extent Turkish parents 
“complicated the integration process for new schoolchildren,” the “Italians, Spanish and 
Yugoslavians” often fought enrollment in preparatory classes (one to two year classes separate 
from regular instruction). These parents “put great value on attendance in a German class” and 
were “generally happy to integrate.”19 For the latter groups, the District President in Düsseldorf 
and other North Rhine-Westphalian District Presidents were content with the short-form 
preparatory classes and the transfer after one (or two) years into regular German classes. For the 
groups with Greek and Turkish citizenship, however, the District Presidents felt new measures 
would not be amiss.20  
                                                
18 Statistisches Landesamt BW, Statistik von Baden-Württemberg: Die Ausländer 1973, vol. 207 (Stuttgart: 
Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, 1974), 19. As of 30 September 1980, there were 73,527 individuals 
with Greek citizenship (8.1 percent of the total number of foreign citizens in the state) registered in Baden-
Württemberg. Of those, 22,115 were children (6,559 under six, 14,336 between six and 15) (Statistisches Landesamt 
BW, Statistik von Baden-Württemberg: Die Ausländer 1980, vol. 287 (Stuttgart: Statistisches Landesamt Baden-
Württemberg, 1981), 31–33). 
19 The report from Detmold mentions that children with Yugoslav citizenship supposedly had some “mentality and 
language barriers,” but does not clarify. 
20 Kultusminister NRW to die Regierungspräsidenten Arnserg, Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster, “Unterricht 
für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: Einschulung von auslänsichen Schulanfängern,” Erlaß II A 3. 36-6/1 
Nr. 4480/73 30-0/0, (November 5, 1973), NW 388-30, Landesarchiv NRW. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of 
Education sent out a circular to its District Presidents at the end of 1973 about schoolchildren with foreign 
citizenship entering the first grade, to which they replied in early 1975. The District Presidents commented on some 
difficulties particularly for schools in which a high percentage of the “beginning class” was “foreign.” 
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The Länder Ministries of Education tried to respond to parental demands, political 
pressure, and their own preferences for integration through their school initiatives. In 1975, 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s Education Administration, under SPD Minister of Education Jürgen 
Girgensohn (1970 to 1983),21 tried to make that apparent to a group of some 250 parents with 
Greek citizenship who marched on the Ministry’s doorstep on Saturday, 17 May 1975.22 After 
greeting the group, the Ministry’s representative laid out the Ministry’s official view of the 
school problems Greek children faced in North Rhine-Westphalia and descried the state’s current 
measures.23 The Ministry representative explained that compulsory schooling laws required 
“children of Greek guest workers” to enroll in German schools. To facilitate that process, North 
Rhine-Westphalia offered preparatory classes, which featured instruction from a teacher from the 
child’s country of origin. In addition, the representative reassured the parents that all “children of 
foreign workers” who attended public primary or lower secondary schools were entitled to 
receive instruction “from a foreign teacher in their mother tongue as well as in geography, 
                                                
21 Jürgen Girgensohn (1924-2007) was a teacher and German social democratic politician. He served from 1970 to 
1983 as Minister of Education. During the war, he was part of the Waffen-SS. After the war, however, Girgensohn 
claimed to be influenced by the experience to become a pacifist and became a member of the German Quakers. 
During his tenure as Minister of Education, he pushed for the spread of Gesamtschulen. 
22 Franz Domhof and Schüren, Ergebnisvermerk II A 4. 36-6/1 Nr. 1358/75 (Düsseldorf: Kultusministerium NRW, 
May 22, 1975), NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW; and Kultusministerium NRW, “Protestkundgebung am Samstag, 
dem 17. Mai 1975,” Z C - BD 14.03 (Düsseldorf, May 13, 1975), NW 388-35, Landesarchiv NRW. The Greek 
families filed to do the march in advance with the police. They expected some 500 participants. The day of, there 
were some 250 participants and 25 police officers placed around the location. The spokesperson for the Greek parent 
group, Ms. Renate Farmakidis, used a megaphone to read a resolution in both Greek and German. The Greek parent 
delegation then took the opportunity to verbally express their wishes on the schooling of their children that they had 
already (and often) sent to the Ministry of Education in writing. Franz Domhof, while having missed the actual 
event on account of illness, wrote the Greek Embassy in Bonn to inform them of their understanding of 
developments (Franz Domhof to Griechische Botschaft, Sektion für Schulfragen and Kotsmanidis, “Unterricht für 
Kinder griechischer Arbeitnehmer in Nordrhein-Westfalen,” May 27, 1975, NW 388-33, Landesarchiv NRW).  
23 For a discussion of the stance of each of the relevant Länder on integration versus bilingual and Greek school 
classes, see Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Athen to Auswärtige Amt, Referat 620, “Deutsch-
griechische Gespräche über die schulische Betreuung griechischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 
March 10, 1977, B 93, Bd. 858, PA AA; and “Die griechisch-deutschen Expertengespräche am 2./3. März 1977 in 
Athen über die Erziehung der Kinder griechischer arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 
Ergebnisprotokoll, (October 20, 1977), B 93, Bd. 810, PA AA. 
  251 
history, and the religion of their home” in order “not to lose their connection to their home 
language and culture.”24  
To address the demands for return, the North Rhine-Westphalian Ministry representative 
also described a new long-form bilingual class that North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of 
Education was developing with input from the Greek government, in order “to provide an answer 
to the individual wishes of the parents for the schooling of their children in view of a rapid return 
and reintegration into the home country.”25 Where staffing needs and prerequisites were met, the 
Ministry planned a six-year program for bilingual instruction featuring half of the instruction in 
German and half in the children’s native language. Classes would be based on the North Rhine-
Westphalian curriculum with heavy emphasis on “country of origin-oriented instruction.” Those 
parents who wanted to integrate could continue enrolling their children in normal preparatory 
classes or directly in regular instruction, but those children with parents planning on returning to 
their countries of origin could soon attend these new bilingual classes.26 
Bavaria had already developed a set of programs for different groups of schoolchildren 
with foreign citizenship. First developed in 1973, the Bavarian Model’s three levels (A, B, and 
C) each included different combinations of German and native-language instruction, depending 
on their parents’ desire for West German or foreign school instruction.27 The idea behind the 
                                                
24 Bundestag’s answer to the Kleine Anfrage 1818.!!! 
25 Domhof and Schüren. 
26 Kultusministerium NRW to Finanzminister NRW, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: 
Erweiterung des schulischen Angebots,” October 28, 1975, NW 388-51, Landesarchiv NRW.  
27 “Die Brücken zur Heimat nicht abbrechen: Das ‘offene Modell’ Bayerns,” Schulreport 21 (1974): 20; Bayerisches 
Staatsministerium für Unterricht und Kultus to Griechische Botschaft et al., “Unterricht in deutscher Sprache,” 
November 13, 1973, StK 17606, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv; and Sekretariat, “12. Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe 
‘Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,’” Ergebnisniederschrift (KMK, October 1973), 2, B 304/3288, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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Bavarian model was that the children’s parents should decide if they planned on staying or 
leaving. If parents planned on returning or felt strong ties to their national heritage, the children 
were to have access to longer cultural and language instruction in order to make return as easy as 
possible (Model C). Model A was on the opposite end, with the children provided with German 
instruction and integrated as quickly as possible with their West German contemporaries.28 
The West German Foreign Office and the Greek government pushed the Bavarian Model, 
but most of the other Länder decided against direct implementation. Most of the Länder 
Education Administrations felt not only that the costs associated with such programs would be 
high, but also that they would lead to problems with integration and scholastic success in West 
Germany. Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education, for example, felt that that carrying out 
such efforts beyond the primary school level would have serious detrimental effects.29 Under 
Christian Democrat Wilhelm Hahn (1964 to 1978), the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of 
Education continued to support integration with the argument that integration was the state’s 
responsibility.30 Furthermore, Hahn felt that the Bavarian model would make social connections 
between children with German and foreign citizenship difficult, as the non-German children 
would be isolated first in the schools and “surely later in society.” Those children who remained 
in West Germany despite their parents original intentions would not have the skills to 
successfully attend vocational school, as “the German language levels attained in addition to 
                                                
28 Bayerischen Ministerrats, “Ausländerrecht: Grundlagen der Ausländerpolitik” (Munich, April 3, 1973), 4–5, StK 
14798, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv. 
29 Sekretariat der KMK, “11. Sitzung der Arbeitsgruppe ‘Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer’ am 
5./6. 06. 1973 in Kiel” (Kiel, June 1973), 2, B 304/3288, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Evangelische Jugendsozialarbeit 
and Rudolf Laerum, “Stellungnahme zur neuen Schulkonzeption des Bayerischen Staatsministeriums für Unterricht 
und Kultus für Kinder ausländsicher Arbeitnehmer” (Munich, June 6, 1973), StK 14798, Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv; and Ray C. Rist, “On the Education of Guest-Worker Children in Germany: A Comparative 
Study of Policies and Programs in Bavaria and Berlin,” The School Review 87, no. 3 (May 1979): 242–68. 
30 Wilhelm Hahn (1909–1996), Lutheran theologian and CDU politician, served as Minister of Culture from 1964–
1978. Hahn was voted into the European Bundestag in 1979 and 1984, but laid down his mandate in 1987. 
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native language instruction [was] usually not enough.” Attendance in these national schools 
would also make transfer into higher levels of secondary school (Realschulen or Gymnasien) 
impossible. Hahn laid out other practical considerations as well, including limited schoolroom 
space and extra material costs (school books, media for language instruction), not to mention the 
need for extra positions for “foreign teachers” and “German teachers” necessary “to ensure the 
care of the foreign schoolchildren.”31 Nonetheless, like North Rhine-Westphalia, several Länder 
Education Administrations eventually developed programs loosely comparable to the Bavarian. 
Despite Hahn’s hesitations, there were multiple reasons for the new programs. Ministry 
dissatisfaction with the national preparatory classes combined with growing conservative 
political and public pressure, requests from some non-German parent groups, and new studies on 
migrant children’s mental health pushed Hahn and the Ministry to make concessions.32 An 
addition impetus, however, was the vastly divergent mother-tongue fluency of the children 
entering preparatory and consular instruction. In Baden-Württemberg, that was not an 
insignificant number. In 1976, Baden-Württemberg subsidized 1,788 consular courses attended 
by 39,142 schoolchildren with foreign citizenship (47 percent of the total 83,329). Those 
thousands of “foreign children,” because of West German citizenship laws, included children 
born in the country as well as new migrants.33 For many children, their native language was the 
language of their mother. Of these heritage speakers, many learned German first.  
                                                
31 Kultusministerium BW, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; and Fördermaßnahmen in den 
Vorbereitungsklassen und zusätzliche Sprachförderung für diese Kinder in den Regelklassen; hier: Zusätzliche 
Angaben zur Kabinettsvorlage des KM vom 25. Februar 1976 - UA II 2111/242,” Aktenvermerk (Stuttgart, April 
27, 1976), 1–3, EA 3/609 Bü 75, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
32 As discussed in Chapter 4.  
33 The issue of “former guest workers and their families” had become a hot political topic. It was no longer possible 
for the Ministry of Education to disregard public opinion about the growing “threat of foreigners” (Landtag von 
BW, “Drucksache 6/7571: Stellungnahme des Kultusministeriums zu dem Antrag der Abd. Uhri und Gen. (CDU) 
betr. Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in unseren Schulen” (Stuttgart, April 18, 1975), EA 8/203 Bü 386, 
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In light of the situation, Hahn acknowledged a need for some new form of native 
language instruction in 1975, particularly in order to avoid overwhelming children or 
psychologically damaging them. Full mother-tongue classes, however, were for Hahn 
unacceptable. As a compromise, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry designed new long-form 
national “primary school classes for foreign children with a single language” for those children 
whose parents explicitly intended to return to their country or origin. To be taught primarily by 
consular teachers with support from German teachers, these classes were supposed to begin with 
a largely Greek curriculum but to add additional German instruction every year.34 
When the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education sent information about the pilot 
project to the consulates, the Greek Consulate expressed enthusiasm, the Turkish Ministry of 
Education general interest, and the Italian Consulate reservations. While some parents with 
Italian citizenship were interested, that interest was not extensive. Wide-spread Italian 
investment in programs encouraging return, never large, had diminished as new migration 
stabilized and enrollment in Italian preparatory programs dropped off generally. Most parents, 
their children born in the country, were concerned with integration. The Italian state, in turn, now 
emphasized school initiatives promoting German language acquisition and Italian as a second 
language.35 In contrast, the Greek and Turkish Consulates, which handled higher rates of in-and-
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34 Kultusministerium BW, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; and Fördermaßnahmen in den 
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35 Sekretariat der KMK, “Unterricht für Kinder italienischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 
Vorlage für das 1. deutsch-italienische Expertengespräch,” Vorlage (Bonn: KMK, 1978), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA; 
and “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der 
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out migration, wanted the long-form classes. The first to get off the ground, five Turkish first-
year classes opened in 1975/76.36 These Turkish long-form classes balanced Turkish language, 
history, geography, and social sciences with six hours of German instruction in the first and 
second grades and ten in the third and fourth. In the later grades, part of the German instruction 
was supposed to be taken up with subjects like singing and handiwork alongside schoolchildren 
with German citizenship.37 Greek classes soon followed, but only after a delay caused by 
arguments over curricular balance (the Greek government wanted all math and science 
instruction in Greek). Early reports from the teachers (both foreign and German) were positive, 
despite some hiccups with coordination and teaching practices between local teachers and those 
sent from the relevant country of citizenship.38 
Greek parents in both Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia were skeptical 
about the new programs and worried about issues of equivalency, but the Greek Government 
expressed enthusiasm.39 After the fall of the military government, the Greek state had renewed 
its efforts to join the European Community. With its application under consideration and West 
Germany one of Greece’s main advocates, the Greek Government in no way wanted to strain its 
                                                                                                                                                       
Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. bis 24. Mai 1978 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 24, 1978), B 93, Bd. 859, 
PA AA. 
36 With such quick acceptance, starting with the 1975/76 school-year, four schools (Heilbronn, Heilbronn, 
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37 Kultusministerium BW and Weiß to Stadt Ludwigsburg, Bürgermeisteramt, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer 
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38 Kultusministerium BW, “Sprechzelltel für den Herrn Minister für eine Sitzung des Ministerrats.” 
39 Domhof to Griechische Botschaft, Sektion für Schulfragen and Kotsmanidis, “Unterricht für Kinder griechischer 
Arbeitnehmer in Nordrhein-Westfalen.”  
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relationship with the Federal Republic. Furthermore, the Greek state was implementing its own 
school reforms leading towards a greater compatibility with the German curriculum. Among 
other changes, Greece’s Minister of Education expanded compulsory schooling from six years to 
nine. In addition, the new government stipulated in the 1975 constitution that modern Greek 
(Demotic) was to be the sole language of education as of the 1977/78 school year, which 
simplified language instruction for Greek citizens abroad.40 As a consequence, the Greek 
Consulates praised these new developments and the new “Joint Expert Subcommittee on the 
Education of Greek children in the Federal Republic” began to work toward degree equivalency, 
agreeing in 1977 to recognize West German school certificates. In this environment, the Greek 
state emphasized the importance of heterogeneity, stressing multi-culturalism and the cultural 
compatibility of Greeks and Germans.41 
The Greek government could also express enthusiasm on account of the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s new “revised agreement on the ‘Instruction of the Children of Foreign 
Workers’” from 8 April 1976.42 As unemployment in West Germany increased, many ethnic-
German parents and public schools had criticized the 1971 Recommendations for downplaying 
                                                
40 Peter Mackridge, Language and National Identity in Greece, 1766-1976 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
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42 Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism (New York: Praeger, 1978), 193–196. 
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cultural maintenance in favor of integration. In response, the KMK reconvened its Working 
Group (led by North Rhine-Westphalia’s Franz Domhof) on the Instruction of Foreign Children. 
The new revisions were explicitly about “expanding on the suggestions for the improvement of 
the possibility for the maintenance and deepening of the children’s knowledge of their mother 
language.” The KMK’s stated “goal [was] to ease reintegration into the home [country’s] school 
system.” They were, however, “also designed to improve the reality of the educational chances 
of the foreign child in the German system.”43 
It was for these second- and third-generation children of migrant workers that conflict 
between integration and cultural maintenance was particularly noticeable because of the size of 
many minority communities. Some groups, such as in Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, were large 
enough that second- and third-generation children sometimes grew up with little to no contact 
with their country of residence’s official language. Some children had their first exposure to that 
official language in preschools or the first grade. In short, “children with migrant backgrounds” 
entered local schools with vastly different levels of language skills and cultural knowledge, some 
speaking German fluently and others knowing hardly a word. Yet, as pressure for return 
mounted, many politicians and parent groups, including many Greeks, argued that it was their 
minority status that needed to be emphasized in order to encourage these children to someday 
return to their (parents’) countries of origin. 
Toward those goals, the 1976 “revised agreement on the ‘Instruction of the Children of 
Foreign Workers’” made concessions to encourage mother tongue acquisition. The 
Recommendations specified that “the mother tongue of foreign schoolchildren living in the 
                                                
43 Ibid.; Sekretariat der KMK, “Plenarsitzung der KMK: Neufassung der Empfehlung ‘Unterricht für Kinder 
ausländischer Arbietnehmer,’” Niederschrift (Munich: KMK, April 8, 1976), B 304/3734, Az.3246/4, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz; and KMK, “Neufassung der Empfehlung ‘Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,’” Mitteilung 
und Information 3/76 (April 29, 1976): 2–4. 
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Federal Government is of equal value to the German.”44 To encourage native language 
acquisition, particularly among second generation schoolchildren with foreign citizenship, the 
Recommendations also urged the Länder to offer instruction in the children’s mother tongue as a 
second foreign language in order to encourage the children to learn their parents’ languages.45  
For the Länder Education Administrations, the Kultusministerkonferenz’s “revised 
agreement on the ‘Instruction of the Children of Foreign Workers’” from 8 April 1976 
represented their answer to combined demands from multiple sides. With requests coming from 
migrant and minority groups, a few of the sending countries (mostly Greece and Turkey), and 
political pressure at home, the question of return became a central goal for education. In the 
previous two decades, return had been a possibility and a consideration, but the primary goal for 
the West German Education Administrations (with the exception of Bavaria) had previously 
been integration. The emphasis on the children’s status as foreign citizens would now lead not 
only to additional opportunities for native language instruction, but contribute to pressure on the 
children to maintain a dual identity, whether or not they were born and raised in the country. Yet, 
that pressure to encourage these children to connect with their “foreign,” non-German identities 
would have repercussions, particularly in an age that did not accept hyphenated identities.  
The European Community and Education for Migrant Workers’ Children 
Although the West German Länder and other European governments tended to take an 
all-or-nothing approach to individual identity, the European Community and other supranational 
bodies stressed multiculturalism even as they pushed for return migration. Looking at continued 
                                                
44 “Griechisch-deutsche Expertengespräche (1977),” 4; and Sekretariat der KMK, “Beschlüsse der KMK: Unterricht 
für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,” April 8, 1976, B 304/3285, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
45 The Turkish government was thrilled. See “Kommuniqué über das erste deutsch-türkische Expertengespräch über 
die schulische Betreuung türkischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Bonn am 2./3. November 1977,” 
Kommuniqué (Bonn, November 3, 1977), 4, B 93, Bd. 860, PA AA. 
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migration across the growing European Community (see Table 5.1), the Member States, 
including both longtime host and sending countries, stressed the value of diversity through its 
action plans and directives. The most famous of those was EC Directive 486/77 on the 
“Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” from July 1977. The work of a contentious two 
years, the Directive made it a legal requirement for European Community Member States to 
enable integration through local schools, while also providing support for mother tongue and 
cultural instruction as a secondary goal. Yet, reflecting the context of its publication, this 
directive, briefly lauded as a clear demonstration of EC support for minority rights, also 
promoted return migration.46  
The European-wide changes in population movements, economic shifts, and expansions 
of the European Community, first in 1973 and then in the early 1980s, led the EC Member States 
to engage directly with the issue of education for the children of migrant workers.47 In contrast to 
their earlier conversations on integration and equal access, however, the mid-1970s debates 
expanded to explore the issue of identity and return migration in detail.48 Most European 
migration in the 1970s was still intra-European (see Table 5.1). These migrants – as Europeans – 
were supposed to become part of a diverse, multicultural European society. In contrast, the same 
politicians hoped that Third Country nations (not members of the European Community) would 
leave. As a result, the intra-European Community debates on education would revolve around 
who belonged, what their cultural identities should be, and the possibility of bicultural and 
                                                
46 Council of the European Communities, “Council Directive 77/486/EEC of 25 July 1977 on the Education of the 
Children of Migrant Workers,” Official Journal L, no. 199 (August 6, 1977): 0032–0033. Both sets of measures are 
supposed to be implemented within four years.  
47 In 1973, Denmark, Great Britain, and Ireland ascended to the European Community. Several other countries had 
applications in or would soon (re)apply. Greece, for example, would reopen its application after the end of the Junta 
regime.  
48 See the discussion of the 1612/68 Directive and the Casagrande case in Chapter 4. 
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multicultural identities.49 Claiming that their work was in the best interests of the children, 
political negotiations among the Member States resulted in the decision that host countries were 
responsible not only for welcome programs but also “in conjunction with the Member States of 
origin, [for] appropriate measures to promote the teaching of the mother tongue and of the 
culture of the country of origin.”50  
  
                                                
49 European Commission and Luce Pépin, The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe 
in the Making - an Example (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), 
63–73. 
50 Council of the European Communities, “77/486/EEC”; and John Morris, “451st Meeting of the Council - Social 
Affairs - Luxembourg, 28 June 1977,” Press Release (Luxembourg: Council of the European Communities, June 28, 
1977), BAC 14/1989 44, Commission of the European Union. Both sets of measures are supposed to be 
implemented within four years.  
  261 
Table 5.1: Foreigners Residing in Selected European Countries by Country of Citizenship, 
1960s – 1980s (in Thousands)51 
Sending Countries!
Host Countries!
Belgium! France! W. Germany! Netherlands!
Italy 
early 1960s! 200.1! 629.0! 196.7 …!
early 1970s! 249.5! 572.8! 629.6! 19.4!
1981! -! 452.0! 624.5! 21.1!
Spain 
early 1960s! 15.8! 441.7! 44.2! -!
early 1970s! 67.5! 570.6! 272.7! 30.7!
1981! -! 412.5! 177.0! 22.8!
Portugal 
early 1960s! 0.9! 50.0! 0.8! -!
early 1970s! 7.2! 812.0! 121.5! 7.6!
1981! -! 859.4! 109.4 9.3!
Turkey 
early 1960s! 10.8! -! 6.7! -!
early 1970s! 20.3! 45.4! 1,027.8! 53.7!
1981! -! 118.1! 1,546.3! 148.2!
Yugo-
slavia 
early 1960s! 4.8! -! 16.4! -!
early 1970s! 7.1! 33.0! 590.0! 32.5!
1981! 23.0! -! 637.1! 59.5!
Greece 
early 1960s! 9.8! -! 42.1! - 
early 1970s! 22.4! 10.1! 406.4! 3.9!
1981! -! -! 299.3! 4.2!
Algeria 
early 1960s! 0.2! 350.5! -! -!
early 1970s! 6.6! 845.7! 4.3! -!
1981! -! 816.9! 5.0! 0.5!
Morocco 
early 1960s! 0.5! 33.0! 1.0! -!
early 1970s! 39.3! 269.7! 24.0! 30.1!
1981! -! 444.5! 39.4! 93.2!
Tunisia 
early 1960s! 0.2! 26.6! 0.4! -!
early 1970s! 2.2! 148.8! 17.5! 1.1!
1981! -! 193.2! 24.1! 2.5!
Total 
early 1960s! 243.1! 1,531.1! 308.3! -!
early 1970s! 420.2! 2,254.4! 3,211.6! 158.4!
1981! -! 3,364.4! 3,462.3! 316.0!
 
                                                
51 Excerpted from Leslie Page Moch, Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650, 2nd ed, 
Interdisciplinary Studies in History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 181–183; and Rosemarie 
Rogers, ed., Guests Come to Stay: The Effects of European Labor Migration on Sending and Receiving Countries 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 5–9. Note that each Country of Citizenship listed had had a bilateral labor 
agreement with West Germany with the exception of Algeria. 
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Part of the shift toward support for minorities and return was a result of the changing 
international environment. The Recruitment Stops in 1973/74 across North-Western Europe did 
not stop new migration, but inadvertently encouraged family and asylum migration from Third 
Countries. Their movement permanently changed the demographic makeup of the continent.52 In 
contrast, those minority groups with European Community membership often remained stable. 
But, where labor migrants during the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s had been socially 
beneficial, new migrants in the 1970s and 1980s (particularly as asylum migration increased) 
were often viewed as drains on society, threatening a civilized European culture. These minority 
groups did not have the right to freedom of movement, and many, concerned that if they left they 
would be unable to return, chose to stay. It was these Third Country nationals that host countries 
within the European Community hoped would leave. Yet, the majority of these same politicians 
did not feel that they could deny social (and increasingly political) rights to those migrants and 
their children who did stay. After all, as Swiss author Max Frisch famously said, “We asked for 
workers and people came.”53 With the resurgence of attention to the Second World War after 
1968/69, it was contentious for a left-leaning government to suggest treating them otherwise.54  
The European Community politicians’ emphasis on acquiring cultural and lingual capital 
initially stemmed from humanitarian and economic considerations as well as concerns regarding 
                                                
52 Klaus J. Bade, Migration in European History, trans. Allison Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 
240–261; Moch, Moving Europeans, 177–185; and Raika Espahangizi, “Migration and Urban Transformations: 
Frankfurt in the 1960s and 1970s,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 183–208.  
53 Yannick Lemel and Heinz Herbert Noll, eds., Changing Structures of Inequality: A Comparative Perspective 
(Montréal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2003), 288; and Doris Meissner, “Managing Migrations,” Foreign Policy, no. 86 
(April 1, 1992): 69. 
54 Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1990: Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest 
Workers, trans. William Templer (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990). 
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minority rights.55 Not all minority or foreign children (in West Germany those groups usually 
overlapped) were migrants, but many were second- and third-generation residents. Whatever the 
color of their passport, these children had often never left their “host country” or only visited 
their “country of origin.” Hence, the focus of their education was no longer always about 
integrating them into their “host” society. They were already part of it, had in fact been born into 
it. Given this demographic change, European Education Minsters and politicians asked if 
migrants’ children needed to learn and associate with cultural backgrounds “with which [their 
parents] arrived in the country.”56 After all, promoting diversity and multiculturalism often came 
into direct conflict with integration.57  
As the prioritization of return increased, European educators explored possibilities for 
overcoming the tension between preparing for return, maintaining minority identities, and 
integrating. Among the options they emphasized were bilingual or bi-cultural education. During 
the ad hoc Meeting of the Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education in 1974, the 
Commission of the European Community argued that “bicultural education appear[ed] 
necessary, not only to enable the child to be re/integrated into the educational system and social 
                                                
55 “2215 die Verwaltungskommission für die soziale Sicherheit der Wanderarbeitnehmer,” EG-Bulletin, October 
1973. 
56 BMBW and Pressereferat, “Statement des Staatssekretärs des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 
Professor Dr. Reimut Jochimsen, bei der Pressekonferenz des Stifterverbandes am 22. Juni 1977 im 
Wissenschaftszentrum in Bonn” (Bonn, June 22, 1977), B 93, Bd. 857, PA AA. 
57 As of 1971, when the European Community institutionalized meetings of its Ministers of Education within the 
Council of the European Community, the supranational body began taking an increasingly active role in the 
instruction of the children within the Community. For early developments in education and the European 
Community, see Council 16/11/1971 on cooperation in the field of education. For the 1974 plan, see Council of the 
European Communities, “Resolution of the Ministers of Education, Meeting Within the Council, of 6 June 1974 on 
Cooperation in the Field of Education,” Official Journal of the European Communities C 98 (August 20, 1974): 2. 
For an early discussion of directions in education for the European Community, see Commission of the European 
Communities and Henri Jane, “For a Community Policy on Education,” Bulletin of the European Communities 
Supplement 10/73 (1973), http://aei.pitt.edu/5588. The European Community avoided programs directly overlapping 
with the Council of Europe’s programs (i.e. modern language instruction). For a list of programs in place as of 1974, 
see Etienne Grosjean, Forty Years of Cultural Co-Operation at the Council of Europe 1954-94 (Strasbourg: Council 
of Europe, 1997). 
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and working life of his country of origin, but, above all, to make it possible for children living in 
a different cultural environment at school and at home to develop morally and intellectually in a 
normal manner.”58  
Even while throwing its weight behind bi-cultural instruction, the Commission of the 
European Community expressed concern about associated problems.59 The Experts on the 
Education of Migrant Workers’ Children worried that bi-cultural education would only benefit 
elites. Furthermore, the school syllabi were already overloaded, too many migrant children spoke 
dialects, there would be a need for too many different languages, and it was continually difficult 
to find qualified teachers. Nonetheless, these experts felt that the potential benefits – including 
the preservation of the “educative role of the family,” the cultural enrichment of the school 
environment, and the opening of the economy of the host country to other countries – all 
outweighed any problems.60  
The support for continuation of identification as members of national minorities across 
Europe on behalf of the Commission, psychologists, and educators stemmed not only from 
pressures to leave. Experts believed it vital to develop children’s identification with their parents’ 
                                                
58 Commission of the European Communities, “Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education: Ad Hoc 
Conference on the Education of Migrants (Strasbourg, 5-8 November 1974): The Education of Children of Migrant 
Workers in the European Community,” Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, 
(November 8, 1974), 2, BAC 144/1987 53, Commission of the European Union. 
59 For more on bilingual education, see Fred Huhn, “Zur Integration der Ausländerkinder in Berlin: Bilingualismus, 
Bikulturalismus, Statusfrage,” dhs, no. 11/80 (1980): 410–19; Christina Bratt Paulston, ed., International Handbook 
of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); and Ingrid Gogolin and Manfred 
Hohmann, Vom “bikulturellen” zum “interkulturellen” Unterricht: die Limburger Modellversuche zum 
Aufnahmeunterricht von Einwandererkindern in Kindergarten und Primarschule (Münster: Waxmann, 1993). For 
comparative, retrospective analysis, see Cristina Allemann-Ghionda and Saskia Pfeiffer, eds., Bildungserfolg, 
Migration und Zweisprachigkeit: Perspektiven für Forschung und Entwicklung, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Frank & Timme 
GmbH, 2010). 
60 Commission of the European Communities and Directorate-General for Research, Science and Education, 
“Meeting of Expert on the Education of Migrant Workers’ Children, Brussels, 14 and 15 April 1975” (Brussels, 
March 17, 1975), BAC 82/1988 No 500, Commission of the European Union.  
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cultural background in order to avoid the potentially disastrous effects of displacement. Multiple 
academic studies demonstrated that instruction in languages other than their language of thought 
(Denksprache) could be detrimental if not carefully handled. According to these studies, 
educational initiatives needed to pay attention to the existing language barriers and the “not 
insignificant psychological difficulties arising from the change in milieu and leading to the desire 
for the connection to the home and a familiar human environment.” A lack of such instruction 
could also lead to familial rifts as children became distanced from their parents. For these 
reasons, Educational Administrations needed to support the possibility of reintegration in the 
“‘home’ [country of origin] school and education system.”61  
To avoid these problems, the European Community’s various bodies recommended 
several necessary steps and a series of “specific measures” for implementation in both the social 
and educational spheres between 1972 and 1975.62 Among them, the Council of the European 
Community adopted a series of Resolutions and Action Programs establishing support for 
education specifically including “the children of migrant workers,” with the goal of promoting 
employment and worker mobility.63 The Council’s 1974 Resolution allowed spending money 
from the European Social Fund (established ing May 1960) on “migrant workers and members of 
                                                
61 More benefits included the possibility of integration and contribution to the development of European free 
movement. See Kultusministerium BW, “Zusätzliche Angaben zur Kabinettsvorlage des KM vom 25. Februar 1976 
- UA II 2111/242,” 1–2. 
62 There were five basic principles that the Commission of the European Community felt needed to be met. These 
included: a) entitlement to an education in accordance with the situation; b) special educational measures must assist 
its integration into the educational and social environment of the host country; c) the native tongue and culture must 
have their place in the school syllabus; d) it must remain possible for the child to be reintegrated into the educational 
system of its country of origin; and e) there can be do discrimination between the condition governing the education 
of nationals of Member States of the Community and those of non/member countries. 
63 Came into force September 20 (Council of the European Communities, “Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 
Concerning a Social Action Programme,” Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C 13 (February 12, 
1974): 1–4).  
  266 
their families” including the “training and education of children.”64 Recommended measures 
included an increased number of “reception and adaption classes” between the ages of six and 
16, improved teaching methods and materials, and “measures to permit teaching of native 
language and culture … where possible during normal school hours.”65  
Building on these prior steps, in 1975 the Italian representative to the European 
Community, with French support, pushed the development of some form of legally binding 
measures specifically about the schooling of foreign children.66 Officially, the directive would 
“improve the conditions of freedom of movement … particularly with regard to the problem of 
the reception and education of children” and promote “the equality of treatment for Community 
and non-Community workers” and their families.67 Focusing primarily on integration classes and 
language support, the second goal emphasized instruction in the children’s mother tongue and 
geography (a third promoted teacher training in relevant subjects and incorporation into regular 
instruction).68 While the other European Community Member States agreed that the Italian 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission,” 3. On of the Pilot Programs 
that the European Community was already considering funding was a training program for bilingual instructors – 
organizers (Italian-German). See “Pilot Schemes Preparatory to European Social Fund Interventions,” V/1446/74-E 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1974), Annex 1, Commission of the European Union. The fund was to 
be used for projects particularly associated with training.  
66 “Education of Migrant Workers’ Children in the European Community,” European Studies, no. 22 (1975): 1–5. 
67 The Commission would make the formal proposal to the Council in July 1975 (Commission of the European 
Communities, “Proposal for a Council Directive on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers (submitted to 
the Council by the Commission on 28 July 1975),” Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C 213 
(September 17, 1975): 2–3). 
68 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft and Mikoleit to Parlamentarischen Staatssekretär et al., “EG-
Vorschlag einer Richtlinie des Rates über die schulische Betreuung von Auländerkinder; hier: Stand der Beratungen 
vor der Rastagung der Arbeits- und Sozialminister am 28. Juni 1977 in Luxemburg,” IV C 2 - 9702 - 3, (June 21, 
1977), B 138/20221, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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representative’s suggestion was advisable, over the following two years they would volubly 
disagree on the actual wording of the legal measure.69 
Among disputes over wording and parameters, one of the ongoing issues the members of 
the European Community debated was who the directive should include. Several participants 
wanted the directive to cover all children of migrant or minority groups.70 In fact, an early title 
for the directive was “Education for Migrant Children.”71 For these participants, the directive 
was about promoting equality of education for all children.72 Others felt that the directive should 
only pertain to European Community Member State nationals. This second group felt that the 
European Community had no jurisdiction over Third-Country nationals and, furthermore, were 
disinclined to commit to funding the necessary school initiatives. The Italian representative, a 
continued advocate for the directive generally, felt that it would never be passed with these 
                                                
69 See also Hywel C. Jones to Schuster, Note, (November 28, 1974), BAC 64/1985 890, Commission of the 
European Union. Hywel Ceri Jones (UK) joined the European Commission as Head of Department for Education 
and Youth Policies in 1973. There, he was directly involved in developing Directive 486/77 and in launching 
ERASMUS, COMETT, TEMPUS, LINGUA, PETRA, FORCE and YOUTH FOR EUROPE. 
70 Comite Economique et Social, “Summary Minutes of the First Meting of the Study Group on the Education of 
Children of Migrant Workers (section for Social Questions) Held at the Committee’s Headquarters in Brussels, on 9 
October 1975” (Brussels, October 29, 1975), 2–4, BAC 14/1989 43, Commission of the European Union; and 
Comite Economique et Social, “Proces-Verbal de la 101ème réunion de la section des affaires sociales, tenue à 
Bruxelles, au siège du Comité, le 15 janivier 1976” (Brussels: European Communities, February 11, 1976), 4, BAC 
14/1989 43, Commission of the European Union. Among those involved in the discussion in 1975 were Mr. Robert 
Aitken (Great Britain), De Heer Bertrands (Belgie), Herrn Franz Domhof (West Germany), Egr. Signore Giuseppe 
Mario Filippone (Belgique), Mr. Seamas Holland (Ireland), M. Menri Hostert (Luxembourg), Herrn Dr. Hüfner 
(Max-Plank-Institut, West Germany), De Heer Lindenboom (Netherlands), Herrn Gerhart Mahler (Bavaria, FRG), 
Egr. Signore Giacinto Margiotta (Italy), Signorina E. Morin (Switzerland), Mr. Erik Odde (Dänemark), Mr. Tim 
Ottevanger (Great Britain), Mme Parvaux (France), M. R. Picherot (France), M. L. Warzee (Belgium), Mr. I. Wight 
(Great Britain).  
71 Brunner and Patrick Hillery, “XVII. Scolarisation des Enfants Migrants,” Minutes (Commission of the European 
Communities, July 23, 1975), EC BAC 82 1988, Commission of the European Union. 
72 Linking the possible directive to the Helsinki Accords from 1975, the Economic and Social Committee applauded 
the possibility of extending the directive to both European Community and Third Country nationals both employed 
and unemployed. Comite Economique et Social, “Prelimintary Draft Opinion of the Section for Social Questions on 
the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers (Doc. COM(75) 390 
Final)” (Brussels: European Communities, October 28, 1975), 7–8, BAC 14/1989 43, Commission of the European 
Union. 
  268 
broader parameters. Britain’s representative, with Italian approved, suggested creating two 
different directives, one for each group.73 Given the European Bundestag’s concern about the 
binding nature of early drafts, Italian concerns were legitimate.74 
Another aspect of the debate on who the European Community’s Directive on the 
“Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” should cover regarded the use of “children of 
migrant workers” in the directive’s title. The Commission’s members discussed the possibility of 
using “foreign children” or “migrant children,” but ultimately decided to use the reference to 
“migrant workers,” in part because of the different Member States’ citizenship laws. The 
specification coincided with the European Community’s treaties’ focus on labor and resources, 
but it also tried to clarify who the states were responsible for supporting. With the different 
European Community’s Member States basing their citizenship laws on a broad spectrum (i.e. 
West German citizenship laws based predominately on jus sanguinis and French laws on jus 
soli), the legal categorization of “foreign children” would have encompassed different groups in 
                                                
73 General Secretariat and Henri Etienne, “814th Meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(Deputies), 19 May 1976: Proposal for a Council Directive on the Education of Children of Migrant Workers,” 
Memo for the Members of the Commission (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, May 20, 1976), 
BAC 14/1989 44, Commission of the European Union. Great Britain, newly a member of the European Community, 
and the Federal Republic were also concerned about their ability to implement the directive. For a comparison of the 
development of the concept of plurality in Britain an West Germany, see Karen Schönwälder, Einwanderung und 
ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Grossbritannien und der 
Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren (Essen: Klartext, 2001). See also Gisella Gori, Towards 
an EU Right to Education (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 44, 215.  
74 European Bundestag, “European Bundestag 1975/76 Session: Resolution Embodying the Opinion of the European 
Bundestag in the Communication from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council Concerning an 
Action Programme in Favour of Migrant Workers and Their Families,” Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 239 (October 20, 1975): 34–36. In the same session, the Bundestag discussed the extension of the 
program for European Schools, which the MPs saw as another method for instructing the children of migrant 
workers (European Bundestag, “European Bundestag 1975/76 Session: Resolution on the European Schools 
System,” Official Journal of the European Communities C 239 (October 20, 1975): 11–13; and European 
Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 23–25).  
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different countries.75 As it stood, while the implication was that these school programs should 
apply to all children, it did not encompass asylum seekers, refugees, illegal children, or 
necessarily local minority groups. Although civil and social rights were supposed to be 
universally applicable, children’s legal status and specific national or minority backgrounds 
influenced the expression of their rights.  
While internal disputes about whom to include in the directive on the education of 
foreign children continued, the European Community pushed through a new Action Program in 
1976. Building on the list of spheres of action for Community cooperation from the Council’s 
June 1974 Resolution, the new Action Program explicitly included both “the children of 
nationals of other Member States of the Communities and of non-member countries.” Without 
establishing any form of rule, regulation, or directive, the Program effectively reaffirmed the 
European Community’s educational goals. Through the Action Program the Ministers of the 
Member States first expressed their “willingness … to pursue and develop, on behalf of the 
nationals of other Member States of the Communities and of non-member countries, suitable 
measures to improve reception facilities for these children and to enable them to adapt to the host 
country’s school system and way of life.” In order to achieve this, Member States were supposed 
to develop their reception programs as well as to provide “more opportunities as appropriate for 
teaching these children their mother tongue and culture, if possible in school and in collaboration 
with the country of origin.” Later in the Program, the European Community Members 
emphasized equivalency, information exchange, and measures for “achieving equal opportunity 
                                                
75 For a multi-faceted discussion of the history and theory of citizenship and behind teaching citizenship in Europe, 
see Viola B. Georgi, ed., The Making of Citizens in Europe: New Perspectives on Citizenship Education (Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008). 
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for free access to all forms of education.”76 It was the intention of the Action Program to offer 
better facilities and materials for “education and training.”77 
Explaining the European Community’s multi-layered goals, however, was a difficult task, 
In West Germany Reimut Jochimsen (SPD), Secretary of State from the Federal Ministry of 
Education, had that task. In 1977, he tried to clarify the upcoming regulation for the West 
German press.78 While acknowledging the importance of cultural maintenance, he told them that 
“the preparation for eventual return [could] only play a limited role,” as “the primary goal [was] 
the attainment of the German language and a rapid integration into German schools.” But, he 
also emphasized that “foreign children and youths need[ed] a deeper knowledge of the language, 
history, and geography of their families’ countries of origin. It was desirable that they were 
familiar with the cultural background with which they arrived and which they must – for both 
themselves and their German peers – preserve and develop.” The end goal was, based on 
European Community recommendation and local aims, to develop a multicultural society.79  
When published, Directive 486/77 on the “Education of the Children of Migrant 
Workers” officially established the primary goals laid out in earlier resolutions and action 
programs as law. The Council of the European Community’ press release emphasized that the 
                                                
76 Not until after the February 1976 adoption of the first action programme would the Member State Ministers of 
Education be called “the council and the ministers for education meeting within the council” (European Commission 
and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 63–64).  
77 Morris, “451st Meeting of the Council - Social Affairs - Luxembourg, 28 June 1977,” 4. 
78 Reimut Jochimsen (1933-1999) was a German economist and SPD politician. From 1973 to 1978 he served as 
Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry of Education. In he began service as the Minister für Wissenschaft und 
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Staatssekretärs des Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Professor Dr. Reimut Jochimsen, bei der 
Pressekonferenz des Stifterverbandes am 22. Juni 1977 im Wissenschaftszentrum in Bonn”). 
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directive’s purpose was to offer the “children of workers who are nationals of another Member 
State” free tuition for the purposes of facilitating their initial reception (including teaching) and 
adapting courses to the specific needs of individual children. The directive also made provisions 
for training the instructors who were supposed to actually do the teaching.80 While not explicitly 
including Third-Country Nationals, the Council took “the opportunity to confirm its political 
resolve to ensure […] the Action Program for migrant workers and members of their [Third-
Country Nationals] families …”81 
Despite building on earlier work, the European Community Member States’ 
implementation of the 1976 Action Plan and subsequent directive had a rocky beginning. The 
accession of Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland to the European Community in 1973 
introduced three new Member States, which were not necessarily on board with promoting a 
European conception of education or with the European Community’s foray into cultural 
politics. Not included under the various charters and treaties, education was essentially a gray 
area of legislation. Denmark, for one, took issue with that tentative legality and prevented the 
1976 Action Plan and 1977 Directive’s full implementation while jurisdiction was being ironed 
out. Nonetheless, the Commission would set up a variety of conferences and seminars for the 
exchange of information and experiences.82 When the Commission actually began implementing 
                                                
80 On the West German side, Mr. Herbert Ehrenberg (Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs) and Reinhard 
Strehlke (State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) participated (Council of the European 
Communities and John Morris, “451st Meeting of the Council - Social Affairs - Luxembourg, 28 June 1977,” Press 
Release (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, June 28, 1977), 4, BAC 14/1989 44, 
Commission of the European Union). 
81 Ibid. 
82 Usually at the end of any funded program. For a list of seminars, see European Communities, “Report from the 
Commission to the Council on Pilot Schemes Relating to Education of Migrant Workers’ Children” (Brussels, April 
27, 1984), 40, http://aei.pitt.edu/3674/. For a discussion of the initial European Community funded programs 
associated with the 1976 Action Plan and 1977 Directive, see Euan Reid and Hans H. Reich, eds., Breaking the 
Boundaries: Migrant Workers’ Children in the EC (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1991). 
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the 1976 Action Plan in 1979, the Member States’ interpretations of the 1977 Directive diverged 
significantly as the different countries’ governments filtered the directive’s final wording 
(though not necessarily its background intentions) through their own political agendas.83 
Responses to the European Community Directive on the “Education of the Children of 
Migrant Workers” within the Federal Republic were varied. West German politicians’ and 
educators’ feelings about the development of the Directive reflected the diversity of the federate 
system. Baden-Württemberg’s CDU-FPD government detested European involvement in 
education, feeling that the European Community had no jurisdiction. For the SPD-FDP 
government in North Rhine-Westphalia, in contrast, the situation was influenced by their own 
Franz Domhof being sent as one of West Germany’s representatives to the Commission’s 
deliberations. The final Directive and resolutions would bear an unsurprising resemblance to 
North Rhine-Westphalia’s own regulations and guidelines.84 Regardless of their initial 
sentiments on the matter, once the directive passed, West Germany declared that its Länder were 
already fulfilling the stipulated requirements, although there was room for improvement.85 Given 
the directive’s similarities to the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1971 and 1976 Recommendations, 
the announcement could hardly have been a surprise.  
The West German Länder and the Italian, Greek, and occasionally Turkish governments 
would all take advantage of the 1977 Directive and associated 1976 Action Program to advocate 
for their arguments regarding the education of the “children of migrant workers.” Both the Italian 
                                                
83 European Commission and Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 23–24.  
84 Franz Domhof, “Gedanken zur Verbesserung des Unterrichts für Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 1975, BAC 144/1987 53, Commission of the European Union; and to Jacoby, 
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February 10, 1984), DE 1.  
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and Greek (after accession in 1981) governments applied for their portion of the European 
Community’s Social Fund. The two also used Directive 486/77’s wording to advocate for their 
specific aims regarding West German education policy. The Italian government, for example, 
referred to the Directive constantly from its publication through the 1980s, pointing to the 
importance of European integration and the necessity of realizing the “philosophy of 
multiculturalism” and developing inter-cultural education. With Italian citizens abroad moving 
into the third generation and remaining relatively stable, the Italian state felt that these “Italians” 
needed to be simultaneously a part of both cultures (as it had since the 1960s).86 To facilitate a 
multicultural upbringing, the Italian government then supported “Italian” children’s access to 
instruction in both German (or French) and Italian, but also supported “German” children’s 
access to instruction in Italian. Multiculturalism and a European identity was, after all, supposed 
be applicable to all Member State nationals.87  
The nine members of the European Community were hardly alone in their increased 
emphasis on minority education and return.88 The worsening economic situation at the end of the 
1970s and a political drift right saw groups like the Council of Europe continuing activities 
associated with the “Legal Status of Migrant Workers” and their education. On 24 November 
1977, after the European Community had finalized the text of Directive 486/77, the Council of 
                                                
86 It is important to remember at this point that these children, while born and raised in West Germany by people 
born and raised in the Federal Republic, had little to no recourse to West German citizenship. Because their parents 
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under international law. Further complicating matters, many groups with Italian citizenship also practiced circular 
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87 KMK, “Entwicklung von Lehr- und Lernmittel für den muttersprachlichen Unterricht mit italienischen Schülern 
in deutschsprachigen Ländern; hier: Arbeitstagung mit Vertretern der EG, des UAauslS, verschiedener italienischer 
Behörde und Mitarbeitern des Instituto della Enciclopedia Italiana am 28 und 19 10. 1985 in Rome,” Anlage (Bonn, 
February 12, 1985), B 304/7788, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
88 Since 1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Luxembourg. 
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Europe published the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers. Articles 14 
and 15 pertained to the education, schooling, training, and mother tongue instruction of migrant 
workers and their children. Article 15 read “The Contracting Parties concerned shall take actions 
by common accord to arrange, so far as practicable, for the migrant worker's children, special 
courses for the teaching of the migrant worker's mother tongue, to facilitate, inter alia, their 
return to their State of origin.”89 
While return migration was important to the European Community, multiculturalism was 
even more so. The Community was committed to diversity and equality of opportunity, which 
the Members of the Community felt could only be realized by requiring measures for integration, 
but also by providing the voluntary option for cultural maintenance. Cultural difference was 
supposed to be celebrated and encouraged in order for these children to lead fulfilling lives no 
matter where they lived. For the majority of the European Community Member States, however, 
that emphasis on cultural diversity focused specifically on other European groups. Although 
migration had already increased from North Africa (partly because of connections to 
decolonization), the representatives focused on cultural similarities within Europe. As the rate of 
migration from the former colonies and other countries increased, some European Community 
Member State governments increasingly questioned whether some migrant groups were capable 
of integration and if cultural intermingling was advisable.  
The Turkish State, National Identity, and Religious Education  
For the majority of the European Community Member States, multiculturalism was well 
and good to discuss in regards to other (and upcoming) Member State nationals. By 1977, 
                                                
89 Article 30 reflected the question of the return “home” (Council of Europe, “European Convention on the Legal 
Status of Migrant Workers,” Explanatory Report (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, November 24, 1977). 
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however, the largest minority group in West Germany was the Turkish. In consequence, where 
earlier debates on integration had emphasized a multicultural group or even just the Italians, by 
the end of the 1970s, those discussions began to focus on the Turkish minority explicitly. The 
Turkish Government’s and some parents’ reorientation of their emphasis on “Turkishness” for 
schoolchildren in West Germany lent importance to that focus. For the Turkish (and West 
German) government, the presence of more than 200,000 schoolchildren with Turkish 
citizenship in 1974 in the Federal Republic drove home the permanence of a Turkish-German 
community.90 With so many schoolchildren abroad, the Turkish State felt it important that the 
children – the majority of whom held Turkish citizenship – identify as Turkish. Already stressing 
a specifically Turkish identity in Turkey, the Turkish government decided to extend their 
emphasis on Turkishness (as opposed to Western secularism) to its citizens abroad.91  
In contrast to the relative unity of the Greek government and parents on education goals, 
the Turkish government and many parents with Turkish citizenship disagreed on what 
schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship should learn.92 With the spread of primary education 
across Turkey, the government was able to promote a clearer idea of Turkishness. Nonetheless, 
many individuals with Turkish citizenship declined to follow the prescribed state vision. Some 
minority groups prioritized specific ethnic or other national identifications, viewing their status 
as Turkish citizens as a legal category rather than ethnic description. Ethnic Kurdish families 
                                                
90 G. von Boehmer, “Dienstreise nach Istanbul und Ankara vom 13. bis 21. September 1974” (Bonn: Auswärtiges 
Amt, September 27, 1974), B 90 1168, Auswärtiges Amt. 
91 Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe: From Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2011), 18. For a discussion of changing conceptions of “Turkishness,” see Soner Cagaptay, Islam, 
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk? (Routledge, 2006). 
92 Roberto Sala discussed the Italian governments efforts in his 2011 book Roberto Sala, Fremde Worte: Medien für 
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Schöningh, 2011). 
  276 
with Turkish citizenship, for example, often preferred to emphasize their Kurdishness rather than 
identify as Turks.93 Even within the ethnic Turkish majority, however, many disagreed on what 
children should learn in state schools. Many religiously conservative families, for example, felt 
that the secular Turkish state did not offer enough religious instruction either in Turkey or 
through consular instruction in West Germany.94 
In the 1970s, the Turkish government began a series of new measures to push a 
specifically Turkish identity on its heterogeneous population. Part of their efforts included 
turning from the West, including limiting West German influence in the Turkish cultural 
sphere.95 This emphasis included limiting the autonomy of the German schools in Turkey and 
cutting back on the number of hours it was permissible to teach in German. Schooling in any 
minority language (limited foreign language instruction was acceptable) was already forbidden, 
as the government felt it might promote ethnic differences and posed a threat to a unified 
national identity. In the 1970s, among other measures, the Turkish Government shut down 
Kurdish publications, a move which eventually escalated in 1983 to a complete ban of any 
publications or broadcasts in languages other than Turkish in the country.96  
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Increasingly repressive policies against Turkey’s minority populations in Turkey 
combined with the European Recruitment Stops led to a significant change in the composition of 
the various Turkish minority groups in West Germany. In the 1960s, the Turkish labor migrants 
were among the best educated in Turkey. In the 1970s, family reunification increased the 
numbers of children and other non-workers (in part because of new difficulties in applications 
for West German work permits).97 In addition, internal conflict in Turkey (over issues ranging 
from political corruption, to school access, or conflict over ethnic identification) led to increased 
applications for asylum across Europe and particularly in West Germany, where asylum laws 
were particularly open.98  
The Turkish government’s push for “Turkishness” included among other things a shifting 
official stance on the place of religious education in the schools. Atatürk’s and subsequent 
administrations had supported a “secular Western-oriented national Turkish education system.”99 
In the 1920s, state schools offered religious instruction in primary and secondary schools, but by 
the end of the 1930s religion had been removed from the curriculum entirely.100 That absence 
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was heavily criticized during the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system (1946-1950) 
when religious education became a significant political and cultural issue. Some members of 
Bundestag argued that the state’s secular stance was leading the country’s youth toward 
degeneracy and promoting terrorist activities. To counter society’s moral collapse and the threat 
of communism, these politicians argued that compulsory religious education was necessary.101 In 
1948/9, after prolonged political and cultural debates, the Kemalist social-democratic 
government decided to again offer religious education in primary schools. The classes were 
initially voluntary and, through the 1970s, only slowly expanded to cover all grades. In 1974, 
however, the state made “morality classes” (which were not supposed to be connected to 
religious instruction) compulsory.102  
The Turkish Government’s tentative investment in religious education meant that, until 
the 1970s, the state did not push the issue in West Germany. In response, particularly after the 
surge in family reunification, many parent groups and Islamic religious organizations began to 
establish after-school and weekend “Qur’an schools,” also called Hodschas. These schools were 
predominately designed as spaces for second-generation children to learn about the Qur’an and 
religious rites and practices. While every iteration of the classes was different, they were 
generally composed of a single-sex group of pupils and taught by a Turkish-speaking Imam.103 
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The Turkish Government also had concerns about Qur’an Schools popping up around 
Turkey. Usually led by Imams without training from Turkish colleges, instructors often taught 
unapproved messages. In order to take control of Islamic instruction, and with increasingly 
conservative movements running through Turkish politics, Turkey expanded its offerings of 
religious instruction in the schools and opened more colleges for religious instructors. In the 
1970s, primary school teachers also began receiving training for teaching Islamic instruction.104 
The West German media and many politicians pushed for restrictions on these classes. 
Many of the Länder, such as North Rhine-Westphalia, found them problematic, in part because 
of reports of bullying and the use of corporal punishment.105 Yet, as “clubs” and independent 
instruction separate from the West German school system, the West German Länder 
governments had little to no control over these courses. What they could do was refuse state 
support and deny permission to open the courses in regular schools. The Länder Education 
Administrations, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, also encouraged the 
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Turkish government to include religious instruction during consular classes once the Turkish 
teachers had received training.106  
The Turkish state’s involvement in religious education made it easy for Baden-
Württemberg’s government to deny the Islamic Community in Germany’s and the Islamic Center 
in Schwetzingen’s 1977 application (the first in Baden-Württemberg of its sort) to introduce 
Islamic instruction into the regular school day. Citing the Turkish Embassy in Bonn’s and the 
Turkish Consulate in Stuttgart’s disapproval of the Islamic Community’s activities, Baden-
Württemberg’s Education Administration claimed it could not grant the request. Furthermore, 
Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education (like North Rhine-Westphalia) had “heard that the 
Hodja or Imams outside of the Turkish state’s control” employed authoritarian styles of 
instruction, including the use of corporal punishment.107  
Despite the supposedly acceptable nature of the Turkish government’s version of 
religious education, official Turkish representatives’ efforts to add to consular courses by 
arranging weekend religious classes for their citizens were often stymied. In 1977, West Berlin’s 
Senator for Cultural Affairs initially began to work with the Turkish Consulate to offer religious 
instruction. To do so, the representative from the Senator for Cultural Affairs told the Consulate 
that they should develop an umbrella organization with no political agenda to which all of the 
different religious associations could belong. If such an umbrella institution could be set up and 
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if the state of Berlin had any money (always uncertain), then West Berlin would be willing to 
cover up to seventy-five percent of the costs associated with the instruction and learning 
materials, as they did with other religious groups.108 By 1978, the Consulate had organized such 
a community (the Association of Qur’an Teachers e.V. and the Association for the Establishment 
and Maintenance of an Islamic Cemetery and Mosque Berlin) with an associated Qur’an 
school.109 However, by then West Berlin refused to provide financial support due to “substantial 
allegations” from other Länder (particularly about private Qur’an instruction in North Rhine-
Westphalia). The city’s government did not feel it could “guarantee that ‘your association taught 
religion in an open, liberal spirit’” and denied funding. Frustrated, the Turkish Consulate wrote 
that it was “difficult to respond to allegations of bullying and corporal punishment,” but 
“investigations would be made.”110  
Even without reservations regarding the possible use of corporal punishment, it was 
unlikely any of the Länder would have added Islamic religious instruction to the regular school 
day. Many West German politicians had difficulty accepting the idea of being home to a large 
non-Christian population. Baden-Württemberg’s 1953 Constitution explicitly stated that public 
schools were to take their form from the Christian Community, educating youths to live in “the 
spirit of Christian charity.”111 With documents like the Constitution backing them, many West 
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German citizens felt that a non-Christian religion was antithetical to the Federal Republic. There 
was a clear exception for the small Jewish community living in West Germany for obvious 
reasons, but Islam was not afforded the same consideration.112  
Even if Islam had been socially acceptable to the ethno-national majority, the West 
German Education Administrations found its organization problematic. Unlike Catholicism, 
German Protestantism, or Greek Orthodoxy, Islam did not have a clear head or leading body 
with which the West German school administrations could work.113 The Turkish government 
applied to function as that head, but many Länder Education Administrations were concerned 
about what Turkish leadership for Islam in West Germany would mean for those Muslim 
schoolchildren with Moroccan or Tunisian (or other) citizenship. The West German Education 
Administrations felt that it was best to confine Turkish Islamic instruction to Turkish consular 
courses.114  
As the Turkish government tried to take a more active role in the education of its citizens 
abroad, the state became vocally frustrated (as the Greek state had long been) with attempts to 
negotiate with the eleven Länder separately. In order to coordinate more effectively and to 
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increase its influence on its nationals abroad, in 1976 the Turkish government agreed to form a 
“Joint Turkish-German Expert Commission on the Instruction of Turkish Schoolchildren in the 
Federal Republic” as a sub-group of the Bilateral German-Turkish Cultural Committee.115 The 
West German government had already formed similar commissions with the Yugoslav and 
Greek governments and would also reach out to the other “traditional sending countries” (Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal). Each of these joint expert commissions was supposed to meet every two 
years to discuss goals, concerns, and appropriate solutions for a specific national group.116 The 
West German and Turkish governments’ mutual sense of the pressing importance of the issue led 
to yearly meetings for the first six years.117 
During the joint expert meetings the Turkish Delegation would claim that a speedy 
integration into the West German school system was important, but, in contrast to earlier 
meetings of the Bilateral Cultural Commission, the delegation increasingly emphasized 
“maintaining [Turkish children’s] lingual and cultural identity.”118 Referring to both the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s 8 April 1976 Recommendations and the relevant resolutions of the 
Council of Europe, they stressed the importance of identity “partially as an aspect of effective 
reintegration.” To achieve their goals, the Turkish government wanted to see “mother tongue 
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ausländischer Kinder’; hier: Wiedereinsetzung der Arbeitsgruppe,” Niederschrift (Bonn: Amtschefkonferenz des 
KMKs, October 14, 1977), B 304/7778, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
117 The Joint Turkish-German Expert Commission on the Instruction of Turkish Schoolchildren in the Federal 
Republic would meet yearly between 1977 and 1982 (six meetings) and then shift to a bi-yearly schedule.  
118 Jürgen Girgensohn to Regierungspräsidenten in Arnsberg, Detmold, Düsseldorf, Köln und Münster and 
Schulkollegium beim Regierungspräsidenten in Düsseldorf und Münster, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer 
Arbeitnehmer: Übergang aus der Klasse 4 der Grundschule zu Realschulen und Gymnasien,” January 26, 1979, NW 
388-44, Landesarchiv NRW. 
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instruction turned into a required subject for all Turkish children” during regular instruction.119 If 
this was not possible, the Turkish delegation asked the West German Ministries of Education “to 
take every effort to include as many Turkish children as possible in this instruction.”120 A year 
later, in 1978, the Turkish government revised their request, asking that, at the least, “Turkish” as 
a subject be allowed instead of “Turkish as a First Foreign Language” in lower secondary 
schools.121 
In response to the early requests regarding compulsory consular instruction, the West 
German side explained its limitations. Legally, the Länder could not require Turkish instruction 
for any schoolchild in West Germany. Children with Turkish citizenship had the same rights as 
children with West German citizenship and as such could not be subjected to additional 
requirements, either in the form of after-school instruction or additional work during regular 
school hours. The West German Ministries of Education were willing to try for solutions to offer 
Turkish for children with Turkish citizenship instead of a first foreign language and to encourage 
consular instruction.122 But the West German educational administrations could not force 
children to develop or maintain Turkish identities. Legally, the choice to culturally identify as 
Turkish belonged to the children. 
                                                
119 See Hermann, “Besuch des türkischen Erziehungsministers Necdet Uğur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 
hier: Gespräch des Präsidenten der KMK mit dem türkischen Erziehungsminister am 14. Mai 1979,” 
Sachstandsbericht (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, May 8, 1979), B 93, Bd. 861, PA AA. 
120 “1. deutsch-türkische Expertengespräch (1977),” 3, 6.  
121 See Ibid., 3; “2. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer 
Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 11. - 13. 4. 1978 in Istanbul,” Kommuniqué (Istanbul, April 13, 
1978), B 93, Bd. 860, PA AA; and Hermann, “4. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission 
für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 24. - 26. Juni 1980 in Izmir,” 
Einführende Vorbemerkungen (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, June 16, 1980), B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA.  
122 “2. Tagung der deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission (1978).”  
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Despite the Turkish Government’s efforts, not all of its citizens attended consular 
instruction or enrolled in native language classes. Particularly religious parents did not view the 
Islamic instruction offered by the Turkish government or the Länder as sufficient. Several groups 
either outright disagreed with the Turkish government’s teachings or felt they were unnecessary. 
As a result, even though consular classes now (usually) included Islamic instruction, many 
families continued to send their children to Qur’an Schools or simply did not have their children 
attend Islamic or Turkish instruction at all.123  
The intensification of the Turkish government’s interest in consular instruction and 
contention over Qu’ran schools demonstrates two points: First, this development shows how 
foreign internal affairs often had a direct impact not only on German perceptions of whether 
schoolchildren should have consular teachers, but on the actual content of their consular 
instruction. Turkey’s internal politics, from educational development to policies on nationalism, 
affected the schoolchildren living abroad and who migrated during the 1970s. Their teacher 
education programs influenced the Länder’s willingness to work with Islamic instruction, even if 
only in consular courses.  
Second, it is clear that despite emphasis on cultural diversity, there were some aspects of 
minority status that the West German governments and society were unwilling to embrace. 
While hesitant to outright deny access to instruction in any religion, local school administrations 
often viewed non-Christian religious instruction as antithetical to West German society and 
certainly a problem when considering a child’s “Germanness.” West German politicians would 
                                                
123 Thomsen Vierra, “At Home in Almanya”; and Kultusministerium BW, “Religionsunterricht für türkische Kinder 
durch die Islamische Gemeinde Deutschland (Islamisches Zentrum Schwetzingen).” See also the North Rhine-
Westphalian Ministry of Education response to the issue in its answer to the NRW Bundestag Landtag NRW, 
“Drucksache 8/2235: Antwort des Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage des Abg. Edelbrock (SPD) betr. 
Koranschulen für türkische Kinder islamischen Glaubens.” 
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use religious or other aspects of ethno-national identity to argue against naturalization and to 
emphasize the extreme foreignness of some individuals. These men and women would claim that 
Islamic education was indicative of cultural distance. There was a limit to cultural acceptance, 
even to promote return. 
Considering Citizenship and Schooling for National Minorities in West Germany 
For minority groups in West Germany, access to schools and identity politics depended 
not only on what the relevant foreign state’s government or parents wanted, but also on the 
acceptance of West German government and society. As more “foreign” children were born in 
West Germany (see Table 5.2), politicians and educators began discussing children with foreign 
citizenship’s probable “Germanness,” even as the West German media deplored the country’s 
future of overrun by foreigners.124 As the fear of these foreign specters grew, Baden-
Württemberg’s Christian Democratic Minister of Education Roman Herzog (1978-1980, later 
President of Germany)125 pointed out that easing naturalization for second- and third-generation 
migrants would be the fastest way of reducing the numbers of non-citizens in the Federal 
Republic.126 Yet, many politicians, particularly members of the CDU and CSU, asked whether 
                                                
124 “Die Türken Kommen: Rette Sich Wer Kann,” Der Spiegel, July 30, 1973; “Aus dem Wörterbuch des 
Unmenschen und Bürokratenjargon: Die zwei Fassungen des ‘Heidelberger Manifests’: Was man unter sich 
‘Unterwanderung’ nennt, soll der Öffentlichkeit als ‘Schicksalsfrage’ verkauft werden,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 
March 4, 1982; and Dirk Cornelsen, “SPD warnt vor einem Schüren der Ausländerfeindlichkeit: Für 
Zuzugsbeschränkungen, um Integration der bereits hier Lebenden fördern zu können / Absage an ‘Heidelberger 
Manifest,’” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 17, 1982. See also Triadafilopoulos, Becoming Multicultural 
Immigration and the Politics of Membership in Canada and Germany, 79–81.  
125 Roman Herzog (born 1934) was a German lawyer and CDU politician who served as President of Germany 
between 1994-1999. He began his political career in Rheinland-Pfalz under Helmut Kohl. He then served in the 
Government in Baden-Württemberg in the Ministry of Education under Lothar Späth (1978-1980) before becoming 
a Member of Bundestag and serving in the Office of the Ministry of the Interior (1980-1983). Ernst Benda then 
named him Vice-president and Chair of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, where he 
became President upon Benda’s retirement in 1987 (until 1994).  
126 Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 4. Februar 1982 (Bonn, 1982), 4945. Dr. Herzog 
(Baden-Württemberg) points out that one could reduce the numbers of foreigners by naturalizing those second and 
third generation foreigners born – or at least migrated while young. 
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these German-born foreigners were in fact culturally German enough to be permitted to become 
German citizens.127  
The debate over the “Germanness” of “foreigners” and considerations about changing 
naturalization laws fed into disagreements over how much normal public school versus consular 
instruction children with foreign citizenship should receive. Many politicians and educators alike 
viewed the Kultusministerkonferenz’s “double goal” as not only impractical, but actually 
disadvantageous to these children instead of helpful. North Rhine-Westphalia’s Educational 
Administration had expressed reservations in 1971 and, by the end of the decade, they – and 
others – felt sure.128 As Herzog explained in the Federal Bundestag in 1982, “We are deluded if 
we imagine that it is possible to teach tender six-year old children to simultaneously be German 
and remain Turkish. If you take this idea seriously, it would entail teaching an extra ten hours in 
the schools because they are Turkish and must learn German. They also needed separate Qur’an 
instruction,” which added to their burden.129  
Part of the problem with addressing the identity and hence the education of these 
schoolchildren with foreign citizenship was precisely their citizenship status. Through the 1970s, 
West Germany was committed – along with most of the Council of Europe’s Member States – to 
                                                
127 For a discussion of changing citizenship laws and naturalization processes in (West) Germany with an emphasis 
on migrant workers, see Douglas B. Klusmeyer and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal 
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128 Kultusministerium NRW, Referat III A 5, “Problemkatalog im Zusammenhang in ausländischen Arbeitnehmern 
(AAN),” July 14, 1971, NW 353-123, Landesarchiv NRW. 
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maintanance when they first enrolled their child in school. Herzog also asked, “what about those who declined West 
German citizenship. Should they still be allowed in or to stay in the country?” Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung, 
4945. 
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limiting cases of dual citizenship.130 As such, foreigners who were not German needed to 
maintain their connection to their country of citizenship, which in turn meant they needed 
cultural instruction. Yet, many of these children, growing up in West Germany, spoke German as 
their mother tongue. In addition, going through the West German school system, they acquired a 
decidedly “German” kind of cultural and social capital.  
While hardly overt within debates about foreign citizens, the issue was different for 
European Community Member State and Third-Country nationals. By the end of the 1970s, the 
children of European Community Member State nationals, while unable to vote in federal 
elections, were supposed to otherwise possess rights almost on par with host country nationals. 
Their membership in the European Community was a sort of European citizenship, which West 
German politicians viewed as a complementary rather than conflicting identity. To be German 
was also to be European, which implied that other Europeans must have similarities to 
Germans.131 As the European Community expanded, welcoming Greece (1981) as well as 
Portugal and Spain (1986), the perception of who was European became tied to membership in 
the European Community (with clear exceptions, such as Switzerland). Many West German 
politicians and educators began feeling that children with citizenship from countries outside of 
the European Community had a greater cultural difference. 
For children of parents with Third-Country citizenship, the issue was more complicated. 
By the end of the 1970s, just over 30 percent of the foreigners in West Germany had Turkish 
                                                
130 Thomas Faist, “How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 
1978–1992,” West European Politics 17, no. 2 (April 1, 1994): 50–71; and Ralf Füchs, “Reform of the Citizenship 
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citizenship, most of whom were Muslim.132 For many West German politicians, not only was 
“Germanness” tied to a Christian identity, but, as the liberal Federal Minister of the Interior 
Gerhart Baum133 said in 1982, they had difficulties conceiving how “an individual who attended 
Qur’an School could possibly understand Germanness.”134 Politicians like Baum felt that a dual-
identity was not possible. “I have wondered” he told the West German Bundestag, “if it is 
possible for people to simultaneously straddle two cultures for a long time, to live and be raised 
in two societies. It might be acceptable for the first generation. But for the second and following 
generations who are and raised here, I see enormous difficulties.”135 Yet, for men and woman 
like Baum, Islam did not fit into their conception of “Germanness,” leading to hesitation 
regarding the idea of permitting “foreigners” to legally become German.  
According to many conservative politicians, the possibility of divided loyalties and 
identities meant that cases of dual-citizenship needed to be kept to a minimum.136 Among the 
Federal Government’s Foreign Office and Ministry of the Interior’s stated reasons for refusing to 
alter the West German citizenship law in 1978 was the perceived necessity of avoiding such 
                                                
132 Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch Für Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: 
W. Kohlhammer, 1982), 66. For more on cultural difference, see Leonie Herwartz-Emden, Aufwachsen in 
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foreigners, which was to be discussed in the Bundesrat on 12 February. 
136 Beauftragter für die Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, Bericht zur 
Ausländerpolitik, 66. 
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situations in accordance with the Council of Europe’s 1963 “Convention on the Reduction of 
Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality.”137 
In signing the 1963 Convention, the multiple members of the Council of Europe argued that 
“multiple nationalities [were] liable to cause difficulties” and in the interest of “greater unity 
between its members” sought to limit such instances, particularly with an eye toward military 
service.  
Following that reasoning, in West Germany, while the children of parents who were 
refugees or stateless could choose to become citizens, second- and third-generation children of 
foreign workers had limited options (mainly marriage). They were, after all, already 
automatically entitled to their parents’ citizenship and supposedly did not need German 
citizenship. In addition, through the 1970s, the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of 
Education continued to claim that the children’s residence was only temporarily, necessitating 
maintenance of their status as foreign citizens. In order to prepare for return and to not divide 
their identities, most of the Federal Ministries and Offices claimed it preferable for the children 
to avoid taking on a German identity regardless of the length of their residence in West 
Germany.138 The Federal Government argued that while local schools needed to encourage 
integration, initiatives supporting return were “just as important.”139 As the North Rhine-
Westphalian Ministry of Education reported in 1977, referring to West German and European 
                                                
137 Council of Europe, “Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations 
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Community policy, “voluntary mother tongue instruction is vital in the interest of enabling 
children to return to their homes and maintain their lingual and cultural identities as ethnic 
groups instead of forcing a conceivably ‘defective integration.’”140 But – in promoting return and 
the maintenance of a non-German identity – the Federal and Länder Governments effectively 
promoted the growth of minority communities. These foreigners needed to integrate, but not too 
much. At heart, at least, they needed to stay foreign.141  
The Federal Republic did make it easier for a select set of foreigners to naturalize in 
1974. Specifically, the government determined that the foreign children of women with West 
German citizenship should be entitled to legal recognition as Germans. Where previously 
citizenship passed exclusively through the father, the 1974 changes permitted West German 
citizenship to pass through the mother as well. The contemporary push for gender equality 
clearly influenced the decision, but at the time the stated reason behind the alteration was the 
number of ethnic German mothers having children with fathers possessing foreign citizenship. 
While unmarried ethnic German women’s children could inherit their citizenship, the children of 
women married to foreign men could not (in 1971, 20 percent of Italian and seven percent of 
Turkish men in the country were married to German women).142 Hence, while born and raised in 
                                                
140 Kultusministerium NRW, “Situation und Entwicklung der schulischen Betreuung von Kinder ausländischer 
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the Federal Republic, these women’s approximately 200,000 children were legally foreigners. As 
the number of these mixed marriages increased (an estimated 17-18,000 annually) and the public 
advocated greater gender equality, the West German government agreed to alter its laws to 
permit this group automatic West German citizenship, despite the prospect of dual citizenship.143  
By 1975/76, it was clear that it was not only the children of ethnic German women that 
were being raised in West Germany. By the late 1970s, a substantial contribution to the increase 
in so-called foreigners came from live births in the country. According to the Social Democratic 
Party’s official stance, those live births made integration vital, as it indicated that in the coming 
years the percentage of legally foreign children in German schools would be growing. That was 
particularly important as the birth rate among West German citizens was sinking (between the 
mid-1960s and mid-1970s, it fell from 2.5 percent to 1.5 percent).144 In comparison, government 
statistics showed comparatively high birthrates among West Germany’s foreign minority groups 
(see Table 5.2) – particularly those of Turkish origin.145 With every passing year, there would be 
proportionally more foreigners in West German schoolrooms, unless they could naturalize. As 
the situation stood, the Federal Ministry of the Interior predicted in the 1970s that, by 2030, West 
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Germany would be home to over twelve million foreign citizens, most born in the country. The 
“foreigner problem,” the Ministry of the Interior announced, was not going to “melt away.”146 
Instead, as several newspapers informed the West German public, ethnic “German children 
would soon be minorities.”147 
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Germany,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 93.  
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Table 5.2: Births (Total, West German and 
“Non-German”) in the FRG in 
Thousands, 1965-1990148 
Table 5.3: Children in FRG’s Regular and 
Vocational Schools in Thousands, 1965-
1990149 
 Total W. Ger.!
Non- 
Ger.! %!
1965! 1,044.3! 1,006.4! 37.8! 3.6!
1970! 810.8 747.8! 63.0! 7.8!
1975! 600.5 504.6! 95.8! 16.0!
1980! 620.6! 539.9! 80.6! 13.0!
1985! 586.1! 532.4! 53.7! 9.2!
1990! 727.1! 640.8! 86.3! 11.9!
 
 Total! W. Ger.!
Non- 
Ger.! %!
1965! 7,286.8! 7,251.7! 35.1! 0.5!
1970! 11,147.8! 10.959.9! 187.8! 1.7!
1975! 12,410.3! 11,954.3! 455.9! 3.7!
1980! 9,089.0! 8,455.2! 633.8! 7.0!
1985! 7,116.1! 6,460.9! 655.1! 9.2!
1990! 6,881.5! 6.121.3! 760.2! 11.0!
 
 
 
Responding to these claims in the media in the mid-1970s as well as to the visible 
increase of supposed foreigners in the schools, many ethnic German families bought into an ugly 
brand of xenophobic hysteria or, more commonly, participated in widespread acts of passive 
racism.150 Some groups with West German citizenship felt that children with foreign citizenship 
attending local schools were not and could never be German. Several West German politicians 
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and West German parent groups stressed the point, arguing that these “foreigners” and “children 
of migrant workers” needed to be in their own classes in order to prevent any disadvantage from 
attaching to the children with West German citizenship (i.e. in Berlin). A few ethnic German 
parent groups, such as those in Lübeck in 1976, went so far as to strike in protest of the high 
percentages of “foreigners” in “their schools.”151 
To address the issue and to calm social unrest, the Federal Government tasked the 
Federal-Länder Commission (Bund-Länder-Kommission, BLK) with coordinating Federal and 
Länder efforts on foreign employment.152 The BLK focused on “family reunification, right to 
residency, future employment policies, and social integration as well as development of return 
migration.” While members from the Federal and Länder Ministries of Education did participate, 
headed by the Federal Ministry of Labor, the commission was more concerned with work and 
residency permits and naturalization than education. When they did mention schooling, the 
BLK’s reports ended up supporting the double goal. The authors stressed the importance of 
preschool, language training, and the completion of compulsory schooling (including vocational 
schooling) as aspects of successful integration.153 But they also assumed that native language 
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Entwicklung der Hauptschule in BW,” Bericht (Stuttgart: Landtag von BW, March 14, 1979); Abgeordnetenhaus 
von Berlin, “Drucksache 6/125: Antwort auf Situation an den Grundschulen mit Ausländischen Kindern” (Berlin, 
June 29, 1971); Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Drucksache 7/1612: Antwort zu Kleine Anfrage betr. Entwicklung 
der Abschlüsse von Hauptschulabgängern (1975-1978; and Anteil der deutschen und ausländischen Schüler)” 
(Berlin, 1977). 
152 Since 1969, federal authorities have had the right to a say in education planning as laid down in Article 91b of the 
Basic Law. The Bund-Länder-Kommission was established in 1970, but it was only in 1975 that “promotion of 
research was added to the Commission’s sphere of work.” See Christoph Führ, The German Education System since 
1945: Outlines and Problems, trans. Iván Tapia (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997), 41–45, http://www.eric.ed.gov. 
153 Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, “Bericht über die Beratungen der Bund-Länder-Arbeitsgruppe zur 
Fortentwicklung einer umfassenden Konzeption der Ausländerbeschäftigungspolitik,” IIc 1 - 24 200/22 (Bonn, 
December 17, 1976), NW 670-63, Landesarchiv NRW; and Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 
“Vorschläge der Bund-Länder-Kommission zur Fortentwicklung einer umfassenden Konzeption der 
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instruction was absolutely necessary. Combining claims of the rights of the children to maintain 
their cultural connection with encouragement to return, the reports encouraged consular 
instruction.  
While the 1976 Recommendations elevated the position of the children’s mother tongues 
and attempted to ease access to regular instruction, the language and cultural classes were still 
solely for foreign schoolchildren. The Recommendations effectively underlined the difference 
between children with West German and those with foreign citizenship, implying that while 
children should integrate, they were to maintain their own national identities. In the name of full 
integration and equal standing with schoolchildren with West German citizenship, the Italian 
government continued to push for changes to West German curricula to permit Italian in place of 
a foreign language, not only for Italians but also for Germans. In October 1979, the 
Kultusministerkonferenz acceded to their demands and added an addendum to the 1976 “Revised 
Agreement” to permit Italian instead of a required foreign language.154 Interestingly, they also 
specified that the language the “children of foreign workers” were entitled to in the schools was 
the relevant country of origin’s official language.155 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ausländerbeschäftigungspolitik,” Vorschläge (Bonn, February 28, 1977), B 93, Bd. 857, PA AA. See also Christoph 
Führ, “Zur Koordination der Bildungspolitik durch Bund und Länder,” in Handbuch der deutschen 
Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 6 
(Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 75–77. 
154 From the AK meeting in Bonn (Sekretariat der KMK, “Neufassung der Vereinbarung ‘Unterricht für Kinder 
ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,’” Beschluß der KMK, (October 26, 1979), B 93, Bd. 1154, PA AA). 
155 In 1977, in response to both the BLK Recommendations as well as the EEC’s Directive, Berlin’s KMK 
representative suggested putting the KMK’s Working Group that developed the 1976 Recommendations back 
together. The other Länder officially agreed with the idea on 14 October 1977. The working group’s mandate 
included “in addition to the coordination of relevant discussions in the context of the European Community and 
Federal Government,” preparation discussions in “bilateral commissions with the sending countries” (i.e. Greece, 
Italy, Yugoslavia, Turkey). The group would meet under its new mandate for the first time in 1978 under the 
leadership of Ministerialrat Gerhart Mahler from Bavaria, as Franz Domhof (North Rhine-Westphalia) was retiring. 
(Senator für Schulwesen Berlin and Schacht to Vorsitzende der Antschefskonferenz der KMK and Rüdiger, 
“Tagesordnung der nächsten Amtsschefskonferenz,” July 28, 1977, B 304/3734, Bundesarchiv Koblenz).  
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As of the end of 1978, the socially liberal “Federal Government was not considering 
changing its citizenship laws” to enable the children of migrant workers to obtain citizenship. 
Instead, citing a need to prevent instances of dual citizenship, the Federal Government actively 
maintained its laws preventing second- and third-generation children with foreign citizenship 
from becoming nationals.156 The state thereby effectively maintained groups of people who were 
legally foreigners, despite going through the local education system from the first grade onwards 
and speaking German as their native language. According to the Federal-Länder Commission the 
continued limitations on naturalization were reasonable, as the Federal Republic was officially 
“not a country of immigration.”157 
                                                
156 See Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992). There are many scholars who have pointed out the problematic simplicity of Brubaker’s argument, 
including Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom 
Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001); and Annemarie 
Sammartino, “After Brubaker: Citizenship in Modern Germany, 1848 to Today,” German History 27, no. 4 (October 
1, 2009): 583–99. 
157 That difference in rights as well as social perceptions of difference led several West German politicians and 
interest groups to discuss the question of West German citizenship for children with non-German citizenship in the 
late 1970s and increasingly through the 1980s. On 3 November 1978, Federal MP Paul Laufs (CDU) from Baden-
Württemberg submitted a question in Bundestag, asking if “the Federal Government was considering changing the 
Nationality Law of the German Empire and States (Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetzes), which tied German 
citizenship to the principal jus soli, so that children of foreign workers born in the Federal Republic of Germany 
could apply when one of parents held the Right to Unlimited Residence (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) as outlined in § 8 
Aliens Act (AuslG).” Reflecting the many interest groups’ claims that second- and third generation with non-
German citizenship should be entitled to citizenship, Laufs asked “If yes, does the Federal Government also plan to 
ease naturalization for this group of people?” A week later, Bundestagary Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry 
of the Interior Andreas von Schoeler’s answered to the negative (Bundestag, “115. Sitzung, Bonn, Freitag, Den 10. 
November 1978,” Plenarprotokoll 8 (November 10, 1978): 9022A – 9022C).  
Dr. Paul Laufs (born 22 June 1938) was a (West) German Engineer and CDU politician. From 1991-1993, he served 
as Bundestagary Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry for Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety and then from 1993-1997 the Federal Ministry for Post and 
Telecommunication. He joined the CDU in 1963 and served as Member of the Bundestag from 1976 to 2002. 
Andreas von Schoeler (born 4 July 1948) served as Bundestagary Secretary of State for the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior from 1976-1982. From 1991-1995, he served as Lord Mayor of Frankfurt am Main. Trained as a lawyer, he 
joined the FDP at 18 but joined the SPD in 1982, after the dissolution of the socio-liberal government. 
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For Europe, the hyphenated identity had not yet become normalized.158 Children were 
supposed to adhere to their parent’s ethno-national identities even as they learned to operate in 
West German society. Permitting naturalization would have acknowledged the blurring of the 
connection between ethnicity and citizenship, which the West German Federal Government was 
not prepared to do for numerous political reasons. Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, 
ethnicity was a contested issue. In 1979, Christian Democrat Lothar Späth, now Baden-
Württemberg’s Minister President, declared “we are a country of immigration.”159 Some 
migrants and politicians argued that many foreign citizens’ tenure in the country meant that they 
were, at least, entitled to German citizenship if not to being ethnically German.160 
Ethno-national identification became a contested issue, with some migrants and 
politicians arguing that many foreign citizens’ tenure in the country meant that they were now 
German. As it became increasingly obvious that the majority of foreigners were in fact 
permanent residents, many politicians vocally advocated for changing citizenship laws. In 1982, 
a coalition of SPD and FDP politicians introduced a new bill in the West German Bundestag for 
revising West German citizenship laws specifically with the intention of easing the citizenship 
process for second- or third-generation foreigners who were either born in or raised from a 
young age in the Federal Republic. As Hans-Eberhard Urbaniak (member of Bundestag between 
                                                
158 By hyphenated identity, I mean the combination of different identity labels, such as “Afro-Germans,” “German-
Turks,” or “Turkish-Germans.” The hyphenated identity has itself become a contested issue as many feel that the 
word order priorities a single aspect of a rich identity 
159 Karl-Heinz Meier-Braun, Deutschland, Einwanderungsland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 46. 
160 Frank-Olaf Radtke, “The Formation of Ethnic Minorities and the Transformation of Social into Ethnic Conflicts 
in a so-Called Multi-Cultural Society: The Case of Germany,” in Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-Cultural Europe, 
ed. Beatrice Drury and John Rex (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), 30–38. 
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1970 and 2002)161 explained in 1982 on behalf of the Social Democratic Party, “we hold it to be 
extraordinarily important that a special offer of naturalization be extended to the entire young 
generation.” He claimed the Federal Government needed to “offer the voluntary step” and allow 
the youth to “make their own decision.”162 
Other, particularly conservative politicians part of the CDU or CSU, emphasized the right 
to remain foreign as an argument against easing naturalization barriers. For many Christian 
conservative politicians and not a few members of the Social Democrats, part of the difficulty 
was the idea of allowing individuals who had not wholeheartedly embraced Germanness to 
become citizens. It was not the government’s business, after all, Christian Democratic Member 
of Bundestag Alfred Dregger eloquently claimed, to Germanize migrants.163 Instead, according 
to Dregger, the West German government needed to continue “recognizing the efforts of 
foreigners to maintain their national identities.”164  
The Federal Government did ease naturalization laws in the 1980s, but did not extend 
birthright and continued to prohibit dual citizenship. Despite the changes, few foreigners would 
choose to follow the new paths to naturalization. The decision against naturalization was due to 
several factors. Many felt that the benefits of West German citizenship were not worth the cost 
                                                
161 Hans-Eberhard Urbaniak (born 1929) was a member of the SPD who served in the Federal Landestag from 1970 
to 2002. 
162 Deutscher Bundestag, 83. Sitzung, 4889. 
163 Dr. Alfred Degger (1920-2002) was a Christian Democratic politician. After serving in the Wehrmacht, he 
studied law, earning his doctorate in 1950. After a political career in Hesse, he served 1972 to 1998 in the 
Bundestag, during which he was Chairman of the CDU/CSU from 1982 to 1991. Degger was known as an avid 
opponent of communism and was a member of the National-Conservative wing of the CDU, the Stahlhelm-Fraktion. 
164 In contrast, the CDU’s Dr. Dregger argued that the young generation’s identity was too important. “As 
maintained in our constitution, we recognize the efforts of foreigners to maintain their national identities…We do 
not want to Germanize anyone. Who wants to become German can und should have the opportunity to do so. But,” 
he added, effectively separating “Germanness” from citizenship, “the CDU … rejected the claim to naturalization” 
(Deutscher Bundestag, \i83. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 4. Februar 1982 (Bonn, 1982), 4895). 
  300 
of giving up their original citizenship. For many European Community Member State nationals, 
they felt that the change did not make enough of a difference to make the paperwork worth it. 
For others, their countries of origin, like Turkey, had laws that prohibited non-citizens from 
inheriting or being buried in Turkey.165  
In consequence, and due to continued new migration, the rate of foreigners in West 
German increased, necessitating continued debates over the place of culture and language in the 
West German school system, particularly for second- and third-generation foreigners and 
children with migrant backgrounds. Essentially legislating the continued categorization of these 
children as foreign, the government felt honor bound – and legally bound under European 
Economic Community Directive 486/77 on the schooling of migrant workers’ children – to 
accommodate that status. While the socio-liberal government sought to improve the situation of 
its migrant population even as it denied the possibility of citizenship, it tried to satisfy the 
sentiment that all individuals were entitled to equality of opportunity and the right to an 
education. Hence, even as the children were supposed to integrate, their status as national 
minorities was legally and socially reinforced, meaning that they were theoretically supposed to 
learn to be different for their own mental health even as they were supposed to learn to be 
German.  
Conclusion  
The 1973 Oil Crisis and subsequent Recruitment Stops encouraged the West German and 
other European Community Member State governments to push native language and cultural 
instruction. For some politicians, parent groups, and other interested parties, that push was about 
                                                
165 See Klusmeyer, “Aliens, Immigrants, and Citizens,” 99–101; and Wendy Pojmann, “The Political Participation 
of Berlin’s Turkish Migrants in the Dual Citizenship and Headscarf Debates: A Multilevel Comparison,” in 
Migration and Activism in Europe Since 1945, ed. Wendy Pojmann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 209–
32.  
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encouraging foreign ethno-national identification in order to encourage emigration to the country 
of citizenship. For other groups, their demands stemmed from a belief in the importance of 
multiculturalism and a celebration of diversity. That confluence of interest meant that, by the 
mid-1970s, there was widespread support for language and cultural classes.  
Despite a rhetoric of inclusion, the different Education Administrations and state 
governments, including the West German, found that there were limits to what kind of diversity 
they were willing to support. Where some states, like the French, technically permitted different 
groups to become citizens after an elongated stay in the country, many West German politicians, 
frequently conservative, refused to consider groups like those with Turkish citizenship as 
potential Germans, in part because of their religious observations. With a largely all or nothing 
mentality regarding identity, if these groups could not be entirely German, they could not be 
legally German at all. In consequence, although there was significant support for alterations to 
West German citizenship laws from the Social Democratic and liberal parties, the proposed 
alterations that did go through were limited and largely unappealing.  
As a result, state governments like the West German inadvertently supported the 
development of diasporas and minority groups within their borders. Officially encouraging 
schoolchildren with non-German citizenship to identify with their country of citizenship, the 
West German government pushed that foreign identity, often to the point of claiming that the 
children could never be local. In consequence, many groups took that message to heart, 
participating in consular instruction and stressing their foreign identities. Others, however, 
ignored official rhetoric and viewed themselves as German, or began to stress a hyphenated 
identity.  
 
CHAPTER 6: EQUALITY IN EDUCATION AND CONTINUING DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST MINORITY CHILDREN IN THE SCHOOL (1976-1984) 
Towards the end of the 1970s, educational experts shocked the West German public with 
several reports about a supposed “lost generation” of “guest worker children” who had fallen 
through the cracks in the school system.1 The media picked up the subject, bemoaning the fact 
that 30-60 percent of children (or more) with foreign citizenship were leaving school without 
their certificates. Commentators expressed concern that many of these children were often 
“illiterate in two languages.”2 Dismay at low levels of school completion and rising 
unemployment turned heads, particularly as the number of “lost youths” rose dramatically in the 
mid and late 1970s.3 With the majority of children with foreign citizenship now born on West 
German soil, educators and politicians compared these schoolchildren to their West German 
counterparts and were dismayed at the results. Journalists reports of mass illiteracy in two 
                                                
1 “Die verlorene Generation? Ausländische Jugendliche in der Bundesrepublik,” Informationen des Deutschen 
Caritasverbandes (Freiburg, September 1975), EA 3/609 Bü 74, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
2 “‘Gemeine Lumpen, Sauigels - Rauswerfen’: Spiegel-Report Gastarbeiter-Kinder in Der Bundesrepublik,” Der 
Spiegel, December 26, 1977. 
3 Among the reports and articles published, see Hartmut Geyer, “Bund und Länder überprüfen Gastarbeiter-Politik: 
Ausländerkinder Meist ohne Schul-Abschluß,” Westdeutsche Allgemeine, January 3, 1977; Wilhelm Griesinger, “60 
Prozent der Ausländerkinder ohne Schulabschluß: Landtag soll sich mit Situation der Gastarbeiterkinder im 
Bildungsbereich befassen,” Badische Neueste Nachrichten, April 1, 1977; Martina Kemff, “Die meisten 
Ausländerkinder verlassen die Schule ohne Abschulß: Die Werden zu Analphabeten in zwei Sprachen,” Die Welt, 
March 28, 1979; and Hermann, Unterricht für türkische Schüler, Vermerk (Bonn: Sekretariat der Ständigen 
Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepulik Deutschland, June 25, 1981), B 304/6178, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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languages fed into contemporary European-wide frustrations that their traditional school systems 
were simply not working.4 
Appalled by these reports and responding to voters’ concerns, politicians across the 
Länder and in the migrant and minority groups’ countries of citizenship, local and international 
media, and parents all sought to uncover the causes of this “catastrophe.”5 The West German 
system was clearly failing these children, but what was the cause? These different actors placed 
the blame on different causes, with left leaning politicians, educators, and journalists assigning 
responsibility to citizenship laws (which usually limited naturalization to those with German 
paternity), intercultural miscommunication, and xenophobia. Right-wing politicians, in contrast, 
attributed these shortcomings to the influx of too many foreigners and the children’s cultural 
background. These groups argued that many children with non-German citizenship were simply 
too culturally different to succeed in the West German system. West German and European 
feminists, after two decades of struggle for gender equality, blamed continued gender 
discrimination and patriarchal familial structures in Catholic Italian, Spanish, and especially 
Islamic Turkish families.6  
                                                
4 Commission of the European Communities, “Report from the Commission to the Council on the Implementation 
of Directive 77/486/EEC on the Education of the Children on Migrant Workers” (Brussels: European Community, 
February 10, 1984). 
5 Education and Culture in West Germany falls under Länder (the West German states) jurisdiction. While they 
coordinate their policies and maintain equivalency through the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education 
and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany (Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der 
Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, hereafter KMK or KMK), which was a voluntary body of the eleven 
West German Länder’s Ministries and Senators of Education. 
6 Ursula Boos-Nünning et al., Aufnahmeunterricht, muttersprachlicher Unterricht, interkultureller Unterricht: 
Ergebnisse einer Vergleichenden Untersuchung zum Unterricht für Ausländische Kinder in Belgien, England, 
Frankreich Und Den Niederlanden (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 1983); Ingrid Gogolin and Manfred 
Hohmann, Vom “bikulturellen” zum “interkulturellen” Unterricht: Die Limburger Modellversuche zum 
Aufnahmeunterricht von Einwandererkindern in Kindergarten und Primarschule (Münster: Waxmann, 1993); Georg 
Auernheimer, Einführung in die interkulturelle Erziehung (Darmstadt: Primus-Verl., 1996); and Leonie Herwartz-
Emden, Aufwachsen in heterogenen Sozialisationskontexten: Zur Bedeutung einer geschlechtergerechten 
interkulturellen Pädagogik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010). 
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These groups wanted to find an external cause for the problem because they felt that the 
West German state was at least partially responsible. Many of these children had been attending 
West German schools from the beginning of their compulsory schooling. Many non-German 
citizens were no longer migrants whose success or failure could be attributed to their countries of 
origins’ education systems. The West German state had a clear obligation to teach them to read, 
whatever external impediments (e.g. migration) might be involved. After all, at the very least, the 
right to education meant promoting literacy. Low levels of completion of secondary education 
needed to be rectified for the good of the West German state, as illiteracy was directly tied to 
human rights abuses, repression, and the failure of the state to equalize its residents’ access to 
schooling.  
The debate about “lost” and “disadvantaged” children and youths was also a concern for 
the “traditional countries of origin” (Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal, and Yugoslavia). 
These governments expressed concerns regarding discrimination within the West German school 
systems and gender inequality in West German schools, worried about their citizens’ access to 
higher levels of secondary school, and questioned their placement in institutions for the learning-
disabled.7 Part of their concern stemmed from the changing international perception of 
education. At the end of the 1970s, in the context of a declining economy after the first oil crisis, 
and amid increasing unemployment in Europe, secondary schooling was associated with 
bettering the labor market. In the 1950s and 1960s, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, and the 
European Community had all pushed education as a tool to promote equality and opportunity. In 
contrast, during the 1970s, education administrators and politicians across Europe re-evaluated 
                                                
7 See also Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Arbeiterkinder Im Bildungssystem (Bad Honnef: 
Verlag Karl Heinrich Boch, 1981), 4, 43; and Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 8/1703: Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Lattmann, et al. und der Fraktionen der SPD, FDP, ‘zur 
Bildungspolitik,’” (Bonn, April 13, 1978), 49. 
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schools as a step on the way to employment. With fewer factory jobs available in either West 
Germany or in the various migrant and minority groups’ countries of citizenships’ post-industrial 
labor market, education beyond lower secondary school was increasingly important.8 Yet, the 
majority of non-German citizens never attended the supposedly mandatory vocational training, if 
they even completed secondary school at all.9  
The change in the public discourse not only reflected economic and social developments, 
but also revealed the increasing polarization of West German political culture in the 1970s. By 
the late 1970s, the debates on education in West German politics had become a heated 
ideological battlefield. If the SPD suggested something, its opponents in the CDU and CSU, 
demanded the opposite, and vice versa. With education under Länder control, this division made 
the standardization of education policy on the federal level impossible. Instead, each of the 
Länder governments went its own way or chose specific partners to work with (e.g. the SPD 
controlled North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse or CDU/CSU controlled Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg).10 
As long as the Social Democratic-Liberal (SPD-FDP) government was in office (until 
1982, when a no confidence vote forced Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to step down), the Federal 
and Länder governments took the stance that it was their duty to try and ensure equality of 
                                                
8 Chapter 5 discusses the limited options for naturalization under West German citizenship law. Out of the hundreds 
of thousands of schoolchildren with foreign citizenship born in West Germany, only a few thousand would become 
citizens. In consequence, “foreign children” were often born and raised their entire lives in West Germany.  
9 For a discussion of vocational training for children with foreign citizenship in West Germany, see Klaus 
Schweikert, Vocational Training of Young Migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany (Washington D.C.: 
European Community Information Service, 1983). 
10 Jürgen Oelkers, “Pädagogische Reform und Wandel der Erziehungswissenschaft,” in Handbuch der deutschen 
Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1998), 227–229; and Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, trans. Brandon 
Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 239–263. 
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opportunity despite children’s different backgrounds.11 After all, according to the ethos of the 
period, every child was supposed to have the same chances for success in the West German 
school system.12 With Article 3 of the Basic Law forbidding discrimination based on social 
background, the state made itself responsible for ensuring that the system did not promote 
inequality. To ensure that promised equality of educational opportunity for migrant and minority 
children, however, the causes of inequality needed to be addressed.  
Separate but Equal? Citizenship in Scholastic Dis/advantage  
In 1978, the SPD-FDP coalition government under Chancellor Schmidt declared that it 
would not alter West German citizenship law. This refusal to even create immigration laws, since 
the “Federal Republic was not a country of immigration,” relegated the legal place of non-
nationals to a strange limbo between the dual, yet opposing, pressures to integrate and leave.13 
Nonetheless, the Social Democratic-Liberal Federal Government acknowledged the permanent 
presence of its many minority groups and agreed with its major opponents in the West German 
Bundestag, the CDU and CSU, that the “potential for conflict” would persist if “the foreign 
population was not better integrated.” To address the issue, the Federal Government created the 
Office of the Commission for Foreigners in 1978.14 The head of the office – the Commissioner 
                                                
11 Helmut Schmidt, member of the SPD, was Chancellor of Germany from 1974 until 1982. 
12 Lutz-Rainer Reuter, Das Recht auf chancengleiche Bildung: Ein Beitrag zur sozial ungleichen 
Bildungspartizipation und zu den Aufgaben und Grenzen der Rechtswissenschaft bei der Verwirklichung eines 
sozialen Grundrechts auf chancengleiche Bildung (Ratingen: Henn, 1975). 
13 Douglas B. Klusmeyer and Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of 
Germany: Negotiating Membership and Remaking the Nation (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 97–118. In part 
because of the past emphasis on the Germany as a country of emigration, the Country did not have any immigration 
laws in place, but rather only “Foreigners Laws.” See Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in 
Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge (Munich: Beck, 2001). 
14 Ausländerbeauftragte. Like other West German ministries and offices, the exact name changed from time to time. 
The current title, emphasizing integration over foreignness, is Beauftragte für Migration, Flüchtlinge und 
Integration, also Integrationsbeauftragter and Beauftragter für Migration und Integration.  
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for Foreigners (Ausländerbeauftragter) – was supposed to provide suggestions for “improving 
the situation of foreigners.” The Federal Government, however, allocated the new office only a 
small budget, preventing the Office from doing more than publishing occasional reports. In 
consequence, the Office had practically no influence.15 
In his first report, the newly appointed Commissioner for Foreigners Heinz Kühn, an 
SPD member and former Minister-President of the North-Rhine-Westphalia state,16 argued that 
the legal differentiation between national groups created continued potential for conflict and 
perpetuated performance gaps. Kühn’s 1979 report, Position and Further Development of the 
Integration of Foreign Workers and their Families in the Federal Republic of Germany, further 
condemned existing practices as discriminatory. To achieve equality, Kühn claimed that it was 
necessary for residents with migrant backgrounds to become citizens.17 Difference needed to be 
eliminated and foreigners recognized as immigrants before they could become full participants in 
West German society. Part of the “full social integration” the report demanded was the “entire 
removal of all segregating measures in the school sector.” Attacking the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s dual goals, Kühn claimed that more attention needed to be paid to 
                                                
15 Reinhard Grindel, Ausländerbeauftragte: Aufgaben und Rechtsstellung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984), 12; and 
Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, “Guest Workers and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the 
Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 until Its Halt in 1973,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West 
Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 189. Member of 
Bundestag Dieter Hussing (CDU) first advocated the creation of such an office (Amt) in 1971, but the Federal 
Government deemed such an action unnecessary. Hussing would nonetheless express continual concern over the 
integration of “foreigners” into German society. 
16 Heinz Kühn (SPD), previously the Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, was appointed as 
Ausländerbeauftragte by under Chancellor Schmidt in 1978 and retained the position until 1980. For more 
information on Kühn’s service as Ausländerbeauftragte, see Bernd Geiß and Bundesrepublik Beauftragter für die 
Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten: 
Tätigkeitsbericht 1983 bis 1986” (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, November 1986), 3. 
17 Ibid., 10. 
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integration instead of cultural inheritance.18 To do so, schools needed to “intensify integrative 
measures for all children and youth, meaning those in preschool (Vorschule), school, and 
vocational training.”19 Without radical changes in policy and the extension of all political and 
social rights to foreign residents, success would continue to be limited.20  
It is difficult to evaluate the accuracy of Kühn’s claim regarding legal differentiation 
causing disadvantages. Kühn based his argument on reports demonstrating that continued 
emphasis on schoolchildren’s status as non-Germans contributed to wide-spread sentiment 
among the German ethnic majority and many minority communities that West German schools 
were not for children considered foreign. Studies both within the Federal Republic and outside 
the state further substantiated his case through interviews and various qualitative studies. While 
not necessarily claiming that naturalization laws needed to change, these historical and social 
science studies suggested that the continued othering of schoolchildren fostered a perception that 
                                                
18 For more on the KMK and its dual goals, see Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism 
(New York: Praeger, 1978), 179–204.  
19 Heinz Kühn, “Stand und Weiterentwicklung der Integration der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Memorandum des Beauftragten der Bundesregierung” (Bonn: Das Amt der 
Ausländerbeauftragten, September 1979), 3–4, NW 670-70, Landesarchiv NRW.  
20 Ibid., 3–4, 20. For a brief description of the Kühn Memorandum, see Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in 
Deutschland, 245–246. Whether or not Kühn’s general indictment of both West German government and society 
caused his promotion, he was not long in his position as Advocate. In 1980 Liselotte Funcke, member of the FDP 
and longtime advocate for women’s rights, replaced him (Liselotte Funcke, “Notiz zum Gespräch mit dem 
türkischen Erziehungsminister am 07. 09, 11.30 Uhr,” September 7, 1981, B 304/6178, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
Funcke, while fulfilling her role admirably given her limited funding, did not have a special interest in education. 
She did, however, promote “Freedom from discrimination and integration into society and the workplace in respect 
of the national, cultural, and religious individualities of the foreigner.” 
For a discussion of citizenship law in West Germany, see Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and 
Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Joyce Mushaben, The Changing 
Faces of Citizenship: Social Integration and Political Mobilization Among Ethnic Minorities in Germany (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2008); and Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: Ethnicity, Utility and 
Nationalism (Oxford: Berg, 2004).  
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the schools were “not for them,” which in turn created a sense of failure even before the children 
entered the classroom.21  
Kühn’s argument hinged on the practice of social othering, under which he explicitly 
included school programs singling out schoolchildren with foreign citizenship. An example of 
these was Berlin’s regulation of classroom segregation from 1970. Under a Social Democratic-
Liberal government (1955-1981), Berlin’s Senate stipulated that no German classroom should 
have more than 20 percent of children with foreign citizenship, because contemporary studies 
claimed that higher concentrations of schoolchildren with non-German citizenship hindered 
integration.22 In order to avoid this problem in areas where communities of schoolchildren with 
foreign citizenship lived, the Senate for Education began a system of bussing in order to place 
children in schools outside of their local districts. The Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1976 
recommendations supported the idea, suggesting that classes not exceed a concentration of 
foreign children higher than 20 percent. The expected remedy, however, was for schools to 
spread the children over multiple classes or local schools. Many of the Länder Education 
Administrations rejected the idea of purely foreign classes outside of the preparatory classes or 
national schools (described in Chapter 2 and 3) because they would, after all, lead to a “ghetto 
education” and permanent social isolation.23 
                                                
21 Ulrike Popp, “Die sozialen Funktionen schulischer Bildung,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 
1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 2 vols., 6 (Munich: C.H. 
Beck, 1998), 265–76.  
22 For a discussion of Berlin education policy regarding schoolchildren with foreign citizenship prior to 1978, see 
Berlin Senator für Schulwesen, “Ausführungsvorschriften über den Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer 
Arbeitnehmer und für jugendliche ausländische Arbietnehmer,” 1971; and Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: 
The Prospects for Pluralism (New York: Praeger, 1978), 223–244.  
23 Rist, Guestworkers in Germany, 193–201. 
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The Berlin government, under SPD-FDP leadership until 1981, chose not to follow 
Kühn’s 1979 recommendation to remove all differentiation and did not dismantle the 20 percent 
cap. And, with the election of a CDU-FDP government in 1981, the Berlin Senat under Major 
Richard Weizäcker (CDU) chose not change its policies. Instead, the new Christian Democratic 
Senator for Health and Social Affairs, Ulf Fink, defended the cap as crucial to Berlin’s efforts to 
“try and stop the development of ghettoization.”24 Yet in areas in urban districts with higher 
concentrations of non-German pupils, schools struggled to cap classes at 20 percent of 
schoolchildren with foreign citizenship. Many new migrants opted to live in the same areas as 
previous co-nationals, leading to the formation of diasporas or “Little Turkeys” in the working 
class districts of Kreuzberg, Tiergarten, and Wedding. Schools in these districts often had a 
majority non-German population, meaning creating a classroom with eighty percent West 
German citizens could be difficult. While agreeing with the general sentiment that “integration 
[was] unthinkable without a school education,” Fink asked the West German Bundestag during a 
discussion of citizenship laws how “integration [should] be fully realized, if the proportion of 
foreigners at times reaches up to 80 percent of a starting first year class? Furthermore,” he added, 
“the absolute number of the foreign children in Berlin’s lower secondary schools in the 1982/83 
school year would be larger than the number of German schoolchildren.” Given these conditions 
and aware of new regulations to be issued in following months, he warned that “bussing would 
no longer help.”25  
                                                
24 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 9/1629: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktionen 
der SPD und FDP betr. Ausländerpolitik” (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, May 5, 1982), 4918. Ulf Fink (born 1942) 
was a CDU politician. After studying political economy, he served under Richard von Weizäcker (CDU) as Senator 
for Health and Social Order from 1981 to 1989, when Walter Mompers (SPD) won the vote.  
25 Ibid.  
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To solve the problem of bussing and high concentrations of schoolchildren with foreign 
citizenship, Berlin Christian Democratic Senator for Education Hanna Renate Laurien26 ordered 
in 1982 that no class with German schoolchildren could be composed of more than 30 percent 
foreign students. Extra foreign children would simply be placed together in a “pure foreigner 
class.” Laurien did permit an exception if all children with foreign citizenship had mastered 
German, at which time having 50 percent of them composing a German classroom was 
permissible.27 Otherwise, Laurien feared that Germans might “become a minority.” She believed 
that German children who lived in areas with higher percentages of foreigners already needed 
extra support. She claimed that placing children from the ethnic-German majority in classes with 
non-German citizens would only further disadvantage the ethnic-German majority. For Laurien 
and many others, the right of children with West German citizenship to equality of opportunity 
trumped the right to education for children with foreign citizenship.28 
The Berlin press reported that “several parents with foreign citizenship,” particularly with 
longer residency, argued that the Berlin Senate’s regulation was discriminatory. According to the 
media, these parents had raised their children in West Germany and the children spoke German 
                                                
26 Hanna Renate Laurien (1928-2010) was a CDU politician and convert to Catholicism (from Lutheranism at age 
24). She served as Senator for School, Youth and Sports in Berlin from 1981 to 1989, when she had to resign. 
Laurien was elected President of the Abgeordnetenhaus of Berlin in 1991 (the first female to be so elected), in which 
capacity she served until 1995. She also served from 1967 to 2000 as the main committee member of the Central 
Committee of German Catholics (Zentralkomitees der deutschen Katholiken). 
27 The new law 16th Alteration of the School Law for Berlin, (16. ÄndSchulG), which came into power on 1 
February 1983, contained rather pointed wording regarding percentages and permissibility of mixing (“Sechzehntes 
Gesetz zur Änderung des Schulgesetzes für Berlin,” \iGesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Berlin, no. 51 (October 12, 
1982): 1807).  
28 “20 Prozent der Abc-Schützen sind Ausländer,” Morgen Post, August 10, 1982; and Dirk Cornelsen, “Deutsche 
Kinder dürfen nicht Minderheit in Schulen werden: CDU-Politikerin Laurien widerspricht katholischer Kirche: 
‘Keine türkischen Kinder über sechs Jahre nachholen,’” Frankfurter Rundschau, August 13, 1982. For a brief 
discussion of the Berlin laws as of 2001, including the 1982 law, see Christine Langenfeld, Integration und 
kulturelle Identität zugewanderter Minderheiten: eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des allgemeinbildenden 
Schulwesens in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 102–111. 
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as their mother tongue. The parents agreed that it was fine to place children with limited German 
language skills in separate classes, but they maintained that children like theirs should not be 
placed in these “foreigner classes.”29 In an attempt to fight the Berlin Senate’s 1982 regulation, 
some parents simply removed their children from the schools in protest.30  
Parents of three Greek and Turkish children sued for the right to enroll their children in 
classes with German schoolchildren, but they lost their case. The Administrative Court 
(Verwaltungsgericht) ruled that the Berlin Senate’s regulation was lawful, as “the 
Administration’s measures did not have as a goal the separation of German and foreign 
schoolchildren, but the creation of a good learning environment for everyone.”31 The court 
further ruled that the Berlin Senate’s “measures were to prevent xenophobia.”32 From the court’s 
perspective, the outcome of the classes and the possibility of discrimination were 
inconsequential. It was the Berlin Senate’s goal in creating the separate classes that made the 
                                                
29 For example, Cornelsen, “Deutsche Kinder dürfen nicht Minderheit in Schulen werden: CDU-Politikerin Laurien 
widerspricht katholischer Kirche: ‘Keine türkischen Kinder über sechs Jahre nachholen’”; “Begrenzung des Anteils 
ausländischer Kinder in Schulklassen? Gesetzentwurf in Berlin / Frau Laurien für einen frühzeitigen Nachzug / 
Kongresse, Initiativen, Pläne,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 13, 1982, B Rep 002 16864, Berlin 
Landesarchiv; “Deutsche Kinder dürfen nicht zur Minderheiter werden: Senatorin Laurien für reine 
Ausländerklassen,” Morgen Post, August 13, 1982; and “Gemeinsamer Unterricht: Ja! Aber deutsche Schüler dürfen 
nicht zur Minderheit werden,” Berliner Zeitung, August 13, 1982, B Rep 002 16864, Berlin Landesarchiv. Other 
than citizenship status, the background of the parents is unclear in the press reports. 
30One example is the Fritzlar-Homberg-Grundschule in Tiergarten:After bringing their children to the first few days 
of class, some parents removed their children and insisted instead on a common “deutsche Erstkläßler” (German 
first grade). The new rules actually raised the limits from 15 percent to 30-50 percent, depending on language 
competency. For the Fritzlar-Homberg-Grundschule, there were 24 “German” and 33 “foreign” schoolchildren 
registered. Given the rules, the school had created two classes, one with 24 German and 5 foreigners since the 
German children could not be separated and still maintain the legal limits. “Eltern schickten ihre Kinder nicht in 
Ausländerklasse,” Tagesspeigel, August 14, 1982. . 
31 “Zahl der Asylbewerber sank um 55 Prozent: Seit Jahresbeginn nur noch knapp 4000 Anträge,” Tagesspeigel, 
September 3, 1982; and Sabine Reuter, “Kälte, welche die Seele krank macht. Das Beispiel der Familie Yesiltepe 
zeigt den Zwiespalt aud, in dem sich Gastarbeiter angesichts der Ausländerfeindlichkeit befinden,” Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, August 17, 1982. 
32 “Zahl der Asylbewerber sank um 55 Prozent: Seit Jahresbeginn nur noch knapp 4000 Anträge”; and Reuter, 
“Kälte, welche die Seele krank macht. Das Beispiel der Familie Yesiltepe zeigt den Zwiespalt aud, in dem sich 
Gastarbeiter angesichts der Ausländerfeindlichkeit befinden.” 
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difference. Laurien’s regulation and the court’s decision appalled multiple groups. One of these 
was the left-leaning Education and Science Workers' Union, which saw the ruling as a 
“dangerous decision” on the part of the court.33 It also offended those “German and foreign 
parents who strove for the integration of their children.” In addition, the union claimed that the 
ruling empowered the school administration to run roughshod over parents, teachers, and 
schoolchildren’s participation rights.34  
Whether or not the court correctly portrayed the Berlin Senate’s motivation, xenophobia 
remained a problem in the schools in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since the late 1960s, 
parents with West German citizenship had been filing complaints with the Länder Ministries of 
Education about their children having to attend schools with foreign children, Turks, and 
Muslims. But at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, an increasing number of West 
German citizens took exception, sometimes violently, with those they viewed as “taking their 
jobs” or moving into “German neighborhoods.”35 Many ethnic German parents opted to move 
out of neighborhoods with large minority populations.36 Some of these parents complained that 
schoolchildren with non-German citizenship took resources from German children and brought 
                                                
33 It should be noted that many teachers in lower secondary education viewed the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und 
Wissenschaft (GEW) as a highly conservative, traditionalist union whose wage structures furthered any 
discrimination existent in the West German tripartite school system. For a discussion of the GEW, see Thomas 
Ellwein, “Die deutsche Gesellschaft und ihr Bildungswesen: Interessenartikulation und Bildungsdiskussion,” in 
Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-
Ludwig Furck (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 97–100. 
34 “Zahl der Asylbewerber sank um 55 Prozent: Seit Jahresbeginn nur noch knapp 4000 Anträge.”  
35 Konrad H. Jarausch, “Fearing Foreignness,” in After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 239–63; and Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40–45. 
36 Ingrid Dietrich, Voll integriert?: Zuwanderer-Eltern berichten uber Erfahrungen ihrer Kinder mit Schule in 
Deutschland (Baltmannsweiler: Schneider-Verl. Hohengehren, 1997); Barbara Fields, “Slavery, Race, and Ideology 
in the United States of America,” New Left Review 181 (May 1990): 95–118; and Geoff Eley, “The Trouble with 
‘Race’: Migrancy, Cultural Difference, and the Remaking of Europe,” in After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and 
Democracy in Germany and Europe, ed. Rita C-K Chin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009). 
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down the quality of school education. Driven by these fears, as Christian Democratic Berlin 
Senator Ulf Fink pointed out, the citizens of Berlin “ended up in one pot with the NPD…,” 
saying: “the Turks must go.”37  
Senator of Education Laurien did not argue that the “Turks needed to go,” but she did 
push for limiting the permissible age for family reunification to six and for the sake of improved 
integration.38 Pointing to statistics on school successes, she claimed that anyone who still thought 
that fourteen and 15 year olds should be allowed to migrate overlooked the fact that these youths 
“could no longer reach their secondary school certificates” despite support measures. For those 
children and youths of all ages already in the city, their parents needed to be convinced of the 
importance of vocational training. Laurien argued this was vital, as foreign children already 
made up around 25 percent of the school body overall (approximately 80,000 in Berlin) and 
these children “needed to become the skilled labor of tomorrow.”39 Yet, despite these claims, the 
CDU-FDP Berlin Senate cut funding for programs promoting integration and combating 
illiteracy over the next three years.40 
                                                
37 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, founded in 1964, was an ultra-right wing party that many in 
Germany and abroad view as a neo-Nazi party. Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 9/1629: Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP betr. Ausländerpolitik,” 4919; and “Brief 
von Mietern an Ihre Wohnungsbaugesellschaft ‘Neue Heimat,’” Der Tagesspiegel, October 10, 1979. 
38 Family reunification is when a resident in one country (here West Germany) brings a family member (usually a 
spouse or children) with foreign citizenship into the country. Because the European and German courts recognized 
the right to be with family as a basic human right, the Federal Republic had to allow the immigration of immediate 
family. In order to reduce migration, several West German politicians attempted to limit the meaning of family or 
the age of acceptable migration. They also set a minimum limit for the length of marriage before a spouse could 
migrate. For more discussion, see Klaus Barwig, Klaus Lörcher, and Christoph Schumacher, eds., Familiennachzug 
von Ausländern auf dem Hintergrund völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1985). 
39 Cornelsen, “Deutsche Kinder dürfen nicht Minderheit in Schulen werden: CDU-Politikerin Laurien widerspricht 
katholischer Kirche: ‘Keine türkischen Kinder über sechs Jahre nachholen’”; “Frau Laurien für Begrenzung des 
Zuzugs von Ausländerkindern: Hinweis auf Probleme der schulischen und beruflichen Bildung,” Tagesspeigel, 
August 13, 1982; and “Laurien: Möglichst Jung: CDU-Politikern für frühe Nachreise von Türkenkindern,” 
Volksblatt, August 13, 1982.  
40 “‘Sie sind Analphabeten in zwei Sprachen’: Kreuzberger Türkenkinder ohne Integrationschancen / Lehrer an der 
7. Grundschule: Der Senat spart am falschen Ende,” Volksblatt, September 21, 1982; and “‘Wir können hier nicht 
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A central part of the Berlin Senate’s and other Länder Ministries of Educations’ concerns 
were the socio-economic background of Turks and other children of traditional guest worker 
groups. These children, often coming from working class families, were on occasion depicted by 
Christian-conservative West German politicians and the West German right-leaning tabloids as 
dangerous or criminal. They depicted the children as problem groups in need of support so as to 
avoid the development of second-class citizens exploiting the generosity of the welfare state.41 
As former guest workers and their families comprised the largest contingent of non-Germans 
(particularly at the primary and lower secondary school levels), the very concept of 
“foreignness” took on a working class and negative connotation, becoming something to be 
viewed with suspicion. As the assumption that foreigners were working-class or unemployed 
took hold, politicians (as well as scholars) often overlooked the existence of non-German groups 
from higher socio-economic backgrounds or families, choosing to examine “foreigners” and 
“Germans” as essentialized categories.42  
 In contrast, the same West German politicians viewed schoolchildren with Dutch and 
French citizenship as desirable additions to the school system. They regarded these youngsters as 
European and as part of the European Community, referring to them as “international” instead of 
“foreign” or even “migrant.” Even as some West German citizens demanded that “foreigners 
                                                                                                                                                       
halb Ankara bieten’: Die Berliner Schulsenatorin Hanna-Renate Laurien (CDU) über ausländische Schülerin der 
Bundespublik,” Der Spiegel, November 22, 1982. Despite problems with general illiteracy, some 84 hours of 
support instruction for Turkish children has been cut. 
41 “Die Türken Kommen: Rette Sich Wer Kann,” Der Spiegel, July 30, 1973; Heinrich Lummer, “Opfer von 
Schmarotzern,” Die Zeit, April 26, 1975; and Lummer and Hanna-Renate Laurien, “Nr. 798 des Senats von Berlin 
über Schulische Betreuung der Kinder von Asylbewerbern - Drs. Nr. 9/2134 und Nr. 9/2415,” Mitteilung Nr. 259 
des Präsidenten des Abgeordnetehauses von Berlin (Senator für Schulwesen, Berufsausbildung und Sport, Berlin, 
April 2, 1985), B Rep. 002, Nr. 16868, Berlin Landesarchiv. 
42 Mustafa Tekinez, “Sind wir nicht alle Menschen?,” in Deutsches Heim - Glück allein: Wie Türken Deutsche 
sehen, ed. Dursun Akçam, trans. Helmut Oberdiek (Bornheim-Merten: Lamuv, 1982), 206–14. 
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leave” Germany, the government expanded European Community student exchange programs.43 
The Länder and Federal Ministries of Education actually actively sought to bring in more 
European, non-German schoolchildren – just those with socially acceptable backgrounds. 
Furthermore, those children from the Netherlands or France who resided in the country were 
more likely to attend higher levels of secondary school and live in areas with lower percentages 
of other groups with foreign citizenship. Unlike the children of working-class communities, these 
children represented the kind of diversity and multiculturalism the European Community was 
promoting.  
The Socio-Economic Divide in West German Scholastic Performance  
In 1981, the Federal Ministry of Education, under Social Democratic leadership, 
discussed the class divide in scholastic success generally, demonstrating that socio-economic 
background played a direct role. In the Ministry’s 1981 publication “Working Class Children in 
the Educational System,” the SPD Minister of Education Björn Engholm44 used over a decade of 
research to show that children from lower socio-economic backgrounds (e.g. the working class) 
generally performed significantly below the averge of children from familie of white-color 
employees and civil servants (Angestellten- und Beamntenfamilien).45 Engholm pointed out that 
the majority of children with non-German citizenship were “working class children too” with 
“ninety percent having working-class fathers” (no mention of mothers). Engholm emphasized 
                                                
43 !!! 
44 Björn Engholm joined the SPD in 1962 and became a member of the Bundestag in 1969. He served as Minister of 
Education between 1981 and 1982. Between 1988 and 1993, he served as Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein. 
He was the successor to Social Democrat Jürgen Schmude, who was Minister of Education from 1978 until 1981, 
when he received an appointment as Minister of Justice.  
45 In 1979, 9.5 percent of working-class children entered Gymnasium, while 49.6 percent of children of Beamte and 
38.2 percent of children of Angestellte entered Gymnasium (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 
Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem, 11). 
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that, when directly compared with ethnically-German children from the same socio-economic 
group, the performance gap diminished significantly.46  
Disadvantage in education as associated with class was controversial in the early 1980s in 
West Germany. With the abolition of the aristocracy and opposition to discrimination based on 
social class inscribed into the West German Basic Law, some contemporary scholars, like the 
liberal sociologist Helmut Schelsky, had claimed already in the 1950s that West Germany had 
developed into a “flattened middle-class society” (Mittelklassegesellschaft).47 Others, usually left 
or liberal scholars such as the political scientist Ralf Dahrendorf, argued that, while the West 
German Constitution promised equality, class divisions continued to act as a sharp social 
divide.48 Dahrendorf’s work exemplified the problem Pierre Bourdieu described in his work on 
French education: the West German school system served as a site that reinforced the socio-
economic divide, even as West German educators attempted to provide programs to promote 
equality of opportunity.49 With the division implicitly based on cultural capital and style rather 
                                                
46 Ibid., 41. 
47 See Hans Braun, “Helmut Schelskys Konzpt der ‘nivellierten Mittelstandsgesellschaft’ und die Bundesrepublik 
der 50er Jahre,” AFS 29 (1989): 119–223. Helmut Schelsky (1912-1984) was a German sociologist. Educated during 
the Third Reich, he served in the Wehrmacht. After the Second World War Schelsky became a Professor in 1949 
and helped establish Bielefeld University.  
48 See for example Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1959). For a brief discussion of how some claimed that, in contrast to Britain, West Germany was a “classless 
society,” see Mary Fulbrook, A History of Germany 1918-2008: The Divided Nation (Malden, MA: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2011), 189–191. Ralph Gustav Dahrendorf, Baron Dahrendorf (1929-2009) was an influential political 
thinker, sociologist, and philosopher. Although initially in the SPD, he joined the FDP in 1967. In 1968, he was 
voted in as a MP for the BW Landestag, but moved in October 1969 to the Bundestag, which he in turn left in 
August 1970. Dahrendorf served briefly as a Bundestagary Secretary in the Foreign Office under Willy Brandt’s 
government (1969-1970), before moving to Brussels to serve as European Commissioner for External Relations and 
Trade (1970-1972) and then European Commissioner for Research, Science and Education (1973-1974). His later 
career was predominantly in England, where he became a member of the House of Lords in 1993 (until 2009) after a 
distinguished academic career 
49 Pierre Bourdieu discussed this as “symbolic power,” which was often a form of violence and suffering. See 
Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture, trans. Jean Claude Passeron (London: Sage Publications, 1990); 
and Don Reid, “Towards a Social History of Suffering: Dignity, Misery and Disrespect,” Social History 27, no. 3 
(October 3, 2002): 343–58.  
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than law, it was almost impossible to overcome class boundaries, as many lower-class 
individuals felt that the upper levels of secondary school were “not for them” and members of 
the wealthy and elite classes often strove to reinforce social divisions.50 
Engholm and many liberal or leftist West German educators and politicians agreed that 
the West German tripartite secondary school system reified West German society’s class 
divisions.51 While the majority of school-age youths now attended secondary school, 
schoolchildren from lower socio-economic backgrounds were more likely to be placed in lower 
secondary schools (Hauptschule) than other children. As Engholm described in his report, that 
trend was true for the children of migrant workers as well. In some areas, such as in many West 
Berlin schools, that meant that lower secondary schools’ student bodies consisted of more 
foreign children than children with West German citizenship, while children with German 
citizenship enrolled in higher secondary (Realschulen and Gymnasien) and comprehensive 
schools (Gesamtschulen). According to Engholm, this class imbalance violated Article Three of 
the Basic Law and hence the state had a responsibility to rectify the situation. 
Engholm clearly acknowledged the importance of national and ethnic background. The 
Federal Ministry of Education’s Report on Working Class Children demonstrated not only that 
                                                
50 Deutsche Bundestag, “Drucksache 6/2071: Antwort des Bundesministers für Bildung und Wissenschaft betr.: 
Schul- und Berufsausbildung der Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” (Bonn: 
Deutscher Bundestag, March 30, 1971); and Klaus von Dohnanyi, Education and Youth Employment in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (Berkeley: Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, 1978). Dr. Klaus von 
Dohnanyi (SPD) was a Bundestag Secretary for the Ministry of Education under Chancellor Willy Brandt from 1969 
until 1972 and Minister of Education from 1972 until 1974.  
51 The tripartite school system included three levels of secondary schooling after primary school (grades 1-4 or 1-6, 
depending on the specific Länder). The lowest level of secondary school (Hauptschule) prepared children for 
unskilled and semi-skilled labor or led to vocational training. The higher levels of secondary school (Realschule and 
Gymnasium) led to higher levels of skilled labor or to university. Theoretically, teachers’ recommendations were 
supposed to be based on an individual child’s skill and merit. For a description of the West German school system, 
see Christoph Führ, The German Education System Since 1945, trans. Iván Tapia (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997); and 
Hans Döbert, “Germany,” in The Education Systems of Europe, ed. Wolfgang Hörner et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2007), 299–235. 
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socio-economic background had a direct impact on education, but also that the children’s (or 
their parents’) ethno-national background influenced their scholastic success. Furthermore, 
where many would have expected cultural difference to play a direct role and to see European 
Member State nationals perform better than others, Engholm showed that some groups – for 
example Greeks and Yugoslavians, who were not yet (technically) part of the European 
Community – successfully managed to navigate the school system. With 13.1 percent of children 
with Greek ancestry and 18.4 percent of children with Yugoslavian ancestry entering the 
Gymnasium, they appeared to have as much of a chance (or more) as ethnically-German children 
of entering higher levels of secondary schools (see Table 6.1).52 In contrast, only 6.1 and 3.7 
percent of schoolchildren with Italian (who were specifically “European”) and Turkish 
citizenship respectively entered the Gymnasium.53 
 
Table 6.1: Rate of Transfer from Primary School to Secondary in Baden-Württemberg’s 
Tripartite School System at the End of the Fourth Grade in 198154 
Nationality 
Lower 
Secondary 
(Haupt-
schule) 
Realschule Gymnasium Other 
Absolute 
Number of 
Children 
% 
Greek! 66.6! 13.8! 13.1! 6.5!  566 ! 16.4!
Italian! 73.1! 14.7! 6.1! 6.1!  658 ! 19.1!
Yugoslavian! 48.8! 28.5! 18.4! 4.3!  565 ! 16.4!
Spanish! 66.7! 14.0! 12.9! 64.0!  186 ! 5.4!
Turkish! 75.5 9.7! 3.7! 11.1  1,086 ! 31.5!
Portuguese! 70.0! 10.0! 8.9! 11.1!  90 ! 2.6!
Other! 33.0! 19.2! 28.1! 9.4!  291 ! 8.4!
Total! 65.0! 15.4! 11.7! 7.9!  3,453 ! 100.0!
                                                
52 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem, 43–45. 
53 Ibid., 42. 
54 Ibid., 42; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1981). 
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In the 1981 report, the authors were careful to point out the difference in success between 
children arriving later in their school careers and those moving through the education system 
from the beginning (or from an early grade level). Chart 6.1 demonstrates that difference, 
depicting the proportions of children at the end of their primary schooling who are moving into 
the three different levels of West German secondary schools. These children were supposed to 
have a better chance of scholastic success than children who arrived after the age of 10 – which 
the chart above clearly supports.  
To try to overcome this imbalance for schoolchildren with non-German citizenship, the 
West German Federal and Länder governments collaborated on several projects.55 Among their 
primary recommendations, the Federal Ministry of Education suggested that local communities 
provide “suitable preschool instruction.”56 The Ministry of Education’s call for increased early 
education for children with migrant backgrounds corresponded with general debates on the need 
for an extension of early childhood education for ethnic-German children.57 Many educators 
claimed that the half-day system needed to be extended to an all-day system and started at an 
earlier age. They claimed more time was needed in order to promote cognitive, lingual, and 
social learning skills and decrease the influence of family background. Educators and scholars 
argued that this intensive training would better prepare young children for the West German 
school system. For those children with non-German citizenship, early childhood education would 
                                                
55 Grindel, Ausländerbeauftragte; and Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Integration der Ausländischen 
Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familienangehörigen, ed., Anregungen der Ausländerbeauftragten zur Novellierung des 
Ausländerrechts (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, 1987). Churches and some civic groups provided 
programs as well. Local libraries set up homework programs and church groups set up preschools. Although hardly 
covering all children, it did alleviate some need even as some of the programs showcased the social divide between 
“German” and “foreign.” !!! 
56 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drs. 8/1703,” 47. 
57 Ibid., 40. 
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expose them to West German language and culture in a school environment and increase the 
probability of successful integration (i.e. completion of a secondary school certificate, entrance 
into higher levels of secondary school, and future employment). Because of the high costs 
involved, and with early childhood, primary, and secondary education under state jurisdiction, 
Federal support for early schooling remained primarily at the level of rhetoric.58 The Federal 
Ministry of Education encouraged the provision of new spots and the training of more teachers in 
early childcare, but there was little that it could actually do without significant financial 
investment.  
Several of the Länder tried to improve access to early childhood education. However, the 
costs of increasing the number of free spots were prohibitive. In addition, many parents 
belonging to West German minority groups were concerned about the possibility of schools 
trying to indoctrinate their children. For example, parents with Turkish citizenship expressed 
concern that their children would be given an explicitly Christian education.59 Since the two 
welfare organizations– the Catholic Caritas and the Protestant Diakonisches Werk – associated 
with the two largest West German churches ran 80 percent of all childcare (Krippen and 
Kindergarten), preschool (Vorschul) and afterschool (Hort) programs, the migrant parents’ 
                                                
58 For a discussion of the provision of preschool and Kindergarten places, see Karen Hagemann, “A West-German 
‘Sonderweg’? Family, Work, and the Half-Day Time Policy of Childcare and Schooling,” in Children, Families, 
and States: Time Policies of Childcare, Preschool and Primary Education in Europe, ed. Karen Hagemann, Konrad 
H. Jarausch, and Cristina Allenmahn-Ghionda (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 19–20.  
59 Council for Cultural Cooperation and KMK, “Die Vorschulerziehung von Wanderarbeitnehmerkinder,” Council 
of Europe, October 12, 1977, B 93, Bd. 857, PA AA; “Schulreifetests bestätigen das städtische Konzept: 
Erfolgreiche Vorschulklassen für Ausländerkinder / Hilfreiche Mitarbeit der Eltern / Geringe Aussteiderquote,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 24, 1981; Ministerium für Arbeit, Gesundheit und Soziales NRW, “Vorläufige 
Richtlinien über Die Gewährung von Zuwendungen Für Hilfen Zur Einschulung (vorschulische Förderung von 
Ausländischen Kindern),” Rund Erlaß (Düsseldorf, February 5, 1988); and rea Lanfranchi, Schulerfolg von 
Migrationskindern: Die Bedeutung familienergänzender Betreuung im Vorschulalter (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 
2002). 
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concerns were understandable.60 Even without these ideological concerns, the attendance of 
children with foreign citizenship or working-class backgrounds was complicated by the expense. 
Parents had to pay for all forms of childcare based on their income. The Länder only offered a 
small number of free half-day preschool classes as part of the primary school system. Those 
facors all but prohibited the attendance of the very groups that the Federal and Länder Ministries 
of Education were at least rhetorically trying to reach.61 In consequence, children from groups 
with middle-class earning power usually filled those preschool spaces available.62 
In the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s, the Federal Ministry of Education, in 
conjunction with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (both under under Social Democratic 
Ministers) did partially finance some programs for homework help and German language 
instruction. The Ministries argued that extra-curricular activities were necessary to enable 
integration and to promote vocational training. The Ministries’ main programs included “German 
for Foreign Workers” and “Measures for Social and Employment Integration of Foreign Youths” 
(MSBE), introduced in 1976 and 1981 respectively.63 Targeted at schoolchildren who arrived 
                                                
60 Both church organizations opposed all-day childcare as a threat to the family. They requested and received state 
support, but rejected state control. 
61 See Deutscher Bundestag, “Drs. 8/1703,” 40. Both North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg significantly 
increased their preschool spots not only with the idea of assisting “children with migrant backgrounds” to overcome 
the inherent disadvantage because their parents were not “German,” but also their class background. In 1976, Baden-
Württemberg’s Ministry of Labor made an effort to get all children places in preschool, including the children of 
foreign workers. By the end of the year, Baden-Württemberg offered almost one-third of the preschool spots in the 
Federal Republic, 15 percent of which went to the children of foreign workers (Kultusministerium BW, “Besuch 
Deutschen Kindergärten Durch Ausländische Kinder,” September 9, 1976, EA 8/203 Bü 388, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart; “Hilfe für Ausländerkinder im deutschen Kindergarten,” Stuttgarter Zeiting, May 29, 1978; and Fridtjof 
Theegarten, “Erstmals im Land: Sonderkurse für Gastarbeiterkinder im Vorschulalter: Bambini lernen Deutsch,” 
Stuttgarter Nachrichten, April 7, 1978). 
62 In consequence, children from groups with middle-class earning power usually filled those halfday Kindergarten 
and preschool spaces available. Only a very small percentage was open allday. Their half-day structure was not 
helpful for working parents. For an indepth examination of the system, see {Citation} 
63 Sprachverband Deutsch für ausländische Arbeitnehmer e.V., “Massnahmen zur sozialen und beruflichen 
Eingliederung ausländischer Jugendlicher (MSBE),” Bericht über das Kursjahr 1978–79 (Mainz, 1980); and 
“MSBE-Kurse: Eine Chance für jugendliche Ausländer,” Der Gewerkschafter, January 24, 1981, 1/81 edition, Rep. 
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after primary school, they were supposed to provide schoolchildren, particularly immigrants, a 
chance to overcome both social and work-related problems created by lack of certifications and 
diplomas. Due to the country’s federal structure the local Ministries of Labor and Education 
initially bore the brunt of the associated costs, but increasingly received substantial Federal 
subsidies “in order to increase offerings.”64 In 1980 alone, the Federal Government contributed 
over 12 million Deutsch Marks, the Federal Employment Agency 80 million, and the individual 
Länder over 6 million.65 These expenses resulted in some successes, at least in terms of 
participation. By September 1980, 12,900 foreign youths were taking part, and by November 
1980 the number had jumped to 14,700 (25 percent of whom were women).66 Together, these 
programs were supposed to address the main hurdles to integration (language skills and 
preparation for the labor market) and scholastic success.67  
                                                                                                                                                       
B 4.2.5, Friederich-Erbert-Stiftung. For a discussion of programs to prepare “foreigners” for the West German labor 
market and vocational training, see Peter König, Berufsvorbereitende und berufliche Bildungsmaßnahmen für 
Ausländer (Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1985). 
64 Bundestag Secretary Engholm’s answer to a question from Member of Bundestag Würtz (SPD) on the view of the 
Federal Government on integrating more “children of foreign workers” into the German Berufsbildungssystem, see 
Deutscher Bundestag, Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages 8. Wahlperiode, Stengraphische Bericht, Sitzung 
197 (Jan. 18, 1980), 15788 C-D. 
65 Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, ed., Berufsbildungsbericht 1980 (Munich: Gersbach & Sohn 
Verlag, 1980), 68, 71; and Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, ed., Berufsbildungsbericht 1981 (Bonn: 
Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 1981), 98, 142.  
66 There were 121,000 youths with foreign citizenship between 15-18 and 150,700 between 19-23 in West Germany 
in 1978 (Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1981, 89; and Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für fie Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 
1980), 66). 
67 Grindel, Ausländerbeauftragte. It should be noted that “immigrant” here refers to individuals who have 
themselves gone through the migration experience. The children of migrants are here referred to as “children with 
foreign citizenship” or “children with migrant backgrounds.” The second term is highly contentious due to the 
Federal Republic of Germany’s current methods and guidelines for gathering statistics, which counts individuals 
with great-great grandparents who were Turkish citizens as still having migrant backgrounds while schoolchildren 
with grandparents who had French citizenship are not. 
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By 1980, the scholastic chances for children from all socio-economic and national 
backgrounds had in fact significantly improved when compared with 1970.68 As the Federal 
Ministry of Education’s report pointed out in 1981, “while in 1970 only about half of the six to 
15 year-olds [with non-German citizenship] attended general schools,” seventy-five percent of 
the children were enrolled by 1978.69 Hence the measure for success in integration shifted from 
enrollment numbers to completion rates and entrance rates into higher levels of secondary 
schools in comparison with ethnic-German children in the same-aged cohort. These more 
ambitious standards shed light on new problems. Engholm would write in 1982 that “despite 
successes, equality of opportunities [had] not yet been realized,” especially in light of sustained 
under-enrollment in vocational training (only 122,194 of 217,900 children between 15 and 18 
years of age in 1982 were enrolled in vocational training) and difficulties with job placement.70 
While, as Engholm stressed, socio-economic background influenced all children’s 
scholastic successes, it is not as clear how much of a role foreign citizenship played. Archival 
records and numerous political and media reports demonstrate that left-, center-, and right-wing 
parents who were part of the ethno-national German majority complained about their children 
having too many classmates with non-German citizenship. They argued that these foreign 
children had difficulties in the school system and that their children would be disadvantaged by 
association. Most parents did not complain about one or two children with foreign citizenship 
                                                
68 Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem, 3; and Uwe Sander and 
Ralf Vollbrecht, “II. Jugend,” in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa 
Berg, Christoph Führ, and Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 206–211.  
69 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 8/1703,” 46; and Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 
Arbeiterkinder im Bildungssystem. 
70 Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Neue Wege in der Weiterbildung ausländischer Mitbürger (Bonn, 
1982), 10; Der Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1984, 1984, 88; and Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drs. 8/1703, 3. 
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and expressed enthusiasm if those one or two were from the United States or France. Yet, not 
infrequently, as larger groups of visibly non-ethnic-Germans moved into a particular school 
district, parents with German citizenship opted to change their residences. Combined with 
slogans painted on walls such as ‘Turks Out,’ it can be argued that this kind of behavior created a 
sense that children with foreign citizenship were unwelcome.  
This is not to say that all neighborhood leaders or parents with West German citizenship 
complained. In some areas in Berlin and the other Länder local leaders even developed programs 
to promote intercultural interactions and integration. In conjunction with the relevant foreign 
legations, local communities would arrange German-Turkish or German-Italian days and weeks, 
during which times local groups could participate in celebrations of cultural diversity. Moreover, 
many of the Länder governments tried to promote a kind of multiculturalism. For example, in 
Berlin some local schools developed intercultural theater groups based in the schools.71 In North 
Rhine-Westphalia, the government committed significant resources to developing textbooks 
promoting multiculturalism or biculturalism. Baden-Württemberg, in turn, spent funds on 
opening more free preschool spots in order to appeal to families from lower socio-economic and 
particularly non-German backgrounds.  
Nonetheless, looking at the case in Berlin, it is clear that the label and reality of 
“foreignness” did often lead to exclusion and isolation, despite many politicians’ explicit claims 
in favor of integration.72 Even unconsciously, the continued othering of children and the frequent 
emphasis not only on difference but on explicitly non-German difference did have an impact on 
                                                
71 Sarah Thomsen Vierra, “At Home in Almanya: Turkish-German Space of Belonging in West Germany, 1961-
1990” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011). 
72 Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 9/1629: Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Fraktionen 
der SPD und FDP betr. Ausländerpolitik,” 4904. For a recent discussion of social acceptance of migrant children in 
the United States, see Dympna Devine, “‘Value’ing Children Differently? Migrant Children in Education,” Children 
& Society 27, no. 4 (July 2013): 282–94. 
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these children’s lives. Since the 1980s, numerous studies have been performed and anecdotal 
evidence collected, demonstrating that, with or without policies explicitly segregating children 
with foreign citizenship, many of these individuals felt that German society was rejecting them.73 
Even many individuals with foreign citizenship who had felt integrated and had felt themselves 
to be German began to feel explicitly othered and maligned under the actively anti-foreigner 
policies of the Kohl government.74 
The Italian Ethnic Minority and Special Schools for the Learning Disabled 
In June 1978, the Italian teachers in South Baden sent a letter to both the Italian and West 
German School Administrations to decry the “catastrophic and scandalous school situation of the 
thousands of Italian children (of whom less than 30 percent reach their secondary school 
certificates).” Condemning the high rates of “dual illiteracy” and limited native language 
instruction, the teachers complained that “to solve the discriminating and embarrassing status of 
the problem of foreign schoolchildren” West German teachers “transferred them en-masse into 
special schools for the learning disabled.” The Italian teachers cited the most recent data from the 
State Office in Stuttgart, which “reveal[ed] the shameful reality that, of 7,233 Italian 
schoolchildren in South Baden, a full 2,541 are in special schools” (see Table 6.2 for Federal 
statistics). To address the issue, these Italian teachers supported “the examination of all cases of 
enrollment in schools for the learning disabled, in order to try and remove as many such children 
                                                
73 Bernd Geiß, Bericht zur Ausländerbeschäftigung, Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für die 
Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen (Bonn: Bundesrepublik Beauftragter 
für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, 1986).  
74 Irina Ludat, “Eine Frage der grösseren Angst,” Die Zeit, October 18, 1985; and Douglas B. Klusmeyer and 
Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Immigration Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, 107–109. 
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as possible.” They recommended the establishment of bilingual classes to alleviate the 
problem.75 
The situation of children with Italian citizenship highlights the role that ethno-cultural 
membership played in scholastic success and arguably-unintentional discrimination. Despite 
being considered European and supposedly more likely to succeed (as discussed above), children 
with Italian citizenship statistically did not perform well in the West German school system, 
begging the question as to why. To the frustration of the Italian government, they often left 
school before completing their secondary school certificates.76 It is highly probable that these 
children’s socio-economic status played a role in this trend. The majority of Italian citizens 
living in West Germany in the late 1970s had either themselves been part of the guest worker 
program that ended in 1973, or were the family members of laborers. Most of them came from 
Southern Italy, which had suffered from high unemployment in the 1950s, and often did not have 
familial traditions of enrollment in higher education or were small business owners who did not 
emphasize education.77 By the late 1970s, however, as the Italian government would point out, 
the second and third generations of Italian citizens were already entering West German schools.78 
                                                
75 Italienische Lehrer im Süd-Baden to Ital./Deutsch Schulbehörde, June 9, 1978, EA 3/609 Bü 94, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. Interesting to note, that in order to solve the problem of preparation classes and 
illiteracy, the teachers supported bilingual education. 
76 Migrants with Italian citizenship have a long history of labor and other migration to Germany as discussed in 
Chapter 2. For a discussion of migrant labor – including Italian citizens from the German Empire through West 
Germany, see Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland. Herbert argues that Germany – through its 
many permutations – had a long history of mistreating its foreign labor.  
77 Post-war Italian migration, part of the trend in South-North labor migration, had begun in earnest in the mid-
1950s and continued throughout the 1960s (Robert Sala, “Vom ‘Fremdarbeiter’ Zum ‘Gastarbeiter’: Die Anwerbung 
Italienischer Arbeitskräfte Für Die Deutsche Wirtschaft (1938-1973),” Vierteljahrshefte Fur Zeitgeschichte 55, no. 1 
(January 2007): 93–120). 
78 Ambasciata d’Italia, “Memorandum” (Bonn-Bad Godesberg, July 13, 1977), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA; and 
Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Rom, “Schulunterricht für italienische Gastarbeiterkinder,” 
Sachstandsbericht (Rome: Auswärtige Amt, March 31, 1977), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA. 
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Theoretically, they should have been as likely as West German working-class children to 
complete their secondary school certifications. Government statistics showed, however, that they 
performed significantly below expectations. Moreover, teachers across West Germany 
(particularly in Baden-Württemberg) referred more of these children to special schools 
(Sonderschulen) for the learning disabled (hereafter “special schools”) than any other ethno-
national group.79 With a blatant discrepancy following national lines, the Italian government, 
consular teachers, and parent groups argued that there was a problem. Their citizens and 
children, they insisted, were not less intelligent than children with West German citizenship.80  
Addressing this “grave problem,”81 the Italian government and its representatives (as well 
as multiple other governments including Turkey) demanded an investigation of the situation. 
Insisting on better and more transparent screening divorced from language competency, the 
foreign governments requested permission to become involved in the referral process. As West 
German Educational Administrations claimed that language skills had no impact on the tests, 
multiple groups began to research the issue in order to find the cause and rectify the problem.82 
                                                
79 For a brief description of “special schools,” see Sieglind Ellger-Rüttgart, “Entwicklung des Sonderschulwesens,” 
in Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Christa Berg, Christoph Führ, and 
Carl-Ludwig Furck, vol. 1, 2 vols., 6 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1998), 356–77. For an article on the social acceptance of 
children attending schools for the learning disabled in Italy, see M. Manetti, B. H. Schneider, and G. Siperstein, 
“Social Acceptance of Children with Mental Retardation: Testing the Contact Hypothesis with an Italian Sample,” 
International Journal of Behavioral Development 25, no. 3 (2001): 279–86. 
80 This problem is not limited to Germany. For a recent discussion of the over-enrollment of Hispanic and Africa-
American schoolchildren in US schools, see Beth Harry and Janette K. Klingner, Why Are so Many Minority 
Students in Special Education?: Understanding Race and Disability in Schools, 2nd ed. (New York: Teachers 
College Press, 2014). 
81 “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 23. bis 24. Mai 1978 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn, May 24, 1978), 9, B 93, Bd. 859, 
PA AA. The Italian state has spent considerable efforts to maintain a connection to émigrés. For a discussion of 
those efforts since the foundation of the Republic of Italy through the First World War, see Mark I. Choate, 
Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
82 For 1977 news reports from Baden-Württemberg, see “Wachsende Zahl von Ausändern an Sonderschulen,” 
Eildienst, February 28, 1977, 26/77 edition, EA 8/203 Bü 389, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; “Über 66 500 
Sonderschüler: Anteil der Gastarbeiter-Kinder wächst,” Ludwigsburger Kreiszeitung, March 2, 1977; and “Mehr 
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Table 6.2: Total Schoolchildren and Schoolchildren with Italian Citizenship in Special 
Schools for the Disabled in the FRG, 1976-198583 
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in Special 
Schools!
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1976 10,099,690 393,800 3.9 404,351 14,959 3.7 65,745 4,771 7.3 
1977 9,903,800 398,176 4.0 434,503 18,098 4.2 57,933 5,344 9.2 
1978 9,677,000 398,015 4.1 486,265 21,094 4.3 70,441 5,769 8.2 
1979 9,489,500 387,829 4.1 552,050 23,925 4.3 73,880 5,905 8.0 
1980 9,186,400 370,700 4.0 637,073 27,819 4.4 76,229 6,002 7.9 
1981 8,865,500 354,300 4.0 697,128 31,929 4.6 79,559 6,299 7.9 
1982 8,472,100 337,000 4.0 723,296 36,353 5.0 78,337 6,425 8.2 
1983 8,042,600 319,300 4.0 712,660 39,455 5.5 74,449 6,287 8.4 
1984 7,590,400 301,900 4.0 667589 39,364 5.9 70,885 5,985 8.4 
1985 7,212,600 284,600 3.9 667200 39,771 6.0 69,119 5,745 8.3 
 
West Germany developed special schools after the Second World War, when “the 
principle that disabled children [were] best assisted in institutions exclusively designed to meet 
their needs was established.” Their task was to “implement the handicapped child’s right to an 
education and upbringing in accordance with his or her ability and nature.”84 The classes in these 
schools were supposed to be smaller, providing extra support and individual attention for these 
children. Spanning both primary and secondary schooling, pupils could in theory earn their lower 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ausänderkinder an Sonderschulen,” Schwarzwälder Bote, March 4, 1977; and “Der Anteil von Gastarbeiterkindern 
in Sonderschulen ist stark Gestiegen: Kinder von Gastarbeitern Sind Häufiger Und Schwerer Psychisch Gestört,” 
Stuttgarter Zeiting, March 12, 1977. 
83 KMK, Ausländische Schüler und Schulabsolventen 1970 bis 1986, vol. 102, Statistische Veröffentlichungen der 
KMK (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 1987); and KMK, Ausländische Schüler und Schulabsolventen 1984 bis 1993, 
131 vols., Statistische Veröffentlichungen der KMK (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 1994). !!! 
84 In 1972, Recommendations 302-315 guided the development of the special school system. They have since been 
superseded by a series of Recommendations from 6 May 1994 (Christoph Führ, The German Education System 
Since 1945, trans. Iván Tapia (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1997), 164–166). The practice of developing special schools for 
the physically and learning disabled began before the Second World War, stemming from church initiatives. The 
were, however, restructured in the post-war period, in part because of problems with teaching and material shortages 
and poor treatment of those with supposed disabilities during the Third Reich. For more on the development of 
special schools, see Ellger-Rüttgart, “Entwicklung des Sonderschulwesens.”  
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(Hauptschule) or higher (Realschule) secondary school certificates. In most of the Länder, 
teachers referred schoolchildren to the schools at a rate of approximately one in 25 children (see 
Table 6.2). Teachers made referrals based on a battery of tests, usually by or before the fourth 
grade when schoolchildren started at one of the three levels of the tripartite secondary school 
system. Tests included a variety of intelligence, visual recognition, and aural recognition 
examinations. With an assortment of exams available, the test administrator selected his or her 
own preferred set. The administrator then reached a conclusion based on information drawn from 
the different tests. Referrals for transfer were explicitly not to be made solely on IQ, but rather 
based on what school the administrator thought would best meet the child’s individual needs.85  
While these special schools might have been useful for some schoolchildren with 
learning disabilities, for others they were highly problematic, particularly as most special school 
pupils never completed any secondary school certifications. Those who did complete their 
certification often found the stigma of having attended a special school for the learning disabled 
impossible to overcome. As a result, many of these individuals were unable to find vocational 
school placement or embark on other paths to skilled labor. The Länder school administrations 
claimed that pupils in special schools could still find placement in the labor market, but in reality 
they were severely disadvantaged.86  
The West German Education Administrations and researchers had been debating these 
issues with special schools since the beginning of the 1970s in the context of their attempts to 
reform the West German education system. In 1973, the German Council of Education’s 
                                                
85 Oberschulamt Freiburg, “Arbeitsgruppe im Oberschulamt Freiburg zur Überprüfung des Überweisungsverfahrens 
auf Sonderschulen für Kinder ital. Nationalität,” 440.65-5a, (March 21, 1979), 3–4, EA 3/609 Bü 94, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
86 Ellger-Rüttgart, “Entwicklung des Sonderschulwesens,” 368–373. 
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Commission, a Federal and Länder body tasked with providing recommendations for the 
education system from 1966 and 1975, suggested that the Länder integrate special and regular 
instruction.87 The Länder educational administrations hesitated, but by 1977, the 
Kultusministerkonferenz began moving toward that suggestion. The KMK recommended ending 
segregated teaching in cases where children, particularly those with learning disabilities, could 
possibility participate successfully in primary and lower secondary schools. There were, after all, 
children with severe learning disabilities who did in fact benefit from the small classrooms and 
could not fully participate in a normal classroom.88 
Even as these debates were taking place, West German teachers were placing increasing 
numbers of foreign children in special schools, but were providing no extra support for the 
children once there. Technically, teachers were supposed to refer children with foreign 
citizenship to special schools on the same basis as children with West German citizenship. As the 
April 1976 Kultuministerkonferenz Recommendations underlined, that decision was in no way 
supposed to be based on language capacity.89 The majority of pupils referred were among those 
born or raised in West Germany, but who supposedly had individual problems with linguistic 
comprehension, despite German being their mother tongue. Parents of these children, sometimes 
speaking no German themselves, often did not understand what was happening during the 
referral process, much less the potential future ramifications. Once foreigners were placed in 
                                                
87 The German Education Council (Deutscher Bildungsrat) was a body with an education commission and 
government commission designed to coordinate the development of the West German education system between 
1965-1975. Their 1970 plan “paved the way” for the Bund-Länder-Kommission für Bildungsplanung und 
Forschungsförderung’s (BLK, established in 1970) 1973 education plan that sought to adapt the FRG’s school 
system to international developments (Führ, The German Education System Since 1945, 61–63). 
88 Ibid., 164–165. 
89 “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission (1978),” 9–10; KMK, “Empfehlungen Zur 
Ordnung Des Sonderschulwesens,” Beschluss der KMK, (March 16, 1972); and KMK, “Empfehlungen Für Den 
Unterricht in Der Schule Für Verhaltensgestörte (Sonderschule),” Beschluss der KMK, (November 17, 1977). 
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special school, teachers there did not have the time to provide the one or two non-German 
schoolchildren with extra assistance. Some of the Ministries of Culture – including Baden-
Wuerttemberg’s – felt that they “could not make recommendations for solutions as … the 
relevant teacher would only be implementing measures for a single schoolchild.”90  
In 1977, with a staggering eight percent (see Table 6.2) of their citizens referred to 
special schools across West Germany, the Italian government intensified its campaign to address 
the issue. In Baden-Württemberg, where the problem was the most severe (nine percent of Italian 
citizens referred) and where the highest number of Italian citizens lived, the Italian Vice Consul 
and his staff arranged multiple meetings with the local school boards and Ministry of 
Education.91 On an immediate level, the Italian Consulate wanted to be alerted when a child was 
going through tests prior to referral. The parents, the Italian legates argued, needed advocates 
and help to understand the system generally and the referral process specifically.92 With the 
Ministry of Culture assuring the Italian Consulates that language competency was not a criterion 
for referral, the Consulate requested permission to actively examine the system in order to figure 
out where the problem(s) lay.  
                                                
90 See Kultusministerium Baden-Württemberg and Abt. UA Ref. 3 Sonderschulen, “Unterricht für Kinder 
ausländischer Arbeitnehmer; hier: Interministerielle Arbeitsgruppe,” Zu UA II 2111/302 (Stuttgart, October 6, 
1976), EA 3/609 Bü 77, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
91 Ital. Gesamtelternkonferenz, “Analyse der aktuellen schulischen Situation der Ital. Schüler in der BRD, 
Insbesondere im Land BW, Süd-Baden/Ortenaukreis,” January 28, 1978, EA 3/609 Bü 78, Hauptstaatsarchiv 
Stuttgart; Kultusministerium BW, “Untersuchung von Grundschüler italienischer Nationalität auf 
Sonderschulbefürftigkeit im Sinne der Sonderschule für Lernbehinderte; hier: Besprechung mit den Mitgliedern der 
italienischen Kommission am 8. 12. 1977 im OSA Tübingen,” Aktenvermerk U II 206.1, (December 10, 1977), EA 
3/609 Bü 78, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; Kultusministerium BW, “Untersuchung von Grundschülern italienischer 
Nationalität auf Sonderschulbedürftigkeit im Sinne der Sonderschule für Lernbehinderte: hier; and Einsichtnahme 
der Italienischen Kommission in die Akten der auf Sonderschulbedürftigkeit untersuchten italeinischen Schüler am 
23. 08. 1978 im Oberschulamt Tübingen,” Aktenvermerk U II 206.1, (August 26, 1978), EA 3/609 Bü 78, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
92 Kultusministerium BW, “Aufnahmeverfahren in die Schule für Lernbehinderte gemäß Bekanntmachung des 
Kultusministerium vom 23. April 1971 nr. UA II 1191 - 1/11 i.d.F. vom 29. Mai 1974 (Amtsblatt K.u.U. 1974/s. 
884); hier: Aufnahme italienischer Kinder und Jugendlicher,” Aktenvermerk Zu UA II 91 - 1, (March 28, 1977), EA 
3/609 Bü 78, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
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Baden-Württemberg’s state government and its Regional School Boards cooperated with 
the Italian Legations, as would other Länder. In 1977, the Regional School Administration in 
Tübingen acknowledged the Vice Consul’s request and agreed to send the Consulate information 
about pupils being tested for referral, despite legal prohibitions on sharing student information.93 
When the Italian Consulate in Freiburg asked the Regional School Board to examine the issue in 
1978, the School Board organized a working group on the subject. When the Italian government 
raised the issue during the first meeting of the Joint Expert Italian-German Commission in May 
1978, the West German and Italian delegations arranged a joint Italian-German Workshop of 
Special Education Experts (paid for by the West German Foreign Office) under the auspices of 
the University of Tübingen to address the cause(s) of the children’s disadvantages.94  
Over the course of 1978 and 1979, the results from these studies were slowly released. 
The South Baden Working Group, after meeting several times in 1978 with participants from the 
Italian Consulate, special schoolteachers, educational consultants (Bildungsberater), and school 
boards, issued a report in January 1979 on the working group’s conclusions.95 While suggesting 
that the schools’ “methods might not be up to contemporary psychological-diagnostic 
standards,”96 the working group felt that the cause of the over-enrollment was not actually the 
                                                
93 Ibid. 
94 From both sides, it was expected that there would be 4-5 professionals as well as a representative from the 
Sekretariat der KMK to Auswärtige Amt, Referat 620, “Deutsch-italienisches Kulurabkommen - Gemischte 
Kommission zur Durchführung - Unterkommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland; hier: Expertentreffen für Fragen der Sonderschulerziehung italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland - Reisekosten der deutschen Teilnehmer,” November 13, 1978, B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA.  
95 As of October 1978, the group met three times. Michel from the School Board in Freiburg authored the report 
(“Besprechung des Herrn Regierenden Bürgermeisters mit dem italienischen Botschafter Herrn Contucci und Herrn 
Generalkonsul Torella am 27. 1. 79,” Vermerk G 3 (Berlin: Senatskanzlei, January 29, 1979), 79, B 002 37880, 
Berlin Landesarchiv; and Oberschulamt Freiburg, “Arbeitsgruppe im Oberschulamt Freiburg,” (March 21, 1979), 1–
3). 
96 Oberschulamt Freiburg, “Arbeitsgruppe im Oberschulamt Freiburg,” 3–4. 
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tests or poor language capacity as the foreign consulates had expected. Rather, while the working 
group acknowledged that children often failed the verbal portion of the tests, reports of school 
administrators and special schoolteachers made it clear that if early language examinations 
showed a child to not have the requisite German skills, the test was broken off in favor of other 
kinds of exams. What was important was that the final decision about referral rested primarily on 
the test administrator’s sense of the child’s best interest.97 In short, if the test administrator felt 
that the child needed special assistance, the child would be referred to special school.  
The South Baden Working Group made a series of recommendations for improving the 
referral process for Italian and other foreign nationals. While language was not a deciding factor, 
the Working Group felt that it would be ideal if the tests were given in Italian. Furthermore, if 
there was a consideration of referral, the group suggested involving a native-language teacher as 
soon as possible in order to diminish any confusion between the parents and the school and to 
provide necessary explanations as well as to better understand the relations within a family and 
their mentality.98 While the second possibility was implemented, the first proved problematic, as 
equivalent material in the Italian language did not exist. At the time, Italy did not host 
comparable schools and hence had not developed the necessary materials.99 
The Italian government and Ministry of Education also differed from their West German 
counterparts in their definition of “learning disabilities,” creating a gap in communication 
between the Italian state and West German education officials. As became evident during the 
1978 meeting of the Joint Expert Commission, the Italian government had a limited sense of 
                                                
97 Ibid., 4. 
98 Ibid., 4–5.  
99 Ibid. 
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which children the West German school administrations might deem “backward,” “disabled,” or 
“disadvantaged.”100 The West German definition was considerably more inclusive than that of 
the Italian government, which viewed children with “learning disabilities” as having severe 
handicaps. In contrast, the West German test administrators focused on referring children who 
would “benefit” from smaller class sizes. According to Italian standards, many or the majority of 
those children referred to special schools in West Germany did not have learning disabilities at 
all. 
Regardless of who qualified as learning disabled, the South Baden Working Group felt 
that altering the referral process for special schools would not actually remedy the situation. In 
their estimation “the high quota of special-school children among the children of foreign workers 
reflects foreign children’s inability to meet the demands of the normal German school.” To 
clarify, the Working Group specified that it “did not mean that [the children] have fundamentally 
lower intelligence,” but rather that their situation in the schools would not be improved by 
changes to the special school programs. The Working Group felt that the situation as a whole 
needed to be reviewed with reference to “foreign children’s abilities in normal German 
schools.”101 The problem was with integration into the entire school system, not just with over-
enrollment in special schools. 
For the Italian representatives in the South Baden Working Group, the problem did not 
stop there. They felt that the issue was not only the German school system, but was also 
                                                
100 See “1. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission (1978),” 10. In connection with the joint 
German-Italian expert commission regarding the education of the children of Italian workers, there was a meeting in 
Stuttgart regarding the instruction of children with Italian citizenship in the Federal Republic in special schools for 
the learning disabled (hereafter special schools). A delegation of Italian Experts would in particular visit special 
schools in Baden-Württemberg and discuss the methods and experiences with German Experts. See Hermann, 
“Deutsch-italienisches Kulturabkommen; hier: Deutsch-italienische Arbeitstagung von Sonderschulfachleuten am 7 
- 9. 11. 1979 in Stuttgart,” Kurzbericht, (December 11, 1979), B 93, Bd. 859, PA AA. 
101 Oberschulamt Freiburg, “Arbeitsgruppe im Oberschulamt Freiburg,” 5. 
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attributable to “socio-economic factors.” They argued that “the high correspondence between a 
child’s unsuccessful social situation and their transfer to special schools mirrored the 
unsatisfactory integration of many families of Italian workers” into West German society. The 
Italian representatives pointed out that children from these families were seldom sent to 
preschool for early training, leading to “continued linguistic difficulties … rendering integration 
in primary school impossible.” For the Italian representatives, it was this reason that “all too 
frequently led to enrollment in special schools.” Furthermore, the “frequent change of location of 
residence of the children and their families between Italy and Germany added another factor to 
the school failures.” A satisfactory solution for the special school problem was primarily to be 
found in improved integration for Italian workers (assurance of jobs, homes, etc.). For them, 
school problems could only be addressed by looking at wider social problems for “which a 
solution was desperately needed.”102 
The participants in the federally funded German-Italian Workshop of Special Education 
Specialists in November 1979 in Stuttgart came to different but overlapping conclusions. Dr. 
Poggio from the University of Tübingen presented the results of a year-long research project 
performed by local and Italian experts as well as a representative from the Regional School 
Administration in Tübingen. Over the previous year, the team had carried out a study examining 
82 Italian schoolchildren’s referrals to special schools around Tübingen. They found that 50 
percent of the transfers could have remained in normal classes.103 Interviewing the examiners, 
teachers, and children, the team’s researchers showed that “the reason for the high quota was the 
                                                
102 Ibid., 6. 
103 “2. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission für den Unterricht italienischer Schüler in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Rom vom 06. - 08. Februar 1980,” Protokoll (Rome, February 8, 1980), 12, B 93, 
Bd. 1151, PA AA. 
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perception of socio-cultural und affective deficits.” As Prof. Angeleri, one of the Italian 
representatives, would report to the Italian Foreign Office, the German authorities’ tests were 
tailored specifically to the West German cultural environment and with German children in 
mind.104 Teachers in the West German classroom were reading these children’s facial 
expressions and gesticulations as indicative of mental retardation. These cultural 
miscommunications were particularly severe when it came to children whose families came from 
Southern Italy (and had similar problems in moves to Northern Italy).105 
The 1979 workshop suggested additional reasons for cultural miscommunications leading 
to over-enrollment. As the Italian consular teachers and Italian representatives in the South 
Baden Working Group had claimed in 1977 and 1978 respectively, class background impacted 
the selection. The difference between the percentages of Italian versus German children enrolled 
in special schools dropped when comparing children from similar working-class family 
backgrounds.106 Both the German and Italian delegations further agreed that the experience of 
migration caused “mental disturbance” (seelische Störung). They argued that not only did the 
language barrier make integration difficult, but that the transition from predominately rural 
communities in Italy to West German cities added a layer of confusion. Some parents also 
moved frequently within West Germany “on account of the EC member state nationals’ freedom 
of movement.” Furthermore, participants in the workshop suggested that the parents’ own 
                                                
104 Ibid. 
105 KMK, “Schulsituation italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” IIc 3 - 24327/8, (June 14, 1983), 
B 304/6253, Bundesarchiv Koblenz.  
106 Hermann, “Arbeitstagung von Sonderschulfachleuten.” 
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unfamiliarity with their new surroundings had a negative impact, to which the West German side 
added the frequent employment of both parents as an additional detriment.107 
Fixing these issues proved challenging. Because individual teachers had the final 
recommendation their ingrained biases played a significant role. Yet, unconsciously reflecting 
social perceptions, teachers’ and psychologists’ assumptions of West German cultural superiority 
were difficult to alter through Ministry of Culture warnings .108 The problem was mitigated by 
the inclusion of Italian pedagogues in evaluation, which the KMK supported as a rule, and by 
allowing consulates to work as mediators between the teachers and parents.109 The Italian 
government and consular teachers further pushed the development of bilingual education. They 
argued that these classes would help work around German teachers’ biases by both celebrating 
Italian culture and including Italian teachers in the children’s education. Furthermore, they hoped 
classes taught in both German and Italian for schoolchildren with Italian citizenship would lessen 
                                                
107 “2. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-italienischen Kommission (1980),” February 8, 1980, 11; and KMK, 
“Schulsituation italienischer Kinder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Herr Prof. Angeleri wrote a report for the 
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Berlin, June 15, 1987); and “11. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht 
türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 21.-23. März 1990 in Berlin,” Kommuniqué (Berlin, 
March 23, 1990), 18, B 304/7794, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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the negative effects of cultural displacement. The Italian government also continued to hope that 
bilingual schools would encourage West Germans to learn Italian as well.110  
While the Italian government and its legation had demonstrated a willingness to explore 
the problem of over-enrollment of children with Italian citizenship in special schools in 1978 and 
1979, they were less forgiving of the problem in the 1980s and 1990s. In February 1980, during 
the Joint Expert Italian-German Commission’s second meeting, the Italian government expressed 
its horror at the continuing steep percentages of its citizens sent to special schools in comparison 
with West German citizens (7.9 compared to 4.0 percent, see Table 6.2). The Italian Government 
criticized the West German school administrations (particularly Baden-Württemberg) for the 
ongoing situation.111 The problem had not actually been solved.  
Despite the inclusion of Italian teachers in the referral process and emphasis on bilingual 
education, the over-enrollment of schoolchildren with Italian citizenship in special schools for 
the learning disabled would continue to be an issue. After 1980, the topic would cease to be a 
matter of primary importance, subsumed under other pressing concerns. Nonetheless, in later 
bilateral meetings (West) German and Italian delegations would continue to discuss the 
                                                
110 For a discussion of bilingual education, see Cristina Allemann-Ghionda and Saskia Pfeiffer, eds., Bildungserfolg, 
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matter.112 Even in 1992, the Italian Embassy would hang signs imploring parents to “save your 
children from special schools.”113 In contrast, for children with Turkish citizenship the issue of 
over-referrals would increase in importance over the mid-1980s, becoming a constant topic of 
discussion for multiple bilateral meetings and for concerned parents.114  
Gender Discrimination and the Image of Turkish Girls with Headscarves 
In the 1970s, and increasingly into the 1980s, many West German politicians and the 
media emphasized gender as a cause of disadvantage for the Federal Republic’s migrant and 
minority groups in the West German school system. Yet, where the West German educational 
administrations were responsible for fixing disadvantages associated with class and citizenship, 
or discrimination based on ethno-national identity, the media and politicians laid gender 
discrimination at the door of migrant and minority families and their supposedly patriarchal 
households. As “foreigner” gradually became synonymous with “Turkish,” West German actors 
focused their attention on “Turkish girls,” particularly “headscarf girls” (Kopftuchmädchen)115 
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children with learning disabilities in Turkey, see Christine Baxter, “Education of Mentally Handicapped Children: 
Turkey - (mission),” PP/1981-1983/1/5.3/03/Technical report (UNESCO Participation and Co-operation for 
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115 Interestingly, it still often is. When explaining that I study education for migrant groups after WWII in West 
Germany, the response is usually “so you meant the Turkish.”  
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Yet, as West German society and governmental institutions emphasized patriarchal oppression in 
Turkish households, they often disregarded continued gender disadvantages in the Federal 
Republic.  
West German emphasis on gender discrimination and its effect on schoolchildren with 
foreign citizenship had changed significantly since the 1960s. In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
educators and politicians worried that families kept “older children, usually girls” at home to do 
housework and care for younger siblings instead of fulfilling their compulsory schooling 
requirements. 116 News reports like Rolf Hartmann’s 4 June 1974 article in the Westdeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung about how “girls [were] hit the hardest” and were “[being] kept from 
schools” were hardly unusual.117 While the number of these girls or boys remains unknown, 
foreign consulate reports and individual stories indicate that at least some children were kept 
home for similar reasons, particularly in families in which both parents were employed.118 The 
foreign embassies and local school administrations worked together to overcome the problem by 
educating parents about the importance and legality of compulsory schooling. And at that it was 
general schooling that mattered. Not until the early 1970s did scholars and politicians emphasize 
                                                
116 No one was certain how many children might be skipping school, a concern discussed in Chapter 4 
(Bundesministerium für Familie und Jugend, “1. Jugendbericht: Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Lage der 
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vocational training for non-Germans. It would not be until the mid-1970s that they turned their 
attention explicitly to women with foreign citizenship’s labor and training.119  
That change in focus came in part out of women’s rights activists and left-leaning 
politicians’ (and a few conservatives’) work to change West German society by promoting 
gender equality. In the mid-1970s, activists began to see success as women’s rights in West 
Germany expanded. Legislators changed multiple West German laws limiting women’s voices in 
the family and in the workplace (e.g. establishing women’s right to work without their husband’s 
explicit permission).120 Historian Monika Mattes argued that their efforts were directly tied to the 
existence of the recruited “guest worker women,” which challenged the image of the woman as a 
homemaker and inspired West German activists to demand unfettered access to the workforce.121 
Whatever the cause, these female and male activists demanded that society take notice of the 
pervasive gender discrimination in West German and European society. In this newly sensitized 
environment, feminist activists, trying to root out any gender based discrimination, also turned to 
education, as well as to foreigners, guest workers, and particularly Turks.122  
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Part-Time Work, Gender Politics, and Social Change in West Germany, 1955-1969, trans. Pamela Selwyn (New 
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West German efforts to remedy gender-based discrimination both in and out of the 
schools emphasized women and girls specifically.123 Male individuals or sexual minorities with 
foreign citizenship were rarely discussed. When they did come into the conversation as subjects, 
men with foreign – and particularly Turkish – citizenship were often uncritically portrayed as 
aggressors keeping women down. School reports and the media painted boys, in turn, as 
patriarchs in training. Well-publicized reports of physical violence and honor killings added to 
that assumption in the West German ethnic majority’s imagination.124 Arguably, the stress on 
girls and women stemmed from the previous image of the immigrant, foreigner, and guest 
worker as male, despite the fact that one in three labor migrants had been female.125 Previously, 
minority women had almost exclusively appeared in tabloids and scholarly studies alike as part 
of a family, not as actors in their own right. Along the same lines, the schoolchild in West 
German discussions on education was usually depicted as a boy. These blind spots in 
combination frequently led politicians and scholars to overlook girls and women with foreign 
citizenship until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Scholars would need time, however, to publish 
any substantial studies. As late as 1984, Klaus Schweikert would write “in the Federal Republic 
of Germany there are approximately 2 million people about whom more or less nothing is 
known: immigrant girls and women.”126 
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As West German scholars began to explore the issue, political and media discussions of 
women and girls with foreign citizenship came to focus on the image of the “Turkish headscarf 
girl.” While representative of only a small slice of West German residents with Turkish 
citizenship, the picture was susceptible to photography. The iconographic image of an explicitly 
culturally-foreign girl became exoticized, standing in as an easy example of a foreign other.127 In 
tabloids like Bild or in weekly newsmagazine such as Der Spiegel, pictures of girls in 
headscarves or burkas began to appear and the headscarf became a symbol of male oppression 
and gender inequality. That perception was underscored by articles and reports on the arrival of 
mail-order brides, who were often illiterate.128 Increasingly West German politicians, educators, 
and feminists felt the need to save these allegedly unfortunate girls. They believed, as a principal 
in Baden-Württemberg argued in 1981, that these poor, oppressed “little headscarf girls” had 
their basic right to equality threatened in their own homes. Ignoring the diversity within the 
groups from West Germany, these politicians and educators overlooked the early secular 
movements and established families with Turkish citizenship who had lived in West Germany 
for more than a decade. They focused instead on newer arrivals and the groups of migrant from 
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verkauften Bräute: Türkische Frauen zwischen Kreuzberg und Anatolien (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983). 
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Turkey who, whether on account of familial pressure or personal choice, wore physical symbols 
of their faith or ethnic identity.129  
The Turkish Government actually agreed that the headscarf was a problem. Pushing 
western modernity and secularism, the state had begun restricting the wearing of religious 
clothing in 1923. In 1934, the government explicitly banned the fez for men and the headscarf 
for women working in civil service (of which there were few).130 The ban was supposed to be a 
part of the push for women’s equality, a shaking off of the repressive traditions of the past. 
However, the headscarf remained a marginal concern in citizenship politics until the 1950s, 
when rural-to-urban migration brought a significant number of women to the cities who still 
covered their heads. Instead of abandoning the headscarf, many of these women became more 
religious, or at least adhered more closely to their understanding of traditional norms.131 In 
response, as the government tried to tighten control of Turkish culture in the early 1980s, it 
explicitly banned the headscarf.  
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Many individuals with Turkish citizenship in the Federal Republic came from outside of 
major urban centers, often hailing from Anatolia.132 Some arrived with limited prior education 
and adhered to conservative versions of Islam. With restrictions in labor migration imposed since 
1973, many immigrants in the mid and late 1970s entering West Germany arrived as either part 
of the wave of family reunifications or as asylum seekers. Among these, some left Turkey for job 
prospects, applying for so-called “economic asylum.” But others made the trip to West Germany 
in order to escape cultural oppression or in search of religious freedom.133 
Responding to the large number of religiously-conservative families with Turkish 
citizenship in West Germany, the Turkish government tried to address the situation there as well. 
After reading a 1981 news report that Turkish girls sometimes wore headscarves in German 
schools, Müjgan Dericioglu, the new Educational Counsellor in the Turkish Embassy in Bonn, 
requested that the Kultusministerkonferenz forbid the use of the headscarf in West German 
schools. According to the Turkish government, “headscarves for religious reasons should [only] 
be worn in the mosque.”134 Despite the Turkish government’s support for banning the headscarf 
in West Germany, the Kultusministerkonferez refused. At that time, as the General Secretary of 
the KMK told Dericioglu, the school administrations in West German did not regulate 
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Eastern Turkey. Until recently, there was a high rate of illiteracy and limited state funding as the government 
concentrated on other social issues and projects. For a discussion of the development of Anatolia, see Uğur Üngör, 
The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). See also Education Committee, “Review of Educational Policy in Turkey: Examiners’ Report and 
Questions,” ED(87)2 (Paris: OECD, May 5, 1987), 1, OECD Archive. 
133 For a discussion asylum seekers from Turkey across Europe, see Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe, 176–201.  
134 Müjgan Dericioglu to Schulamt Recklinghausen, “Türkische Mädchen mit Kopftüchern im Schulunterricht,” 
April 20, 1981, B 304/6178, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Hermann, “Unterricht für türkische Schüler; hier: 
Antrittsbesuch der neuen Erziehungsrätin an der türkischen Botschaft beim Generalsekretär der KMK.” For a 
description of the relationship between the Turkish government and its citizens, see Karin Hunn, “Nächstes Jahr 
kehren wir zurück--”: Die Geschichte der türkischen “Gastarbeiter” in der Bundesrepublik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2005). 
  347 
schoolchildren’s clothing. The one major exception was for physical education, during which 
time schoolchildren were required to wear appropriate sports clothing.135  
Despite the ongoing public debate on the subject, actual evidence regarding gender 
discrimination from inside the families was difficult to evaluate. In 1981, a Federal Ministry of 
Education report on the “foreign girl in the German education system” claimed it could “not 
draw conclusions about foreign school girls’ school participation and educational expectations as 
available evidence was hardly quantifiable.”136 What West German school statistics did show 
was that girls were more likely to finish their school degrees than their male relatives, but less 
likely to start vocational training or find jobs.137 Despite lack of clear evidence, West German 
scholars, the media, and politicians placed such discrepancies at the door of parents and religious 
affiliations. They claimed that male members of these communities prevented their daughters, 
wives, and sisters from entering the work force.138 They usually overlooked West German 
foreigner laws (Ausländergesetze) limiting new immigrants’ – often wives’ – access to work 
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permits.139 This restriction was part of the “housewifization” of many immigrant women, which 
reflected the idea that women with non-German citizenship were only in the country to act as 
mothers and wives of migrant men before returning to their countries of origin. Supposedly in 
the Federal Republic to serve as culture-bearers for their children, West German officials argued 
that they did not need any vocational training.140 They further ignored the fact that the same 
points could still be made about some girls with West German citizenship. 
This is not to say that women’s rights activists or all left- or right-leaning politicians were 
unconcerned about the success of girls with West German citizenship or that they ignored girls 
with foreign citizenship. On the contrary, the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family, Women, and 
Health (hereafter Family Ministry) under Christian Democratic leadership expressed continued 
concern, committing support for research both on the situation of women and girls and to 
promote programs to combat the problem.141 As part of that research, the Family Ministry 
published its Sixth Youth Report in 1984 on “the improvement of equality of opportunity for 
girls in the Federal Republic.”142 The report argued that society’s organization still prevented the 
majority of women from working outside of traditional women’s spheres of employment and 
often from working at all. Even from the start, despite applying for diverse jobs and often 
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searching more intensively than their male counterparts, women had difficulties finding positions 
in vocational training (of which there were already too few). The Youth Report showed that, 
simply put, girls and women with West German citizenship still faced significant gender 
discrimination despite reforms removing legalized difference. 
Yet the Federal Government’s statistics on education and labor depicting enrollment in 
vocational training, retraining, or continued training opportunities suggested that girls and 
women with West German citizenship had a clear advantage over migrants. As Schweikert 
pointed out in 1984, only five percent of female migrants had taken advantage of vocational 
training measures. Of the MSBE programs financed by the Federal Government or other basic 
vocational training measures, only 25 percent of the participants were women. Furthermore, less 
than one percent of “female migrant workers had used the retraining, continued training and on-
the-job familiarization training opportunities on offer.” In contrast, men with foreign citizenship 
were 2.5 times more likely to take advantage of such opportunities, while women with German 
citizenship were three times more likely and men 4.5 times.143  
In the few pages that the 1984 Youth Report dedicated to girls with migrant backgrounds, 
the researchers argued that the reason for this discrepancy was because these girls and women 
not only faced the same disadvantages as girls and women with German citizenship, but also 
additional difficulties. The report suggested that these disadvantages stemmed from the families 
themselves as well as the migration process. Girls and women with foreign citizenship, the 
researchers felt, were not necessarily given the chance to succeed in the West German system as 
                                                
143 König stressed the inadequacy of the MSBE programs and Schweikert pointed out that the other programs 
mentioned above were not widely used by anyone (Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familien, Frauen und 
Gesundheit, “6. Jugendbericht: Verbesserung der Chancengleichheit von Mädchen in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland,” Unterrichtung (Bonn: Bonner Universitäts-Buckdruckerei, February 15, 1984), 12, 40–43; 
Schweikert, “Female Migrants in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 4–5; de Troy, “The Specific Training Needs of 
Immigrant Women,” 35; König, Berufsvorbereitende und berufliche Bildungsmaßnahmen für Ausländer; and 
Christine Schmarsow, “Ausländische Mädchen im deutschen Bildungssystem”).  
  350 
many “girls of a marriageable age (between 15-25) were being sent back to their homes” or 
chose to leave West Germany.144 According to the Family Ministry, their families and their roles 
as migrants limited their chances in the West German labor market by ending their residence in 
West Germany just as these women would have entered vocational training, thereby skewing 
statistics.145  
Politicians like Hanna-Renate Laurien, the Berlin Senator of Education, also claimed that 
the problem lay with the families. In contrast, however, she argued that families with foreign 
citizenship did not understand the West German system or the value of participating in 
vocational training, and thus did not encourage or allow their children to enroll. According to 
Laurien, it needed to be made clearer to Turkish families how necessary “a vocational education 
was for their children, particularly for girls.”146 Some Länder set up parent education campaigns 
to try and explain the necessity of participation, stressing the compulsory nature of vocational 
training for everyone, even immigrant schoolchildren arriving after completing their compulsory 
schooling in their countries of origin.147 
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Quantifying the exact level of repression female schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship 
faced due to West German gender discrimination, on account of their status as national 
minorities, or because their families were unsupportive is well nigh impossible. Social pressure 
from both within and outside the family was often patriarchal in nature. The assumption of many 
West German teachers that Turkish and other foreign students were incapable of performing well 
in the system led to frustrations and disadvantage. Schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship were 
also referred at a high rate (around seven percent) to special schools for the learning disabled. 
Pendular and return migration further skewed the possible analysis of how many children chose 
to complete their education or continue into vocational schools.  
Unable to establish a clear cause, in the early 1980s the Federal and Länder governments 
decided to solve the problem by establishing a series of pilot programs to integrate young people 
into the West German labor market. The limited data available suggested that seventeen percent 
of the participants in the federally-funded programs available to everyone were female. The 
Federal Ministry for Education and some of the Länder also financed a small selection of 
vocational training programs specifically for “immigrant women,” or young women with non-
German citizenship (usually with a maximum of 10-90 participants). Focused on social need in 
areas with a large minority presence, many of these programs promoted training for preschool 
teachers, interpreters, or hospital workers. Yet, despite popularity and continued need, the 
funding for many of these programs would run out or be cut between 1983 and 1985 after the 
CDU/CSU-FDP government took over with Helmut Kohl as Chancellor. Kohl’s government 
initially argued against integration programs, claiming that the government should provide 
equality of opportunity by ensuring that the same programs were available to everyone, not by 
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providing extra services.148 Toward the middle and end of the 1980s, however, the Federal 
Government would turn toward multiculturalism and promoting integration through contact 
between individuals with and without German citizenship.149  
Conclusion  
For many educators and administrators, including the Social Democratic Federal 
Ministers of Education Jürgen Schmude (1978-1981) and Bjoern Engholm (1981-1982), the 
apparent discrimination against children with foreign citizenship meant that West German 
residents “with foreign backgrounds” required social support, specialized education, and 
assistance with employment.150 The men and women involved in integration debates made these 
claims regarding the needs of children with migrant backgrounds as a way to escape dire 
predictions about their “future chances.”151 Governmental and expert reports warned of a time to 
come plagued by crime, a vanishing “German” people – defined only as those with ethnic-
German ancestry – and endemic high unemployment unless something was done.152 In order to 
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meet these needs and avoid the creation of an underclass of ghettoized and impoverished 
foreigners, politicians from all major parties agreed that “integration of those foreigners – in 
particular the children and youths – who live [in West Germany] needs to be improved,” and 
each major political party turned to education as a solution.153 
In the early 1980s, however, this initial fervor turned into a widespread concern that 
perhaps full integration was not possible at all. Even before Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl 
became Chancellor in 1982, the West German media and several left, liberal, and right-wing 
politicians argued that the SPD and FDP’s attempts had failed. With the second oil crisis 
sparking further increases in unemployment, and turning the German ethnic majority’s 
sentiments against foreigners, Kohl was able to win the 1982 vote partly on an anti-immigrant 
platform. Kohl used public fears that an under-class of non-Germans was developing and 
concern that German culture was disappearing to take a tough stance against “guest workers and 
their families” as well as against asylum seekers and refugees.154  
Once in office, Kohl’s government shifted the responsibility for education from the state 
to individual families. The international and most national communities had seen the state as 
being responsible for ensuring the availability of programs to even the scholastic playing field. In 
the early 1980s, however, Kohl’s conservative-liberal government claimed that it was the 
migrant families’ and families with migrant backgrounds’ responsibility for taking the 
opportunities that schools afforded everyone. It was their fault if they fell through the cracks, and 
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it was not the state’s task to catch them. Part of that change was a reduction in funding and 
support for extra education programs, like homework help or support for vocational training.  
The Federal Republic was not the only European government to take a conservative turn. 
Across the continent, partly in response to the decline in economic growth, conservative neo-
liberal governments took power. As a consequence, budgets for social programs were cut and 
support for educational expansions was withdrawn. Where the state had previously been held 
responsible for ensuring equality, many conservative governments argued against state 
interference. In the European Community, the sentiment turned against continued migration, 
moving the EC to become Fortress Europe. 
Despite significant withdrawals of federal financial support, the CDU/CSU-FDP Federal 
Government coalition demanded some level of cultural assimilation into West German society. 
While this had long been the party’s stance, reports on domestic abuse, honor killings, and 
arranged marriages within minority communities demanded redress and heightened the perceived 
need for immediate integration.155 Muslim households were viewed as repressive familial 
structures that denied daughters their individual rights, while supporting only male children.156 
Many conservative politicians argued that some level of integration, or preferably assimilation, 
was necessary to overcome these human rights abuses. As reports of this nature proliferated, 
federal ministries – including the Ministry of Education and the Family Ministry – emphasized 
the importance of schooling not only for the provision of opportunity and integration, but also as 
a way to save children – especially girls – from their conservative and fundamentalist families. 
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CHAPTER 7: FROM A CONSERVATIVE PUSH FOR RETURN MIGRATION TO 
MULTICULTURALISM (1982–1990) 
On October 13, 1982, the new Chancellor Helmut Kohl delivered his first speech to the 
West German Bundestag titled “A Coalition of the Center: For a Policy of Renewal,” in which 
he presented the program of the newly elected CDU/CSU-FDP government. Building on his 
protectionist stance and campaign promises to halve the number of foreign citizens in West, he 
declared that he would limit new migration “precisely in the interest of the children, who have a 
right to their own family.” He went on to tell the Members of Bundestag that “the foreigners who 
would like to go back to their homeland must be assisted in doing so. Foreigners in Germany 
should be able to decide freely, but they must decide if they want to return to their country of 
stay here and integrate.”1 Local West German schools were supposed to provide classes to 
support either the one or the other.  
At the end of the decade, however, the same Chancellor Kohl celebrated diversity within 
German society. In the preface of the Report ’99: On the Situation of Foreign Employees and 
their Families – Survey and Perspectives for the 1990s, he explicitly advocated “respect, 
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tolerance, and openness” between “we Germans … and our fellow foreign residents.”2 Schools 
were now supposed to promote and support multiculturalism, as well as teach students to 
celebrate the multiplicity of cultures and citizenships – and by extension identities – within 
society.  
Both Kohl’s stance at the beginning of and at the end of the decade reflected major 
economic and political transformations in West Germany and Europe. At the beginning of that 
decade, West German politics reflected a conservative turn across the European Community 
Member States. As the 1981 Oil Crisis again led to a global recession, several governments, 
including the new CDU/CSU-FDP government of the Federal Republic, embraced a neo-liberal 
economic turn; they began cutting government spending and fell back on a rhetoric of “national 
homogeneity.” These conservative grabbed hold of the line in the European Community 
Directive 486/77 from 1977 on the education of the children of migrant workers promoting 
native language and cultural classes in support of return to suggest that non-nationals should 
return to their countries of citizenship or origin, thus removing the burden of their care from their 
host country.3  
Support for programs for return migration in West Germany also stemmed from feelings 
that the school initiatives widely funded in the 1970s had failed. All of the money and effort 
poured into the schooling of children with non-German citizenship had, it seemed, failed to stem 
continued reports of the bilingual illiteracy of many schoolchildren, and thousands of youths (15 
                                                
2 Helmut Kohl, “Vorwort von Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl,” in Bericht ’99: zur Situation der ausländischen 
Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien: Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven für die 90er Jahre, ed. Bernd Geiss, 2nd ed. 
(Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, 1990), 7.  
3 Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, 
Flüchtlinge (Munich: Beck, 2001), 244–249; Rita Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 117–119, 142–154; and Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe: From 
Guest Worker to Transnational Citizen (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011), 21–23. 
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to eighteen) with foreign citizenship failed to find spaces in vocational training programs.4 Some 
education researchers and officials argued that the Kultusministerkonferenz’s dual goals, 
promoted in the 1976 revisions to the Recommendations on the schooling of migrant workers’ 
children, were in fact a double burden, preventing children from either integrating or maintaining 
their cultural and lingual heritage. That feeling of failure contributed to demands that the 
children or their parents choose: either fully integrate into West German society or leave.5 
In contrast to the push for full assimilation or emigration by Christian conservatives, 
many politicians in the SPD and the new Green Party, founded in 1980 on a predominantly 
environmental platform, continued to support bi- and multiculturalism. They argued that West 
Germany had changed, and its society needed to acknowledge that the country was home to a 
multicultural society. In the end it was the idea multiculturalism that captured the larger public’s 
support during the mid- and late 1980s, partly in response of the failure of the Kohl 
administration to actually reduce the number of resident non-citizens.6 Yet, academics and 
various state politicians and representatives espoused a number of different versions of this 
concept, as historian Rita Chin has shown in her 2007 study on the guestworker quesitons in 
postwar Germany.7 Beyond the host county’s divisive definitions of inclusion and identity, 
however, the countries of citizenship continued to play a direct role in shaping their citizens’ 
identities and education options in countries like West Germany. Depending on the county of 
                                                
4 See, for example, “Die meisten Ausländerkinder verlassen die Schule ohne Abschluß: Sie werden zu Analphabeten 
in zwei Sprachen,” Die Welt, March 28, 1979; and “‘Sie sind Analphabeten in zwei Sprachen’: Kreuzberger 
Türkenkinder ohne Integrationschancen / Lehrer an der 7. Grundschule: Der Senat spart am falschen Ende,” 
Volksblatt, September 21, 1982. 
5 Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 142. 
6 Eberhard Nitschke, “Ausländer finden freundliches Klima,” Die Welt, December 7, 1985; and Jürgen Raschert, 
“Wie Schulen zu interkulturellen Handlungseinheiten werden,” Zeitschrift für Pädagogik, 1987. 
7 Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 192–194. 
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citizenship’s (e.g. Italy, Greece, or Turkey) specific internal circumstances, the governments 
supported different definitions of the term, reinforcing their own definitions of nationalism and 
identity.  
The school programs created by the local Länder and foreign governments reflected their 
political goals and stances regarding the place of foreign citizens in West German society. 
Different states supported programs for return migration, bicultural education, or foreign 
language education depending on their stance on multiculturalism, integration, and belonging, as 
well as their financial flexibility. Over the decade, as governments altered their goals, European 
Community aims changed, and the political winds shifted, so too did support for different 
education programs.  
Pushing West Germany’s Minority Groups to Leave 
The European Council Directive 486/77 on the education of the children of migrant 
workers from July 1977 stipulated that host countries “offer [education in] the mother tongue and 
of the culture of the country of origin with a view principally to facilitating their possible 
reintegration into the Member State of origin.” This directive colored the development of school 
initiatives for migrant and minority children in West Europe for the following decade.8 Both host 
countries and country-of-citizenship governments designed and advocated education programs 
encouraging schoolchildren to return to their countries of citizenship. Arguments from politicians 
across the political spectrum supported this venture. In West Germany politicians from the 
CDU/CSU claimed that, without such classes, children were bound to remain. These children 
would be too disconnected from their (parents’) countries of origin, and thus incapable of easy 
                                                
8 Council of the European Communities, “Council Directive 77/486/EEC of 25 July 1977 on the Education of the 
Children of Migrant Workers,” Official Journal L 199 (August 6, 1977): 77. 
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assimilation. In contrast, politicians from the Green Party (including the Alternative Liste für 
Demokratie und Umweltschutz (AL)) and the SPD stressed long-established claims pointing to 
the importance of classes acknowledging the children’s cultural heritage.9 By learning their 
(grand-) parents’ cultures, the political Left, including the Social Democratic Party, argued that 
the children would have a choice regarding their futures.10 In this atmosphere, the Kohl 
government and most Länder Ministries of Education continued supporting programs for cultural 
training that had taken off in the 1960s and mid-1970s, but cut programs for integration. 
Working together with the country-of-citizenship governments, the West German Education 
Administrations also began developing courses specifically to promote return, both in West 
Germany and in the countries of citizenship.  
The impetus behind the different political parties’ support for emigration stemmed in part 
from the economic crisis and the resulting strains of public funding. During the 1970s, the West 
German Federal Government under SPD-FDP leadership had increased social spending on the 
federal level as had the Länder governments. When unemployment jumped at the beginning of 
the 1980s in the context of the global recession, the state coffers were empty.11 Under the new 
                                                
9 In 1980, for example, Green party politicians in Baden-Württemberg used the political importance of return in 
order to support mother language and cultural classes. (Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 153). For 
more on the development of the Green party in West Germany before 1984, see Elim Papadakis, The Green 
Movement in West Germany, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2014). The Alternative Liste was political party in West 
Berlin that would eventually become part of the Green Party (Roger Karapin, \iProtest Politics in Germany: 
Movements on the Left and Right Since the 1960s (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2009), 127). 
10 Beauftragter für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Bericht zur 
Ausländerpolitik” (Bonn: Der Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, March 19, 1984), 39–40; and 
Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 42–53.  
11 During the economic ups and downs of the 1970s, the state budget declined and unemployment rose. Between 
1975 and 1980, the percentage of unemployed workers had briefly sunk, but begun to climb steadily again. Then, 
between 1980 and 1981, the rate of unemployment jumped from 3.8 to 5.5 percent (the previous high in 1975 had 
been 4.7). Each one of those 1.2 million individuals, 168 thousand of whom had foreign citizenship (in 1980 889 
thousand total, 107 foreign citizens), were supposed to receive support from the welfare state (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch 1982, 106). See also Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen, and 
Stephen Castles, “Germany: Immigration and Social Exclusion in a Declining Welfare State,” in Migration, 
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conservative CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government public policy took a neoliberal turn. The dual 
goal was to reduce the number of unemployed and to cut government spending for the 
unemployed. To reach this goal, Kohl’s administration pushed for a limitation of federal 
interventions, arguing that it could no longer support any “extras,” including education support 
programs. In following, the Federal Government withdrew most support for Länder projects. In 
order to handle unemployment, the Government attempted to decrease the number of foreign 
workers in the country alongside attempting to discourage married women, particularly mothers, 
from participating in the work force.12  
This neoliberal turn and emphasis on limited spending contributed to two changes 
regarding the federal stance on non-Germans’ place in the country. First, the Federal SDP-FDP 
coalition Government’s programs developed before 1982 were premised largely on future 
choice.13 Under the new CDU/CSU-FDP government, the administration demanded children and 
their parents make their decision to stay or go now, not later. The children, accordingly, needed 
to either fully integrate, adopting at least a minimum of “Germannness” or, preferably, leave the 
country for their country of citizenship.14 There would be no need to try and combine thouse 
goals as the choice, made in the immediate present, was a done deal. Second, where the old SPD-
FDP Government had argued that the state was responsible for providing school measures to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 137–
62. 
12 Jeremy Leaman, The Political Economy Of Germany Under Chancellors Kohl And Schroder: Decline of the 
German Model? (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013), 26, 121. For a discussion of the FDP’s stance on family 
reunification, see Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 103–114.  
13 See, for example, Deutscher Bundestag, “Drucksache 8/1811: Antrag der Abg. Hasinger, et al. und der Fraktion 
der CDU/CSU betr.: Zukunftschancen der Kinder ausländischer Arbeitnehmer,” Verhandlungen des Deutschen 
Bundestages (Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag, May 17, 1978).  
14 Beauftragter für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Bericht Zur 
Ausländerpolitik,” 33–34.  
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equalize access and facilitate integration, the new CDU/CSU-FDP government claimed 
responsibility for these things lay with the families themselves. They, once again, could choose 
to integrate and take advantage of available resources, or they could leave. While Länder 
governments continued to express concern about integration, the Christian conservative Federal 
Government argued that it held little or no responsibility.15 
Part of the Kohl administration’s stance stemmed from its view of Germanness and 
certain minority groups. Many Christian conservative politicians felt that German culture needed 
to be protected and preserved from foreign influence.16 They claimed that integration was 
impossible for many minority groups, and particularly for Turks. Turkish children were too 
foreign to ever be completely German. Why, then, should the government support integration? 
The same argument applied to culture-specific education, but with the addition that, while 
minority groups had every right to preserve their own cultures, it was far better (and easier) for 
them to do so in their own countries.17  
Accoringly, one of Kohl’s first measures at Chancellor once in office, in October 1982, 
was to try and establish a program to reduce the foreigner population in West German. With this 
initiative the CDU/CSU tried to keep its campaign promise to encourage foreign residents to 
leave .18 Because of internal conflict between CDU/CSU and FDP, however, the government 
failed to develop its own program. Instead, it pulled out an abandoned plan from the previous 
                                                
15 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 244–248. Following neoliberal policies, the Kohl 
government did not advocate education for all, but rather schooling for those who had a legal entitlement. Groups 
like asylum seekers (discussed in Chapter 8) were systematically excluded. 
16 Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe, 28; and Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 215. 
17 Bernd Geiss, Wehrpflicht für Ausländer und Doppelstaater, 5th ed. (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, 
1989); and Chin, The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany, 144–149. 
18 Gerda Strack, “Rückkehr in die Heimat unterstützen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 21, 1983. 
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Federl Government under SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and implemented it, beginning in 
November 1983. The program, “Support for the Preparedness of Foreigners to Return,” 
permitted non-nationals to collect their social security if they moved back to their supposed 
home countries.19 To take advantage of the program, however, applicants had to formally apply 
by June 1984 with the intention to migrate by the end of September of the same year, which 
required non-German citizens to decide immediately.20 The program would be judged a failure, 
as the population of non-Germans did not in fact sink as much as the new CDU/CSU-FDP 
government had promised, but tens of thousands of individuals and families with non-German 
citizenship did leave.21  
Among those individuals with foreign citizenship who emigrated from West Germany 
were tens of thousands of children. With less assistance in the schools and increased social 
xenophobia, these schoolchildren decided to emigrate (often without their parents), either to 
pursue education opportunities in their countries of citizenship or to escape discrimination in 
West Germany.22 As part of that outflow, some 40,000 schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship 
                                                
19 Bundesministers für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Referat L 6, “Gesetzentwurf zur Förderung der 
Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern beschlossen,” Sozialpolitische Informationen, (June 22, 1983): 3; 
“Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern wird nun finanziell Gefördert” XVII, no. 15 (December 9, 1983): 2; 
Beauftragter für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und Ihrer Familienangehörigen, “Bericht zur 
Ausländerpolitik,” 33–34. See also Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 249–262; and Konrad 
H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, trans. Brandon Hunziker (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 245–247.  
20 Bundesministers für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Referat L 6, “Gesetzentwurf zur Förderung der 
Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern beschlossen”; Bundespressestelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, 
“DGB: Rückkehrprämie Ist Eine Politische Fehlgeburt,” Nachrichten Dienst 188/83 (June 22, 1983); and Walter 
Ludsteck, “Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik: Ungeliebt, doch unentbehrlich: Auszug der Ausländer würde nicht 
alle Arbeitsmarktprobleme lösen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 24, 1983. 
21 Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, 
Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 45. For some press on the program, see “Pirkl: 200 000 
Türken werden heimkehren,” Die Welt, February 24, 1984; and “Rückkehrförderung / Positive Bilanz gezogen: Zahl 
der Anträge lag hinter den Erwartungen,” Handelsblatt, July 12, 1984. 
22 Jan Skrobanek, “Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Identity and the (Re-) Ethnicisation of Youth with a Turkish 
Ethnic Background in Germany,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 4 (April 1, 2009): 535–54; and 
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left the FRG between 1983 and 1984. In consequence, although the total number of 
schoolchildren with non-German citizenship in West German public schools continued to 
increase between 1979 and 1988, there was a brief period of decline in 1984-85 (see Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1: Number of Schoolchildren with Non-German Citizenship in West German 
Public Schools by Citizenship and Percent of Total, 1979–198823 
 Total W. German 
Total  
Non- 
German 
% Italian % Greek % Turkish % 
1979! 9,394,554 ! 8,842,504 ! 552,050! 5.9! 73,880! 0.8! 49,210! 0.5! 252,476! 2.7!
1980! 9,093,526 ! 8,455,225 ! 638,301! 7.0! 76,332! 0.8! 50,776! 0.6! 317,509! 3.5!
1981! 8,772,287 ! 8,073,792 ! 698,495! 8.0 79,649! 0.9! 52,366! 0.6! 359,713! 4.1!
1982! 8,380,608 ! 7,655,804 ! 724,804! 8.6! 78,446! 0.9! 51,718! 0.6! 380,579! 4.5!
1983! 7,955,351 ! 7,241,130 ! 714,221! 9.0! 74,516! 0.9! 48,368! 0.6! 375,369! 4.7!
1984! 7,501,998 ! 6,834,409 ! 667,589! 8.9! 71,003! 0.9! 44,521! 0.6! 336,270! 4.5!
1985! 7,128,190 ! 6,460,990 ! 667,200! 9.4! 69,136! 1.0! 41,495! 0.6! 331,592! 4.7!
1986! 6,954,895 ! 6,270,425 ! 684,470! 9.8! 69,380! 1.0! 38,609! 0.6! 335,953! 4.8!
1987! 6,777,696 ! 6,070,193 ! 707,503! 10.4! 70,470! 1.0! 37,398! 0.6! 344,642! 5.1!
1988! 6,707,376 ! 5,970,169 ! 737,207! 11.0! 71,662! 1.1! 37,534! 0.6! 353,317! 5.3!
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ming-Bao Yue, “Whereto for Multiculturalism? The German Debate on Leitkultur and the Promise of Cultural 
Studies,” in Managing Ethnic Diversity: Meanings and Practices from an International Perspective, ed. Hasmath 
Reza (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 199–219. School children interviewed would mention how the 
West German majority’s social rejection pushed to decide to be foreign (“‘Nicht Türken und nicht Deutsche?’: Die 
zweite Generation der Arbeitsemigranten kehrt in die Heimat der Eltern zurück,” Die Tageszeitung, September 18, 
1984). 
23 KMK, Ausländische Schüler und Schulabsolventen 1983 bis 1992, vol. 128, Statistische Veröffentlichungen der 
KMK (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 1994), 17; KMK (Germany), Ausländische Schüler in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, 1970 bis 1983, Statistische Veröffentlichungen der KMK (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 1984), 4. See 
also Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: 
W. Kohlhammer, 1990), 342; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1989), 351; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch 
für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1990), 357; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 
ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1986), 354; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer, 1987), 349; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1988), 357; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, ed., Statistisches 
Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1985), 357. 
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The decision to leave West Germany also depended on conditions in the country of 
citizenship. Because the economic and social situations in Greece, Spain, and Portugal had 
improved and these states had joined the European Community many families from theses three 
countries opted to leave West Germany. Reflecting those decisions to return, the number of 
children with Greek citizenship in West Germany dropped (as did the total number of Spanish 
and Portuguese schoolchildren) by more than 1,000 a year until plateauing in 1986 at between 
37,000 and 38,000.24 By contrast, the number of children in West Germany with Italian 
citizenship briefly increased at the beginning of the decade, before dropping and then stabilizing 
between 69,000 and 71,000. Despite the temporary decline, however, the overall number of 
schoolchildren with foreign citizenship living in West Germany rose over the 1980s until more 
than one in ten schoolchildren had non-German citizenship. That population growth was 
predominately due to an increase in the number of schoolchildren with Yugoslavian citizenship 
(see Table 8.1) and other “non-traditional minority groups,” as well as, after 1986, 
schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship. As historian Ulrich Herbert emphasized in his 2001 
study Ausländerpolitik (Foreigner Policies), Kohl’s promises to reduce the number of non-
Germans in West Germany remained unfulfilled.25 
For those who did choose to remain and for new migrants, the Kohl administration 
continued to persue its neo liberal policies. The CDU/CSU-FDP Federal government continued 
to rhetorically support programs for German language instruction and vocational training. But, 
following its agenda, the Federal Government cut much of its financial support for the school 
                                                
24 It should be noted that part of the reason for the relatively stable number of schoolchildren was on account of 
minor, continual out- and in migration. Not all of the children year to year were the same, even if the majority were 
(Ulrich Herbert, \iGeschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, 
Flüchtlinge (München: Beck, 2001), 251–258). 
25 Ibid., 249–262; and Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, 
Perspektiven, 48–53, 80–87.  
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measures in place, such as the vocational training programs and the “measures for social and 
vocational integration of foreign youths” (MSBE) programs. Whereas in 1980 the SPD-FDP 
Federal Government had paid 12.3 million Deutsch Marks for the program, in 1986 the 
CDU/CSU-FDP government only paid 5.2 million (see Table 7.1).26  
The federal cuts of the 1980s hit programs for homework help particularly hard. The 
Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs had provided the bulk of the funding behind many 
of these programs in several of the Länder (including West Berlin). Consequently, it was a major 
blow when, in 1985, the Ministry announced that it would be tapering off its support and 
bringing financial help to an end in 1987. Many of the Länder Ministries of Education protested 
without regard to their political orientation. The Christian Democratic Senator for Schools in 
Berlin, Hanna Renate Laurien, for example, was dismayed. She wrote the Ministry for Labor and 
Social Affairs to explain what an important role the classes played for both citizens and foreign 
nationals. Receiving apathetic responses from the Federal Government, the CDU-FDP Senate in 
Berlin and other Länder Education Administrations began a long process of budget review in an 
attempt to find monies to continue homework help programs. Regardless of these efforts, the 
Länder often did not have the budget to support these programs themselves. As a result, despite 
widespread protest, these programs were cut back or shut down. 
Although the Kohl administration’s neoliberal policies pushed cuts in government 
spending, its emphasis on return migration led to the active support and funding of programs that 
facilitated this aim. Both the relevant foreign governments and the West German Ministries of 
                                                
26 For a description of the Maßnahmen zur sozialen und beruflichen Eingliederung ausländischer Jugendliche 
(MBSE) programs, see Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, ed., Berufsbildungsbericht 1981 (Bonn: 
Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, 1981), 75, 98. In 1980, the social democratic-liberal Federal 
government paid 12.3 million Deutsch Marks for the program. Ibid., 142; and Bundesminister für Bildung und 
Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1987 (Bad Honnef: Bock, 1987), 192. In 1985/86, 3,021 youths with foreign 
citizenship took part in the program, 1,039 youths fewer than the previous school year. 68.3 percent of those youths 
had Turkish citizenship (Bundesminister für Bildung und Wissenschaft, Berufsbildungsbericht 1981, 75). 
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Education felt the need to take action and help the children succeed in their country of 
citizenships’ school systems. On the side of the Länder Ministries of Educations, part of their 
motivation was the feeling of failure. Believing in their own system’s superiority and claiming 
that local education programs were supposed to enable smooth (re)integration, the emigrating 
schoolchildren’s difficulties represented a breakdown of the West German system. The countries 
of citizenships’ Ministries of Education, in turn, did not want unemployable citizens on their 
hands and hoped to take advantage of any skill sets developed West Germany.27 Because of 
overlapping interests, they collaborated with the West German government to develop 
integration programs to help foreign Germans integrate into unfamiliar school systems after 
emigration.28 
That concern was hardly new. The Greek Ministry of Education, for example, had been 
working to address the issue since the 1960s. At that time, the Greek government’s concerns had 
centered on secondary education and equivalency. That issue was largely solved in the mid-
1970s when the Greek government recognized the German school certificate (discussed in 
Chapter 5).29 In consequence, in the 1980s the West German and foreign state’s Ministries of 
Education were able to turn towards resolving problems with vocational training and growing 
concern over the concept of belonging. During the exodus in the early 1980s, many left West 
Germany with the hope of finally fitting in. But West German residents with foreign citizenship, 
                                                
27 “11. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 21.-23. März 1990 in Berlin,” Kommuniqué (Berlin, March 23, 1990), 1–2, 14, B 
304/7794, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
28 Auswärtige Amt to Zentralstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung, Auslandsabteilung, “Deutsche Lehrer für die Türkei; hier: 
Vermittlung durch die ZAV,” August 2, 1985, B 304/6181, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
29 Although not always solved to everyone’s satisfaction. While secondary school certificates were now recognized, 
the level of recognition continued to be disputed. For example, the Greek and Italian governments argued that West 
Germany should view its secondary school certificate as the equivalent of the Realschule certificate rather than the 
lower secondary (“7. Stizung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission vom 12. - 14. Dezember 
1990 in Bonn,” Protokoll (Bonn, December 14, 1990), B 304/6120, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
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despite the West German ethno-national majority’s claims that they were foreign, clearly were 
not quite “Italian,” “Greek,” or “Turkish” either. Upon arriving in their country of citizenship, 
“returning” children, who had often been born and raised in Germany, frequently faced crises of 
identity. Many children discovered that their knowledge base was almost entirely different than 
that of their age cohort, leading to teasing and rejection on the grounds that they were 
“German.”30 
In Turkey, the Ministry of Education developed “Anadolu schools” in Istanbul and 
Ankara, as well as a few other cities, to try and assist the flood of schoolchildren returning to 
Turkey in 1983/84 in response to the Kohl government’s anti-foreigner policies and pressure 
from the ethno-national German majority to leave.31 When 40,000 schoolchildren arrived from 
West Germany (see Table 7.1), the Turkish government struggled to accommodate them. 
Expecting the pace to continue, the Turkish government expended significant efforts to ease their 
transition, organizing schools and programs to support their language and cultural needs.32 To do 
so, teachers in the Anadolu schools were supposed to provide instruction partly in German 
(preferably given by teachers from Germany) and partly in Turkish (by local teachers) in order to 
promote integration. The Turkish school system in the 1980s emphasized connection to the state 
and cultural capital alongside the acquisition of reading, writing, and arithmetic. 
                                                
30 Auswärtige Amt, Referat 203, “Ankara-Besuch des niedersächsischen Kultusministers Oschatz (14.-16. 4. 1987)” 
(Ankara, April 24, 1987), B 304/6043, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Brian J.K. Miller, “İlk Ders İstiklal Marşı Oldu: 
Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity, 1984-85” (38th Annual Social Science and History Association Meeting, 
Chicago, November 24, 2013). 
31 Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, “Schulische Wiedereingliederung türkischer 
Rückwandererkinder,” 612-600.65/1, (April 3, 1985), B 304/6181, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Turkish Ministry of 
Education, “Vorschläge des türkischen Ministeriums für nationale Erziehung Jugend und Sport zur Verbesserung 
der Chancengleichheit hinsichtlich der Integrationsmöglichkeiten türkischer Gastarbeiterkinder der 2. Generatin in 
der BRD” (Mainz, June 1985), B 304/6181, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
32 Miller, “Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity.” 
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Investing in programs encouraging migration, the West German Federal and Länder 
governments agreed to assist the Turkish government in staffing and running the schools. 
Although assistance would begin only after a delay, in 1985 the West German Foreign Office 
and representatives from the Länder (including from the Kultusministerkonferenz), agreed to 
send seven German teachers to teach in Turkish schools and the Foreign Office agreed to cover 
their salaries and travel expenses out of their school fund.33 
Despite Turkey’s efforts and eventual West German assistance, integration was not 
always smooth and these programs only had limited success. The first and most basic hurdle was 
that, in moving to Turkey, schoolchildren from West German usually dispersed, with many 
moving to the countryside and away from the urban centers in which the Anadolu schools were 
established. Even in the urban centers where the Anadolu schools were located, there was not 
always have enough German teachers to actually provide the promised German language 
instruction. Added to that, both inside and outside of the Anadolu schools, many schoolchildren 
found the differences between the West German and Turkish systems overwhelming or their 
teachers and classmates less than appreciative of their cultural differences.34 
                                                
33 A further eighteen had already applied and the Foreign Office was vetting them (Auswärtige Amt to Sekretariat 
der Kultusministerkonferenz, “Schulische Wiedereingliederung türkischer Rückwandererkinder”). The meeting was 
to discuss how the German side can help with the scholastic reintegration (schulische Wiedereingliederung) of 
Turkish children, who either with or without their parents have (re-) migrated from the FRG to Turkey.  
The Council of Europe and UNESCO became involved with German teachers in Turkey and programs for helping 
reintegration. The Council of Europe gave the Sekretariat a yearly report for 1987/88 about a Pilot Program/class at 
the Anadolu Lisesi Kemal Yurtbili in Turkey funded by the Council of Europe. The program’s creators aimed to 
smoothly reintegrate schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship from the Federal Republic into the Turkish school 
system. Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz to Mitglieder des Ausschusses für ausländische Arbeitnehmer, 
“Unterricht für türkische Schüler:; hier: “Jahresbericht 1987/88 über eine Versuchsklasse des Europarates in der 
Türkei,” October 7, 1988, B 304/6180, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
34 “8. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der 
BRD vom 10. – 12. June 1985 in Izmir,” Kommuniqué (Bonn, June 12, 1985), 17, B 304/7794, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz; Auswärtige Amt, Referat 203, “Ankara-Besuch des niedersächsischen Kultusministers Oschatz (14.-16. 4. 
1987)”; and Miller, “Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity.”  
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North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister of Culture, Social Democrat Hans Schwier35 heard 
about some of those difficulties first hand in 1986 during a trip to meet with the Turkish Minister 
of National Education, Youth, and Sports, Metin Emiroğlu.36 During that visit, Schwier went to 
see an Anadolu school.37 It was Republic Day (29 October), a national holiday during which 
normal classes were suspended in favor of poetry recitals and other activities. In honor of the 
foreign visit, the school had 300 uniformed school children – all returned from Germany – stand 
in rows to sing the national anthem and recite Atatürk sayings, including “Sovereignty belongs 
unconditionally to the Nation.”38 After the recital, the children reported their perception of the 
manifold hurdles to integration in Turkey. They commented on the “hideous school uniforms,” 
“austere discipline,” “rote memorization without meaning or purpose,” and “continuous moral 
appeals” (Moralappelle). Furthermore, the pupils were instructed that the girls should not be 
seen too long with boys. According to Schwier’s report, which, granted, was biased in favor of 
the West German system, the pupils claimed that in Germany everything was totally different, 
freer. In the German ambassador’s report on the same visit, he emphasized that “the returned 
children had experienced a sympathetic and open system in Germany, but in Turkey had to (re-) 
                                                
35 Hans Schwier was a West German SPD politician and pedagogue in North Rhine-Westphalia. He served as 
Minister of Research from 1980 to 1983 and Minister of Education from 1983 to 1995.  
36 Metin Emiroğlu was a Turkish politician and jurist. He was a founding member of the Turkish Motherland Party 
(ANAP). He served as Minister of Education, Youth, and Sports from 1985 to 1987 under Turgut Özal, Prime 
Minister from 1983 to 1989. He succeeded Vehbi Dinçerler (ANAP) and was succeeded by two more ANAP 
Ministers in 1989 alone before Yıldırım Akbulut (1989-1991) took over as Prime Minister when Özal was elected 
President. 
37 The visit ran between 27 October and 1 November. The first days was spent laying a wreath at the Ataturk 
Mausoleum and talking with the Turkish Minister of Education, among other activities. It should be noted that 
Republic Day is the day that the Turkish constitution was amended, the Ottoman Empire was officially disbanded, 
and Turkey became a Republic. 
38 “Hakimiyet Kayıtsız Şartsız Milletindir” and “ist der kampf auch noch so aussichtslos, setzt Euer Blut für die 
republik ein” (Poll, “Türkei-Besuch des Kultusministers von Nordrhein-Westfalen Hans Schwier vom 27. 10.-1. 11. 
1986; hier: Ankara-Gespräche, 27.-29. 0. 1986” (Deutsche Botschaft, Ankara, November 11, 1986), B 304/6043, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz).  
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acclimatize to tight regulations.”39 Without locally established cultural and social capital, these 
children faced difficulties associated with othering on account of their supposed Germanness.40 
They, being neither from one group nor accepted in the other, had in fact become something 
new.41 
To some extent, the children returning from West Germany were actually lucky. These 
children, while facing problems with cultural capital, were often able to attend secondary 
schools. In contrast, many Turkish children in Turkey never had the chance. While the 
government had reached an overall eighty-percent literacy rate by 1985 and had ninety-eight 
percent enrollment in primary school (from grades one to five) in 1986, there was only a 54 
percent enrollment in grades six to eight. With a decreasing budget and a population increase of 
approximately one million children a year, the Turkish Ministry of Education did not have the 
resources to expand secondary schooling, despite making it part of the standard curriculum.42 
                                                
39 They supposedly told the West German delegation that for days the teachers had instructed them [their pupils] to 
relay only positive things about Turkey when their Turkish teachers were busy with Schwier (Ibid). Also of interest 
to the West German delegations and particularly the Foreign Office were the children’s claims of frustration that 
they were unable to maintain their German connections/heritage. Children in Turkey had a tight school schedule, 
with classes running from 8:30 in the morning until 4:30 in the afternoon. After release, they still had homework, 
making it difficult to visit the German Cultural Institute or to develop their German interests. Furthermore, many of 
their parents still lived in Germany and sometimes “the girls also had to take care of younger siblings,” as not 
everyone has relatives in Ankara. Furthermore, German visa restrictions made it difficult for the children to return to 
Germany in order to visit family. 
40 Miller, “Anadolu Lise & Turkish National Identity.” 
41 Abdelmalek Sayad demonstrated this process in regards to the Algerian population in France (\iThe Suffering of 
the Immigrant, trans. David Macey (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), 45–62).  
42 The literacy rate was highest in urban areas among men. Illiteracy, in turn, was higher in rural areas of the East 
and particularly among women. The budget for the Ministry of Education actually declined from 13.7 percent in 
1970 to 11.1 percent in 1980 and 8.8 percent in 1986, less than half the amount sent on defense (Education 
Committee, “Review of Educational Policy in Turkey: Examiners’ Report and Questions,” ED(87)2 (Paris: OECD, 
May 5, 1987), 9–11, OECD Archive). The report was discussed during the 38th session of the OECD’s Education 
Committee with the Turkish delegation, headed by Metin Emiroğlu, Minister of National Education, Youth and 
Sports (Education Committee, “Summary Record of the 38th Session Held at the Château de La Muette, Paris from 
1st to 3rd June 1987,” ED/M(87)1 (Paris: OECD, September 15, 1987), OECD Archive). For a discussion of the 
development of education and the Turkish state’s perception thereof, particularly in regards to the 1980 military 
coup, see Sam Kaplan, The Pedagogical State: Education and the Politics of National Culture in Post-1980 Turkey 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 38, 173–216. 
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The schoolchildren arriving from Germany, then, while facing the personal trauma of learning a 
new system, often received extra support.  
The severe limitations of the system in Turkey led the North Rhine-Westphalia’s Minister 
of Culture, Schwier, to make multiple recommendations for increasing support for the 
schoolchildren from Germany living in Turkey upon his return. He backed the request of the 
Turkish Minister of National Education, Youth, and Sports, Metin Emiroğlu, for more teachers 
and school materials, particularly for secondary schools and vocational training. He also 
suggested easing visa restrictions for the children, which the schoolchildren at the Anadolu 
school had requested. West German visa restrictions made it difficult for the children to return to 
Germany in order to visit family. It would be unfortunate, after all, if these children lost their 
connection to Germany. Their presence in Turkey would promote business and positive 
communication between the two countries, but only if their link to West Germany was not 
entirely severed.43 
The Turkish government continued supporting the Anadolu schools and the West 
German Länder would send teachers and supplies.44 But the expected waves of thousands of 
returning schoolchildren did not materialize. Instead, as of 1990, there were (only) 2,884 
schoolchildren enrolled in five Anadolu schools. Nonetheless, there were still concerns with 
those children’s futures. Although they numbered less than 3,000, there were still too many to all 
receive spots in the Turkish higher education system. Still developing their university and 
                                                
43 See Poll, “Türkei-Besuch des Kultusministers von Nordrhein-Westfalen.” 
44 Support predominately came from the (West) German Foreign Office, Bavaria, Hesse, and North Rhine-
Westphalia. As of 1990, Berlin was going to look into possibilities for support. See (“11. Tagung der gemischten 
deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
am 21.-23. März 1990 in Berlin,” Kommuniqué (Berlin, March 23, 1990), 10, B 304/7794, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
  372 
vocational school programs, Turkey claimed that “despite rising school successes, the situation 
was still not satisfactorily solved” and requested further West German assistance.45  
Because of limited return migration to Turkey and continued immigration to West 
Germany, primarily through family reunification and asylum applicants, the Turkish and West 
German Ministries of Education stopped emphasizing programs for reintegration in Turkey in 
the mid-1980s. Instead, the Ministries of Education in both countries focused on cultural and 
language instruction for Turkish citizens living in the Federal Republic. The governments turned 
back to the programs developed in the 1960s and 1970s, expanding or altering the programs to 
meet new political aims.46 
The Kohl government’s failure to actually reduce the number of foreign citizens in West 
Germany, combined with massive social changes, contributed to a significant shift within 
government policy in the mid-1980s. One important factor that supported this shift was the 
recovery of the economy. As the economy began to pick up the number of unemployed plateaued 
before beginning to decline. Another factor was the changing political culture. The Green Party 
advocated minority rights and multiculturalism across West Germany since its founding in 1980. 
Its stance forced the other parties, including the SPD and the FDP, to reconsider the issue, 
particularly after the 1987 Federal elections in which the Green Party won 8.7 percent of the 
vote.47 The Greens’s policy was derived from new scholarship in the social scientists and history 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 For a description of some specialized, local programs for schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship, see Sarah 
Thomsen Vierra, “At Home in Almanya: Turkish-German Space of Belonging in West Germany, 1961-1990” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2011); and Sarah Thomsen Vierra, “Learning to 
Belong: The Second Generation at School” (38th Annual Social Science and History Association Meeting, Chicago, 
November 24, 2013). 
47 Kai Ambos, “The Greens and the West-German Federal Election of 1987: The New ‘Third Party’?,” Politics 8, 
no. 1 (April 1, 1988): 24–31; Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 149–162; and Carl-Ulrik Schierup, 
Peo Hansen, and Stephen Castles, “The ‘Migration Crisis’ and the Genesis of Europe’s New Diversity,” in 
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that demonstrated the long history of immigration to the German territories and the long-time 
multi-faceted and multi-ethnic nature of German society.48 Social support for ethno-centrism was 
diminishing and the myth of German cultural homogeneity was crumbling. By 1985/86, the 
conservative fervor to push minorities with foreign citizenship to emigrate diminished in favor of 
a discussion of multiculturalism.49 
New European Community and international pressure to emphasize layers of European 
and national identity added to that swing in political and social perceptions of multiculturalism 
and minority rights.50 This changing emphasis on ethnicity provided room for diversity under the 
“European” label. Instead of promoting a dual identity – either German or foreign – European 
community trends meant that the Federal and Länder governments began to promote 
interculturalism and multiculturalism.51 Three of the former guest worker states had, after all, 
joined the European Community, coming under the “European” label, in the beginning of the 
1980s. This meant only half of the original eight states that had had bilateral labor agreements 
with the Federal Republic were not EC Member States. With the Treaty of Maastricht in 
                                                                                                                                                       
Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2006), 21–47. 
48 Among other studies, see Klaus J. Bade, Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland?: Deutschland 1880-
1980 (Berlin: Colloquium, 1983); Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerbeschäftigung in Deutschland, 1880 bis 
1980: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz, 1986); and Klaus J. Bade, ed., 
Population, Labour, and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). 
49 Sabine von Dirke, “Multikulti: The German Debate on Multiculturalism,” German Studies Review 17, no. 3 
(October 1994): 513–36. 
50 Carl-Ulrik Schierup, Peo Hansen, and Stephen Castles, “Migration, Citizenship, and the European Social Model,” 
in Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2006), 48–80; and Dieter Gosewinkel, “Historical Reflections on Citizenship in Europe,” in The Making of 
Citizens in Europe: New Perspectives on Citizenship Education, ed. Viola B. Georgi (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
Politische Bildung, 2008), 31–36. 
51 Isabell Diehm and Frank-Olaf Radtke, Erziehung und Migration: Eine Einführung (Kohlhammer, 1999), 125–
161. 
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development (signed in 1992), the Federal Government wanted to push associated ideals of 
unity.  
With the new (re)emphasis on multiculturalism, the West German Education 
Administrations determined that, because the different governments involved could not predict 
where children would eventually choose to live, the children should, if they wanted, learn to 
straddle both worlds. While at first glance that stance was similar to the Education 
Administrations’ aims from the 1960s and the Kultusministerkonferenz’s double goals, there was 
a significant difference. Whereas in the 1960s the intention was for children to be able to operate 
in either their country of residence or country of citizenship’s society, the goal in the 1980s was 
for the children to simply be both. The children were ethnically different, but they were at least 
partially German, or at least – some of them – European.52 The cultural capital and schooling 
learned in one country should therefore fit into the other.  
Greek Bilingual Instruction and the Pressure for Return versus Multiculturalism 
For the Greek ethno-national minority in West Germany, the pressure for return differed 
significantly from the Turkish. Even as the incoming Kohl government in the Federal Republic 
ran on a platform promising to reduce the overall number of foreigners in West Germany, in 
1982 the Greek Embassy in Bonn announced that the Greek government had developed a “new 
[policy] direction” regarding its citizens abroad. Namely, the state “sought increased return 
migration to Greece.” Accordingly, the head of the Greek Embassy’s Educational Authority, 
argued that “Greek schools [in Germany] needed to prepare [children] for return” because 
                                                
52 Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 39–45. 
  375 
eighty-two percent of “Greeks expressed a desire to return.”53 With this approach the new 
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) government, under Andreas Papandreou, Greek 
President from 1981 to 1989, altered the course set under the previous conservative Prime 
Minister, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis. 
With the West German Federal Government’s stance on emigration, the Greek 
government was able to move forward with its new policy direction. In the 1960s and 1970s the 
Länder governments had frequently denied the Greek government’s and diaspora’s requests for 
expanded Greek language instruction, partly on the grounds that it prevented integration. 
Residents in West Germany, most of the Länder Ministries of Education argued, whether 
citizens or not, needed to be able to succeed in the West German school system and labor 
market.54 In contrast, in the early 1980s, several of the Länder, governed by CDU-FDP or SPD-
FDP coalitions, agreed that those Greek citizens committed to return should prepare, arguably 
even to the exclusion of inclusion. They viewed the choice to stay or go as an either/or and tried 
to provide programs for both.55 
In addition to practical considerations as the Greek diaspora in West German stabilized, 
the Greek government’s policy shift also reflected changes in the European Community.56 The 
                                                
53 Geogiovasilis claimed that “other than Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg is the state that does the most for Greek 
schoolchildren” (Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW, Referat IV/2 / PrGr “A,” “Gespräch bei Herrn MR Jansen 
am 19. 03. 1982” (Stuttgart, March 19, 1982), EA 3/609 Bü 91/1, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart).  
54 The Ministry of Education in Baden-Württemberg often made this claim, as did most of the KMK. Bavaria was 
more accommodating to the Greek government’s requests, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
55 Bernd Geiss, ed., Bericht ’99: zur Situation der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer und ihrer Familien: 
Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven für die 90er Jahre, 2nd ed. (Bonn: Das Amt der Ausländerbeauftragten, 1990). 
As the KMK’s Subcommittee on Foreign Children reconsidered their mandate and goals, they reestablished their 
dual goal (Sekretariat der KMK and Hermann, “21. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 13. 
November 1985,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: KMK, November 13, 1985), 1–3, B 304/7772, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz).  
56 For more on Greece’s accession to and integration into the European Economic Community, see Iacovos 
Tsalicoglou, Negotiating for Entry: The Accession of Greece to the European Community (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 
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European Community had reached a consensus among its member states at the beginning of the 
decade to push multiculturalism and promote equivalency, exchange, and multiculturalism 
between the different Member States’ systems.57 Taking advantage of that shift, the Greek 
Government used the language of European Community Directive 486/77 on the education of 
migrant workers to argue that the Directive’s support for minority cultures established a 
schoolchild’s right to remain Greek in Germany. The Greek Ministry of Education pointed to the 
directive’s emphasis on the right of a minority group to try and straddle both worlds. The Greek 
state continued to argue that, as most of its citizens would return – and many were returning –to 
Greece, they needed a solid Greek education (a point which many Greek parents supported).58  
Technically, based on the 1976 (i.d.F. 1979) Kultusministerkonferenz recommendations 
on instruction for migrant workers’ children, schoolchildren from former guest worker countries 
were still entitled to receive support for both integration and native language and cultural classes. 
With their own regulations reflecting the KMK’s Recommendations still on the books, the 
Ministries of Education felt obligated to provide them.59 Consequently, despite Federal cutbacks, 
the Länder governments and their Education Administrations attempted to continue financing 
                                                                                                                                                       
1995); and Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos and Argyrēs Passas, eds., Greece in the European Union (London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
57 Gisella Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 77–104; and 
European Commission and Luce Pépin, The History of European Cooperation in Education and Training: Europe 
in the Making - an Example (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2006), 
99–103.  
58 Auswärtige Amt, “2. deutsch-griechische Expertentreffen über Schulfragen,” Vermerk, (November 23, 1976), B 
93, Bd. 810, PA AA; and Euan Reid and Hans H. Reich, eds., Breaking the Boundaries: Migrant Workers’ Children 
in the EC (Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd, 1991), 45–49.  
59 Hermann, “16. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 28. 11. 1984 in Bonn,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, December 27, 1984), 2–4, B 304/7771, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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their various forms of consular courses, bilingual instruction, or private national schools.60 The 
spread of the courses, however, depended on local interest and the support of the relevant foreign 
government (as Table 7.2 demonstrates).61 
  
                                                
60 With education still under Länder jurisdiction, the Länder governments and their Education Administrations were 
technically responsible for the situation on the ground. That responsibility was part of what prompted the Länder to 
try and keep programs running. Where the Federal Government’s overarching goal was both to push a conservative 
political agenda and placate the countries of origin in the interest of bi-national relations, the Länder Education 
Administrations had to deal with the situation on the ground in the neighborhoods and the schools. Bock and the 
Emiroglu would underline this point in 1987, when Emiroglu expressed frustration with having to work with the 
individual Länder while the Federal Government expressed approval of Turkish demands (“Besprechung zwischen 
dem türkischen Erziehungsminister und Herrn Staatssekretär Bock vom 19. bis 21. März 1987 in Berlin, 
unterzeichnet am 22. 3. 87,” Protokoll (Berlin: Senator für Schulwesen, Berufsausbildung und Sport, Berlin, March 
22, 1987), 87, B 304/6043, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
61 The kind of consular classes available and spread depended on the relevant states’ stance on nationalism, 
integration, and education generally, as is discussed below.  
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Table 7.2: Schoolchildren in Mother Language and Cultural Classes by Language in 
Primary (P) and Lower Secondary (LS) Schools, 1984/8562  
Country/ 
Language!
BW! Berlin! NRW!
Total! P and SL!  %! Total!  ! % ! Total! P and SL! % !
Greek 12,771! 7,439! 58.2! 983! 434! 44.2! 13,482! 7,487! 55.5!
Italian 23,415! 11,220! 47.9! 548! 159! 29.0! 19,702! 8,908! 45.2!
Spanish 3,747! 2,734! 73.0! 132! 123! 93.2! 8,320! 5,444! 65.4!
Portuguese 2,266! 1,765! 77.9! 60! 35! 58.3! 5,741! 3,572! 62.2!
Turkish 51,508 21,923! 42.6! 26,120! 2,971! 11.4! 128,982! 92,060! 71.4!
Serbo-Croatian63 
25,485! 15,603! 61.2! 4,785! 2,676! 55.9! 18,982!
9,001!
53.2!Slovenian 274!
Albanian 459!
Macedonia 372!
Arabic  ! 290!  !  !  !  !  ! 459!  !
Total 133,745! 60,974! 45.6! 32,628! 18,730! 57.4! 227,476! 128,036! 56.3!
 
According to a report to the West German Foreign Office in preparation for a series of 
Joint Expert meetings on the instruction of foreign citizens living in the Federal Republic, the 
Kultusministerkonferenz chart displaying the number of schoolchildren attending some form of 
native language and/or cultural instruction.64 Each of the Länder provided a different set of 
statistics based on their own form of support and collection. Despite the unreliability of those 
                                                
62 The “P” stands for primary school; the “LS” for lower secondary school (Hauptschule). Each of the Länder 
Education Administrations collected their statistics differently and reported back to the KMK with different 
abbreviations and standards. This table reflects the KMK’s compiled table. For the complete table, see 
“Unterweitung in der Muttersprache und der heimatlichen Landeskunde unter der Verantwortung der 
Konsularbehörden des Herkunftslandes im Schuljahr 1984/85,” see Hermann, “9. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-
türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 1. - 
3. Oktober 1986 in Berlin,” Vorbereitende Notizen und Unterlagen zur Tagesordnung (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 
September 22, 1986), 4.1.3, B 304/6042, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1985, 349. It is not possible to provide reliable Federal wide totals as several Länder (i.e. 
Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein) did not provide the KMK with statistics regarding participation in 1985/86.  
63 Although North Rhine-Westphalia allowed the Yugoslav government and citizens to setup and run different 
language classes, many of these children simply attended whatever classes were available, regardless of their own 
ethnic affiliation. Many of these children, in fact, identified simply as Yugoslavs and did not view themselves as 
Croatian or Serbian, etc. Other than NRW, the rest of the Länder usually listed these classes simply as “Yugosalv” 
rather than separating out the language groups.  
64 Hermann, “9. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht türkischer 
Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1986),” 4.1.3.  
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statistics and the lack of information about which kinds of courses those numbers covered 
exactly, they nonetheless demonstrate the high number of children with foreign citizenship 
enrolled therein as well as the importance of location as a deciding factor behind whether or not 
the children would enroll. In North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, where the Education 
Administration had partially integrated consular instruction into the regular school day and paid 
for the instruction, 71.4% of Turkish children enrolled in North Rhine-Westphalian schools 
participated. In contrast, in Berlin, where a high number of minority groups within the Turkish 
minority lived (e.g. Kurds), only 11.4% enrolled. In contrast, of the schoolchildren with Greek 
citizenship in the Federal Republic, approximately one in two schoolchildren attended some 
form of Greek instruction.  
The basic structure of most consular courses continued in the form they had from the 
early 1960s. Usually stipulated to run five hours a week, the local Education Administration 
staffed these classes with teachers selected and sent by the country of citizenship governments 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). Five of the eleven Länder, including North Rhine-Westphalia, 
financed the courses, and hence had a measure of control over their content and organization. 
The other six, including Baden-Württemberg, provided varying levels of financial subsidies but 
viewed the consulates as having (almost) complete control of content and organization. Not all of 
the countries of citizenship opted to spend a significant amount of money on the courses and by 
no means did every member of the eight eligible minorities in West Germany choose to 
participate, as Table 7.2 shows. Of the national and language groups taking part in the native 
language and cultural instruction run by the sending countries’ consulates, schoolchildren with 
Greek citizenship were far more likely to participate in the consular course instruction. 
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Technically, consular courses were supposed to realize the right of minority groups to 
maintain or build a connection to their cultural or ethnic heritage. By the early 1980s, however, 
the classes were increasingly about creating a connection to the country of citizenship. Many of 
those courses, including those for students with Italian citizenship, were almost entirely for 
children born in West Germany. By no means was this true for every group. Thousands of 
migrants continued to arrive yearly from Turkey through the process of family reunification and 
as asylum seekers (see Table 7.1).65 Additionally, somewhat to the Länder Ministries of 
Education’s surprise (and North Rhine-Westphalia’s Ministry of Education’s displeasure), the 
Moroccan and Tunisian governments, both former guest worker countries, expressed an interest 
in the schooling of their citizens in West Germany and Arabic-language consular instruction.66 In 
consequence, consulates had to provide classes for children who were German with foreign 
citizenship as well as new immigrants. The cultural and linguistic differences between the 
children created difficulties for both the countries of citizenship and West Germany. The West 
Germany Education Administrations had to question what kind of information they should 
impart as part of the everyday curriculum and for whom. 
Länder Education Administrations’ advocacy of some programs for cultural maintenance 
and integration did not, however, extend to all children with non-German citizenship. 
Schoolchildren with foreign citizenship who were not a part of one of those traditional guest 
worker countries did not have the right to similar courses.67 The West German Education 
                                                
65 Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe, 17–23.  
66 NRW was home to the largest minority groups from Morocco and Tunisia. Because NRW’s Ministry of 
Education paid for consular courses, the state was highly annoyed at the idea of having to fund new sets of consular 
courses (Hermann, “10. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: 
Sekretariat der KMK, September 1983), 18, B 304/7771, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
67 Hermann, “16. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 2–4. 
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Administrations felt a moral and legal responsibility to provide care for the descendants of 
groups associated with the former guest worker programs specifically.68 In contrast, new groups 
– frequently arriving as asylum applicants – were supposedly there by choice, regardless of their 
reason for migration or flight. On those grounds, the West German Education Administrations 
disclaimed a need to provide extra services. These groups were entitled to their basic rights, but 
not extras.69 
After 1981, West German residents with Greek citizenship had a right to state support 
because of their status as former guest workers (regardless of when an individual migrated), but 
also as European Community Member State nationals. With that status in mind, in the early 
1980s the Länder Ministries of Education collaborated with the Greek government to restructure 
some of the education initiatives for Greek schoolchildren already in place and develop new 
materials. In CDU-FDP Baden-Württemberg, for example, the Ministry of Education worked 
with the Greek legation to expand Greek-language instruction in bilingual school programs, 
permitting Greek consular teachers in both primary and secondary schools to offer mathematics 
and the sciences. The Education Administrations also set up a bi-national committee to develop 
school materials, particularly for social studies, for those classes integrating the local and Greek 
curricula.70 In North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse, under SPD-FDP governments that at least 
rhetorically promoted biculturalism and bilingual education over return, the Ministries of 
                                                
68 Ibid. See also Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in 
Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 55. The bi-lateral labor agreements frequently stipulated some 
form of social and cultural support. For more on the contracts, see Ulrich Herbert and Karin Hunn, “Guest Workers 
and Policy on Guest Workers in the Federal Republic: From the Beginning of Recruitment in 1955 until Its Halt in 
1973,” in The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949-1968, ed. Hanna Schissler (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 187–218; and Johannes-Dieter Steinert, “Migration and Migration Policy: West 
Germany and the Recruitment of Foreign Labour, 1945–61,” Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (January 1, 
2014): 9–27. 
69 Chapter 8 lays out the difference in state support for asylum applicants versus other kinds of migrants.  
70 Hermann, “16. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 11–12. 
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Education had begun collaborating with the Greek government to develop instructional materials 
since the 1970s. During the 1980s, the two Länder Education Administrations encouraged the 
other former guest worker countries to participate as well. These lessons and materials were 
supposed to reach audiences across West Germany.71  
Despite Länder and country-of-citizenship Education Administrations’ representatives’ 
agreement on the benefits of offering Turkish as a first foreign language, the implementation of 
the classes proved problematic. Among the chief concerns was the availability of school 
materials. Old materials usually targeted either schoolchildren in Turkey or newly arrived 
immigrant children. As the European Community Action Program from 1974 had stated, there 
were few to no good schoolbooks for native language instruction for the children of foreigners 
abroad (second and third generation). To rectify the problem, the Commission of the European 
Community encouraged the development of new schoolbooks taking the migrant experience into 
account (like the Greek). New materials were supposed to acknowledge the unique experience of 
minority schoolchildren – be they immigrants or children born in their countries of residence.72  
In the 1980s, because of local needs and with European Community support, Hesse and 
North Rhine-Westphalia worked with the Greek legations to develop school materials for 
children with Greek citizenship raised in West Germany. In these two Länder, the Ministries of 
Education had encouraged the integration of consular instruction into the standard school day 
during the 1960s and 1970s. They were consequently concerned about the conceptual integration 
of Greek and German subjects (e.g. history) and language lessons. With European Community 
                                                
71 Ibid.; and Hermann, “28. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 15./17. März 1987 in Berlin,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, March 20, 1987), 6–7, B 304/7772, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
72 Commission of the European Communities, “Commission Proposals for Action in the Education Field. 
Information Memo,” Press Notice (Brussels, March 1974), http://aei.pitt.edu/30240/; and European Commission and 
Luce Pépin, History of European Cooperation, 65–68; and Karen M. Anderson, Social Policy in the European 
Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 146. 
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financial support, the two Länder worked with Greece to develop school materials between 1982 
and 1986 for materials for schoolchildren with Greek citizenship living in West Germany.73 The 
materials were explicitly supposed to support schoolchildren with different levels of language 
skills and teach them to be Greek regardless of the length of their West German residence. In 
addition, the West German Länder and the Greek legation also worked to develop audio-visual 
materials and a student magazine. However, as the eleven Länder each permitted different kinds 
of Greek language instruction, the Länder and Greek Ministries of Education tried to make the 
school materials applicable for a range of courses, including consular instruction, bilingual 
instruction classes, and national schools.74  
The use and development of Baden-Württemberg’s bilingual classes exemplify both the 
different levels of Greek mother-tongue and cultural instruction as well as the changing focus of 
the classes over the 1980s. As mentioned in Chapter 5, many of the Länder designed long-form 
classes in the 1970s that were, essentially, bilingual instruction targeted at those families 
intending to return to their “home countries.” In these classes, those schoolchildren interested in 
returning to their country of citizenship or in maintaining their cultural heritage received 
instruction in both German and the country of citizenship’s state language. The standard course 
                                                
73 For more on the projects the Commission of the European Community financed, see Ursula Boos-Nünning, 
Towards Intercultural Education: A Comparative Study of the Education of Migrant Children in Belgium, England, 
France, and the Netherlands., 1986, 18–29; Reid and Reich, Breaking the Boundaries, 1991, 15–65; and 
Directorate-General for Education and Culture, European Commission, “Report on the Education of Migrants’ 
Children in the European Union,” COM (94) 80 final (Brussels: European Commission, March 25, 1994), 13, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1257/.  
74 There were different audio-visual media and teaching materials, didactic games and teaching aids for the 
Landeskunde and the language support under development (“5. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen 
Expertenkommission für den Unterricht griechischen Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 3. - 5. 12. 
1985 in Munich,” Protokoll (Bonn, December 5, 1985), 8–9, B 304/6120, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Sekretariat der 
KMK and Hermann, “19. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 21. Mai 1985,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: KMK, July 1985), 11–12, B 304/7772, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; “6. Tagung der 
gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht griechischen Schüler in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland vom 1. - 3. März 1988 in Athen,” Protokoll (Bonn, March 1988), 13–15, B 304/6120, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Reid and Reich, Breaking the Boundaries, 1991, 31–34.).  
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construction for Baden-Württemberg in primary school (grades one through four) included nine 
hours of non-German instruction in language, geography, and history in comparison to the five 
weekly hours of (after-school) consular instruction (see Table 7.2 and 7.3).75 The rest of the 
standard curriculum – seventeen hours – was supposed to be offered in German. Theoretically, 
children transitioning into secondary school would then attend regular instruction in order to 
prepare for vocational training. Although available to all former guest-worker states, the Turkish 
and Greek governments were usually the two who organized classes.76  
Where the Turkish government accepted the nine hours of Turkish language and social 
studies instruction (as discussed in Chapter 5), the Greek government pushed for extended hours 
in Greek (see Table 7.3). Even in the late 1970s, when the Greek government claimed to support 
the either-remain-or-go choice Greek citizens in West Germany all faced, the Government still 
pushed additional Greek language instruction. The Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education 
was willing to make a few concessions, as its CDU-FDP government was among those bent on 
encouraging return migration.77 After the initial test-phase in 1977/78, Baden-Württemberg 
permitted Greek teachers in primary and secondary bilingual classes to teach the Greek language 
(instead of English), history and social studies, geography, and mathematics. German teachers 
oversaw the remaining subjects: German, physics and chemistry, biology, sports, music, the 
visual arts, shop, and economy. In July 1981, the Baden-Württemberg Education Administration 
                                                
75 The majority of the Länder, even those financing mother language and cultural instruction, considered still the 
classes consular instruction (Konsularunterricht) because of the countries of citizenships’ direct involvement. 
76 Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW, “Bildungsverhalten und Schulerfolg der ausländischen Kinder in Baden-
Württemberg: 2. Bericht zum Projekt ‘Untersuchung von Schulbesuch und Schulverlauf ausländischer Schüler in 
Baden-Württemberg’: Tabellen” (Stuttgart, 1983). 
77 Tietze, Einwanderung und die deutschen Parteien, 197–198, 211. 
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agreed with the Greek Consulate to add two hours of Greek-Orthodox religious instruction, for a 
total of eleven hours of Greek language instruction a week. 78 
Table 7.3: Instructional Hours for Primary Bilingual Instruction in Baden-Württemberg 
for Schoolchildren with Turkish or Greek Citizenship, 198279 
 Turkish Greek 
Grade First! Second! Third! Fourth! First! Second! Third! Fourth!
Turkish/Greek 6! 6! 6! 6! 4! 4! 4! 4!
Religion     2! 2! 2! 2!
Social Studies 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3!
Mathematics 4! 5! 5! 5! 4 5! 5! 5!
German 6! 6! 7! 7! 6! 6! 7! 7!
Art/Home Ec.* 1! 2! 3! 3! 1! 2! 3! 3!
Music 1! 1! 1! 1! 1! 1! 1! 1!
Sport 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3! 3!
Extra Support 2! 2! 3! 3! 2! 2! 3! 3!
Total 24! 26! 28! 28! 24! 26! 28! 28!
Turkish/Greek 9! 9! 9! 9! 13! 14! 14! 14!
German 17! 19! 22! 22! 11! 12! 14! 14!
* Art and Home Economics were, when possible, taught together with German schoolchildren. 
Italicized subjects taught in the mother language.  
 
In 1982, however, as part of the new Greek PASOK government’s shifts in policy 
direction, Geogiovasilis requested several alterations to Baden-Württemberg’s curricula for the 
bilingual classes. Geogiovasilis did not have a significant problem with primary schooling 
(grades one through four), although he felt that there was not enough Greek instruction. It was 
secondary instruction that he took issue with. In meetings with the Kultusministerkonferenz and 
the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Education, he informed the German delegations that “it was 
common knowledge that lower secondary schools (Hauptschulen) took the pupils left over from 
                                                
78 Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für 
griechsiche Schüler,” January 14, 1987, EA 3/609 Bü 90/2, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
79 Oberschulamt Stuttgart, December 28, 1982, EA 3/609 Bü 92, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart.  
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the Realschule and Gymnasium.” According to Geogiovasilis, the lower secondary curriculum 
“looked like busywork and not actually an intensive instructional program.” He claimed the 
laxity of the German school program caused schoolchildren migrating to Greece “enormous 
difficulties, as the Greek schools were comprehensive schools, which placed emphasis on rich 
educational material … through the end of the instruction period.” To rectify that qualitative 
difference, the West German secondary-school program for Greek citizens needed to be closer to 
the Greek curriculum, particularly in the sciences, as the Greek legation felt the Greek lyceum’s 
courses were vastly superior to the German.80 
Toward this end, Geogiovasilis recommended changing Baden-Württemberg’s bilingual 
classes to emphasize return to Greece over integration. He did acknowledge that, in the end, the 
parents had to choose whether to return or remain in West Germany.81 But he felt that families 
who planned to stay in West Germany could attend regular instruction and take after-school 
consular instruction. For children whose families intended to return to Greece, however, the 
Greek embassy recommended offering in primary school six hours of Greek language and 
religious instruction, three hours of social studies, and five hours of mathematics, for a total of 
fourteen hours of Greek language instruction. German instructors were then to offer six or seven 
hours of German language instruction, one to two hours of visual arts and textiles, one hour of 
music, and three hours of sports, for a total of eleven to fourteen hours. In lower secondary 
school (Hauptschule), Geogiovasilis wanted Baden-Württemberg to allow Greek teachers to give 
the chemistry and biology instruction. At the end of their secondary schooling, Greek citizens 
                                                
80 Griechische Botschaft to Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW, “Unterricht für Kinder griechischer 
Arbeitnehmer; hier: Muttersprachliche Modellklassen,” 923 (5.2), (March 31, 1982), EA 3/609 Bü 91/1, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
81 See Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW and Referat IV/2 / PrGr “A,” “Gespräch bei Herrn MR Jansen am 19. 
03. 1982.” 
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would then be able to take exams to receive an equivalency certificate for the Greek Lyceum. 
The goal, in part, was not only to enable a smooth integration during the school years, but also 
after the completion of secondary school.82  
Even as Baden-Württemberg and other Länder acceded to some of Greek government’s 
requests, they continued to emphasize the children’s ability to function in West Germany as well. 
Consequently, when the Greek Embassy’s Education Office and Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry 
of Education agreed on a newly revised curriculum for both primary and (lower) secondary 
classes in June 1983 the state only made partial concessions. In response to the Embassy’s 
requests, Greek teachers were permitted to offer physics and chemistry. But Baden-
Württemberg’s Ministry of Education decided that social studies should be divided between 
Greek and German teachers in order to allow students to learn to operate in both systems. Under 
the new guidelines to West German school curricula, teachers now offered a new unit called 
“labor-economy-technology” (“Arbeits-Wirtschaft-Technik”), which schoolchildren needed in 
order to move toward vocational training.83  
Baden-Württemberg’s Ministry of Education stressed the need to integrate again in 1985, 
as part of its own campaign to improve the local system and success rates. As part of Baden-
Württemberg’s new rules regarding examination for lower secondary schools, the Ministry of 
Education stipulated that children attending national classes had to participate. The rules 
                                                
82 The Greek Embassy was also taking steps to try and develop Greek private schools (Ergänzungsschule) and extra 
programs working toward the Lyceum in Berlin (for example, Griechische Botschaft Erziehungsabteilung to 
Berliner Verwaltungsamt, “Einrichtung einer griechischen Ergänzungsschule in Berlin; hier: Bereichtstellung von 
13 Klassenräumen,” August 6, 1982, B Rep 002 23582, Landesarchiv Berlin; and Senator für Schulwesen, 
Berufsausbildung und Sport and Bath to Regierende Bürgermeister von Berlin, Senatskanzlei III C, “Griechisches 
Lyzeum in Berlin,” July 23, 1986, B 002 16867, Berlin Landesarchiv.). 
83 Ministerium für Kultus und Sport BW to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum 
Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für griechsiche Schüler (IV-2-2111/713),” June 9, 1987, EA 3/609 Bü 90/2, 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart. 
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included the caveat, however, that schoolchildren attending Greek (or other national) classes 
could take the exams in Greek instead of English as a first foreign language. Other subject 
examinations would also be given in the instructional language (be it Greek or German). The 
goal here, as the Ministry of Education emphasized, was to ensure that the schoolchildren who 
chose to remain in West Germany would not be cut out of the system. Instead, the Ministry of 
Education planned that schoolchildren with Greek citizenship would be able to choose between 
entering Baden-Württemberg’s vocational training programs or returning to Greece at any point 
in their schooling to continue their education there.84 
In the ongoing discussions about which topics should be taught in Greek versus German, 
religion became a point of contention at the end of the 1980s. Although one of the classes that 
most West German Education Administrations permitted in Greek, the Greek Orthodox Church 
announced that it preferred to have religious instruction taught in German. The Greek 
government, however, pushed for the instruction to be continued in Greek in order to provide the 
children more exposure to the language. Under (West) German law, the separation of church and 
state dictated that the approved religious authority had control over the development of the 
curriculum. In consequence, the Länder Ministries of Education let the Patriarchy choose, 
permitting the relevant teachers to provide instruction in whatever language the Church 
promoted.85 
Although the Greek government continued to push extended Greek language instruction, 
it revised its stance on its foreign citizens’ schooling during Prime Minister Papandreou’s second 
term, from 1985 to 1989. In 1985, the Greek Democratic Socialist government joined the other 
                                                
84 Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für 
griechsiche Schüler.” 
85 “6. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission (1988),” 8–12. 
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European Community Member States in revitalizing European integration. A part of that 
revitalization included a push for secondary school and university equivalency and 
multiculturalism. Toward that end, the Greek government encouraged education policies, 
including bilingual programs, to promote flexibility across both systems.86 The Greek 
government also acknowledged and encouraged their citizens’ parents’ choice to participate in 
the West German system or to attend Greek schools.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
86 Dimitrios Zachos, “Citizenship, Ethnicity, and Education in Modern Greece,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies 
27, no. 1 (2009): 140–141; and Anastasia Diamantopoulou, “The European Dimension in Greek Education in the 
Context of the European Union,” Comparative Education 42, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 131–51. 
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Table 7.4: Enrollment in General Education by School Type and Citizenship in Thousands, 
1982 and 198787 
1982!
 
 
 Total! German! %!
Non-!
German! %! Turkish! %! Italian! %! Greek! %!
P+SL 4,501.00! 3,921.70! 51.2! 579.2! 80.5! 324.9! 85.4! 61.1! 77.9! 40.1! 78.5!
Special 319.3! 283.1! 3.7! 36.1! 5 19.7! 5.2! 6.4! 8.2! 1.6! 3!
Realschule 1,278.10! 1,238.60! 16.2! 39.5! 5.5! 12.6! 3.3! 4.5! 5.7! 3.1! 5.9!
Gymnasium 2,050.50! 2,002.00! 26.2! 48.4 6.7! 9.2! 2.4! 3.4! 4.3! 5! 9.7!
Comp. 226.3! 210.3! 2.7! 16! 2.2! 13.5! 3.5! 2.9! 3.7! 1.4! 2.7!
Evening  42! 40.5! 0.5! 1.5! 0.2!  ! 0!  ! 0!  ! 0!
Total 8,375.10! 7,655.80!  ! 719.3!  ! 380.6!  ! 78.4!  ! 51.7!  !
   !  !  !  !  !  !  !    !  !  !
1987!
 
 Total! German! %!
Non-!
German! %! Turkish! %! Italian! %! Greek! %!
Primary 2,304.00! 2,033.80! 33.5! 270.2! 38.2! 138.4! 40.1! 28.3! 40.1! 12.3! 33!
Hauptschule 1,356.70! 1,131.40! 18.6! 225.3! 31.8! 108.2! 31.4! 22.5! 31.9! 13! 34.9!
Special 254.2! 213.2! 3.5! 41! 5.8! 23.9! 6.9! 5.6! 7.9! 1.4! 3.8!
Realschule 915.3! 855.5! 14.1! 59.8! 8.4! 23.3! 6.7! 5.7! 8.1! 3.7! 9.9!
Gymnasium 1,596.10! 1,531.80! 25.2! 64.3! 9.1! 16.9! 4.9! 3.6! 5.2! 4.6! 12.4!
Comp. 244.2! 213.2! 3.5! 31.1! 4.4! 17.1! 5.0! 2.2! 3.1! 1.1! 3.0!
Evening  41.4! 38.1! 0.6! 3.2! 0.5! 0.9! 0.2! 0.1! 0.2! 0.1! 0.3!
Total 6,777.80! 6,070.20!  ! 707.6!  ! 344.7!  ! 70.5!  ! 37.4!  !
 
Many children, after all, regardless of their parents’ original intentions, stayed in West 
Germany, making a German schooling important. Without the appropriate West German lower 
                                                
87 The “P+H” stands for primary and lower secondary as Federal and most Länder level statistic bureaus had not yet 
begun to systematically separate the two for publication. Special schools are Sonderschulen and “Comp.” are 
Gesamtschulen. Evening schools are the combined number for evening Realschulen and Gymnasien (KMK, 
Ausländische Schüler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1970 bis 1983, 4, 18, 69, 82, 95, 109; KMK, 
Ausländische Schüler und Schulabsolventen 1983 bis 1992, 128:17, 37, 45, 53, 59, 63, 74, 83; Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1985, 357; Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 
1990, 1990, 342; and Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, ed., Daten und Fakten zur 
Ausländersituation, (Bonn: Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Integration der Ausländischen Arbeitnehmer 
und ihrer Familienangehörigen, 1990), 22–24). 
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secondary school certification, placement in vocational schools was almost impossible.88 
Although, despite those concerns, at that 1985 Joint Expert meeting on the schooling of children 
with Greek citizenship in West Germany the West German Länder reported that ninety-two 
percent of youths with Greek citizenship looking for vocational school placement were able to 
find it. In addition, the overall number of schoolchildren with Greek citizenship had declined in 
primary and lower secondary school while the percentage of children attending higher secondary 
schools (Realschule and Gymnasium) had risen (see Table 7.4).89 
To continue those positive developments and to make bilateral (or private) schools more 
palatable to minority communities (diaspora) abroad, the Greek government agreed to 
collaborate with the Länder Education Administrations, working closely with both Social 
Democratic and Christian Democratic Parties (in North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse as well as 
Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria respectively). The goal was to enable schoolchildren to remain 
in the German system but be ethnically Greek. To do so, the children were to receive enough of a 
German schooling to enable them to attend vocational schooling or university. They were, 
however, supposed to learn the Greek language and Greek culture, as well as be taught to 
identify as Greek. Toward that end, the 1985 Joint Meeting of experts agreed that the different 
Länder offering bilingual classes (among them, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and 
Rhineland-Pfalz) or extra mother-tongue instruction would work with the Greek government to 
develop new curricula incorporating both West German and Greek school material.90  
                                                
88 Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für 
griechsiche Schüler.” 
89 “5. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission (1985),” 2, 11. 
90 Part of the reason for that increase was because many children tracked into lower secondary school returned to 
Greece to finish their education. (Ibid., 7–9; and Seifert to Oberschulämter, “Allgemeine Hinweise und 
Empfehlungen zum Schulversuch; hier: Hauptschulen für griechsiche Schüler”). 
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Accepting the continued residence of many of its citizens in West Germany, the Greek 
government relented in its pressure for the development of a solely Greek identity. “Greeks were 
important cultural bearers,” carrying a thousand years of European culture with them wherever 
they went. A Greek education in West Germany was, then, supposed to “raise young people from 
both countries [Germany and Greece] in their role as European citizens.” Both countries – 
country of citizenship and country of residence – agreed they had a “moral and political 
responsibility … to develop schooling for the third generation of migrant workers,” which was 
particularly important in light of the “expected mobility of people in Europe.”91 Return migration 
was tapering off and the Greek government came out in support of biculturalism. Greek citizens 
in West Germany, according to the Greek government, were to learn to be both Greek and 
German.  
Nonetheless, the Greek state’s continued push for consular instruction and bilingual 
schools based on the “right to the mother language regardless of the parents’ desire to return.”92 
The state argued that children needed to be able to function within the (West) German school 
system, but they still had a right to – and should – self-identify as Greek. To this end, the Greek 
state recommended making native language instruction compulsory for Greek citizens. The 
Länder declined to either compel Greek-language instruction or establish the schools the Greek 
state requested. But the Länder would continue to offer extra native language instruction (usually 
between seven and ten weekly hours, inclusive of two hours of religious instruction), even if they 
                                                
91 “6. Tagung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission (1988),” 1–2. 
92 “7. Stizung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission (1990),” 5. 
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generally refused to integrate these instructional hours into the normal school day, as Hesse 
had.93 
Even with that rejection of full acculturation, schoolchildren with Greek citizenship 
arguably succeeded in West German schools. Be it because of the Greek government’s push to 
ensure its citizens’ education, the value parents placed on scholastic success, or the children’s 
supposed Europeanness or cultural compatibility, by 1990 the Greek diaspora performed almost 
on par with the ethnic-German majority.94 Those successes became apparent in the rate of 
enrollment in higher levels of secondary schooling, vocational training, and universities, which 
were almost on par with the German ethno-national majority.95  
Those successes contributed to the Greek state’s continued promotion of the importance 
of Greek identity and culture along with the ability to be an ethno-national minority abroad. 
Multiculturalism continued to mean that Greeks should be Greek first and foremost. For many 
Greek parents, that definition fit with their own, as evidenced by the number of both German 
residents with Greek citizenship migrating to Greece over the 1980s as well as the number of 
parents who enrolled their children in either Greek consular instruction, bilingual instruction, or 
private schools.96  
                                                
93 Ibid., 4–6. The Greek government argued that this instruction needed to be integrated into the West German 
school-day before noon in order to avoid overburdening the children. They additionally pointed out the problems for 
some schoolchildren associated with having to attend two schools. Some of the Länder representatives – including 
the representative from Berlin – complained that weekly instructional classes were overrunning the permissible 
hours (eight in Berlin). Others, like Baden-Württemberg, simply declared that the Greek wishes could not be 
fulfilled. 
94 Ibid., 10–12. 
95 Ibid., 11. Despite the Greek governments efforts in West Germany, there were continued problems with 
reintegration into the Greek school system and society for some schoolchildren.  
96 “7. Stizung der gemischten deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission vom 12. - 14. Dezember 1990 in Bonn,” 
Protokoll (Bonn, December 14, 1990), 7–8, B 304/6120, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; “6. Tagung der gemischten 
deutsch-griechischen Expertenkommission für den Unterricht griechischen Schüler in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland,” Vorbereitende Notizen zur Tagesordnung (Bonn, 1988), 7–8, B 304/6120, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; 
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Turkish Instruction: National Identity, Language, and Islam  
Although many ethnic Germans in West Germany in the early 1980s supported a 
multiculturalism that included residents with Turkish citizenship, many continued to draw a line 
at Turkish or other Muslim minority groups’ inclusion as German. The ethno-national majority’s 
widespread rejection of German residents with foreign citizenship had a long-lasting impact on 
how many Turkish citizens interpreted their own identities.97 Many individuals with Turkish 
citizenship decided that, if the West German state and ethnic majority was going to reject them, 
they would embrace an ethnically-Turkish and explicitly Muslim identity over a German.98  
In response to that situation, and because of shifting political and social circumstances in 
Turkey, the Turkish government took a more active stance in promoting a cultural connection to 
Turkey for children with Turkish citizenship, one that explicitly emphasized a Muslim Turkish 
identity. Similar to the Greek government, Turkish citizens were to maintain their ethnic-Turkish 
identities (or develop them) regardless of where they lived. Unlike the Greek government, 
however, the Turkish government expected the majority of its citizens to remain abroad. 
Consequently, even as the government highlighted a specific Turkish identity, the Turkish 
legations in West Germany stressed the need for Turkish citizens to enroll in and finish 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen, ed., Daten und Fakten zur Ausländersituation (Bonn: 
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Familienangehörigen, 1990), 22–25. 
97 Abadan-Unat argues in the 2011 book that “by the 1980s, Turks were the most visible and numerous of 
Germany’s ethnic groups, making them a primary target of xenophobia” (Turks in Europe, 186). See also Stephan 
Lanz, “The German Sonderweg: Multiculturalism as ‘Racism with a Distance,’” in European Multiculturalism 
Revisited, ed. Alessandro Silj (London: Zed Books, 2010), 105–46. 
98 Zeynep Kılıç, “Second-Generation Turkish Immigrants in the United States and Germany: Dilemmas of Cultural 
Identity,” in Crossing Over: Comparing Recent Migration in the United States and Europe, ed. Holger Henke 
(Laham, M.D.: Lexington Books, 2005), 169. For a discussion of the situation regarding immigrant identity in the 
2000s, see Yıldız Köremezli, “Immigrants’ Struggle for Recognition: Religion and Politics,” in Religion, Identity 
and Politics: Germany and Turkey in Interaction, ed. Haldun Gülalp and Günter Seufert (New York: Routledge, 
2013), 60–71. 
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secondary schooling. To achieve its goals, the Turkish government promoted a series of 
education initiatives for language and religious instruction in cooperation with different Länder 
Education Administrations.99  
Part of the Turkish government’s specific aims developed from the high rate of new 
migration, in contrast to groups with Italian and Greek citizenship (see Table 7.1). Although 
thousands of schoolchildren with Turkish citizenship were born in West Germany, the sharp rise 
in total number derived in part from to school-age individuals with Turkish citizenship migrating 
to West Germany through processes of family reunification or as asylum seekers.100 Many of 
these children and youths arrived during their schooling and enrolled directly in West German 
secondary schools (usually lower secondary).101 For those born in the country, many had at least 
one parent who had only recently arrived because of the high rate individuals in West Germany 
who decided to marry someone raised in Turkey. In consequence, where many Italian and Greek 
families entered the third generation, children of Turkish citizens were often first or second 
generation on at least one side.102  
Trying to make it easier for immigrant youths to complete their secondary school 
certificates, the Turkish Embassy and delegations, as well as families with Turkish citizenship, 
requested permission to develop Turkish as a first foreign language class in West German 
                                                
99 “8. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkischen Expertenkommission (1985),” 4–7. 
100 Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 69. Asylum 
discussed in Chapter 8. 
101 For a discussion of continued migration to and from Turkey (Ibid., 156–158). It should be noted, however, that 
thousands of children with Turkish citizenship, or eligible for Turkish citizenship, were born in West Germany. In 
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Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1986, 74. 
102 Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe, 17–31; and Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: 
Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 44–45. 
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schools.103 The idea behind these programs was to enable newly arriving schoolchildren to 
continue taking Turkish language and cultural instruction. Furthermore, the Turkish legations 
and Länder Education Administrations felt that the course would enable schoolchildren to boost 
their grades. In addition, many politicians and families felt that it would be easier for the children 
to focus on learning German after arrival than both German and English. Moreover, as many 
Länder only offered consular instruction for primary school, Turkish as a first foreign language 
provided Turkish citizens considering returning to Turkey or simply with an interest in the 
language with an opportunity to learn and/or perfect their skills.104 
The Länder Ministries of Education and various foreign governments began discussing 
the possibility of offering Turkish (or other) native languages instead of the requisite first foreign 
language in the early 1970s. Only in response to requests from the Turkish legations and with 
reference to the high rate of family reunification in the late 1970s and 1980s, however, did the 
Länder Educational Administrations seriously discuss the issue and begin pilot programs.105 
Berlin’s first widespread (not pilot) programs got off the ground in 1980/81. By 1985/86, seven 
                                                
103 “3. Tagung der Gemischten deutsch-türkische Kommission für den Unterricht türkischer Schüler in der 
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Länder Education Administrations offered Turkish instead of English as a first foreign 
language.106 
The Länder Education Administrations decided to permit Turkish instead of English (or 
other first foreign languages) for multiple reasons. New research from within West Germany and 
Europe claimed that children learned foreign languages better if they had mastered their mother 
tongue.107 In addition, for Länder like Berlin (under the guidance of Christian Democratic 
Senator Hanna-Renate Laurien), programs for Turkish as a first foreign language fit into the 
Länder governments’ internal and foreign policy goals of promoting emigration and/or the 
maintenance of cultural connections.108 For Berlin schools, the population concentration also 
meant that many children ended up in what were essentially “pure foreigner classes.”109 In some 
schools, occasionally in Kreuzberg, children were not necessarily learning German, in part 
because, on occasion, the majority of the pupils in a single school spoke Turkish as a mother 
tongue. Offering the pupils a space to actually learn Turkish seemed advisable.  
In Berlin, to achieve the state’s foreign and internal policy goals, the Senator for 
Education established a small working group in the early 1980s to design schoolbooks that 
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specifically reflected the social and living conditions of children with Turkish citizenship.110 The 
working group, including Berlin officials as well as German and Turkish schoolteachers, 
however, felt that the problems facing immigrant and minority children were not only due to the 
lack of school materials but also to the inadequacy of traditional teaching techniques for this 
group of children. Minority children in West Germany had different language levels for German 
and had different kinds of schooling in their countries of citizenship, and thus needed different 
kinds of instruction. Consequently, the schoolbooks the working group developed not only 
contained new materials, but also provided a new method for teaching language, including 
extensive literary analysis. 
The working group printed their first textbooks for the fifth and sixth grades in 1983 for 
testing, with final versions for grades five through nine released in 1985.111 In 1987, the project 
concluded with the publication of a 350-page teacher’s handbook. The end results were full sized 
books of some one hundred pages each. They were intentionally bright affairs with multiple 
pictures printed in six different colors of ink. Altogether, by the end of the project, Berlin and the 
series' authors produced over 1,000 pages of teaching and learning materials, both textbooks and 
handbooks. From the initial printing in 1983, the team intended to distribute and test the material 
                                                
110 Because of the commonality of this experience in Berlin, the Berlin Senate for Education decided to itself fund 
the development of schoolbooks specifically for these children, although the West German Federal Ministry of 
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in the Federal Republic, but also in other European countries, including the Netherlands, Great 
Britain, Denmark, and Sweden.112 
The international reception from both Turkey and the European Community Member 
States was initially positive. While the European Community could not fund the materials’ 
development as Turkey was not a member of the EC, the European Community was explicitly 
interested in seeing what happened with the books. Toward that end, the European Community 
financed a 1985 conference in Berlin (the books for grades five to nine were in use and the tenth 
grade material and teaching book was in preparation) to present the books. The Commission of 
the European Community also supported translations for use in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Great Britain. At the conference, representatives would praise the books for 
providing a service that was greatly needed and filling a gaping hole.113  
Despite that positive reception, there were several difficulties with the materials’ actual 
use. Because these schoolbook programs partly re-conceptualized how language should be 
taught, working with the books necessitated additional teacher training, making them difficult for 
teachers and schools to use. The Länder and Turkish Education Administrations disagreed 
among themselves to begin with over who should teach the classes; teachers from the children’s 
(parents’) countries of origin, or from West Germany. Either way, newly arriving Turkish 
teachers had to not only learn the West German school system, but also new teaching methods. 
On a rotation, new teachers had to be continually trained. In contrast, ethnic-German 
schoolteachers often did not speak Turkish, even if some Länder required limited training on 
                                                
112 Euan Reid and Hans H. Reich, Breaking the Boundaries: Migrant Workers’ Children in the EC (Multilingual 
Matters, 1992), 16–17. 
113 “Sutherland eröffnet EG-Kolloquium über Türkischbücher,” Landespressedients Berlin, October 14, 1985, 3; and 
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how to teach “immigrant children” (by which they meant local and migrant children with foreign 
citizenship). The courses aimed at a “general introduction to the educational and social problems 
of migrants workers’ children and teaching in a multicultural environment, or at specialization 
(“German for foreigners”).”114 Each of the Länder using the material eventually chose their own 
options, with Berlin importing teachers.  
In addition, the Berlin Senator of Education faced significant difficulties with enrollment, 
as did the other Länder Education Administrations. The Berlin Senator of Education had 
expected one quarter or one third of the total secondary-school-age youths with Turkish 
citizenship in lower primary schools (Hauptschule) in Berlin to register, but only some 12.5% of 
the schoolchildren did. Between 1983 and 1985, interest in the programs hovered at only 
approximately 350 (of 2,540 in the 1985 school year) schoolchildren. From the Berlin side, 
members of the different political parties (SPD, CSU, Alternative Liste, and FDP) attributed the 
problem variously to the long distance to schools offering the classes and to limited information 
for the parents.115 Furthermore, it was quickly discovered there were several vocational 
disadvantages to the programs, as many employment tracks required English competency.116  
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The Senator for Education argued against those claims, declaring instead that the limited 
student interest stemmed from changing migration patterns and the shifting interests of the 
Turkish government. The Senate for Education pointed out that, as with the other West German 
minority groups, fluctuating migration patterns meant that there was less horizontal migration 
into the school system and more children with Turkish citizenship born in the country by the 
mid-1980s. Even traveling to another district for language instruction in Berlin only took 20 to 
30minutes on public transport. And, to overcome difficulties with vocational programs, which 
the Education Administrations claimed was not significant, the Senate for Education 
recommended establishing student working groups for English where necessary for the 1985/86 
school year.117 What the representatives from the Senate for Education saw as the largest 
problem by 1987 was the Turkish government.  
In 1987, the Turkish Ministry of Education expressed dissatisfaction with the 
materials.118 Initially, the Turkish legations had praised the school materials, but they became 
increasing critical of the volumes. The Turkish Ministry of Education’s representatives would 
inform Christian Democrat Georg-Berndt Oschatz,119 Minister of Education in Lower Saxony, 
during a trip to Turkey in April 1987 that the materials published in West Germany, particularly 
those in use in Berlin, did “not reflect the requirements of the Turkish side in respect to the 
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presentation of modern Turkey (possessing anti-Turkish passages and inaccuracies).”120 Oschatz 
reported back to the Kultusministeronferenz Subcommittee on Foreign Children that the Turkish 
government wanted “instructional materials that lead Turkish children toward national 
identification and to the discovery of a personal Turkish identity.” As the Berlin Senator for 
Education had touted the impetus behind the books as promoting the possibility of return, it 
agreed to halt production of the books until they could be reviewed.121 
The Turkish government also dismissed its support for the new textbooks because, by 
1987, the state turned toward supporting classes in Turkish in place of a second foreign language 
instead of the first.122 Studies and developmental programs showed that children taking Turkish 
as a first foreign language had difficulties with further advancement. Several vocational 
programs as well as university tracks required a minimum level of English achievement. 
Therefore, in line with the Turkish government’s emphasis on vocational training, the Turkish 
government changed its emphasis for Turkish instruction in secondary schooling.123  
Part of the changing concern for the Turkish Ministry of Education was the increased 
connection of Turkish national identity with religion. In September 1980, responding to 
escalating violence between conservative and left-leaning political groups (often serving as 
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proxies for US and Soviet interests), the Turkish military staged another coup.124 After taking 
control of the government, which it only relinquished in December 1983, the military instituted a 
series of major education reforms designed to prevent, as Sam Kaplan would describe in his 
2005 book “the consolidation of distinct identities that threatened to fragment the nation into a 
polity riddled with division.”125 As part of those reforms, in July 1981 the President of Turkey, 
Bülent Ulusu, a retired Admiral from the Turkish Navy, announced the decision of the Military 
Security Council in Erzurum to change school law, making Islamic instruction compulsory in 
primary and secondary school.126 
The new policies directly influenced how the Turkish government tried to shape 
instruction in West Germany. Previously, in joint expert meetings of the “West German-Turkish 
committee on the instruction of Turkish children in West Germany” the Turkish delegations had 
supported some Islamic religious instruction. Now, with all children with Turkish citizenship to 
participate in religious instruction as a central part of their civics instruction in classes on 
“Religion and Morals,” the state stepped up its campaign to provide its citizens abroad similar 
instruction. As the Turkish delegations explained to the West Germans in the sixth meeting of 
the expert commission in 1982, “Islamic religious instruction was of great meaning as part of 
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Turkish culture.”127 Claiming the importance of religious instruction for identity development, 
the Turkish legation suggested making the classes compulsory, as they were in Turkey.128  
The West Germans negated the idea of compulsory Islamic instruction on legal grounds 
(as it had regarding Greek consular instruction), but several of the Länder governments had 
approved adding Islamic instruction to consular instruction in the 1970s.129 Now, with active 
pressure from the Turkish government to spread Islamic instruction and a growing number of 
children identifying as Muslim across the country, however, the Länder had to reconsider 
permitting relevant classes during standard instruction. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and 
the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war shortly thereafter, however, the Länder governments viewed 
Islam as threatening, even revolutionary in tone.130 Concerned that providing Islamic religious 
instruction might encourage children to rebel or disregard West German law, the 
Kultusministerkonferenz established a subcommittee on Islamic religious instruction to examine 
the question in the early 1980s. Meeting five times between 1983 and 1984, the group discussed 
the compatibility of Islam and West Germany, as well as issues like the language of instruction, 
the possibility of opening the instruction up in public schools, and the acceptability of providing 
the instruction to non-Turkish citizens.131 
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Even as the Kultusministerkonferenz’s group was meeting, the Turkish military turned the 
government back over to the people. Halil Turgut Özal, who had acted as deputy Prime Minister 
under Ulusu between 1980 and 1982, was elected Prime Minister, serving between December 
1983 and October 1989.132 Under Özal’s leadership, as he was a devout Muslim, the government 
continued the trend to permit expanding freedom of religious expression in Turkey as well as 
promoted religious instruction in the schools.133 His party, the center-right neoliberal Motherland 
Party (Anavatan Partisi, abbreviated ANAVATAN (formerly ANAP)), and other religious 
politicians also took on the idea of national unity in order to challenge secular foundations of the 
state’s school system.134 Promoting that unity, the Turkish pedagogical state took an increasing 
interest in its citizens abroad, emphasizing the importance of its citizens’ schooling as the 
schoolchildren as their number in West Germany climbed past 350,000 (the total population with 
Turkish citizenship living in West Germany surpassed 1.5 million).135  
The KMK’s subcommittee on Islamic instruction did not know the complexities of the 
situation in Turkey, but they were interested in whether it was culturally or legally acceptable to 
allow the Turkish government to make Islamic instruction more available to its citizens – or even 
all Muslims – in schools in West Germany. As such, they approached the question from the point 
of view of legal permissibility in Germany, trying to decide if Islam was compatible with 
German culture. If it was, the committee had to address concerns over what orthodox Islam 
permitted, and what the Turkish government in particular wanted. To address the compatibility 
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between Islam and German society, the committee invited Tilman Nagel, a German Orientalist 
and expert in Islamic studies, to report on the issue of “compatibility between Islam and the 
[West German] Basic Law” to the KMK’s committee in September and again in November 
1983. Navel argued that Islamic law directed Muslims living in a non-Islamic state to follow 
local law and to carry out personal observances, but not to obey Islamic law (Sharia law).136 
Based on his depiction of Islam, the KMK’s subcommittee determined that German schools 
could, theoretically, offer Islam without contravening the West German Basic Law. Furthermore, 
the committee felt that, as proselytizing was relatively unsuccessful, it was no danger.137  
Although the KMK’s subcommittee decided that Islamic instruction could in theory be 
offered in West German schools, they could not reach a consensus on what form that instruction 
could or should take. Addressing language was perhaps the easiest of the committee’s tasks. 
They determined that Islamic instruction could in theory be provided in German instead of 
Arabic (it was also provided in Turkish, after all). But, as had been a problem for West German 
Education Administrations in the 1970s, there was no international Islamic group that could 
unquestionably act as interlocutor with the state and limited Islamic training in German 
universities. The Turkish government offered to fulfill that position, as it did in Turkey. Yet, the 
KMK’s committee felt that, with increasing numbers of citizens from Morocco and Tunisia in 
West Germany, as well as other groups adhering to Islam, offering Turkish Islamic instruction in 
the schools would be inappropriate.138 Unable to agree if Islam should be allowed in schools 
                                                
136 Hermann, “3. Sitzung der Kommission ‘Islamischer Religionsunterricht,’” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: KMK, 
September 16, 1983), 5, B 304/7771, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Hermann, “4. Sitzung der Kommission 
‘Islamischer Religionsunterricht,’” 2–5. 
137 Hermann, “4. Sitzung der Kommission ‘Islamischer Religionsunterricht,’” 4–6. 
138 Some of the West German ethno-national majority felt it needed to prevent the Turkish government from 
developing Turkish Empire in Germany. For a discussion of the continued islamicization of the Turkish government, 
see Ersin Kalaycioğlu, “Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of the 
  407 
without a clear university track producing teachers or a clear head of the faith, the KMK’s 
committee recommended relying on the individual Education Authorities’ discretion.139  
Even as the KMK’s committee reached its decision, the Turkish state would make it 
easier for the Länder Education Administrations to work with it in regards to religious 
instruction in the mid-and late 1980s. In 1984 the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı, or Diyanet) in Turkey founded the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs 
(Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği, abbreviated DİTİB) with headquarters in Cologne. The 
Länder Education Administrations consented to work with DİTİB as a contact to further develop 
some form of standardized Turkish Islamic religious instruction for consular instruction.140 That 
agreement did not, however, lead to opening Islamic instruction in public schools or to allow 
non-Turkish citizens to attend.141  
Not all of the Länder Education Administrations were apprehensive about Islamic 
instruction. In 1984, the Berlin government permitted Islamic religious (or “religious ethics 
grounded in Islam”) instruction for one to two hours a week as part of Turkish consular 
instruction, as North Rhine-Westphalia had done in the 1970s. For the Berlin Senate for 
Education under Senator Laurien the question of Islamic instruction was an issue of right.142 
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Rubin (New York: Routledge, 2013), 27–42. 
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Namely, the right of the schoolchild was to receive religious instruction. Laurien, a devoted 
Catholic, felt that the separation between church and state meant that the state should ensure 
religious instruction was not against the Basic Law, but the relevant religious associations should 
determine the content.143 In following, the Berlin Senate required the Turkish General Consulate 
be answerable and that the instructional content not contradict the Federal Republic’s Basic 
Law.144 Convinced of its importance, in 1984 Senator of Education Laurien went as far as to 
write the Turkish General Consulate to tell them that if they had any problems organizing the 
classes they were to inform her as soon as possible so she could provide support.145 
As the decade progressed, the Turkish legations pressed for additional Islamic 
instruction. In June 1985, the Turkish delegation to a Joint Expert Commission on the instruction 
of Turkish schoolchildren in West Germany Meeting again argued for the construction of 
obligatory Islamic religious instruction for Turkish school children. This time, however, the 
Turkish delegation hoped to see two weekly instructional hours in Turkish included in the pre-
noon period in public schools. The delegation wanted the instruction to be imparted by teachers 
trained in Turkey. For the curriculum and materials the Turkish delegation recommended the 
Länder use what the North Rhine-Westphalian team (from the Soest Institute) was developing in 
collaboration with a Turkish representative.146  
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Despite hopes, the Soest Institutes materials, part of a series the teaching materials 
funded by the North Rhine-Westphalian and Hessian Ministries of Education for teaching 
children with non-German citizenship, were not available until the end of the decade.147 Even 
then, representatives from North Rhine-Westphalia, presenting the text to the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s Sub-Committee for Foreign Children in September 1988, discussed 
the limitations of the materials, telling the committee that the materials were only relevant for 
Turkish schoolchildren. It was impossible, the group told the subcommittee, to develop material 
for general “orthodox Islamic religious instruction … given the multiplicity of Islamic 
organizations and groups, some of which had opposing viewpoints.”148 The North Rhine-
Westphalian representatives were right about the multiplicity of positions. In 1982 in Berlin 
alone, among the Muslim population, there were 90 percent Sunni and 10 percent Shi’a Muslims. 
Within these groups, there were further divisions, like the traditional Süleymanli-Movement and 
the Islamist fundamentalists associated with the National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi, 
MSP) under Necmettin Erbakan.149 The progress of the 1980s only brought further 
diversification as asylum seekers and other migrants, including a growing numbers of Kurds and 
Alevites, arrived.150  
Neither the West German Education Administrations nor the Turkish government 
supported multiculturalism within the diverse Turkish minority groups. The Turkish government 
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was in the middle of a concentrated effort to bring about cultural unification and/or 
homogenization in Turkey. The West German Education Administrations, in turn, wanted to be 
able to work with a single Turkish minority group instead of a multiplicity. They argued, perhaps 
understandably, that if they supported every group, there would never be an end to the number. 
In consequence, both sets of governments and Education Administrations supported a specific 
brand of both Islamic instruction and Turkish-language and cultural classes, outright denying 
certain groups the permission, or even the right, to maintain their own cultures within a public 
setting like the school. Multiculturalism was good in as far as it encouraged the Turkish state’s 
definition of Turkishness. It became questionable when discussed in regards to the minority 
groups holding Turkish citizenship.151 
Interculturalism, a European Identity, and Italian Language Courses 
The Italian government’s efforts to influence West German education policy 
demonstrates the mix of individual aims connected with European rhetoric in the early and mid-
1980s. For the Italian state, the longevity of the Italian diaspora’s residence in West Germany 
combined with the promotion of a European identity shaped the government’s arguments. As the 
Italian ambassador pointed out in a 1982 keynote address at the University Würzburg, there was 
some continued pendulum migration, but the “number [of Italian citizens in West Germany] was 
relatively constant and it [was] clear that these people [were] going to remain.” With the goal of 
“preparing the third generation to enter school,” the Ambassador wanted to see children with 
Italian citizenship acknowledged as part of the European Community – meaning on par with 
West German citizens. The Ambassador claimed that it was therefore “very important that they 
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learn the German language as early as possible,” but also that they care for and maintain contact 
to their culture – particularly through Italian instruction.152 These children were supposed to 
embrace their European heritage and learn – either through attending West German classes and 
consular instruction or in bilingual European schools – to be a mix of German and Italian.153 
The Italian government’s hopes of promoting an intercultural identity for its citizens 
continued to reflect European Community aims across the 1980s. The Community, which 
stagnated briefly in the early 1980s as the Member States negotiated just how involved the 
Community should become in areas beyond labor, moved again toward integration and 
collaboration in the mid- and late 1980s (as mentioned above). The Italian government would 
play an influential role in that shift and develop its own school initiatives, materials, and policies 
in line with those EC trends. Yet, even as it promoted multiculturalism, its citizens did not 
necessarily reap the benefits of those policies as they continued to struggle academically. 
Like the West German government, the Italian government underwent a significant shift 
in its politics over the 1980s. The 1983 Italian election saw socialist Bettino Craxi become Prime 
Minister, succeeding Christian Democrat Amintore Fanfani.154 Craxi, who served from 1983 to 
1987, was the first Socialist Prime Minister in Italian history. In office longer than any other 
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Prime Minister to that date, scholars frequently view Craxi’s tenure as one of recovery and 
stability. Education reform would, however, only be piecemeal under Craxi’s leadership, 
although the state did succeed in introducing significant reform to the curriculum in 1985. What 
would change significantly would be the state’s success in foreign policy.155  
Craxi’s successes in the European Community demonstrates that improvement. He had 
already shown a commitment to the development of European integration and during his 
leadership in Italy, he reaffirmed that stance, championing Eurosocialism.156 In 1985, the Italian 
state under Craxi took the presidency of the European Community. He and his Foreign Minister 
Giulio Andreotti pushed for the inclusion of Portugal and Spain in the Community and 
reinforced political integration.157 Part of that emphasis was to quash the French plan to create a 
two-tiered layer of inclusion for EC Membership, but it was also in order to ensure the equality 
of the Italian state’s citizens abroad. Those citizens had been flexing their political muscles, 
becoming a political force on their own. Responding to pressure from the various Italian 
diasporas across the world, the state created a range of agencies in order to encourage and 
maintain ties to emigrant communities. The Committees of Italians Abroad, established in 1985, 
acted as advisory boards to the Italian consulates in order to protect the rights of those citizens.158 
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Responding to those citizens’ demands, the Italian state would again focus on Italian instruction 
and cultural education in places like West Germany after years of only partial engagement.159  
Because the Italian state was finally steadily advocating its education goals and trends in 
favor of European integration, as well as due to West Germany’s own political situation, in the 
mid-1980s the West German School Administrations acceded to Italian requests. The longevity 
of the diaspora’s residence in West Germany and their relationship to the European Community 
also influenced the West German Education Administrations’ willingness to work with them. At 
the same time, as West Germany celebrated an “Italy Day” in June 1986, in Munich the 
President of the Kultusministerkonferenz, Social Democratic Senator of Education in Bremen, 
Horst Werner Francke,160 gave a speech on the change in education for schoolchildren with 
Italian citizenship in West Germany since the publication of the KMK's 1976 decision regarding 
the double goals. One of the main differences Francke emphasized was that many of the foreign 
children living in 1986 West Germany had been born there, were attending kindergarten, and 
were entering regular instruction alongside ethnic-German schoolchildren. Instead of 
maintaining their mother tongue, these children (with Italian citizenship) spoke German and had 
to learn Italian. According to Francke, these changes meant that the Education Administrations 
now needed to think about the “place of Italian language and culture in the German curriculum 
and how it should be taught.” Francke claimed that the West German community should 
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celebrate “Italian school children in West German as being comfortable in two member states.” 
In light of European Community aims, he depicted the situation as a positive development.161  
While the Italian diaspora in West Germany did stabilize (after a sharp decrease in 1983 
and 1984, see Table 7.1), by no means did all families with Italian citizenship intend to stay. 
Some parents with Italian citizenship even stressed their intention to someday return to Italy. In 
1980, for example, a group of “Italian parents from bilingual schools” sent a letter to the 
Bavarian Ministry of Education to express thanks for native language instruction offerings. They 
agreed that, while many “Italian parents [did] indeed plan on remaining in West Germany” (60 
percent enrolled in German schools in Bavaria), some parents, including the authors of the letter, 
“plan[ned] on returning to Italy.” For this very reason, they informed the Ministry, they had their 
children attend bilingual schools and wanted the Ministry to continue the classes. They knew that 
some people argued that the bilingual instruction hurt their children’s chances in the West 
German school system, but they felt the people who complained did not fully understand the 
situation. Without the classes, the parents “knew that their children would not have a chance in 
the Italian system upon their return.”162 Consequently, the parents liked the courses and declared 
that they were even willing to send their children longer distances to take part.  
The Italian government disagreed that the children had no chance in the Italian system, 
but, acknowledging the difficulties of return, did establish some return programs in areas seeing 
high migration. Toward that end, the Italian government established programs for return in 
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Palermo and some additional locations.163 The Foreign Office would encourage such support as 
returning children had skills that, theoretically, would benefit both countries. Besides, as the 
Italian government pointed out, training children to operate in both counties theoretically 
fulfilled part of the European Community and Council of Europe’s goals for international 
communication and cultural exchange.164 
Yet, responding to the Committees of Italians Abroad, the government’s main focus was 
on its citizens still abroad in West Germany and other European countries and not those 
returning. In continual bilateral meetings, and during sessions of the European Community, the 
Italian government proclaimed its interest in both promoting a European culture and improving 
Italy's cultural (and general) reputation across Europe. Toward that end, under the auspices of the 
European Community, the Italian Government collaborated with other European states to 
develop new school initiatives and school materials for its citizens living abroad. First with the 
French and then West German Ministries of Education, the Italian government created two 
schoolbook series called Tra Noi. With the materials resulting from the schoolbook project, the 
involved governments aimed to serve both children learning Italian as a second language and 
those with heritage language skills. The Italian government also supported the schoolbook 
program specifically with an eye toward promoting the “philosophy of multiculturalism” and 
pushing a European identity that equally combined the Italian ethno-national identity with other 
ethnic affiliations, setting them on par.165 With Italian citizens abroad moving into the third 
generation and remaining relatively stable, the Italian state claimed (as it had almost continually 
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from the 1960s) that these Italians needed to be simultaneously a part of both their heritage and 
country of residence cultures.166 Multiculturalism and a European identity was, after all, 
supposed be applicable to all Member State nationals.167 
The Tra Noi working groups designed their school materials to disseminate the Italian 
language and Italian and European culture to children who spoke French or German as a mother 
tongue. Aiming at children needing or wanting to learn Italian, even if they already had Italian 
citizenship, the Italian government advocated opening up classes using the new materials to all 
children. European integration, after all, dictated that all children – not only minority groups – 
learn to internalize a European identity in and out of the school.168 Toward that end, the 
European Community actually redefined the entire concept of migration as a social and legal 
category. Member State nationals who had previously been labeled “migrant workers,” such as 
those who had moved from Italy to West Germany for work, were now simply “Europeans” 
taking part in inter-European movement. They – outside of Federal voting – were supposed to be 
just like someone from Berlin moving to Cologne for a new job. The Italian government used the 
same argument to claim that its effort to spread Italian language classes in Germany should be 
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seen in the light of standard cultural politics. It was just a “normal discussion” about wanting to 
see a state language taught as part of the regular curriculum in order to encourage the 
relationship between the two countries and teach the children that the other country was 
wonderful.169 The goal of language instruction was not supposed to only be to help migrant 
children, but also promote language instruction and cultural understanding.170 
With that aim, in 1986, during the visit of the President of the Kultusministerkonferenz, 
Bremen Senator Francke, to Italy, as well as in later meetings, the Italian delegation stressed that 
“it [was] of great importance that the Italian instruction for the children of foreign workers take 
place in the course of the regular instruction in German schools.”171 The 1979 changes to the 
1976 KMK Recommendations on the instruction of migrant workers’ children already permitted 
Italian instead of English as a first foreign language in primary and lower secondary for Italian 
citizens.172 But, the Italian government argued, Italian should also be offered as a third language 
option in upper secondary schools (Realschule and Gymnasium) and comprehensive schools 
(Gesamtschule) alongside (usually) French or Latin. Furthermore, both country of residence and 
country of citizenship governments should promote student exchanges and partnerships. While 
not explicitly stated, what the Italian government wanted to see was its citizens and culture on 
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par with the other European Community Member State nationals, such as France or the 
Netherlands, with which the Federal Republic had vibrant exchange programs and school 
partnerships.173  
The West German Education Administrations by and large responded positively to Italian 
requests. Where in the 1960s, the Italian legations’ desire to expand Italian language offerings 
and open up consular instruction to both Italian and West German citizens had been shot down 
(as discussed in Chapter 2), in the 1980s the West German Länder agreed, both on account of 
demographic changes and in response to new European Community goals. Not only were some 
new bilingual schools set up in North Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin, and Bavaria (as well as in some 
other locations), but the West German Education Administrations also consented to opening up 
the new Tra Noi classes to West German schoolchildren. Much to the Italian legations’ delight, 
the classes became so popular among ethnic-German children in some areas that they were 
attended by “seventy to ninety percent German schoolchildren.” For the West German Education 
Administrations, this counted as a problem, as they continued to differentiate between 
appropriate instruction for German citizens and foreigners. As the intention behind the classes 
was to reach schoolchildren with Italian citizenship, the Länder representatives in the 
Kultusministerkonferenz felt that the courses were not ideal for German citizens. Furthermore, if 
the classes were to be dominated by children with German citizenship they needed different 
sources of financing. Nonetheless, the Länder Education Administrations appreciated how the 
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courses worked within the framework of the European Community’s goals for intercultural 
education.174 
Although the Italian government was pleased with the development of the classes, it 
would remain frustrated throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s with the performance of its 
citizens in West German schools. The Italian ethno-national minority group in West Germany, 
while fully benefitting from perceptions of it as as European, after decades of migration to the 
FRG still did not perform well in the West German school system (see Table 7.4). Whether due 
to continued othering by West German officials, socio-economic differences, or choices made by 
individual Italian citizens, schoolchildren with Italian citizenship continued to be 
overrepresented in special schools for the learning disabled and lower primary schools. The 
discrepancy was so clear that, by the end of the decade, the Italian government pushed to 
reinstitute the Joint Expert Committee on the instruction of children with Italian citizenship 
living in (West) Germany.175  
The Italian government’s push for a European identity and cultural exchange became a 
central part of the European Community’s agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s as part of the 
transition to the European Union. The Members of the European Community were reforming the 
supranational institution, reshaping what it stood for and what programs it financed. Where 
previously diversity between the European members was encouraged, now the Member States 
lauded “European unity.” But, for the European Community, divergent education systems 
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continued to be a major stumbling block to promoting labor and cultural exchange. To overcome 
that barrier, the European Community Member States emphasized and aggressively promoted 
further degree equivalency as well as modern language acquisition. New European Community 
school initiatives and higher education programs like SOCRATES, EURYDICE, and 
ERASMUS explicitly encouraged travel abroad, inter-European Community communication, 
and youth exchanges.176 Where cultural exchange had previously rested on migrant workers and 
art programs, it now became a norm to promote temporary exchange programs and inter-
European Community collaboration. Furthermore, any Member State national was supposed to 
be able to travel anywhere within the EC and integrate smoothly, because integration was – 
theoretically – largely unnecessary due to a shared European culture. Movement between the 
countries was no longer supposed to be migration, but simply “intra-European movement.”177 
The programs successfully encouraged collaboration and exchange between European 
Community Member States, but also diminished support for Third Country nationals. 
Specifically available for Member State nationals, the programs had the inadvertent effect of 
excluding European Community residents with so-called Third Country citizenship. 
Furthermore, European languages were increasingly accessible as part of the normal (secondary) 
school curriculums in many European states, meaning that native language instruction was less 
pressing.178 Hence, supporting “us,” the EC ostracized “them,” even through programs designed 
to support diversity. Moving toward the infamous “Fortress Europe,” the European Community 
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Member States also agreed to tighten immigration policies. Increasingly, the EC limited support 
for Third Country nationals, promoting its members over the foreign other.179 
With the change in migration patterns and international focus there was a sense that the 
European Community Directive 77/496/EEC on the “Education of the Children of Migrant 
Workers” from 1977, supposedly never having succeeded in its aims, was now obsolete.180 Part 
of the Directive’s alleged failure was on account of its rootedness in a period of mass family 
reunification and new migration. Member State approval had partly been based on 
encouragement for return migration. Yet, while return – and often circular – migration to other 
European Community Member States was high, those individuals with Third Country (non-EC) 
citizenship were less likely to leave.181 Instead, these groups often put down roots, becoming 
permanent residents (and often citizens) in their countries of residence, although they frequently 
faced continued xenophobia and othering.182 Furthermore, these minority groups’ children were 
increasingly born in-country, meaning that pressure to “return to their countries of origin” (now 
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Panayi, Outsiders: History of European Minorities (London: Hambledon, 1999), 117–160. 
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questioned as they originated from within host country borders) diminished and with it interest in 
promoting programs to enable a “smooth reintegration.”183 
The European Community also felt that the other international organizations involved 
with human rights and education could support Third Country Nationals. The Organization for 
European Cooperation and Development and the Council of Europe, among others, were (and 
continue to be) involved in education research, particularly for migrant and minority groups. For 
example, in June 1968, the OECD established the Centre for Educational Research and 
Innovation (CERI) in Paris. Over the 1980s, the group increasingly worked to support the 
exchange of information on education and school initiatives in Europe (and beyond). Toward 
that goal, among other projects, CERI carried out a study between 1982 to 1986 on “Education 
and Cultural and Linguistic Pluralism,” as part of which they published a report on immigrants’ 
children at school.184 The Council of Europe, in turn, continued to finance projects promoting 
equality of opportunity, particularly for migrant groups and in countries with high youth 
unemployment or limited job training.  
Responding to international changes, in the late 1980s the Commission of the European 
Community cut support for the “schooling of the children of migrant workers,” reducing it to 
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almost nothing by 1989.185 The emphasis on ensuring/enabling equality diminished in favor of 
program implementation. As of 1990, the Commission decided to discontinue all national or 
local projects, focusing instead on investing in Community networks and exchanges.186 Hence, 
some of the funding cuts included in the programs for Greek schoolbook development as well as 
consular instruction. As from the beginning, the Commission only financed the development of 
education programs, as it felt its duty in regards to the named education initiatives had been 
fulfilled.187 Furthermore, many of the projects that had previously been covered by general funds 
for “migrant workers’ children” or “intercultural education” now fell under the purview of one of 
the established (named) European Community education programs (i.e. Lingua).188 In the early 
1990s, in response to the planned European Community border changes and new treaties (i.e. the 
Treaty of Maastricht), programs for children of guest workers and intercultural education would 
again be funded, but hardly with the same emphasis or level of financial support.189  
Alongside promoting exchange and equivalency, at the end of the decade the European 
Community also stressed a bicultural, bilingual form of education that promoted European 
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Citizenship. Happy with that shift, in 1988 the Greek government joined the Italian in promoting 
the idea of a European education.190 In 1990, a Greek delegation would claim that its goal for its 
citizens abroad was the “bilingual and bicultural education of Greek children in the framework of 
European unity.”191 For the Greek government, that continued to mean, however, an identity for 
its nationals as explicitly Greek. The Italian state rhetorically emphasized the same goals as the 
Greek, but the Italian government continued to encourage an intercultural form of identity. What 
both of these forms of multiculturalism stressed and what a bicultural education entailed, which 
the Commission of the European Community encouraged, was the development of a European 
form of citizenship that encompassed the different layers of identification.192 A prescribed form 
of global citizenship, European Community citizenship education stressed diversity and internal 
compatibility, which often left the question of how Third Country citizens or ethno-national 
minority groups fit into that society up in the air.193  
Yet, despite the European Community’s official support for migrant and minority 
integration and a multi- or bicultural identity, in West Germany in the late 1980s European 
Community Member State nationals were still legally non-German and mostly labeled as 
“foreign.” Within West Germany, some areas, like Berlin, continued to cap classes and put 
European Community Member State nationals in pure foreigner classes.194 They were still 
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legally foreign despite claims of European unity and long-term residence. That perceived 
foreignness, in turn, meant that, like Third Country nationals (e.g. Turkish citizens), the state 
continued to other them, influencing their rights and social inclusion. Instead of counting second- 
or third-generation children as locals, officials like the Berlin Senator for Health and Social 
Affairs would generally claim in 1988 that “guest worker families, even those who have lived in 
Berlin more than 20 years, have maintained their cultural values and norms despite their long 
stays.”195 
Conclusion 
By the end of the decade, across West Germany and Europe there was a widespread push 
for multiculturalism and the word was “in every mouth,” as journalist Elisa Klapheck wrote in an 
1989 article for the Tageszeitung in Berlin.196 As, however, Klapheck went on to explain, the 
meaning of the term was heavily debated. In West Germany, the different Länder governments, 
foreign advocates, and the Education Administrations, as well as the public media, each 
suggested a different understanding. In Länder with predominately SPD or Green governments, 
the trend was to discuss multiculturalism as biculturalism or interculturalism, creating a mix of 
new identities across cultures. In contrast, Länder with predominately CDU governments (CSU 
in Bavaria), multiculturalism was often understood to imply diversity, with each group 
maintaining their own culture.197 
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The definitions of the term across Europe reflected those cultural and political divisions 
and different experiences. The Greek government used the term “multiculturalism” to justify a 
separation between the minority and majority cultures. The European Community’s Directive 
486/77 on the education of the children of migrant workers was thus legal permission for a 
minority group to retain its specific ethnic attributes while being allowed to succeed in the ethno-
national majority’s society. In contrast, the Italian government pushed an intercultural form of 
multiculturalism. What the Italian government stressed was a cross between two or more 
cultures.  
All of the variations of those definitions were arguably accurate. Yet, the 
multiculturalism the Italian, Greek, and Turkish (as well as other countries of citizenship) 
governments advocated was a state-sponsored and state-controlled version of identity and 
culture. These states, and West Germany, wanted the relevant individuals’ culture and identity to 
reflect their approved definitions. The Education Administrations involved carefully designed 
the classes for dissemination.198  
For the West German Federal and Länder governments, as well as the ethno-national 
majority, that support was a step towards inclusion instead of rejection.199 Although the 
movement would be slow and depended on the exact location in the Federal Republic, many of 
the varied long-term minorities began to see themselves as at home. The ethnic-German 
majority, in turn, began to see these permanent foreign citizens as at least partly German. While 
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still not common, the hyphenated identity (i.e. Turkish-German) was also slowly making its way 
through (West) German society.200 
Yet, although the acceptance of some forms of multiculturalism became more common 
among the ethno-national majority, the minority groups, and the governments involved, the 
concept introduced new problems even as it solved others. Arguing that multiculturalism allowed 
for diversity and a heterogeneous society, many actors involved felt that state-sponsored 
multiculturalism fixed problems with discrimination. To an extent, that was true. Just as true, 
however, was that state-sponsored multiculturalism ossified the boundaries of what a select set of 
cultures were supposed to be and entail. For the West German majority, West German Muslims 
were Turkish citizens and, for most involved, Turkish citizens were Turks. Setting those 
parameters meant that groups like the Kurds and the Alevi had to struggle for recognition and 
permission to maintain their own cultural capital. Establishing a multiplicity of “us” still 
excluded thousands of people as “them.”201 
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CHAPTER 8: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION FOR ETHNIC GERMANS, ASYLUM 
SEEKERS, AND FOREIGN NATIONALS (1987–1992) 
 
In 1987, the government in Hungary loosened its border restrictions, allowing thousands 
from the Eastern bloc to apply for travel visas and leave the country with legal permission. 
During the Cold War, many of the communist Central, Eastern, and Southeastern states had 
refused to permit their citizens to migrate. In May 1989 Hungary opened its boarder completely, 
creating a hole in the Iron Curtain. In response to the Hungarian policy in the context of the 
general political change in the Soviet policy, other communist states also opened their borders 
for emigration between 1987 and 1989. Many individuals were understandably concerned about 
the potentially temporary character of this opportunity. Consequently, hundreds of thousands 
chose to move away from their former homes in the East. Some were fleeing at the first available 
opportunity. Other individuals opted to leave because they were concerned about the future. Still 
others were worried about possible changes in (West) German citizenship laws as the Federal 
Republic began to take steps to prevent or limit the number of both returning ethnic Germans and 
asylum seekers, especially after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in October 1989, the (re)unification 
of the two Germanys, and the collapse of the Soviet system. 
At the same time, internal conflicts and wars in places like Turkey and Yugoslavia led to 
mass emigration. In Turkey the “low level war” between the Turkish government and the 
suppressed Kurdish minority that had started in the 1970s gained intensity when the Kurdistan 
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Workers Parts (PKK) announced a Kurdish uprising August 1984. 1 In Yugoslavia the increasing 
ethnic conflicts during the 1980s became increasingly violent at the end of the decade and 
developed into a series of full-fledged wars on the Balkan in 1991. That violent disintegration of 
the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia resulted in the founding nine states.2 
As a result immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia with varied ethnicities, 
already the largest citizenship groups, exploded. The states of origin had had bilateral labor 
agreements with West Germany during the guest worker era, meaning that their citizens had 
right to extra support programs in West Germany. The new wave of immigrants, however, often 
claimed entry as asylum seekers instead of through family reunification. In 1988 their numbers 
reached 14,873 from Turkey (including Kurds) and 20,812 from Yugoslavia (see Table 8.2). 
Despite being co-nationals, the legal differentiation between these new and established groups 
meant different rights. The issue became particularly contentious, as many of these groups 
pointed out that they were ethnic minorities, not part of their country of origin’s ethno-national 
majority.  
Whatever their specific reasons, first dozens and then hundreds of thousands of migrants 
flooded into the Federal Republic between 1987 and 1992.3 Some were immediately eligible for 
(West) German citizenship because they counted as “ethnic Germans” (202,673 in 1988, see 
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Table 8.1) while others arrived as asylum seekers claiming political or ethnic persecution or 
escaping war (103,076 in 1988, see Table 8.2). The majority of asylum seekers hailed from 
within Europe, often coming from similar countries of origin as those migrants entitled to 
German citizenship. This combination of migrants, together with challenges to old conceptions 
of “national” and “ethnic” identity, raised new questions for the West German Federal and 
Länder governments. They were forced to reconsider different legal groups’ rights and the 
appropriateness of programs for their integration or acknowledgment of their cultural heritage.  
The Länder Ministries of Education’s reconsideration of schooling for new migrant 
groups reignited debates over what the right to education meant for foreign nationals. In the 
1950s, they had decided that the right to education, as a positive right, meant that the government 
had to take action. In a federated system, the Länder had to guarantee access to schools by 
including all children under compulsory schooling laws regardless of their country of citizenship 
(as discussed in Chapter 1). The local municipalities had to make sure that this right was 
realized. In the 1960s and 1970s, the West German Ministries of Education additionally viewed 
the state as responsible for enabling all children equal education opportunities in the local school 
system. This necessitated integration programs for foreign nationals (see Chapters 2 through 4). 
The Ministries of Education and Education Research also further brought the right to education 
together with minority rights, and claimed that children needed instruction in their mother 
tongue, as full literacy in their first language was supposed to both psychologically and 
scholastically benefit the child (see Chapter 5). By the early 1980s, in short, the right to 
education entailed inclusion under compulsory schooling laws, equality of education 
opportunities, and access to native language instruction. 
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The late 1980s waves of migration forced the Länder Ministries of Education to 
reconsider their definition of the right to education, as well as practices and guidelines for the 
instruction of foreign nationals and migrant schoolchildren. Between 1987 and 1992, the Länder 
representatives in the Kultusministerkonferenz’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign 
Schoolchildren” on the instruction of foreign children argued over how to handle the new 
groups. Debating their ethical and legal obligations, the Länder representatives questioned 
whether the different groups of ethno-national German migrants, asylum seekers, and established 
ethno-national minority groups should be treated the same or differently. Their answers were 
dependent on their resources, the size of the groups, and the ethno-national German majority’s 
perception of a group’s right to be in Germany. 
Returning Ethnic Germans and Reunification  
In August 1988, the CDU Senator for Education, Vocational Training, and Sports, 
Hanna-Renate Laurien, announced that there were around 2,500 recently arrived ethnic-German 
children (Aussiedlerkinder) in Berlin schools. Around two-thirds of these migrant children 
attended Berlin primary schools, and one-third enrolled in secondary schools. The Senator 
expected another 400–500 in the following weeks. Laurien wanted to take the opportunity to 
“thank all of the teachers and staff working toward the integration of these German youths from 
abroad.” She went on to “wish the school children and teachers every success in their work.”4  
Ethnic-German migrant children with German citizenship may have technically been 
welcome in the FRG, but their arrival in large numbers challenged norms already under scrutiny 
for three reasons in particular. First, as many of the newly arriving ethnic-German children spoke 
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little or no German, many education officials debated whether the established integration 
programs were appropriate. Second, their language competency and cultural associations raised 
questions about what their rights should be. Third, the presence of the thousands of children only 
connected to Germany through a distant past raised questions about the connection between 
ethnicity and citizenship.5 Limited German language knowledge and clear cultural differences 
between these new migrants and the ethnic-German majority born in the country raised questions 
about their “Germanness.”6  
The challenge here was that, unlike soi-disant “foreign” children, migrant ethnic-German 
children were legally – and socially – entitled to citizenship and hence equal educational 
opportunities on the same basis as the ethnic-German children born in the Federal Republic. The 
Länder Ministries of Education had been working to ensure equal opportunities on a minor scale 
since the Federal Republic’s founding in 1949 (as discussed in chapter 1). Toward that end, in 
1977 the Kultusministerkonferenz agreed on a set of “Recommendations regarding Returning 
Germans” emphasizing rapid integration and establishing school initiatives to ensure their right 
to education.7 Based on those recommendations, the individual Länder decreed that schools 
needed to place migrant ethnic-German children directly in the regular classroom and provide 
them with an extra ten hours of extra German instruction per week. For those few children 
possessing limited German knowledge, schools were supposed to provide intensive German 
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6 Ibid. 
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language support classes.8 As ethnic Germans, however, the Länder Ministries of Education 
assumed that the children would already be culturally German. In theory, the arrival of new 
migrants would in no way dilute the ill-defined ideal “Germanness.”9 Even if migrant ethnic-
German children did need the more intensive German classes, arrivals usually spread across the 
Federal Republic. The small groups facilitated integration and prevented strain on individual 
school systems.  
Table 8.1: Ethno-national German (Aussiedler) Migration to West Germany, 1968-199210 
 Total Polish 
Soviet 
Sphere 
(Former) 
Yugoslavia 
School Age 
(6-18) % of Total 
1968-1981 530,343 298,302 68,233 9,442 112,461 21.2 
1982 48,170 30,355 2,071 213 7,674 15.9 
1983 37,925 19,122 1,447 137 6,635 17.5 
1984 36,459 17,455 913 190 5,540 15.2 
1985 38,968 22,075 460 191 6,303 16.2 
1986 42,788 27,188 753 182 7,108 16.6 
1987 78,523 48,419 14,488 156 14,217 18.1 
1988 202,673 140,226 47,572 223 38,990 19.2 
1989 377,055 250,340 98,134 1,469 63,718 16.9 
1990 397,075 113,253 147,455 530 66,905 16.8 
1991 221,995 40,129 147,320 450 47,843 21.6 
1992 230,565 17,742 195,576 199 56,738 24.6 
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The opening borders as of 1987 meant, however, that the trickle of “returning Germans” 
became a flood, straining the systems in place. As Table 8.1 shows, approximately 18 percent of 
newly arriving ethnic Germans migrants were school-age children, meaning that 38,990 children 
were entitled to places in public school in 1988 followed by an additional 63,718 in 1988.11 The 
sharp increase in new migration from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, particularly 
from Poland and the other countries of the Soviet Bloc, meant that many of these migrants spoke 
common languages. Moving in larger groups, they frequently wished to maintain their common 
linguistic or cultural affiliations instead of assimilating into their new surroundings. As part of 
that desire, several individuals expressed the wish to have the children not only learn German but 
also to maintain their mother tongues (i.e. Polish or Russian). 
The increase in total numbers combined with their foreign language and cultural 
affiliations forced the Länder Education Authorities’ representatives in the 
Kultusministerkonferenz to reconsider the question of instruction for migrant ethnic-German 
schoolchildren. As German citizens, these schoolchildren were supposed to integrate quickly and 
fully. Yet, their own desire for language instruction, combined with a new emphasis within the 
European Community on the importance of modern foreign-language acquisition (discussed in 
Chapter 7), meant that the Länder Ministries of Education could not simply brush aside the 
request for non-German native language instruction.12 The issue was further compounded by 
resentment inside West Germany against these migrants’ arrival. The local administrators 
complained about costs associated with integration and xenophobia turned against ethnic-
                                                
11 Give or take three percent. 
12 Rainer Münz, Wolfgang Seifert, and Ralf Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, 
Perspektiven, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1999), 133–147. 
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German children.13 The media in turn started debating whether these groups legitimately counted 
as “German” even possessing German citizenship. The combination of public and political 
sentiment led to a new debate over the questions what defined German citizenship rights. 
One challenge that the arriving ethnic-German schoolchildren’s “Germanness” posed was 
the question about the difference between this migrant group and other new groups – particularly 
asylum seekers arriving from Poland, Russia, and other Eastern European countries. In 1988, the 
KMK’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign Schoolchildren” debated whether the 
similarities between the groups should influence their schooling. Because of their ethnocultural 
similarities, some members of this subcommittee suggested including new asylum seekers and 
returning ethnic-Germans in the same integration classes. Both returning ethnic-German 
schoolchildren and asylum seekers, after all, theoretically had the same right to education. 
Furthermore, with the same language competency and culture, both groups of migrants needed 
German lessons in order to be able to participate fully in the West German classroom. The 
representatives from the city-states Berlin and Hamburg, however, immediately vetoed the 
possibility, pointing to the legal difference between the two groups.14 Both groups might have 
the right to education, but law and Länder regulations did not view them as identical. Migrant 
ethnic-German children were not subject to class caps or quotas for “foreigners.” Länder law 
                                                
13 Daniel Levy, “The Transformation of Germany’s Ethno-Cultural Idiom: The Case of Ethnic German Immigrants,” 
in Challenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration, ed. Daniel Levy and Yfaat 
Weiss (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 221–38. 
14 Hermann, “35. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 2. September 1988 in München,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, September 26, 1988), 2–5, B 304/7775, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. The UAauslS addressed this topic both because of the similarity of concerns between this 
group and “foreign children” and because within their Länder, these representatives were being given the task 
anyhow. Their decision to look at the issue was officially supported when the Amtschecfskonferenz (110. Meeting on 
8/9 September 1988) turned to the SchA (277th Meeting 22/23 September 1998), which asked the UAauslS to look 
at the issue of what to do with this group (Hermann, “36. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 
14. Oktober 1988 in Frankfurt,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, November 
10, 1988), 2–3, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
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also decidedly included these German citizens under compulsory school laws, unlike asylum 
seekers.15  
The Kultusministerkonferenz’s Subcommittee also briefly considered handling migrant 
ethnic Germans under the revised KMK “Guidelines for the Instruction of the Children of 
Migrant Workers” from April 1976. The children’s and their parents’ desire for their children to 
maintain their mother tongue (predominately Polish or Russian) and European Community’s 
emphasis on foreign language acquisition meant that the KMK ideally should support their 
continued language competency. Toward that end, the KMK’s “Subcommittee on the Instruction 
of Foreign Schoolchildren” discussed several possibilities. It considered placing ethnic German 
children in something similar to national preparatory classes with Polish or Russian as the main 
language of instruction, and debated the possibility of establishing Polish or Russian in place of a 
first or second mother tongue class, much like the various programs that had been implemented 
in the early 1980s for schoolchildren with Turkish (or other) citizenship.16 
Ethnic-German migrants’ rights as German citizens meant, however, that they were not 
legally recognized as “minority groups” and hence not entitled to minority rights. According to 
the West German Federal Government’s viewpoint, newly arriving ethnic-German citizens’ 
mother tongue was German, even if they did not speak the language. While the Länder 
Ministries of Education were obligated to provide extra German language instruction and other 
support programs, Polish or Russian (or other) instruction was not guaranteed. Schools could opt 
                                                
15 Juergen Haberland, Eingliederung von Aussiedlern und Zuwanderern: Sammlung von Texten, die für die 
Eingliederung von Aussiedlern aus den osteuropäischen Staaten und Zuwanderern aus der DDR und aus Berlin 
(Ost) von Bedeutung sind, 2., 1979. 
16 Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–5.  
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to offer other languages, but, as German citizens, the children were only entitled to German (and 
English in secondary schools) language instruction.  
On the other hand, the European Community’s emphasis on international relations and 
the opening borders in the East turned the Federal Government’s attention to the possible 
economic benefits of having citizens skilled in languages like Polish. Consequently, the Länder 
Ministries of Education determined to support the children’s maintenance of their foreign 
language skills.17 While clarifying that ethnic-German children did not fall under the “Guidelines 
for the Instruction of the Children of Migrant Workers,” the KMK’s Subcommittee 
recommended some acknowledgment of their language skills. The Subcommittee’s members 
recommended that the Länder Ministries of Education use for two approaches: First, that schools 
offer Polish or Russian as a first foreign language; second, in accordance with European 
Community developments, the Ministries should develop tests to acknowledge language 
competency.18  
Several Länder Ministries of Education followed the two recommendations and 
eventually offered Russian- and Polish-language classes in addition to providing intensive 
German instruction. Berlin even decided to offer Russian as a first foreign language instead of 
English. Yet the Berlin Senate for Education continued to differentiate between German citizens 
and foreigners, limiting attendance to ethnic-German children and denying it to schoolchildren 
with Russian citizenship. Other Länder, like North Rhine-Westphalia, where 42,000 recently 
arrived ethnic-German children attended school during the 1988/89 school year, offered both 
                                                
17 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 15./16. Januar 1991 in Berlin,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der Kultusministerkonferenz, January 30, 1991), 2, B 304/7775, 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
18 Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–5.  
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Russian and Polish. Schools provided these programs either as after-school instruction or in 
place of the first foreign language.19 
Regardless of government intentions, the biggest obstacle to providing either integration 
classes or mother language courses was limited resources. Unprepared to handle the unexpected 
mass migration, the Länder Ministries of Education did not have the requisite teaching materials, 
personnel, or funds to implement their regulated programs. To alleviate these difficulties, the 
CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government promised assistance, but the monies were neither 
immediately forthcoming nor sufficient.20 For some programs, such as providing Russian or 
Polish in place of a first foreign language, interested parent groups stepped in to provide funding. 
That did not, however, solve personnel problems. Unlike classes for ethno-national minorities, 
the Länder governments could not draw on foreign reserves of teachers. The Ministries of 
Education needed local teachers and materials for regular instruction as well as for new 
integration courses, language classes, and homework help programs (precisely those cut two 
years before).  
Through the end of the decade, material and personnel shortages persisted as new 
migrants continued to arrive en masse. While Berlin Senator Hanna-Renate Laurien welcomed 
those 2,500 migrant German children already in the city, the Senate of Education’s resources 
were already strained. To accommodate these new children, the Senate arranged for an additional 
                                                
19 Kultusminister NRW, Antwort der Landesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage 1648 des Abgeordneten Wickel F.D.P. 
Über Schulische Integration von Aussiedlerkindern (Düsseldorf: Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, May 26, 1989). The 
NRW schools hired 1900 extra teachers for normal instruction and 400 for support classes. 
20 Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–5; Bund-Länder-Kommission and Ausschuss Bildungsplanung und 
Arbeitskreis, “Maßnahmen im Bildungsbereich zur Integration der Aussiedler,” 1989, B 138/66568, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz.  
  
439 
111 teaching positions for German language and regular instruction.21 But when new arrivals far 
outstripped the expected 400 to 500 new schoolchildren, these were simply not enough teachers. 
As new migration did not stop or even plateau between 1988 and 1990 (see Table 8.1), Berlin 
and the other Länder had enormous difficulties accommodating the new children.22  
According to some scholars, the flood of ethnic-German migration was one of the reasons 
reunification happened as quickly as it did. While many of the ethnic-German migrants traveled 
from Poland, Russia, and other Eastern European states, some hailed from East Germany. The 
West German ethno-national majority did not want to have to pay for and accommodate the 
thousands of co-nationals arriving monthly. In their turn, many individuals in the GDR wanted 
the material comforts capitalism afforded. While it is difficult to determine exactly to what 
extent the demands of migration and the reintegration of ethnic Germans played, in 1990 the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic unified as a single state.23 
Unification shook the foundations of what it meant to be German. Regardless of 
continued claims of ethnic similarity, forty years of different schooling, governance, and food 
had an impact on culture. However great or slight the difference, many “Ossies” and “Wessies” 
(informal terms for people born East and West Germany respectively) claimed that there was a 
difference. Moreover, the West German Federal and Länder governments’ legal and cultural 
definitions of “Germanness” had to change because of its claim that all East Germans, as ethnic 
                                                
21 Wilfried Fest, “Organisationsrahmen für die Berliner Schulen erweitert” (Berlin: Senator für Schulwesen, 
Berufsausbildung und Sport, Berlin, June 14, 1988), B Rep. 002, Nr. 16868, Berlin Landesarchiv; 
Landespressedients aus dem Senat, “Aussiedlerkinder an Berliner Schulen Willkommen.”  
22 Sekretariat and Hermann, “39. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 18. Mai 1989 in 
Stuttgart,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Kultusministerkonferenz, June 15, 1989), 1–2, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz. 
23 The populations of West and East Germany were approximately sixty-three and sixteen million respectively. For a 
discussion of German (re) unification, see Konrad Hugo Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994); Konrad H. Jarausch and Michael Geyer, Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003), 221–245.  
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Germans, were entitled to (West) German citizenship. Unification resolved the question of the 
GDR’s citizens’ place in the Federal Republic, it obviated a political need to maintain the 
connection between ethnicity and citizenship.  
For the people living in the former East Germany, unification challenged their conception 
of “Germanness,” not only by changing citizenship status but also by increasing the ethnic 
diversity in the five Länder. Prior to unification, the East German population had been 
comparatively homogenous. Although the government of the German Democratic Republic had 
recruited migrant labor from other communist states, it had maintained relatively strict 
provisions in their guest-worker agreements regarding families and children. To prevent 
immigration through family reunification, the East German state avoided accepting married 
migrant laborers. If female migrant workers became pregnant while in the GDR, the government 
often deported them.24 Nonetheless, some ethno-national minority groups, the largest possessing 
Vietnamese or Mozambican citizenship, did establish families.  
To handle the politically acceptable ethno-national minority groups that did live in East 
Germany, the East German government had developed a few special school programs. Upon 
arrival in the GDR, Cuban families had to participate in classes on communism to ensure that 
they internalized the correct communist ideology.25 For diplomats, the GDR set up a special 
school in which the children received intensive German instruction for three to six months as 
                                                
24 For more on migrant workers and minorities in East Germany, see Marianne Krüger-Potratz, Anderssein gab es 
nicht: Ausländer und Minderheiten in der DDR (Münster: Waxmann, 1991); Almut Zwengel, ed., Die 
“Gastarbeiter” der DDR: politischer Kontext und Lebenswelt (Münster: LIT Verlag Münster, 2011). The Federal 
Republic of Germany tried to actively deport the Vietnamese migrants in the former Eastern bloc directly after 
unification (Matthias Maass, “‘Soft’ Coercive Diplomacy versus Informal Resistance: Attempts at Deporting ‘Illegal 
Vietnamese’ from Reunifying Germany, 1990-1995,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 9, no. 3 (August 29, 2014): 
1990–1995). 
25 For more on Cuban migration to East Germany, see Yamilé Lena Pérez Naranjo, “Cuban Migration in Germany” 
(Ph.D., Freie Universität Berlin, Germany, 2014). 
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well as some subject lessons. The state also established separate Soviet schools for the children 
of the members of the Soviet army. In contrast, the state placed children of the Vietnamese or 
Mozambican ethno-national minorities into East German schools on an individual basis.26  
After unification, however, as the waves of ethnic-German migrants and asylum seekers 
continued to arrive in Germany from Poland, Russia, and other Central and Eastern European 
states, the new East German Länder had to incorporate them, just like the West.27 With the 
extension of the West German Basic Law to the former East, the Federal Republic’s asylum 
provisions and citizenship laws now applied across the entire country. Adjusting to 
comparatively large groups of immigrants, the former Eastern Länder slowly began 
implementing the various integration and cultural programs established in the West.28  
As the waves of ethnic-German migration from Eastern Europe continued after 
reunification, an increasing number of ethnic-Germans in both parts of the unified FRG 
expressed resentment towards the new arrivals. Many private and public individuals argued that 
these new immigrants were not truly German. Official reports noted increasing instances of 
bullying in and out of schools.29 In 1991, North Rhine-Westphalia’s representative to the KMK’s 
“Subcommittee on the Instruction of Foreign Schoolchildren” would, for example, report that 
                                                
26 Buried under other issues, the question of language programs for children of former migrant workers or foreign 
citizens did not become a major concern in the five Eastern states until the mid-1990s. The five Länder did, 
however, become involved in debates over how to handle asylum seekers and returning ethnic Germans.  
27 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 2.  
28 Buried under other issues, the question of language programs for children of former migrant workers or foreign 
citizens did not become a major concern in the five Eastern states until the mid-1990s. The five Länder did, 
however, become involved in debates over how to handle asylum seekers and returning ethnic Germans.  
29 An interesting component of the research for this project was the number of individuals living across Germany 
who informed me about their own experiences with migrant German or minority classmates in the schools after 
hearing about the topic of my dissertation. The frequency of stories told about children chased down streets, 
ortracized in the schoolroom, or mocked on the playground will likely not surprise given the number of official 
reports on the subject. There were, however, also stories about exciting American schoolchildren or French 
exchange students.  
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Polish language speakers had a poor reputation within the local population, although Russian 
seemed to be accepted. Schoolchildren who were members of the German majority often treated 
Polish-speaking German children as unwanted foreigners and the children faced obvious 
discrimination. Actively taking Polish as a first foreign language in place of English at times led 
to being targeted, as German-speaking Germans viewed participation in the courses as a rejection 
of German culture. Other Länder representatives, particularly from the Eastern Länder like 
Brandenburg, claimed that language reputation was a non-issue. Polish language offerings were 
well received and acceptance was “as high as the Western European languages.” Here the GDR 
tradition to teach Russian as the first foreign language in its schools might have helped.30 
Regardless of the level of local acceptance, participation in these programs created a 
barrier to scholastic achievement. Schoolchildren enrolled in Russian or Polish instead of 
English faced the same difficulties as children with Turkish citizenship enrolled in Turkish 
instead of English (see Chapter 7). Namely, these children quickly found themselves cut off from 
many vocational training opportunities and often university entrance. In order to ensure their 
equality of opportunity, the Länder had to establish English Language Assistance initiatives for 
youths wanting to enter a vocational programs or university tracks for which English was 
obligatory. But not all children had access, and those who did often felt overburdened by the 
extra instruction.31  
Tension over who counted as “German,” combined with the long-term residence of 
foreign nationals, placed the relationship between citizenship and ethnicity under scrutiny. The 
idea that arriving ethnic-German children could be “German” while culturally and linguistically 
                                                
30 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 5–7; Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–5. 
31 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 5–7; Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–5. 
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dissimilar to their other “German” classmates caused concern especially among Christian 
conservative German politicians and in more right-wing popular media about the “pollution of 
German cultural identity”.32 The situation further highlighted contradictions in the perception of 
who was “German” with regards to citizenship, paternity, and culture. Some SPD and Green 
politicians criticized the traditional ethnic definition of German citizenship. They advocated 
change, because many newly arriving “Germans” were arguably no more “ethnically German” 
than “foreign” asylum seekers or other migrants.33 The CDU/CSU-FDP Federal Government 
responded to this debate with a revision of the citizenship laws in 1990 and restricted the number 
of individuals who could claim “ethnic German” status.34 Only individuals from the former 
Soviet Union had “an unconditional claim to immigration to Germany.” Furthermore, citizenship 
could now only be granted when the necessary paperwork was provided and an applicant 
demonstrated “knowledge of the German language.” 
The new citizenship laws also further opened citizenship to members of the established 
ethno-national minorities. There had been some few adjustments to citizenship laws in the 
previous years, opening up some possibilities for becoming German. But, prior to the new 
citizenship laws, few non-German citizens had opted to renounce their citizenship in favor of 
                                                
32 Landespressedients aus dem Senat, “Aussiedlerkinder an Berliner Schulen Willkommen”; Fink, “Sprachprobleme 
bei Aussiedlerkindern”; Ausschuß für Schule und Weiterbildung, “Eingliederung Der Aussiedler (Antr CDU Drs 
10/3650) in Verbindung mit Eingliederung der Aussiedler - Koordiniertes Vorgehen von Bund und Ländern (Antr 
SPD Drs 10/3651),” Vorlage, (November 8, 1988); Nora Räthzel, “Aussiedler and Ausländer: Transforming German 
National Identity,” in Transformations of the New Germany, ed. Ruth A Starkman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006), 157–79. Drs!!! 
33 Levy, “The Transformation of Germany’s Ethno-Cultural Idiom: The Case of Ethnic German Immigrants”; 
Bundespressestelle des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, “Richert: Ausländergesetz ist Nationalistisch und Dient 
der Ausländerabwehr,” Nachrichten Dienst 67 (April 6, 1990).  
34 “Ethnic Germans” as of 1 July 1990 has to apply for visas before leaving their home country. The 1992 
Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz of 1992 further stipulated that only people born before 1 January 1993 could apply 
for entry into Germany as an ethnic German (Rainer Münz, “Ethos or Demos? Migration and Citizenship in 
Germany,” in \iChallenging Ethnic Citizenship: German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration, ed. Daniel Levy 
and Yfaat Weiss (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002), 29–30). 
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naturalization. Many European Community Member State nationals saw only limited benefits to 
changing their legal status. Other foreign minority groups demurred in part because of 
restrictions regarding dual citizenship and legal complications with the other country involved 
(i.e. inheritance rights).35 The new laws stipulated that youths between 16 and 23 who had lived 
at least eight years in Germany and attended school in the country could apply for 
naturalization.36 Adult foreigners who had lived for at least 15 years in Germany (around 40 
percent of foreign citizens) were also entitled to apply for citizenship regardless of their 
economic standing.37  
The revised citizenship laws did not settle the question of “Germanness” even as the laws 
opened up the category. Instead, European Union developments, naturalization, and continued 
migration put a strain on the connections between citizenship, ethnic identification, and mother 
tongue. To some extent, those changes severed the connection between nationality and ethnicity 
as it became increasingly common for ethnic Germans to move to other parts of Europe even as 
immigrant continued. Furthermore, the plurality of native languages made it almost impossible 
for any state to offer all of them. Those changes to ethnicity and citizenship in turn complicated 
the concept of the right to education, turning the Länder Ministries of Education’s focus toward 
supposedly useful state languages rather than native languages. In consequence, while a group 
needed to have the right to their mother tongue, they no longer had even semi-guaranteed access 
to any but the official state languages.  
                                                
35 For a discussion of Turkish citizens “practicing German citizenship,” see Ruth Mandel, Cosmopolitan Anxieties: 
Turkish Challenges to Citizenship and Belonging in Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 206–231. 
36 Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., “Foreigner Law (1990),” in Germany in Transit: Nation 
and Migration, 1955-2005, trans. Tes Howell (Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), 160–61. 
37 For a discussion of the “naturalization of foreigners” in the 1990s and additional technicalities of citizenship, see 
Münz, Seifert, and Ulrich, Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Strukturen, Wirkungen, Perspektiven, 124–132. 
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The Right to Native Language for Kurdish Ethnic Minorities 
Part of the Länder’s reconceptualization of the right to native language instruction for 
minorities developed out of the demands of larger minority groups’ requests for mother tongue 
instruction. Among these efforts, in 1987, Wolfgang Wieland and Sevim Çelebi-Gottschlich 
brought a motion to the Berlin House of Representatives.38 Both belonged to Alternative Liste, 
the Green Party in West Berlin. Reflecting the Green Party’s stance across West Germany, the 
two AL members argued that Kurdish children should receive language instruction in their 
Kurdish mother tongue in West Berlin public schools. According to the two MPs, the Senate 
needed to provide Kurdish in public schools because “the right to the mother tongue is a 
universal human right” as “confirmed in the Helsinki Accords” from 1975.39 Citing sociological 
and educational studies from the era as well as West Berlin teachers’ reports, Wieland and 
Çelebi-Gottschlich argued that mother tongue instruction was necessary for the cognitive, 
emotional, and social development of the child. They supported their demands for Kurdish 
classes by pointing to the Turkish state’s prohibition on the dissemination of materials or 
instruction in the Kurdish language, the lack of options in West Berlin, and to the over-
proportional enrollment of Kurdish immigrants in schools for the disabled (Sonderschulen). 
Wieland and Çelebi-Gottschlich further claimed that the children born in West Germany to 
Kurdish immigrants from Turkey were “overburdened by confrontation with Turkish in the 
                                                
38 Sevim Çelebi-Gottschlich was the first migrant with Turkish origins to serve on a (West) German parliament. A 
Green (Alternative Liste) politician, Çelebi-Gottschlich served in the Berlin Abgeordnetenhaus from 1987-1989. 
Wolfgang Wieland (born 1948) was a Bündnis 90/Die Grünen politician in Berlin. After studying law, he served in 
the Berlin 1987-1989, 1993-1995, 1999-2001, and again from 2002-2004. From 2001 to 2002 he served in Berlin as 
Bürgermeister and Senator für Justiz. From 2005-2013, he was a Member of the German Bundestag.  
39 The Helsinki Accords’ “Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States” eighth article 
was on the “Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples.” See Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, “Helsinki Final Act” (Helsinki, August 1, 1975), http://www.osce.org/mc/39501. For more on the Helsinki 
Accords, see Antonio Cassese, The Human Dimension of International Law: Selected Papers of Antonio Cassese 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), 76; Thomas Buergenthal, ed., Human Rights, International Law, and the Helsinki 
Accord (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1977). 
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schools,” after learning Kurdish in their parents’ homes as their mother tongue and German in 
their surroundings.40 
The right to mother tongue instruction for non-ethno-national minority groups sat at the 
crux of the question about Kurdish language instruction. While national identification continued 
to be important as a legal category, public discourse was moving away from a focus on national 
minorities in favor of ethnic minorities. People were increasingly understood as individuals who 
participated in local cultural and ethnic groups rather than necessarily acting as representatives of 
the country to which they held citizenship. As this outlook pervaded international discussions of 
migration, West German politicians and education administrations began asking how the right to 
education and its trappings (particularly mother tongue and cultural instruction) should be 
extended to children from non-national minority groups (i.e. Kurds or Albanians). 
Part of the shift away from a specifically national minority group in favor of ethnic 
minorities was due to the growing question of who could be part of a national minority and what 
such membership entailed. Within West Germany, intermarriage, “German” return migration, 
and the naturalization of previously foreign individuals all influenced assumptions of what it 
meant to be German.41 The dubious “Germanness” of many Germans and supposed 
“Germanness” of foreign citizens put the connection between ethnicity and nationality into 
                                                
40 Wieland and Çelebi-Gottschlich, “Kurdisch als muttersprachlicher Unterricht,” Antrag (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus 
von Berlin, September 2, 1988), B Rep. 002, Nr. 16868, Berlin Landesarchiv. 
41 As did the identification of permanent foreign citizens as (at least partly) “German.” While still not common, the 
hyphenated identity (i.e. Turkish-German) was also slowly making its way through (West) German society. For 
more information on plural or hyphenated identities and Germany, see Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner, eds., The 
Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity, and Community, Postcolonial Encounters 
(London: Zed Books, 1997), 167–206; Ayhan Kaya, “Citizenship and the Hyphenated Germans: German-Turks,” in 
Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences, ed. Emin Fuat Keyman and Ahmet 
İçduygu (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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question.42 Some people – both in the mass media and among academic scholars – argued that 
the nation and “nationality” were constructed categories and the nation was nothing more than an 
“imagined community.”43 They criticized post-war policies and practices that had followed a 
short tradition of assumed German ethnic superiority and emphasis on a supposedly real German 
ethnicity.44 This tradition, amplified by Nazi Germany, had led to an artificial concept of national 
homogenization. Now the German state and society needed to move to a concept of national 
identity and citizenship that allowed heterogeneity and recognized ethnic diversity.45 
Acknowledging the heterogeneity of national groups threw the validity of the Länder 
Ministries of Education’s programs for mother tongue and cultural instruction into question. 
These courses were supposed to ensure the child’s right, as an individual, to education and self-
actualization as well as her/his rights as a member of a minority by enabling the child to learn the 
language and culture of her/his parents. Yet the Kultusministerkonferenz’s 1976 
“Recommendations on Instruction for Migrant Workers’ Children” only guaranteed the offer of 
state languages – and then only from former guest worker countries. Accepting (as was long 
known) that not all children spoke the official state language of their ((grand-) parent’s) countries 
of origin, the Länder Ministries of Education questioned if they were actually offering 
                                                
42 It should be noted that this is almost exclusively true among European groups or groups popularized in the media. 
Groups from Africa, Asia, etc., were usually viewed a national minorities (i.e. “Chinese” or “Kenyan”) or even 
continental minorities (i.e. “African” or “Asian”).  
43 Among other studies, Benedict Anderson’s influential 1982 Imagined Communities explored the development of 
the concept of the “nation” and “nationalism” (Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Rev. ed (London: Verso, 2006)).  
44 Dieter Gosewinkel, Einbürgern und Ausschliessen: die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen 
Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001). 
45 Karen Schönwälder, Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität: Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten 
in Grossbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren (Essen: Klartext, 2001); 
Danielle Juteau Lee, The Social Construction of Diversity: Recasting the Master Narrative of Industrial Nations, ed. 
Christiane Harzig (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).  
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appropriate support or truly ensuring the children’s rights to education, to their native language, 
and as minorities. 
In the mid-1980s, the individual Länder’s Educational Administrations in West Germany 
began extensive discussions about whether to treat foreign ethnic minorities differently from 
foreign national minorities. The debates developed out of international trends, but also from non-
national foreign minority groups’ requests, first for recognition as official minorities and then for 
state assistance with language and cultural classes.46 When, in 1987 and 1988, Green Party 
(including the Alternative Liste) politicians like Wieland Çelebi-Gottschlich submitted requests 
in several Länder (including Berlin, Bavaria, and Lower Saxony) that mother tongue instruction 
be extended to all minority groups in the country (i.e. Kurds and Indians), the Länder were 
already considering the issue.47  
The Länder Education Administrations approached the issue primarily from two 
directions. The first was the consideration of whether national groups other than the “traditional 
guest worker countries” should be supported in West German public schools.48 The April 1976 
KMK “Recommendations on Instruction for Migrant Workers’ Children” specified that the 
Länder would support the official state languages of the former guest worker countries. Länder 
recognition of a group as an official minority did not guarantee state support.49 While 
                                                
46 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS.” Before those 1992 alterations, the question of which national minorities 
should be covered again became an issue, in part because of the reframing of the question of which countries 
constituted guest worker countries. 
47 Hermann, “40. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 8. September 1989 in Bonn,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, September 29, 1989), 23–24, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv 
Koblenz. 
48 Former “guest worker” countries, meaning those which had had official bilateral labor agreements with the 
Federal Republic, included Italy, Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 
49 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS.”  
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recognizing other national minority groups, most of the Länder maintained their intention of only 
financing former guest worker countries in public schools. On this basis, the individual Länder 
denied requests for state support for Indian or Japanese language instruction. Hesse did offer 
religious instruction in Armenian but had no plans to provide any other sort of offering.50  
The second direction the Länder Education Administrations approached the 
accommodation of ethnic minorities from was to ask what language and cultural associations it 
was acceptable to teach minority groups from the former guest worker countries. Many migrants 
from the former guest worker countries did not personally identify as members of their country 
of origin’s majority. Furthermore, groups like the Kurds, who frequently had Turkish citizenship, 
were known to be repressed minorities in their countries of origin. Public media informed the 
West German majority that the internal cultural conflicts in Turkey prevented Kurds from freely 
practicing their own culture. A 1983 Turkish law “Concerning Publications and Broadcasts in 
Languages Other Than Turkish” dictated that they could not publish in Kurdish. Suffering from 
severe repression, the Kurds in Turkey had formed groups like the PKK and the country was 
embroiled in armed conflict, particularly in the Southeast. Unlike for members of a national 
majority, these children could not go back to Turkey if they wanted to learn to be members of 
their ethnic groups.51  
The most famous example of these discussions centered on West Berlin’s Kurdish 
minority with Turkish citizenship. Technically, schoolchildren in West Berlin had the right to be 
schooled in their respective native language regardless of ancestry or residency status. In 1986, 
                                                
50 In NRW, the Cultural Administration had already decided to continue to provide mother-language and cultural 
instruction only to the children from former guest worker countries. 
51 Human Rights Watch, Turkey: Violations of Free Expression in Turkey, 1999. Law 2932 “Concerning 
Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other Than Turkish” was lifted in 1991. While Kurdish publications were 
then legal, broadcasting was still prohibited. For more on the PKK, see Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK 
and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007). 
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the Senate officially acknowledged that “the Kurdish belong to a people (Volk) with their own 
culture and language.”52 Nonetheless, while schools across the city offered Turkish from the first 
grade through secondary school completion certificates, the West Berlin Senate for Education 
did not support any Kurdish instruction. Some individual schools offered their own programs, 
but they were not standard or guaranteed.53  
Despite theoretical support for minority rights, West Berlin’s Senate for Education denied 
Wieland and Çelebi-Gottschlich’s 1987 request to support Kurdish in public schools. The CDU-
FDP Senate argued “the Turkish Kurds in Berlin came as Turkish citizens.”54 As such, they 
would be offered the same support programs as their fellow citizens. The Senate’s answer was 
largely premised on the Consulate’s funding of the language and cultural classes. In Berlin, the 
relevant foreign consulates were responsible for providing extra native language classes outside 
of regular school instruction and for ensuring the children’s right to their native language. Hence, 
if the Turkish General Consulate did not choose to offer language instruction in Kurdish, then the 
Senator of Education decided instruction in Kurdish would have to be offered at their parents’ 
own initiative.55 West Berlin would by no means deny them their right to Kurdish language 
instruction, but the city was not going to pick up the tab when their funds were already limited. 
As of 1992, the Länder were still split on the issue of a moral right to native language 
versus state language instruction. Largely because of financial expediency, however, most 
                                                
52 Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Drucksache 10/1152 (Idf. Nr. 8): Große Anfrage der Fraktion der AL über 
Situation der Kurden in Berlin,” 40. Sitzung vom 10. Dezember 1986 (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 1986). 
53 Hermann, “40. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 8. September 1989 in Bonn,” 23–24.  
54 Senator für Schulwesen, Berufsausbildung und Sport, “Senatsvorlage zur Beschlußfassung für die Sitzung am 
Dienstag, dem 19. Juli 1988” (Berlin, July 11, 1988), B 002 16868, Berlin Landesarchiv. “The Kurds are one among 
many tribes (Volksstamm) in Turkey.” 
55 Ibid.  
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decided to continue only offering mother tongue and cultural instruction in the official state 
languages. The SPD-FDP government in Bremen alone decided to offer Kurdish instruction in its 
schools as of 1 February 1992, with teaching materials produced in Sweden.56 With a 1991 order, 
Lower Saxony opened the possibility of Kurdish language instruction but did not actually offer 
any classes.57 Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, and 
Rhineland-Pfalz each explicitly declared that they neither intended to offer Kurdish native 
language classes nor provide financial support for any instruction other than official state 
languages.58  
Children with foreign citizenship either born in the Federal Republic or migrating 
through processes of family reunification clearly fell under compulsory schooling laws. Yet, the 
Federal Republic’s Länder’s governments claimed that the right to education included the right 
to native language instruction. Based on their practices, the Länder governments felt that their 
role in ensuring the children’s right to an education extended only as far as providing access to 
the regular classroom. Frequently basing their decisions on the limitations of their budgets, as the 
Länder Ministries of Education argued that they could not do more. The Ministry of Education 
representatives continued to express obligation to minority groups from former guest-worker 
countries on account of their sense of responsibility for the fact that these groups were in the 
                                                
56 The classes were supposed to open their doors on 1 August 1993 at the latest.  
57 Lohmar, “50. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 29. April 1992,” Ergebnisniederschrift 
(Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, July 31, 1992), 9–10, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz; and Lohmar, “51. Sitzung 
des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 29. September 1992,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat 
der KMK, September 29, 1992), 8–9, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. The Issue had been partially discussed in 
the 298. Sitzung des SchA am 2/3. 07. 1992 in Kiel. The SchA was interested in seeing the UA reexamine the issue. 
Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt had not considered the issue. 
58 Some individual schools and teachers did, however, offer other language instruction (Sekretariat and Lohmar, “49. 
Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 12. Dezember 1991,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: 
KMK, April 1, 1992), 8–9, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). Rhineland-Pfalz wrote that “Die 
Meschenrechtsverletzungen an Kurden werden aufs schärfste verurteilt. Es ist nicht angebracht, unter bewußter 
Einbeziehung von Kindern und Jugendlichen, den zu erwartenden Konflikt zu eröffnen.”  
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country at all. Added to that, in five of the Länder the relevant foreign states paid for and staffed 
the courses. The Länder Ministries of Education felt free to agree rhetorically that other minority 
groups had the right to education in their mother languages. In contrast to the 1970s, however, 
the Ministries viewed their role as lack of prevention if families set the classes up themselves 
rather than offering them.  
Compulsory Schooling for the Children of Asylum Seekers  
Just like ethnic-German migrants and children with foreign citizenship born in the 
Federal Republic of Germany or entering through processes of family reunification, 
schoolchildren migrating to the Federal Republic as asylum seekers had a right to education. 
According to West German law, all children supposedly had a right to education. For asylum 
seekers, the right to education as well as to cultural and language maintenance was further 
protected under the United Nations’ 1951 Refugee Act and the 1989 Convention on the Right of 
the Child.59 Yet in practice, just like for other migrant groups, asylum groups’ legal status and 
specific group members influenced what form that right to education took in practice. In this 
case, the right to education did not necessarily extend to inclusion under compulsory schooling 
laws.  
After the Second World War, West German asylum law was one of most inclusive 
among the European states on account of its Nazi past. Inscribed into the 1949 Constitution, the 
                                                
59 For more on the United Nations “Convention on the Right of the Child,” see “United Nations: Convention on the 
Right of the Child (adopted November 20, 1989),” International Legal Materials 28 (November 1989): 1448–76; 
and Karin Arts, “Twenty-Five Years of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Achievements 
and Challenges,” Netherlands International Law Review 61, no. 03 (December 2014): 267–303. For information on 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, see United Nations Refugee Agency, “Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees,” 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/.  
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Basic Law, asylum seekers had to be admitted into the country and allowed to apply.60 Over the 
following decades, asylum seekers from across the world, but particularly Europe, chose to seek 
refuge in West Germany. Some hoped to find a better economic situations, but the majority were 
trying to escape life-threatening situations. Some asylum seekers’ applications were rejected, 
often because of quota limitations, but the Federal Republic’s asylum law dictated that an 
individual could not be sent back to an area in which they could be endangered. In consequence, 
thousands of individuals were permitted to stay in the country despite their applications’ formal 
rejection.61  
Initially, asylum seekers accounted for a minimal proportion of the overall migration to 
the Federal Republic (see Table 8.2). Over the course of the 1970s, however, an increasing 
number of people began taking advantage of West Germany’s liberal asylum procedures. 
Improved methods of travel also meant that applicants arrived from further abroad. The majority 
of asylum applicants, like those escaping the Vietnam War, still sought a better life as they tried 
to escape life-threatening situations. Others, however, used asylum law to circumvent 
increasingly restrictive family reunification policies. These migrants, often from the former guest 
worker countries like Turkey, entered the country as asylum seekers and used the long 
application processing periods to join families or find jobs. Increasingly noticeable, the ethnic-
German majority complained about an imagined strain on resources and possible ethnic 
                                                
60 See section one on West German Basic Rights, Bundesministerium der Justiz, Grundgesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn, 1949), 1–49, http://heinonline.org. 
61 Hartmut Wendt, “Asylum-Related Migration to Germany: Dimensions, Categories of Refugees, Legal Basis, 
Development, Regions of Origin and European Comparison,” Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft 28, no. 1 
(2003): 67–90; and Patrice G. Poutrus, “Asylum in Postwar Germany: Refugee Admission Policies and Their 
Practical Implementation in the Federal Republic and the GDR Between the Late 1940s and the Mid-1970s,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 115–33.  
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pollution. Some claimed that the majority of asylum seekers were “economic migrants” who 
were not actually in danger in their countries of origin.62  
In response, the Federal Government tried to restrict the number of asylum seekers 
entering the country. The Government could not prevent entry, as the right to asylum was 
inscribed into the Basic Law. In order to curb immigration, beginning under SPD Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt (1974 to 1982) and continuing under CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982 to 
1998), the Federal and Länder governments instituted legal restrictions to make asylum seekers’ 
lives harder. The Federal and Länder governments severely curtailed personal freedoms and 
rights. While particularly restrictive in those Länder with conservative CDU/CSU-FDP 
governments, even the SPD-FDP Länder, which rhetorically supported diversity and asylum 
rights, also checked the rights of asylum seekers. Among the Länder governments’ measures, 
they restricted asylum seekers freedom of movement and access to work. They hoped that by 
making asylum in West Germany unpalatable, fewer asylum seekers would come.63 These 
policies led to a temporary decline in the total number of asylum seekers between 1980 and 1983 
and again between 1986 and 1987 (see Table 8.2).64  
  
                                                
62 Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2007), 107–109. 
63 Restrictive measures included the 1978 and 1980 Acceleration of the Asylum Procedure (Beschleunigung des 
Asylverfahrens) as well as the Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz) from 1980 and 1987 (Ulrich Herbert, 
Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge 
(München: Beck, 2001), 286–322; Andreas Zimmermann, Das neue Grundrecht auf Asyl: Verfassungs- und 
völkerrechtliche Grenzen und Voraussetzungen (Berlin: Springer, 1994), 5–38.  
64 Restrictive measures included the 1978 and 1980 Acceleration of the Asylum Procedure (Beschleunigung des 
Asylverfahrens) as well as the Asylum Procedure Act (Asylverfahrensgesetz) from 1980 and 1987 (Ulrich Herbert, 
Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flüchtlinge 
(Munich: Beck, 2001), 286–322; and reas Zimmermann, Das neue Grundrecht auf Asyl: Verfassungs- und 
völkerrechtliche Grenzen und Voraussetzungen (Berlin: Springer, 1994), 5–38.  
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Table 8.2: Asylum Applicants by Region of Origin (Total and Percentage of Total), 1980–
199265  
 Total Africa % Europe % 
Selected European Asylum Applicants: 
Poland % Turkey % 
(Former) 
Yugosl.66 % 
1980 107,818 8,339 7.7 65,809 61.0 2,090 1.9 57,913 53.7 -   
1981 49,391 5,910 12.0 21,169 42.9 9,901 20.0 6,302 12.8 -   
1982 37,423 6,885 18.4 15,264 40.8 6,630 17.7 3,688 9.9 -   
1983 19,737 3,484 17.7 6,589 33.4 1,949 9.9 1,548 7.8 -   
1984 35,278 5,868 16.6 11,553 32.7 4,240 12.0 4,180 11.8 -   
1985 73,832 8,093 11.0 18,174 24.6 6,672 9.0 7,528 10.2 -   
1986 99,650 9,486 9.5 25,164 25.3 10,981 11.0 8,693 8.7 1,242 1.2 
1987 57,379 3,568 6.2 36,629 63.8 15,194 26.5 11,426 19.9 4,713 8.2 
1988 103,076 6,548 6.4 71,416 69.3 29,023 28.2 14,873 14.4 20,812 20.2 
1989 121,318 12,479 10.3 73,387 60.5 26,092 21.5 20,020 16.5 19,423 16.0 
1990 193,063 24,210 12.5 101,631 52.6 9,155 4.7 22,082 11.4 22,114 11.5 
1991 256,112 36,094 14.1 166,662 65.1 3,448 1.3 23,877 9.3 74,854 29.2 
1992 438,191 67,408 15.4 310,529 70.9 4,212 1.0 28,327 6.5 122,666 28.0 
 
Despite those restrictions, many groups viewed a circumscribed life in Germany as safer 
than the situation in their countries of origin. Through most of the 1980s, the majority of asylum 
seekers originated within Europe, as Table 8.2 shows. The composition of those “Europeans” 
would, however, shift over the decade. As discussed, an increasing number came from the 
former Yugoslavia. In addition, between 1987 and 1989, even as migrant ethnic Germans 
flooded West German schools, Polish asylum seekers also made the journey, making up between 
twenty and thirty percent of the total number of asylum applicants. While these total numbers 
                                                
65 Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990, 59; and Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, 
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 73. “African” asylum applicants included Includes 
Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka as the largest countries of origin. “Europe” includes Turkey, 
Poland, and the (former) Yugoslavia as well as multiple other states. 
66 “Yugoslavia” includes Croatia (1992: 1,024); Slovenia (1992: 50); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992: 6,197); and as 
well as former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which each became independent states in 1992 or 1993. 
Statistisches Bundesamt, Germany, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1993 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 73.  
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were not nearly as high as those for the ethnic Germans (48,419 in 1987; 140,226 in 1988; and 
250,340 in 1989 from Poland (see Table 8.1), the clear similarities between these migrant groups 
and those entering as Germans or through processes of family reunification led to question of 
whether these groups should be treated differently or not.67 
Through most of the 1980s, the majority of asylum seekers originated within Europe, as 
Table 8.2 shows. The composition of those “Europeans” would, however, shift over the decade. 
As stated, an increasing number came from the former Yugoslavia, particularly after the various 
Balkan Wars began in 1991. In addition, between 1987 and 1989, even as migrant ethnic 
Germans flooded West German schools, Polish asylum seekers also made the journey, making 
up between 20 and 30 percent of the total number of asylum applicants. While these total 
numbers were not nearly as high as those for the ethnic Germans (48,419 in 1987; 140,226 in 
1988; and 250,340 in 1989 from Poland (see Table 8.1), the clear similarities between these 
migrant groups and those entering as Germans or through processes of family reunification led to 
question of whether these groups should be treated differently or not.  
In contrast, only a relatively small portion of asylum seekers came from Africa (7.7 
percent in 1980 and 11 percent in 1985). Even then, official statistics were misleading, as the 
Federal Republic of Germany included Afghanistan, India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka under “Africa.”68 Regardless of their point of origin in Africa or the Middle East, the West 
German authorities treated these groups (as well as those from Turkey, despite their official label 
as “European”) as “others.”  
                                                
67 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 286–322. For more on the breakup of Yugoslavia, see 
Pavković, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, 75–121; and Carole Rogel, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and Its 
Aftermath (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004), 1–26.  
68 I have no idea why the Federal Republic’s officially statistics include these countries as “African.” 
  
457 
As the proportion of migrants from “Africa” increased to 12.5 percent of the overall total 
in 1990 (24,210 of 193,063) and continued to grow, parts of the ethnic-German majority 
population reacted poorly and a mostly right-wing minority sometimes violently. It was here that 
the effect of the 1990 unification pronounced itself loudly. Asylum policy dictated that the state 
spread asylum seekers across the country in order to limit the burden of any one location. Placing 
asylum seekers in the former Eastern Länder as well as the former Western Länder brought 
many East Germans into contact with “non-European foreigners” for the first time. Coming from 
diverse cultural backgrounds, these groups of migrants were often visibly different from the 
ethnic-German majority and targeted by right-wing extremists. In August 1992, in Rostock-
Lichtenhagen in Mecklenburg, the problem was thrown into stark relief during four days of 
rioting involving groups of hundreds of right-wing extremists. During the riots, participants burnt 
down an asylum center while thousands of their neighbors stood by cheering.69 
Restricting locations where asylum seekers could live and/or placing them in centers not 
only gave right-wing extremists a concentrated target but it also directly affected asylum seekers’ 
access to education.70 Laws and regulations regarding the right to residence combined with 
compulsory schooling laws limited children’s access to public schools as well as programs for 
mother language or cultural maintenance. The majority of the Länder had worded their 
compulsory schooling laws to cover any children with legal or common residence 
(“gewöhnlicher Aufenthalt”) in the area. The legal phrase was, however, ambiguous, and left the 
                                                
69 Police responses were heavily criticized (“Rostock-Lichtenhagen,” Spiegel, August 23, 2007; and Deniz Göktürk, 
David Gramling, and Anton Kaes, eds., Germany in Transit: Nation and Migration, 1955-2005 (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 2007), 13). 
70 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 286–307. See also “GEW sieht Schulprobleme bei 
Asylbewerber-Kindern,” Stuttgarter Zeiting, June 29, 1987; “Kinder von Asylbewerbern müssen nicht in die 
Schule,” BZ, April 28, 1988; and Ursula Herdt, “Diskriminierung ist noch ein Mildes Wort: Aussidler gegen 
Asylbewerber und Flüchtlinge,” Lehrzeitung B-W 8/1989 (1989): 170. 
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status of some groups unclear. In several Länder, the Ministries of Education were uncertain as 
to whether or not (and which) specific groups of asylum seekers’ children were included. 
Because of that legal ambiguity, the majority of the Länder had only partial coverage, if any.71 
Some children, including many asylum seekers and those sans papiers (without papers), simply 
fell through the cracks.72 
 
In the late 1980s, only two of the eleven West German Länder, Hesse and Lower Saxony, 
clearly included some asylum children under their compulsory schooling laws. Lower Saxony’s 
rules indirectly included parts of this heterogeneous group by specifying that any children who 
had their legal residence for at least five days in the state were covered. The Hesse Ministry of 
the Interior, in contrast, explicitly included asylum seekers who applied for asylum at the 
Regional Municipality under compulsory schooling law for the duration of the proceedings as of 
1980. Those children in refugee camps, however, were not to be included.73 In consequence, 
both Länder, while including more asylum seekers under compulsory schooling law than the 
other Länder, still only instituted partial coverage. 
The issue of asylum seekers’ explicit inclusion under compulsory schooling laws had 
been raised through the 1960s and 1970s, but usually brushed aside, in part because it affected 
                                                
71 KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den einzelnen Budnesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern” 
(KMK, 1990), B 304/7773, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. In Hesse, those children in refugee camps did not fall under 
compulsory schooling. 
72 There was also a problem of under-age refugee children living alone. Hesse recommended creating a nation-wide 
program to place these children in occupational programs (Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Drucksache 11/158: 
Situation unbegleiteter minderjähriger Ausländer/innen in Berlin” (Berlin: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, February 
21, 1991).  
73 KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den einzelnen Budnesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern”; 
Hessisches Kultusministerium, “Unterricht für Kinder ausländischer Eltern,” Gesetze, Verordnungen, Erlasse 
(Wiesbaden, May 25, 1987); Niedersächsisches Kultusministerium, “Durchführungsbestimmungen zu Den §§ 42 
und 46 Bis 53 NSchG,” Schulverwaltungsblatt, July 16, 1976, 218; and Niedersächsisches Kultusministerium, 
“Durchführungsbestimmungen zu den §§ 42 und 46 bis 53 NSchG,” Schulverwaltungsblatt, June 23, 1985, 236.  
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too few children or was considered unimportant. For example, when the question was raised 
regarding the “boat people” from Vietnam in the 1970s, Baden-Württemberg’s Ministries of the 
Interior and Education agreed that the trauma experienced by children or families applying for 
asylum negated any need for schooling. These children had already undergone horrific 
experiences in their places of origin, followed by the shock of migration. There was, according to 
these Ministries, no need to immediately force these children to begin attending schools in a 
strange country and subject them to the suffering associated with learning a new school system. 
Particularly when it was unclear that these children would remain in West Germany.74 
In addition, the establishment of asylum in (West) Germany promoted confusion 
regarding the children’s exact legal status, which added to the problem of ensuring the right to 
education.75 As the Berlin government described in 1986 (and the KMK agreed), there were 
three clear groups of children of asylum seekers. The first, around twelve percent, were those 
whose applications had officially been accepted. This group had a clear right to residency in 
West Germany and (usually) fell under compulsory schooling laws. But the picture became 
muddied with the second group: those who were as of yet unrecognized. Within this group, there 
were children who would likely remain only two to three or up to six weeks in a refugee camp. 
The Berlin government felt that these children should not fall under compulsory schooling 
requirements. But this group also included children of asylum seekers who, on account of quota 
distributions, sometimes had to wait up to two years for processing. The third group made the 
situation even more complicated. This group, the largest at approximately seventy percent, 
                                                
74 See, for example, Innenministerium BW to Staatsministerium, Ministerium für Kultus und Sport, Finanz-, 
Ministserium für Wirtschaft, and Ministerium für Arbeit, “Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft für Vietnam Flüchtlingshilfe,” 
VIII 2702/401, (August 7, 1979), EA 3/609 Bü 85, Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart; and “265 Vietnam-Flüchtlinge 
Kommen Nach Stuttgart,” Reutlinger Generalanzeiger, September 22, 1979. 
75 Hermann, “26. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat 
der KMK, November 1986), 9, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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included those asylum seekers whose asylum applications had been denied, but whose residency 
in West Germany was permitted for “humanitarian reasons.” These individuals were allowed to 
remain in Berlin or the other Länder for up to eight years and were not (usually) actively 
deported thereafter.76 
As the number of asylum seekers rose in the mid-1980s, the Länder Ministries of 
Education re-addressed the issue of compulsory schooling in response to political and social 
outcry as well as internal concerns. It was one thing to allow a few dozen or even a hundred to 
stay out of school, but thousands of children? Politicians, particularly from the Green Party, 
raised concerns about the asylum seekers’ equal treatment and school care.77 For example, over 
1986 and 1987 members of the Alternative Liste in West Berlin requested information from the 
CDU-FDP Senate about the equal treatment and school care of the children of asylum seekers, 
pointing out that these children had the right to education. The Berlin Senator for Education 
consistently responded that measures were being taken, citing numbers of teachers hired and 
classes opened. Changes to compulsory education were not immediately on the agenda.78 
The Länder were divided on the advisability of changing their individual laws to extend 
coverage to asylum seekers. Many Länder Ministries of Education felt that inclusion might lead 
to legal difficulties, such as with liabilities.79 Others argued for partial coverage. Baden-
Württemberg’s CDU-controlled Ministry of Education, for example, supported the idea of 
                                                
76 Ibid.  
77 See for example Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage Nr. 2270 vom 5. 9. 1986 über 
‘schulische Betreuung und Gleichbehandlung der Kinder von Asylbewerbern in Berlin,’” Schlußbericht (Berlin: 
Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, November 5, 1986), B Rep 002 16867, Berlin Landesarchiv.  
78 Ibid.; and Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, “Drucksache 10/1498 (Idf. Nr. 13): Beschlußempfehlung des 
Ausschusses für Ausländerfragen vom 26. März 1987 zum Antrag der Fraktion der SPD über Schulpflicht für 
Kinder von Asylbewerbern, Drucksache 10/1044,” 52. Sitzung vom 14. Mai 1987 (Berlin, May 14, 1987).  
79 Hermann, “26. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 9–10.  
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compulsory schooling specifically for those children who remained despite the rejection of their 
asylum application. SPD-governed North Rhine-Westphalia briefly moved in that direction, 
claiming that private groups (including the churches) could no longer carry associated costs on 
account of the significant increase. Similarly, Bavaria, governed by the CSU, extended its 
compulsory schooling specifically to its center for asylum seekers in Zirndorf, which had its own 
primary and lower secondary school (Volksschule).80 Regardless of their individual decisions, by 
1989 each of those Länder Ministries of Education without clear compulsory schooling laws 
agreed to (usually) permit voluntary school attendance on the grounds that “something needed to 
be done for the children.” 81 
The question of the right to education for asylum seekers and equal education access 
included the issue of support and integration programs. Addressing the issue in 1988, the 
Kultusministerkonferenz’s “Subcommittee on Instruction for Foreign Schoolchildren” debated 
how best to serve this legal group. As discussed above, representatives briefly considered putting 
asylum children from Eastern Europe in the same classes as ethnic-German migrants, a 
possibility which was quickly vetoed. Representatives decided instead that including asylum 
children under regulations for “equal integration help” and the support programs outlined in the 
KMK’s 1976 Recommendations would be a better fit.82 The Subcommittee’s members agreed 
that asylum children would benefit from German and mother tongue instruction, when 
                                                
80 KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den einzelnen Budnesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern.” 
81 Ibid. 
82 For more on “gleichen Eingliederungshilfen,” see Hermann, “35. Sitzung des USAuslS,” 2–3. Namely, in the 
revision of the guidelines for the “Instruction for the Children of Foreign Workers” from 8 April 1976 (with 
revisions in 1979) for the children of foreign workers is planned. For this group, the regulations for equal integration 
assistance (Eingliederungshilfen) and support-programs were of more relevance. Yet, in contrast to ethnic German 
migrants, as asylum seekers, these groups’ continued residence was often in question. In addition, these children’s 
education in their countries of origin could not be equated. 
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convenient. Nonetheless, while the Subcommittee felt that asylum seekers were supposed to be 
treated on an equal basis with other ethno-national minority schoolchildren, asylum children’s 
legal status resulted in a sharp differentiation in treatment.  
For those asylum seekers who did fall under compulsory schooling laws, the Länder 
Ministries of Education theoretically agreed to provide German language training and access to 
integration programs. After all, the Länder’s understanding of the right to education demanded 
integration support in order to enable asylum seekers to attend (West) German schools, as did the 
United Nation’s Refugee Act. Despite the KMK’s Subcommittee-proposed extension of the 
KMK’s 1976 Recommendation’s programs to asylum seekers, however, asylum seekers seldom 
had full access. Even when the Länder Ministries of Education stipulated that specific groups 
were supposed to receive German language support, there were significant difficulties in the 
provision of it. Insufficient funding and materials compounded the already complicated legal 
situation. It was not uncommon that Länder dictated that the children’s attendance “could be 
postponed for half a year on account of adverse conditions” (i.e. limited teachers).  
When agreeing that the children should receive native language support, the 
Subcommittee’s representatives approached these children paradoxically as a single, if “very 
heterogeneous group.”83 They quickly found that their diversity complicated the provision of 
native language and cultural instruction. Asylum groups spoke dozens of languages, meaning 
that the Länder needed teachers trained in those languages already in Germany as they could 
hardly request that the country of origin send teachers. Furthermore, despite the United Nation’s 
Refugee Act stipulating that asylum seekers and refugees receive cultural support, the Länder 
usually only even tried to provide measures for cultural maintenance to groups with citizenship 
                                                
83 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 5. 
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in former guest worker countries. This contingent was hardly insignificant. Together, citizens 
from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia made up over 30 percent of the total asylum seekers 
(and had since 1987).84 Groups from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey – once in possession of 
some sort of legal residency –were theoretically entitled to receive instruction in the official 
language and culture of their country of origin in public schools on the same basis as their fellow 
citizens. But these two diverse groups were not the majority of asylum seekers and that majority 
usually only received cultural assistance from private groups, if anything. Lower Saxony and 
Sachsen-Anhalt did include Croatian children in compulsory schooling instruction, but the other 
Länder only accepted them into schools for “humanitarian reasons.”85 
Even when the Länder governments were willing, the mandated dispersal of asylum 
families throughout the country led to difficulties achieving the minimums necessary for setting 
up support classes.86 Several Länder, like North Rhine-Westphalia, tried to offload 
responsibility, encouraging private associations and groups to establish educational programs.87 
Some Länder, like Berlin (governed by a SPD and AL coalition between 1989 and 1991), 
arguing that programs for cultural instruction were advisable in order to ease return for larger 
groups, agreed to establish voluntary extra programs. These voluntary extra programs, however, 
were only established upon parental application, necessitating the asylum seekers’ familiarity 
                                                
84 With the exception of 1990. 
85 Lohmar, “49. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 7; and Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 23.  
86 In some Länder, this was intentional (Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 286–307). 
87 Hermann, “26. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 9–10. Walter (NRW) pointed out that many of the responsible parties were 
not prepared to support the costs of the voluntary school attendance of this growing number of children. For this 
reason, in NRW there was a tendency to move toward including specific groups of asylum seekers under 
compulsory schooling law. 
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with Berlin law.88 Given that the majority of their guardians were unaware of the possibility, that 
stipulation was paramount to denial. 
Responding to the growth of new migration through asylum, some of the Länder did 
eventually change their compulsory schooling laws in the early 1990s. As of 1 January 1991, 
Berlin’s new compulsory schooling law came into effect, establishing a legal basis for the 
inclusion of asylum seekers. Bavaria also changed its laws to include the children of asylum 
seekers. In contrast, Baden-Württemberg, Hamburg, North Rhine-Westphalia, and Rhineland-
Pfalz did not rewrite their school laws, continuing to permit asylum children’s enrollment “for 
humanitarian reasons” on a voluntary basis.89 Lower Saxony still included most children under 
its compulsory schooling laws, but reported that the children of asylum seekers in asylum homes 
did not fall under compulsory schooling.90 
Nonetheless, many migrant schoolchildren with refugee status continued to receive 
mixed treatment across Germany. For example, the Länder Ministries of Education agreed in 
1992 that the 1,600-1,800 refugee children from Bosnia-Herzegovina arriving on rescue 
transports should be encouraged to integrate, as the duration of their residency in the Federal 
                                                
88 While acceptance into schools for younger schoolchildren was possible, youths 16 years of age or older faced 
often-insurmountable difficulties. Because of their status, these youths could rarely take part in vocational programs 
or any other relevant measures, such as those provided by the MBSE (KMK, “Ergebnis einer Umfrage in den 
einzelnen Budnesländern zur Schulpflicht für Kinder von Asylbewerbern”; and Senatsverwaltung für Schule, 
Berufsbildung und Sport, “Ausführungsvorschriften über den Unterricht für Ausländische: Kinder und Jugendliche,” 
Dienstblatt des Senats von Berlin, Teil III, Wissenschaft und Kunst, Schulwesen, no. 11 (May 24, 1984)).  
89 For more on the specific school laws, see Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 5. In Bremen, asylum children 
now fell under compulsory schooling law as soon as it was clear that they would be remaining in the state. 
Schleswig Holstein had also changed its laws to include asylum children in its new school laws as of 1 January 
1990. 
90 Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 10–11. Among the new members of the Sub-Committee, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommerns reports that the children of asylum seekers had a right, but not requirement to attend school. In 
Sachsen Anhalt the children could on request. In January 1993, Sachsen-Anhalt would start the process of redoing 
their compulsory schooling law, see Lohmar, “52. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 20./21. 
Januar 1992 im Sport- und Kongreßzentrum, 1992 Berlin,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, 
March 2, 1993), Pt. 10.6, B 304/7776, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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Republic was uncertain. But across the country material support was grossly insufficient. In 
addition, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein were the only Länder in which they were 
included under compulsory schooling. In Lower Saxony, they tried to handle the situation by 
gathering the children together for instruction, placing them in primary schools, lower secondary 
schools (Hauptschule), or in comprehensive schools (Gesamtschule), but classes were generally 
overfull. At least these children received some immediate support, more than in most of the other 
Länder.91 
Part of the problem was that compulsory schooling still only came into effect (and 
general school attendance was only possible) after the children had been assigned to a 
municipality for temporary residence. Several Länder (including Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, 
Bremen, Hesse, and Rhineland-Pfalz) reported in 1992 that those children of asylum seekers 
housed in central, short-term residences were not receiving an education as they were not 
officially registered in the community.92 Even though Berlin placed asylum seekers and their 
children immediately into “transitional residences,”93 the Berlin Senator for Education reported 
in 1992 that school attendance was irregular.94 Even with legal and supposedly humanitarian 
provisions, there continued to be administrative as well as material problems with broader 
inclusion in schools and the guarantee of the right to education. 
                                                
91 Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 23. There were two groups, one that arrived with Hhilfstransporten – 
including Bosnian refugees applying for asylum. 
92 Lohmar, “50. Sitzung des UAauslS,” Pt. 11.4. Rhineland-Pfalz (and Sachsen) reported that also in some of the 
collective centers, some level of instruction was being offered (Ibid., Pt. 11.3). In accordance with the local 
Landesmeldegesetzes. 
93 Lohmar, “50. Sitzung des UAauslS,” Pt. 11.3. 
94 Lohmar, “51. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 10–11.  
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The Länder’s emphasis on official papers and legal status combined with limited 
resources meant that thousands of children of asylum seekers did not receive the education to 
which they were supposedly entitled. International law dictated that the children have access to 
schools and that the right to an education meant inclusion under compulsory schooling laws. 
Local interpretations of the right to an education agreed. Yet, Länder and Federal efforts to 
discourage asylum seekers from entering or remaining in the country led to hundreds or 
thousands of children positioned outside of school laws. The severe limitations on where asylum 
seekers could live as well as what employment they could engage in often resulted in a legal 
status where families could not register with local cities and consequently did not fall under the 
relevant school laws. Further lack of resources meant that those Länder and cities willing to 
create programs for these children often (necessarily) delayed implementation, resulting in 
months (or longer) without any access to schools.95  
Instead of reforming practices of exclusion, the Federal Republic revised its constitution 
in 1993 with its so-called Asylum Compromise. The changes, negotiated between the ruling 
CDU/CSU-FDP government and the SPD (the main opposition), abolished unconditional access 
to asylum procedure. As of 1993, asylum seekers from “safe third states” could be deported 
without a hearing. Furthermore, applicants from countries the Federal Republic deemed “free of 
persecution” were subjected to a simplified asylum procedure that usually meant cases were 
immediately rejected and subjected the asylum seeker to possible deportation. As a result, the 
number of asylum seekers arriving yearly did drop, but the care of those permitted to stay did not 
necessarily improve.96  
                                                
95 Herbert, Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik in Deutschland, 286–307.  
96 For a discussion of the “the 1978/1980, 1986, and 1993 Bundestagary asylum debates” in (West) Germany, see 
Niklaus Steiner, Arguing About Asylum: The Complexity of Refugee Debates in Europe (New York: St. Martin’s 
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The changes to asylum law and continued restrictions on asylum seekers’ access to 
schools reflected trends across the European Union. With the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and later 
developments, the European Union began to regulate asylum collectively, making entry more 
difficult.97 For those school-age asylum seekers who did make it into the country and were not 
immediately deported, most of the EU Member States’ laws extended the right to education for 
foreigners generally.98 The realization of that right for asylum seekers and refugees, however, 
was often written into the books but not actually implemented. As in the Federal Republic, the 
reasons varied. Some argued that the children should not be compelled to attend school for 
humanitarian reasons. Others simply did not have the materials to implement the guaranteed 
support classes.99 Yet, during the 1950s and later discussions of what the right to education 
meant, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Community (now European 
Union) and local groups all agreed that the realization of the right to education required 
compulsory schooling. The discrepancy between claims and practice begs the question of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Press, 2000), 59–96. For a discussion of asylum law within the context of West German immigration, see also Klaus 
J. Bade, Ausländer, Aussiedler, Asyl in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3rd ed. (Hannover: Niedersächsische 
Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1994); and Münz, “Ethos or Demos? Migration and Citizenship in Germany,” 
24–25. Germany now rejects some of the highest numbers of unaccompanied minors of any of the European Union 
Member States (Amanda Levinson, “Unaccompanied Immigrant Children: A Growing Phenomenon with Few Easy 
Solutions,” The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute, January 24, 2011, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/). 
97 For more on the European Union and the right to asylum, see Susan Kneebone and Felicity Rawlings-Sanaei, eds., 
New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007); and rew Geddes, 
Immigration and European Integration: Beyond Fortress Europe, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
98 Gisella Gori, Towards an EU Right to Education (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 332–333. 
99 Commission of the European Communities, “Report on the Implementation in the Member States of Directive 
77/486/EEC on the Education of the Children of Migrant Workers” (Brussels, January 3, 1989). 
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whether German practices actually denied this group of children the right to education instead of 
ensuring it.100 
State-Language Instruction and the Breakdown of Yugoslavia 
Even as the Länder reconfirmed their commitment to offering only official state-language 
instruction to former guest worker countries’ citizens in public schools, their resolve was tested. 
In particular, the slow dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars brought up several issues 
for the Länder regarding the proper schooling of the approximately 130,000 former Yugoslav 
citizens within their borders (see Table 8.3). As the old communist state splintered and new state 
governments formed, the individual Länder and Federal Government asked each other how they 
were supposed to interact with these new government entities and the individuals whose 
citizenship status was in flux. Should a foreign state – such as Croatia – be permitted to send 
teachers if that state had not yet been officially recognized by the Federal government? Were 
these states, once part of a guest worker country, even entitled to have foreign language and 
native language instruction in public schools? Furthermore, what about those foreign citizens 
who did not necessarily belong to the new states’ ethnic majority, particularly in light of the 
violence shocking the world? Unsurprisingly, the answers to these questions depended on the 
individual Länder (in regards to the programs they had in place as well as their leadership) and 
the specific ethnic and/or national group in question.  
Yugoslavia had had a complicated cultural relationship with West Germany as a guest 
worker country. As a communist state, the Federal Republic had been wary of signing a bilateral 
                                                
100 Morten Kjaerum, “Refugee Protection Between State Interests and Human Rights: Where Is Europe Heading?,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2002): 513–36; Sarah Cemlyn and Linda Briskman, “Asylum, Children’s Rights 
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labor treaty and then cultural agreement. Nonetheless, it did both in the late 1960s. Over the next 
decades, the two states would create multiple two and three-year programs outlining their 
cultural relationship. In 1974, as part of that cultural exchange, the two countries agreed to meet 
almost yearly to discuss the school instruction of children with Yugoslav citizenship living in 
West Germany. For both countries, the issue was pressing, as by the end of the 1970s 
Yugoslavian citizens made up the second largest national group in West Germany (see Table 8.3 
for 1985-1992).101  
As a guest worker country, the children of Yugoslav citizens were entitled to receive 
mother tongue and cultural instruction in West German public schools. But, from the beginning, 
the acknowledged heterogeneity of the Yugoslav population raised complications for West 
German school authorities in setting up the classes. Many individuals did, in fact, understand 
themselves as ‘Yugoslav,’ but others viewed themselves as ‘Croatian,’ ‘Serbian,’ etc. Yet, these 
labels did not necessarily mean that members the specific groups spoke the same languages or 
wanted their children to learn them. In the 1970s, the Yugoslav consular classes that were 
eventually established provided different language instruction depending on the makeup of a 
specific immigrant group, parental preference, and available teachers from Yugoslavia (see 
Table 7.2). The children in the classes were often “mixed,” coming from households speaking 
Croatian, Serbian, or both (or another language altogether).102 Because of the languages’ 
                                                
101 Lindemann, “Deutsch-jugoslawisches Zweijahresprogramm für den kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen 
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similarities, this solution was usually viewed as perfectly acceptable by the educational 
authorities as well as the parents involved. 
As the Yugoslav state began to shatter at the end of the 1980s, however, the question 
arose of what was to happen to these teachers and classes, particularly as the affected children in 
West German schools numbered approximately one hundred thousand (see Table 8.3). When the 
Greek government had collapsed in 1967 and then again in 1974, its new governments had still 
understood themselves to be “Greek,” as had new Spanish and Portuguese governments in the 
late 1970s. Here, in contrast, there was no one entity replacing the Yugoslav government, but 
first a whittling away and then disintegration into nine state entities. Contestation over borders 
and national belonging turned vicious, as both ethnic and national identification became 
politically contentious.103  
Table 8.3: Children in the West German Länder Schools by Citizenship, 1985-1992104 
 Total Greek Italian Portugal Spanish Turkish Yugosl. Other 
1985 667,200 41,495 69,136 12,157 20,047 331,592 85,148 107,625 
1986 684,470 38,609 69,380 11,682 18,909 335,953 89,090 120,847 
1987 707,503 37,398 70,470 11,667 17,804 344,642 93,039 132,483 
1988 737,207 37,534 71,662 11,323 16,840 353,317 98,513 148,018 
1989 760,259 38,024 71,751 11,249 15,815 358,496 102,942 161,982 
1990 779,662 37,063 71,225 11,069 14,439 363,206 102,527 180,133 
1991 799,875 37,347 70,257 10,973 13,315 360,912 107,670 199,401 
1992 837,014 37,404 69,148 10,942 12,223 359,609 131,808 215,880 
 
                                                
103 For more on the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, see Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the 
Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992 (Westport: Praeger, 1997); Pavković, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia; Sonia 
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In West Germany, the changes to (the former) Yugoslav state had important 
repercussions on the schoolchildren’s access to mother tongue classes. In 1990, the Yugoslav 
Embassy and representatives from the Croatian government met with the Bavarian Ministry of 
Culture—as well as with Baden-Württemberg and Hesse—about the instruction of children with 
“Croatian ancestry” in native language and culture by Croatian teachers. For the German Länder, 
the answer to accepting teachers was not a simple diplomatic concern, particularly as the country 
had not been recognized (but likely would be) and any answer would be extended to Slovenia as 
well.105 But then, Hesse and North Rhine-Westphalia already offered Croatian instruction, which 
they planned to continue.106 Berlin, in turn, agreed to establish a Croatian private school, which 
was to open its doors on 1 October 1990.107 
In April 1992, the Federal Republic of Germany recognized the Croatian and Slovenian 
states, which made the Länder Education Administrations’ relationships with their governments 
easier. The Länder expressed their willingness to begin or continue offering the relevant official 
state languages. Baden-Württemberg was prepared to contribute to children with Croatian or 
Slovenian citizenship’s educations as dictated by Baden-Württemberg’s current rules. Berlin 
promised no financial support, but did agree to provide rooms at no charge (as per its standard 
agreements). In contrast, North Rhine-Westphalia (along with Bavaria, Lower Saxony, and 
                                                
105 Lohmar, “45. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 4. 
106 Lohmar, “47. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 20. Juni 1991 in Frankfurt a.M.,” 
Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, June 27, 1991), 13, B 304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. The 
other Länder were considering it as they expected the subsequent recognition of the Republic of Croatia and 
Slovenia by the Federal Republic. Lohmar, “49. Sitzung des UAauslS,” 7. 
107 In line with the Private School Laws (Lohmar, “44. Sitzung des Unterausschusses für ausländische Schüler am 
19. September 1990 in Kiel,” Ergebnisniederschrift (Bonn: Sekretariat der KMK, September 28, 1990), 5, B 
304/7775, Bundesarchiv Koblenz). 
  
472 
Rhineland-Pfalz) each declared that they would provide instruction in the languages the parents 
of “the children with Yugoslav ancestry” preferred, regardless of current citizenship status.108  
North Rhine-Westphalia’s decision contravened the KMK and individual Ministries of 
Educations’ guidelines. Technically, only citizens of a specific nation-state were supposed to 
attend that state’s consular courses. As the decisions over the Kurdish language had shown, those 
courses were only supposed to be offered in the official language of state. Even though neither 
the state representatives from Slovenia or Croatia raised concerns, in 1992 the representative for 
Hesse, Jungblut, raised the issue of which children should attend consular instruction, pointing 
out that there were multiple ways to define a group.109 For children from the former Yugoslavia, 
labels could be given based on national citizenship or language group. As the lines between them 
did not fall clearly, Jungblut felt that the only children who should attend consular instruction 
were those children who belonged to both groups (legal and linguistic). It might be unfortunate, 
but the remaining children were simply to fall through the cracks.110 
Adding difficulties to the provision of native language and cultural instruction for 
minority children in the Federal Republic, the viciousness of the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia led to the 1992 UN Embargo (Resolution 757). The Embargo dictated that no monies 
could be given to the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”111 The Länder 
                                                
108 Children from other former-Yugoslav territories received different treatment than those children with Croatian or 
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were forced to ask about the legality of continued financing of native language classes for those 
Länder that generally gave grants to the relevant consulates for running the instruction (i.e. 
Baden-Württemberg). It was much less of an issue for those Länder who had taken control of the 
courses in the 1960s. After consulting with various lawyers, the Kultusministerkonferenz 
determined that Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Saarland, and Schleswig-
Holstein could continue giving the relevant Consulates and Embassies subsidies for the 
schoolchildren’s instruction in Germany, as the Embargo’s language forbade giving support to 
officials in Yugoslavia, but not to Yugoslavian officials abroad. According to the Länder, it was 
important that these schoolchildren already in Germany not have their rights removed because of 
the Embargo on the country abroad.112  
The question of how to identify and deal with the schoolchildren who had possessed 
citizenship from the former Yugoslavia and had citizenship from one of the successor states 
demonstrates the continued importance of national identification and citizenship. Despite the 
West German emphasis on ethnic, religious, and other minority categorization, the Federal 
Republic continued to grant rights depending on their specific legal categorization. Their 
willingness to fund native language and cultural instruction depended, in part, on the foreign 
state’s willingness to emphasize a specific language and cultural capital. For many politicians, 
the ambiguity of national identification was unacceptable. To receive state support in Germany, 
children needed to be all or nothing.  
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Conclusion 
Between 1987 and 1992 new immigrants came predominantly from countries outside of 
the European Community, often arriving as asylum seekers. In the mid-1970s, the majority of the 
EC Member States argued that Third Country nationals should be treated the same as Member 
State nationals. By the end of the 1980s, in contrast, supporters of that argument numbered far 
fewer, in part because of that change in migration patterns. The conservative stance of many 
European Community Member State nationals exacerbated that balance, as those conservative 
governments argued against providing any extra services. Instead of funding school initiatives 
with the goal of reaching all children, EC Member State nationals or not, the European 
Community emphasized program development only for Member State Nationals. The European 
Community did, however, encourage its member states to support multilingualism, in part 
because of easier exchange but also to encourage economic development.113 That encouragement 
combined with its promotion of compatible national identification under the rubric of 
“European” led to a de-emphasis on national identity.  
An acceptance of Europeanness combined with obvious diversity within specific ethno-
national groups, including the German, led the Länder Ministries of Education to acknowledge 
the existence of regional and minority identifications instead of only national ones. 
Acknowledging that many foreign nationals were not part of the ethnic majority of the country of 
origin paved the way toward recognition that a child’s mother tongue might not be a state 
language. Given that part of the question here is if the children themselves identify with the 
language in the so-called “native language classes.” The KMK acknowledged the political and 
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social importance of the terminology and questioned its use, particularly as national languages do 
not necessarily reflect a child’s own family practices (see, for example, Yugoslavia).  
Changes in migration across the European Community and West Germany led, in part, to 
the question – once again – of whether Germany was a country of immigration. The members of 
the Ministries of Education, working on the issue of foreign children, argued that the Federal 
Republic was clearly and unequivocally a country of immigration. They further agreed that the 
size of the country’s minority groups meant that “mother tongue” instruction needed to be a 
normal part of the instruction for ethnic minorities. The different Ministries of Education, 
however, were unsure how to address the issue, given “political connotations.”114 And, 
unsurprisingly, implementation posed an issue.  
Yet, even as the Länder representatives argued that native language instruction was vital, 
they treated ethnic-German migrants, asylum seekers, and established ethno-national minority 
groups differently. While discussing new German migrants, the Länder Ministries of Education 
emphasized integration. For established groups specifically from former guest worker countries, 
the Länder agreed that these children were entitled to and should receive support for native 
language instruction – but only as a state language – and some integration classes were 
necessary. For asylum seekers, however, the Länder debated whether they should bring some 
under compulsory schooling laws at all. While the government claimed that all children should 
have equal educational opportunities, as soon as any specific groups were mentioned, that 
equality fell apart. Looking at groups of ethnic Germans, foreign citizens, and asylum seekers, 
the Ministers of Education did not pretend to treat children equally. Depending on their legal 
status in the country, they received different forms of support and had different rights. Not 
                                                
114 KMK, “Weiburger Forum ‘Zur Zukunft des muttersprachlichen Unterrichts’: Tagung vom 21-23.08.1991” 
(Weiburger: KMK, August 23, 1991), B 304/7773, Bundesarchiv Koblenz. 
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equality of opportunity. Education administrations and state officials rationalized different 
treatment and implementation of programs to ensure equality of opportunity for diverse groups. 
All children might have a right to an equal education, but resources were limited, and someone 
was going to get cut.115 
To some extent, the (West) German Ministries of Education’s stance was premised on the 
assumption that someone else would take care of the question of morality. The existence of the 
European Community and the Council of Europe, as well as other institutions, in some ways 
lightened the local load. As long as these institutions listed Germany as possessing a good record 
in comparison to other Member States, the majority of the West German Ministries decided they 
did not have to significantly revise their stances. Particularly not when the Italian and Greek 
governments hesitated to provide any support at all for their new waves of migrants.116 By 
mostly fulfilling directives established ten or more years prior, the comparison implied that 
(West) Germany was doing a good job. 
Citizenship status continued to influence the realization of the right to education and 
equality of opportunity. Some Länder rules still subjected foreign children to caps on the 
acceptable percentage of non-Germans in regular instruction. Furthermore, studies began to 
show that teachers were less likely to promote foreign or minority pupils into higher levels of 
secondary school than visibly ethnic-German children. While hardly policy, these practices 
contributed to discrepancies in access. Where officials determined that the children of the 
different groups of migrants belonged influenced what their rights were and under what 
                                                
115 For an excellent discussion of “the school education of the children of minorities” from 1989-1999 in Germany 
laid out by the individual Länder, see Ingrid Gogolin, Ursula Neumann, and Lutz-Rainer Reuter, eds., Schulbildung 
für Kinder aus Minderheiten in Deutschland 1989-1999 (Munich: Waxmann, 2001). 
116 For a discussion of the measures other European Community Member States implemented for their migrant and 
minority populations (Commission of the European Communities, “Report on Directive 77/486/EEC”). 
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conditions they could exercise them. The legal categorization of the different children meant that 
their exact rights changed, regardless of the idea that human rights were individual rights and 
should be ensured for each.  
CONCLUSION: MIGRATION AND EDUCATION 
In West Germany and across Europe, 65 years of debates and policies have not provided 
a single, clear-cut answer to the question of how to guarantee the right to education for all 
children or best educate migrant children. Instead, the question continues to be regularly revived 
and reconsidered with the arrival of new migrant groups. The repeated explorations of the issue 
over the last decades have suggested divergent problems and proposed different solutions, from 
consular, preparatory, and special support classes for mother language and cultural instruction or 
integration to teacher training and curriculum development – depending on the aims and agenda.  
What can this interdisciplinary and transnational study, combining the history of 
migration and education research with a discourse and public policy analysis, contributes to the 
many earlier explorations by politicians, educations experts and other parties involved? What 
then, does looking at 40 years of school policies and programs for migrant children in West 
Germany between 1949 and 1992 demonstrate if not continual failure? Foremost, I argue that it 
shows that access to education is dependent on the importance of the form of migration and the 
migrant's citizenship status. Demonstrating that claim, I will lay out four points to take from this 
dissertation, showing that while there has not been unqualified success, there have been some 
improvements to the situation.  
My first claim is the most obvious: new groups with new concerns continue to migrate, 
making a single fix to the “problem of education for migrants” impossible. As of 1997, the 
  
479 
European Bundestag has argued that there is no way to entirely stop migration.1 Even with the 
establishment of “Fortress Europe,” new migrant groups, be they labor migrants, asylum seekers, 
or people who migrate for other reasons, continue to travel across state boundaries. The 
individuals in each group arrive with their own diverse cultures, religions, and languages as well 
as concerns and hopes regarding their futures. In consequence, there cannot be a single, perfect 
solution to education for every past, present, and future migrant group. What is feasible is the 
establishment of regulations setting out a framework for schooling in order to enable an 
Educational Administration to act quickly to meet new groups’ needs.  
Second, this project demonstrates the tension between legal status and the right to 
education. Ideally, promoting Universal Human Rights means that all children have the right to 
education. Over half a century of international collaboration defines that universal right as 
meaning that all children have a right to a primary or basic education and should have access to 
secondary schooling. For European Union Member State governments, all children should have 
the same access to schooling, regardless of their ancestry, citizenship, socio-economic status, 
gender, or any other factor. The German state too, claims that children have a right to equality of 
opportunity and therefore all children should have full access to all levels of the education 
system. Because education is a positive right, all children have to be compelled to attend, 
meaning universal inclusion under compulsory schooling law.2 
                                                
1 European Bundestag, “The Teaching of Immigrants in the European Union,” Working Document, Education and 
Culture (Luxembourg: European Union, November 1997), 43. 
2 Dick Mentink and Flora Goudappel, “The Education Provision in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union: A Bleak Perspective,” European Journal for Education Law and Policy 4, no. 2 (September 1, 
2000): 145–48; Paulí Dávila and Luís María Naya, “Education and the Rights of the Child in Europe,” PROSPECTS 
37, no. 3 (April 10, 2008): 357–67; Florentina Burlacu, “Children’s Right to Education,” Euromentor Journal 3, no. 
4 (December 2012): 126–36; and Colin Power, “The Right to Education,” in The Power of Education, Education in 
the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects 27 (Springer Singapore, 2015), 15–27. 
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Yet while European directives and the German Basic Law have anti-discrimination 
clauses about ancestry, gender, and socio-economic divides, those clauses do not have 
stipulations preventing discrimination based on legal status or the possession of paperwork. That 
gap leaves room for German and European Union directives and policies that prohibit, indirectly, 
access to schools based on specific citizenship status and form of migration. One example, which 
this project only briefly addresses, are asylum seekers and undocumented or stateless children. 
Their situation was and continues to be bleak. Because of immigration laws and quotas, many 
undocumented or irregular migrants, arriving without state approved paperwork, were and are 
either unable or afraid to register with local city offices meaning they did and do not possess 
residency and, in turn, their children were and are sometimes barred from attending schools. That 
issue of residency also continues to prohibit the education of school age asylum seekers. Asylum 
children, if they were and are included under compulsory schooling law at all, often could and 
cannot register as local residents while living in camps or temporary housing, which, again, 
prevents their school enrollment.  
Less blatantly discriminatory, German compulsory schooling laws do cover those 
migrant children who arrive(d) with approved paperwork, but that inclusion does and does not 
necessarily mean that they received and receive the same education as either the ethno-national 
majority or even each other. On the surface these children fell and fall under the same 
compulsory schooling laws and were and are entitled to the same education. They were and are 
required to attend public schools and enroll in one of the levels of the segregated secondary 
school system, which includes a variety of school forms, including Realschulen and 
comprehensive schools to the Gymnasium. Depending on their citizenship status, place of origin, 
and legal relationship to the European Union, however, these children have access to different 
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programs and school initiatives. European Union Member State nationals, for example, have the 
right to enroll in a variety of exchange and language programs run through the European Union 
SOCRATES Program, introduced in 1994, and other initiatives.3 Third country nationals (non-
EU Member State nationals), in contrast, are excluded from these initiatives unless the country of 
citizenship government is a candidate country. Not only are they ineligible for many European 
Union-funded programs, but their citizenship status often prevents them from participating in 
local exchanges that would violate their terms of residence or require reentry. 
In Germany specifically, the differentiation in legal status also provides room for 
segregation and social othering. Citizenship and legal status not only influence migrant 
children’s right and access to education, but also how a government views their right to state 
support. On a basic level, local Education Administrations, like those in Berlin, use legal 
difference to separate children into classes based on their citizenship status (i.e. German or non-
German). These “pure foreigner classes” are not designed to assist supposed non-German 
children (often born and raised in Germany), but instead support German children. The Berlin 
Senator for Education continues to argue that while all children have a right to education, 
German citizens have more of a claim to state resources.4  
Adding to that challenge, local Education Administrations, like those in Berlin, the 
economic and social composition of neighborhoods and a rise of private schools, for which 
parents often have to pay a school fee, creates further segregatation in public schools. The 
schools in neighborhoods with predominately ethnic-German school children from wealthier 
                                                
3 Hubert Ertl, “EU Programmes in Education and Training: Development and Implementation in Germany, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom,” in Implementing European Union Education and Training Policy, ed. David Phillips and 
Hubert Ertl (Springer Netherlands, 2003), 213–64. 
4 Sylvia Vogt and Marie Rövekamp, “Zwischen Brennpunkt- und Privatschule: Wie sollen Kinder lernen?,” Der 
Tagesspiegel, October 24, 2013; and “Streetworker: ‘Schule Sollte Keine Last Sein,’” Die Zeit, January 2, 2012, sec. 
Schule. 
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families often receive better resources. Families with children attending these schools usually 
assume the children will be tracked into higher levels of secondary schools. In contrast, areas 
with less money and/or higher minority populations frequently receive less money. Ethnic 
Germans and many affluent migrant or minority parents often try to move away from the later 
neighborhoods in acts of what is considered passive discrimination to ensure that their children 
have supposedly better opportunities. Interestingly, however, ethnic German children are more 
likely to be transitioned into upper levels of secondary school if they attend schools with large 
non-German populations.5  
Furthermore, on a conceptual level, partly because of West Germany’s exclusive 
citizenship laws and partly due to pressure of the countries of citizenship, for decades the Federal 
Republic was invested in promoting identification of migrant groups as foreign nationals in order 
to encourage their return to their country of origin. This official othering and emphasis on 
residents with non-German citizenship as supposed foreigners led the Länder to encourage 
consular classes only partly with an eye towards minority rights. While that right to be a minority 
should be lauded, the associated sentiment of rejection by the ethno-national majority creates 
problems with the schooling of migrant children. This policy slowly changed, as this study has 
shown, since the mid-1980s. But even now that certain children with migrant backgrounds can 
naturalize, the continued feeling of rejection among – particularly those who are visibly different 
– minority groups leads to the perception that public services, like schools, are “not for them.”6  
                                                
5 Vogt and Rövekamp, “Zwischen Brennpunkt- und Privatschule”; “Streetworker”; and Juliane Karakayali and 
Birgit zur Nieden, “Klasseneinteilungen: Zur Geschichte und Gegenwart von Segregation an Berliner 
Grundschulen,” in Vom Rand ins Zentrum: Perspektiven einer kritischen Migrationsforschung, Berliner Blätter 
65/2014 (Berlin: Panama-Verlag, 2014), 77–93. 
6 Philip Anderson, “‘You Don’t Belong Here in Germany…’: On the Social Situation of Refugee Children in 
Germany,” Journal of Refugee Studies 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 187–99. 
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My third point regards what the involved foreign governments and minority groups see as 
appropriate schooling. Countries like (West) Germany do not develop their school laws or 
educational initiatives in isolation. Some country of citizenship governments are explicitly 
interested in their foreign citizens' and/or nationals’ education. Many of these governments 
actively advocate for and invest in their foreign citizens’ schooling because they want their 
citizens to continue to feel a connection in order to promote financial remittances or encourage 
eventual return. Other states in the European Union view their foreign nationals as 
representatives, whose residence abroad influences their international relationships.  
The specific perception of nationality and the meaning of citizenship influences a country 
of citizenship’s participation in its foreign citizens’ education, often dictating what kind of 
programs the government is willing to advocate and fund. The three West German Länder 
governments I looked at – Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia and West Berlin –
exemplify some of those differences also seen between other European Union Member States 
and non-EU countries from which workers migrate(d). To start with, the Italian government has 
almost continually since the 1960s pushed identification as both Italian and European. In the 
1960s and subsequent decades, Italian state ministers and legates pointed out that being 
European and part of the European Community almost certainly meant that the bulk of its 
emigrants were going to remain in their chosen countries of residence – not, however, as 
migrants but as residents of the European Community. While this identity meant that the children 
should integrate and become part of local society, it did not necessitate divorcing them from their 
Italian heritage. Instead, the children were supposed to integrate their experiences in Germany 
and identify as Italians within a ”European” intercultural framework. Not only were Italian 
children supposed to embrace both, but so were children with German citizenship. After all, the 
  
484 
Italian legations asked, were not both groups of citizens European Community Member State 
nationals? That trend persists, with the Italian government continuing to support some bilingual 
schools and after-school language programs.  
The Greek Government, in contrast, usually promotes a specifically Greek identity for its 
citizens. Following a long tradition of establishing diasporas abroad, the Greek government 
argued between the 1950s and 1980s that its citizens needed access to a full Greek education in 
order to enable them to be Greek. This was particularly important as, for the bulk of the 40 years 
under examination in this study, the Greek Government claimed that all of its citizens would 
someday return to Greece. Even after the state joined the European Community in 1981, the 
Greek Government claimed that its citizens were Greek first and foremost. For the Greek state, 
European multiculturalism, in contrast to interculturalism, meant that Greek citizens had the right 
to continue to be Greek abroad. The Greek government did acknowledge, however, that some of 
its citizens might not return and hence needed to integrate. Yet even then, the state argued that 
those citizens who planned to someday return needed access to Greek national private schools. 
Only the recent economic crisis forced the Greek government to close those schools’ doors.7 
The Turkish government initially pushed integration into the West German system in 
order to promote literacy and participation in the West German labor market. Only in the 1970s 
and 1980s, when the government in Turkey began to reform its education system and promote 
turkification, did the Turkish state begin to avidly push a nationalist agenda for its citizens 
abroad. Following that trajectory, the government initially encouraged integration classes over 
programs to teach national association. By the time the state decided to push nationalism, a large 
portion of its school-age foreign citizens were born in Germany, although many continued to 
                                                
7 Stella Tsolakidou, “Cuts in Operational Costs and Personnel in Greek Schools Abroad,” Greek Reporter, October 
25, 2011. 
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migrate as secondary-school-age children. To promote national identification for both groups, 
the German and Turkish governments encouraged and often funded Turkish as a first or second 
foreign language (instead of English) for those older children alongside supporting the usual 
after-school classes in Turkish culture, history, geography, and religion. Some Turkish legations 
pushed for private schools, but the issue was usually submerged under more pressing concerns. 
Nonetheless, in 2010, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan argued that Turkey’s 
citizens in Germany should have access to Turkish schools, a demand German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel denied, instead favoring policy promoting integration.8 
The important point drawn from the comparison between these three country of 
citizenship governments’ goals and kinds of programs advocated is twofold. On the one hand, 
their efforts shaped West German school initiatives for foreign citizens. On the other, these state 
governments’ willingness to fund specific kinds of programs and make demands on their 
nationals behalf influenced the choices of their citizens abroad. Without Italian state advocacy, it 
is unlikely that Italian would be offered in German secondary schools. In turn, Greek private 
schools cannot survive without Greek state funding. The country of citizen governments then 
have a direct impact on the kinds of choices their citizens can make. Those choices, in turn, 
emphasize the difference between the groups, setting them each apart from one other and from 
the German ethno-national majority. They also promote a sense of community within the groups, 
promoting nationalism and teaching a form of citizenship that the children might not have 
otherwise either felt or subscribed to.  
My fourth point relates to the school initiatives in West Germany, be they funded locally 
or by the country of citizenship, and the difficulty of actually defining scholastic success. Partly 
                                                
8 “Erdoğan will türkische Gymnasien in Deutschland,” Die Zeit, March 24, 2010, sec. Ausland; and Markus Horeld, 
“Türkische Schulen: ‘Erdoğan macht einen Gedankenfehler,’” Die Zeit, March 26, 2010, sec. Schule. 
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in response to international and the country of citizenships’ individual demands (particularly 
from Italy, Greece, and Turkey as some of the primary countries of citizenship), the West 
German Educational Administrations designed multiple programs beginning in the 1950s which 
combined their own goals with those of the relevant foreign states. While implementation 
differed across the Länder, most of the local Education Administrations offer both integration 
and consular courses. Among the consular classes, the Länder Education Administrations usually 
permitted five to ten hours of instruction, during which teachers from the relevant country of 
citizenship taught language, history, geography, and religion. These classes could, however, only 
be offered in public schools when the citizenship group in question were so-called guest worker 
children. Most other minority groups had to form private clubs if they wanted to offer similar 
instruction for their children. For guest worker children, many of the Länder Education 
Administrations also encouraged the development of national preparation classes, which were 
supposed to prepare children to either return to their country of citizenship after a brief stay or 
integrate into West German schools. After 1970, however, several Education Administrations 
began switching almost entirely to German intensive integration classes for all children with 
foreign citizenship, which are still available in a revised form. In addition, the Länder Education 
Administrations also offered some German language support for children with non-German 
citizenship enrolled in West German schools. 
The combination of both cultural and integration classes offered between the 1960s and 
1980s reflected German and European political understanding regarding how migrant and 
minority children should be educated. On the one hand, promoting the right to education and 
social order, host country governments wanted minority children to be able to integrate into their 
societies. To do so, the children needed a standard education (whatever that may be) alongside 
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local residents. But, in the name of minority rights and arguing that many children would 
emigrate further or return to their countries of citizenship, the German Federal Government and 
many Länder governments claimed that the child’s best interest dictated a need for cultural and 
language classes preparing them to leave. The European Community and most of the 
governments of the migrant’s countries of citizenships supported this policy. As a result, the 
majority of the Länder Education Administrations did try, following local regulations, to ensure 
children had classes to permit both integration and cultural maintenance.  
Any measure of success was, however, stymied by the social and political context. Even 
when trying, the Länder Education Administrations’ efforts were obstructed by social 
perceptions of identity, material considerations, changing political goals both in Germany and 
abroad, as well as by shifting definitions of what the right to education entailed. First, the double 
goal of integration while maintaining their connection to their country of citizenship was a 
problem, not because either goal was wrong, but because of the social assumption that those two 
aims were at odds. In the ethno-national majority’s perception between the 1950s and 2000s (and 
for some today), an individual had to be either German or non-German. Most German – and 
many European – politicians and educators did not view a combined or hyphenated identity for 
children with non-German citizenship as possible, making it difficult for children to bridge that 
gap. 
Even without the psychological frustrations, material considerations often meant that 
even offering the promised classes was unfeasible. In the 1950s and 1960s, West German 
Education Administrations had a continual shortage of trained personnel to teach the classes they 
had agreed to offer. Even when there were teachers, the materials (textbooks and workbooks) for 
lessons frequently did not exist, or there was a lack of space and funding. Today, there are 
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usually educational materials available, but space and personnel shortages persist, particularly 
within the first year of any new group’s arrival. The result is that many children often have to 
wait weeks or months to see the inside of a school. When they are admitted, classes are often 
overfull or there are material shortages.9 
Shifting international and local understandings of compulsory school also makes it 
difficult to ensure access to the appropriate kind of education. At the beginning of the 1950s, 
compulsory schooling in Germany technically included secondary schooling, but it was not 
uncommon for children to leave school without completing their school certificates. By the 
1960s, however, the Council of Europe pushed secondary schooling for all children, arguing that 
an individual could not have equal chances in their later lives without it. Technology had 
irrevocably changed the labor market and without secondary schooling, most vocational tracks 
would be unavailable. That changing understanding of a minimum education strained programs 
for integration. The integration classes developed in the 1950s were designed to teach children 
basic literacy and mathematics, but did not enable migrant children to complete secondary 
school. In the 1950s, that was completely acceptable as preparation for blue-collar labor. By the 
end of the 1960s, when secondary school had become an integral part of compulsory schooling, 
that bar for success meant dropping out was unacceptable. Success in the school system was 
contingent on completing the secondary school certificate and entrance into vocational training. 
Hence, the 1950s and 1960s integration programs were, by 1970s standards, abject failures.  
The perception of failure was further complicated by continually shifting opinions on the 
state’s role in education. In the 1950s, the state was responsible for not preventing access to 
education, but was hardly required to ensure that every supposedly foreign child under its care 
                                                
9 “Bildung - In der Chancenlotterie: Mit dem Flüchtlingszustrom steigt auch die Zahl schulpflichtiger Kinder aus 
Krisenregionen. Doch viele Schulen können sie nicht ausreichend fördern,” Spiegel, 2014. 
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actually received equal rights. By the end of the 1960s, in contrast, various advocacy groups and 
supranational organizations argued that the state’s job was to ensure equal rights extended to 
everyone. In that mindset, a government was responsible for providing the necessary programs to 
realize equality. In response, several Länder governments in West Germany implemented in the 
1960s and early 1970s diverse pilot projects to try to discover the perfect solution for how to 
integrate migrants. The global financial recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, however, combined 
with the perception of a failure of the earlier policy, contributed to ongoing disputes over equal 
education. As conservative parties took control of many European governments in the 1980s, 
including the West German, they concluded that state was only responsible for providing the 
same programs for all children – the children were responsible for taking those programs and 
succeeding within them.  
Judging the Länder Education Administrations’ actions based on their contemporary 
definitions of education equality and stated goals, implementation still did not usually reflect the 
stated ideals of a given time period. Indeed, the programs were often successful in keeping 
migrant and minority schoolchildren off the streets. But integrative programs only rarely 
prepared these children to “fully participate” in the normal West German classroom and they 
usually failed at setting children on a supposedly equal level with West German schoolchildren. 
Furthermore, no matter what local or international law stipulated regarding the right to mother 
language instruction or intensive German language instruction, the point was often moot without 
the necessary resources to realize Länder regulations.  
The understanding of state responsibility for ensuring equal education access also 
depended on the specific group in question and the role of the host country in their arrival. For 
the Federal Republic, the assumption in the 1940s and 1950s that the state had to compensate for 
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the Nazi past led the Federal Government and the Länder governments to support cultural 
programs and school access for DPs and some ethnic refugee groups from Eastern Europe. In the 
1960s and 1970s, the invitations extended for migrant labor meant that West Germany was 
responsible for the social care of those workers and their families. The legacy of that 
responsibility and regulations written into the School Laws of the Länder sustained that 
accountability. For other migrant groups like asylum seekers (e.g. children from what is now 
Albania), however, the West German Länder denied any responsibility for their education 
beyond basic integration classes. That approach has persisted, meaning that the German state 
views itself responsible for returning citizens and even European Union Member State nationals, 
but less so for asylum seekers.  
Regardless of disappointing levels of success and only partial implementation, some 
success is still better than none. In the end, it is better to try than to ignore the problems. The 
result of doing nothing is abject failure. A majority of the children in the system may have been 
crushed by it, but some thrived. For some individuals with migrant backgrounds, like German 
Greens politician Cem Özdemir or movie director Fatih Akın, the programs were instrumental. A 
minimum then, of what can be done, is to provide full access to schooling for all children, 
regardless of their legal status in the country or possession of documentation. 
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